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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the question of human freedom through the lens of the revival of 
republican political theory that has taken place in recent decades. In its first part, it 
distinguishes between different strands of that revival and argues that one of these presents a 
variant of human freedom which more adequately captures the human condition than does the 
ideal of freedom traditionally endorsed by liberal thought. It then considers that question of 
freedom in relation to very fundamental questions of power, law, and the reasons for which 
we accept the existence of an organised public power in the first place, arguing that the 
individual finds himself trapped between, on one hand, threats to his freedom which are 
horizontal, emanating from private parties, and those which are vertical, arising from the 
apparatus of public power which exists in order to protect man from man. In part two, one of 
the principal advantages identified for the neo-republican ideal - its aptness for application to 
the freedom of individuals in relation to each other, as well as in relation to the state - is 
explored within the specific contexts of the relationship of husband to wife and that of 
employer to employee. In each case, the relationship between the question of freedom and the 
specific legal rules which determine when and where public power will intervene against or 
on behalf of one party in relation to another, most generally the rules of private property, is 
analysed. It is argued that freedom is primarily a function of the ‘ordinary’ law: that which 
determines one’s rights and duties in relation to others, and which determines the distribution 
of property through taxation and spending. On the basis of this account, a renewed republican 
constitutionalism which focuses upon issues of property within the constitution - as a right 
protected by fundamental rights documents, and as a potentially distorting factor within the 
democratic process - is offered in part three. The normative element of republican 
constitutionalism is not exhausted by the issue of how to organise the organs of the state such 
that the individual is not dominated by the state: issues of private right being a function of 
constitutional processes, the constitution must also ensure that its outputs do not force man to 
live at the mercy of man. 
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“It is sufficiently understood, that the opinion of right to property is of moment in all matters 
of government. A noted author has made property the foundation of all government; and most 
of our political writers seem inclined to follow him in that particular. This is carrying the 
matter too far; but still it must be owned, that the opinion of right to property has a great 
influence in this subject.” 
 
David Hume, Of the First Principles of Government 
 
 
“The limits of political emancipation are evident at once from the fact that the state can free 
itself from a restriction without man being really free from this restriction, that the state can 
be a free state without man being a free man.” 
 
Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question 
 
 
“The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything 
under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every 
point, or rather in every relation from one point to another.  Power is everywhere; not because 
it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.” 
  
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1 
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Introduction - The dual failure of republican constitutionalism 
 
The history of the modern state is a history of expanding functions. Where once the principal 
functions of the political unit were those of preserving internal peace and securing its citizens 
and their property against external threats, over time the state has assumed far greater role. 
The regulation of commerce, the provision of health care and education and the partial 
redistribution of wealth are now commonly undertaken by western liberal democracies, and 
new or renewing states have often signalled an intention of assuming an even broader role in 
protecting the welfare of their citizens. What was once optional tends now towards necessity: 
the exceptional becomes the new normal. The power of the state is great and in many ways 
still growing, exercised via a unique coercive apparatus and legitimated by a democratic 
mandate. The state has time and again demonstrated a willingness to abuse both of these 
assets. Once justified as protector and benefactor, its history shows it to have been as likely to 
destroy and tyrannise.  
  
These abuses of power have not been without consequence and in recent years, the trajectory 
of expansion has encountered resistance. The effects of a global financial crash have 
dovetailed with a still-thriving neo-liberalism and a renewed libertarian trend in politics to 
mean that in much of the world we see the role of the state, already under attack throughout 
the 1980s and 90s, being scaled back. On this basis, the place of the regulatory state of the 
post-war world is no longer secure, while the end of the era of full employment places the 
welfare state under tremendous strain. The proceeds of economic growth find their way into 
the hands of a small sliver of society, a privileged few who have come to resent the cost of 
securing the welfare of the disenfranchised many. The distribution of wealth in the major 
capitalist economies becomes ever more unequal. Gains fought for over many generations are 
undone by the stroke of a pen. The state’s role in the distribution of wealth and the provision 
of services is increasingly threatened, forced to justify itself ever more frequently against 
those who would dismantle it. All the while the state’s destructive capacity is, on the basis of 
transient and ill-defined threats, maintained, honed, and exercised with alarming frequency. 
The shrinking of the state is an asymmetric project. 
 
Against this background, a new political republicanism offers the possibility of erecting 
intellectual defences against the twin threats of totalitarianism on one hand and neo-
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liberalism and libertarianism on the other; promise of succeeding where liberal-legalism has 
largely failed. The reconceptualisation of the idea of freedom as involving not that one not be 
interfered with, but that one not be subject to the arbitrary interference of another, makes a 
vital contribution to understanding what sort of life we can and should desire within a 
progressive political framework. In particular, the neo-republican revival reveals the 
precariousness of human existence, sandwiched as the individual is between dual threats to 
his freedom: that posed by those with whom he shares the world and, on the other hand, that 
which derives from those institutional structures put in place to protect him from those other 
persons, but which themselves harbour the potential to repeat the totalitarian excesses of the 
mid-20
th
 century. Republican freedom is a dualist freedom. 
 
The neo-republican project has thus far failed to fulfil its potential. Its failure is two-fold. The 
first is perhaps best understood as a failure of imagination. Where neo-republicans have 
brought their conceptual apparatus to bear upon legal questions, they have too often claimed 
for their project the identity of a friendly companion to, rather than rival of, those traditions 
based upon a conception of freedom which republicanism rejects. The neo-republican ideal is 
therefore translated into an assessment of constitutional practice which finds the status quo 
largely satisfactory, quibbling only with its theoretical underpinning. Republican 
constitutionalism is too often liberal constitutionalism in a different guise. While this 
continues to be true, the energy which drives it is wasted. 
 
This failure is consequent on a more basic but more important misstep. The neo-republican 
project has neglected the duality from which it begins and which should ground all that 
follows; it has maintained the liberal focus upon threats to freedom which emanate from the 
state and left largely untheorised those which are horizontal - an important consideration in 
the past, and one which re-emerges hand in hand with the rolling back of the state. While the 
threats posed by the state are more obvious and more extreme than are those posed to man by 
his fellow man, the latter are more widespread; where liberalism focuses on (un)freedom at 
the margins, exceptional and intermittent, neo-republicanism must consider that which is 
normalised within the legal system, constituted by (and therefore amenable to dismantling by) 
the ‘ordinary’ private law. An account which accepts this as part of the project of freedom 
returns the freedom-promoting capacity of the state to centre-stage and suggests that it is 
worth defending against the neo-liberal and libertarian desire to dismantle it in the name of 
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freedom. It shows why and how the aim of political freedom common to liberal and 
republican constitutionalism should be augmented by a concern for a fuller, human, freedom 
in whose light that constitutional project must be understood.
1
 
 
The thesis proceeds in the following stages. Chapter 1 explains what I understand to be the 
claims of neo-republicanism and the reasons for their attractiveness. It considers how the 
movement relates to republicanism as a historical phenomenon, and what it offers as a 
normative ideal which is not present in dominant strands of liberal and libertarian thought: a 
vision of freedom which takes public and private equally seriously as potential sources of 
unfreedom. It emphasises the relational nature of neo-republican freedom, distinct from the 
methodological individualism of liberalism, but also from communitarian approaches which 
assume the existence of a distinct and unitary public interest whose promotion is required for 
the achievement of freedom. It argues that the liberal ideal of freedom as non-interference is 
undesirable in that it is reduced to absurdity by the necessity of shared human existence.  
 
Chapter 2 introduces law to the picture, arguing against claims that law necessarily reduces 
freedom and demonstrating how the relationship between law and freedom varies with the 
concept of freedom from which one begins. Neo-republican freedom implies the rejection of 
both the state of nature metaphor as a paradigm of freedom and the absolutism which Hobbes 
accepts in trading liberty for security. Reconceived in republican terms, the move from the 
state of nature into the presence of an unbounded sovereign merely exchanges horizontal for 
vertical unfreedom. The republican ideal, which deprecates both forms of unfreedom, situates 
itself between these extremes. It justifies the very existence of an organised public power - 
the state - and makes it necessary to explain how that power must relate to law if freedom is 
not to be infringed at the formal level: the answer offered involves appropriating the rule of 
law ideal, which itself protects the individual from the arbitrary exercise of power. 
 
Chapter 3 considers two forms of horizontal unfreedom which not only exist in the presence 
of public power but which, like the relationship of slavery which republicanism takes as its 
antithesis, are contingent upon it: that based on gender and that on economic factors. In each 
case, historical manifestations of the relevant form of horizontal unfreedom are reconsidered 
                                                          
1
 References to an opposition between human and political emancipation are influenced, beyond the obvious, by 
the use of the latter term in Alex Gourevitch, Labor and Republican Liberty, (2011) 18 Constellations 431, at 
442. 
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for lessons applicable to the current project. Each acts as a guide to the existence and location 
of horizontal domination in contemporary society. Chapter 4 returns to fundamentals, 
revisiting prominent liberal accounts as to the relationship between, firstly, specific 
distributions of wealth and freedom and, secondly, freedom and private property itself. The 
neo-republican account benefits from the fact that liberal positions on these questions 
collapse into incoherence: the non-interference ideal cannot justify the real-world existence 
and distribution of private property. 
 
Two case studies are offered in chapters 5 and 6, based upon the historical manifestations of 
horizontal domination flagged up in chapter 3. The former considers the relationship between 
husband and wife and the manner in which changes in law which have occurred over time 
have largely undone the historical ability of husbands to domineer over their wives. Chapter 6 
does the same in the context of employer and employee, showing how legal rules determine 
whether an employee is obliged to live at the mercy of his employer. Here, we return to the 
picture our account of property: where the law of divorce permits a radical discontinuity in 
the property background against which husband and wife relate, that of employer and 
employee leaves that background largely intact. To the extent that the background in question 
is constituted by the state and its laws, however, it is right that the law be used so as to 
recalibrate the relationship between employer and employee, such that no relationship of 
domination exists between them. This requires the amendment of the circumstances under 
which and the identities of the parties on whose behalf public power is willing to intervene. 
Its defence of property having put in place the conditions for horizontal domination, the 
conditions of deployment of the state’s coercive apparatus must be calibrated to rebalance 
private relationships. 
  
Our third part considers the implications of horizontal domination for republican 
constitutionalism. Chapter 7 examines the use to which constitutional thinkers have put the 
neo-republican ideal. Two themes are identified: a hesitant relationship with democracy, and 
ambivalence as to the role of rights review of legislation. It suggests that each derives from a 
unthinking inheritance of the liberal presupposition that the most likely relationship of 
domination is vertical, when in fact unfreedom is as likely to be horizontal. Neo-republican 
constitutionalism cannot be satisfied with rules and practices which render free in relation to 
the state, but must demand those which foster horizontal freedom. 
5 
 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 proceed on this basis. The first analyses the right to property as a rights 
whose protections is as likely to impede the spread of freedom as promote it. The second is 
thematically linked, considering the potential of money to subvert the democratic process: 
where republican thought is concerned to establish its own relationship with democracy, we 
can instead assume that its democratic credentials are secure and look at a specific example 
of how the democracy can be improved, in order that the new end identified for the 
republican constitution - that of fostering horizontal freedom - is satisfied. 
 
One theme of this project is the extent of the interrelation between law and freedom, and the 
counter-intuitive location of the most important nodes of interaction. Human freedom is as 
likely to be impacted by quotidian principles of judicial review and family law as it is by the 
grand constitutional questions which have colonised the discourse of freedom in modern 
times. Alongside this, the elucidation of the complex interaction between public and private - 
both threatening freedom but each manipulable by and to a considerable degree underpinned 
by the other - provides us with a second conclusion: that we must be alert to the possibility of 
a feedback loop, whereby private power ‘captures’ public power and uses it for its own 
magnification, which in turn makes it easier for the process to repeat itself in future. This 
process has characterised the distribution of power in the United Kingdom and the United 
States in the years of neo-liberal pre-eminence, and has been both ‘legitimated’ and obscured 
by a rhetoric of freedom which owes much to the liberal conception of freedom against which 
republican thought situates itself.  It suggests how we might begin to redress the imbalances 
of contemporary freedom by taking seriously both public and private power, remaining 
sensitive to their interaction in constituting the situations of unfreedom we encounter all 
around us in the modern world. In all of this, the initial, fateful recognition of private 
property conditions all that follows. Where public power sustains property, we are required to 
intervene elsewhere to prevent this willingness from founding horizontal relationships of 
domination. 
 
This thesis is a work in constitutional theory which displays a greater concern than is normal 
amongst constitutional theorists for what we might call ‘ordinary’ law. The discussion of 
abstract ideas and concepts is intertwined with a concern for their consequences in the field 
of an actually existing legal and constitutional order. This reflects a deeply held belief that 
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constitutional theory, if it is to be worth doing, must say something about real constitutions; 
their strengths and their weaknesses; how they work and how they should work; what they do 
and what they should do. Its argument can be summed up in the twin propositions that the 
average individual’s primary experience of freedom and unfreedom is horizontal in nature 
and contingent upon the ordinary law of private right and obligation, and that the optimal 
organisation of a polity’s constitution can be identified only in light of this fact. 
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Part 1 - Chapter 1: Republicanism and Neo-republicanism 
 
1.1  Republicanism 
 
This chapter examines the literature on republicanism, both as historical phenomenon and in 
the form of the neo-republican project centred on the ideal of non-domination. It aims to 
commandeer it in order to steer a path between visions of law and politics which leave the 
individual exposed to the dominating potential of the state on one hand and, on the other, 
those which, determined to protect the individual from the state, lay her bare to forms of 
economic and social domination which only the state can hope to prevent. The ideal of non-
domination requires us to focus attention in the first place on the most dominated, yet neo-
republicanism has failed to do so. Those who have been and continue to be unfree in our 
society - the poor, certain minorities, women - are potentially the greatest beneficiaries of a 
switch from a liberal to a republican consciousness, but risk being neglected as a 
consequence of republicanism’s unquestioning assumption of certain key liberal 
presuppositions. I aim to maintain these groups as my focus, and so stay true to the 
underlying logic of the neo-republican project.  
 
1.1.1 Belated clarity 
 
Only since the publication of Phillip Pettit’s ‘Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government’ in 1999, has ‘republicanism’ taken on a settled meaning, and even then only in 
a specific context. Prior to this, republicanism was an exceptionally vague term.
1
 The links 
between republicanism as a political theory, the republic as a political system,
2
 and the res 
publica
3
 more generally, creak with the strain that the passage of time has placed upon them. 
The already-difficult question of what thinkers such as Aristotle, Arendt, Harrington, Milton 
                                                          
1
 Hence John Adams’ observation that “There is not a single more unintelligible word in the English language 
than republicanism,” quoted in Linda K. Kerber, The Republican Ideology of the Revolutionary Generation, 
(1985) 37 American Quarterly 474. The observation originates in a letter to the playwright Mercy Otis Warren, 
known as the “Conscience of the American Revolution.” 
2
 Consider the  very different senses in which ‘republican’ is used in the (non-justiciable) clause in Article Four 
of the U.S. Constitution which requires the United States to “guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government” (meaning a form of representative democracy) and in modern debates in the United 
Kingdom and Australia as to the possibility of replacing the Monarch with a non-hereditary head of state. On the 
latter, see, e.g., Wayne Hudson and David Carter (eds.), The Republicanism Debate, New South Wales 
University Press (1993), outlining a debate which lead to a 1999 referendum. The proposal, to replace the Queen 
with a President elected by two-third majorities of a joint session of Parliament, was rejected. 
3
 Literally, the ‘public thing’ or the ‘republic’: traditionally translated into English as the ‘commonwealth’. 
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and Machiavelli have in common is further complicated by the entry into the equation of 
Skinner, Pettit and those who follow. Though Pettit’s ideal of non-domination has in a sense 
usurped older manifestations of republicanism, properly understood it encompasses many of 
their concerns, though in a manner which both avoids the vagueness of older republican 
thought: it permits the articulation of old ideas in terms better suited to the critique of modern 
political orthodoxy. Its analytical tools are ripe for instrumentalisation in a manner which 
those of its predecessors were often not. To see why we must contextualise it within the 
broader tradition. 
 
1.2 Dichotomies of freedom: ancient and modern 
 
Within modern political-legal theory, republicanism defines itself principally in opposition to 
liberalism, from which it is distinguished by the answer it gives to the question of what it 
means for an individual to be free. Answers to this are dominated by two seminal discussions: 
on one hand we have Benjamin Constant’s distinction between the ‘liberty of the ancients’ 
and the ‘liberty of the moderns’ and, on the other, Isaiah Berlin’s division of freedom into its 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ variants.4 Consideration of each illuminates the distinctive nature of 
the eventual republican alternative.  
 
In modern times,
5
 Constant told us, freedom is understood to encompass a variety of rights, 
including:  
 
“the right to be subjected only to the laws, and to be neither arrested, detained, 
put to death or maltreated in any way by the arbitrary will of one or more 
individuals. It is the right of everyone to express their opinion, choose a 
profession and practise it, to dispose of property, and even to abuse it; to come 
and go without permission, and without having to account for their motives or 
undertakings.”6  
                                                          
4
 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Liberty, Oxford University Press (2002); Benjamin Constant, The 
Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, in Biancamaria Fontana (ed.) Constant: Political 
Writings, Cambridge University Press (1988).  
5
 Modernity is relative - Constant delivered his lecture to the Aténée Royale in 1819. 
6
 Constant, note 4, at 310-11. Constant’s was not the first attempt at unravelling these issues: Four others - Jean 
Lousie de Lolme, Joseph Priestly, Geramine de Staël and Jean Charles Simonde de Sismondi - had considered 
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These various instantiations of modern liberty are linked by their individual focus, marking 
off areas of life in which to interfere with a person is to render her unfree. Interference with 
certain rights is a breach of freedom per se (so that, for example, any attempt to stop a person 
choosing a profession is incompatible with his freedom) whereas the limitations put in place 
by the criminal justice system are similarly incompatible only if exercised, not according to 
law, but at the mere will of some other persons. This distinction between mere interference 
and interference which is arbitrary or capricious will later prove vital to the case for 
republican freedom.  
 
In contrast to the individualism of ‘modern’ liberty, that of ‘the ancients’ “consisted in 
exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of the complete sovereignty; in deliberating, 
in the public square, over war and peace… in examining the accounts, the acts, the 
stewardship of the magistrates; in calling them to appear in front of the assembled people, in 
accusing, condemning or absolving them.”7 The ancients (Constant refers to Sparta and Rome, 
noting that Athens was the most ‘modern’ of ancient republics) did not consider it possible to 
exercise freedom individually, for freedom comprised the communal exercise of powers 
belonging to the people as a whole. This was more than mere solidarity: the “complete 
subjection of the individual to the authority of the community” was compatible with this 
‘ancient’ freedom.8 The individual enjoyed no rights or freedoms qua individual and was at 
the mercy of the collective action of his peers.  
 
1.2.1 Exercise and opportunity concepts 
 
What Constant describes does not include mere unconsummated potential. In modern times, 
one’s freedom to dispose of one’s property includes the possibility of not doing so: the actual 
disposal is irrelevant to freedom. ‘Ancient’ freedom, however, holds the fact of having the 
option to deliberate matters of state insufficient. One is free only insofar as one participates.
9
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the contrast between ancient and modern liberty. See Guy Howard Dodge, Benjamin Constant's Philosophy of 
Liberalism, University of North Carolina Press (1980), at 43-5. 
7
 Constant, note 4, at 311. 
8
 Constant, note 4, at 311.  
9
 The obvious modern reference point is Rousseau, in particular his insistence that freedom is achieved through 
participation in a process of collective self-determination. Constant acknowledges this, but regards Rousseau’s 
insistence on ancient liberty in a very different context to be a deadly error: “[B]y transposing into our modern 
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The distinction is between ‘exercise-concepts’ and ‘opportunity-concepts’ of freedom 10  - 
does one have to act in a certain way in order to be free? If so, we have an ‘exercise’ concept. 
If not, if freedom is understood merely in terms of how one might potentially act, separately 
from whether or not one acts at all, then it is an ’opportunity-concept’ and “being free is a 
matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to 
exercise these options.”11  
 
This distinction matters, for the assumption that the ‘liberty of the ancients’ can only sensibly 
be considered an exercise-concept - that if being free means acting in consort with one’s 
fellow man, a failure to act renders unfree - has seen it subjected to damaging criticism. Not 
all of its cognates are so conceived: Hannah Arendt follows Aristotle in emphasising the 
centrality of the interactive dimension of human existence, but nevertheless prizes the 
possibility of not participating: 
 
“Not everyone wants to or has to concern himself with public affairs. In this 
fashion a self-selective process is possible that would draw together a true 
political elite in a country. Anyone who is not interested in public affairs will 
simply have to be satisfied with their being decided without him. But each 
person must be given the opportunity.”12 
 
With this simple amendment, the liberty of the ancients shows itself capable of 
accommodating the individual autonomy which Constant’s view might be considered to deny, 
without immediately lapsing into the sort of selfish individualism encouraged by perspectives 
which make room only for the individual, and which consequently deprecate the phenomenon 
of collective social enterprise. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
age an extent of social power, of collective sovereignty, which belonged to other centuries, this sublime genius, 
animated by the purest love of liberty, has nevertheless furnished deadly pretexts for more than one kind of 
tyranny.” Constant, note 4, at  318. 
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 Charles Taylor, What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty, in Alan Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom, Oxford 
University Press (1979), at 213. 
11
 Taylor, note 10, at 213. 
12
 Hannah Arendt, Thoughts on Politics and Revolution, in her Crises of the Republic, Harcourt (1972), at 233. 
See also Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin (1990), at 279-80. 
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1.2.2 The triumph of modern liberty 
 
For Constant, the triumph of modern liberty was based on practicality rather than principle, 
resulting from the changed nature of the modern state as compared to the ancient city-states. 
The increased size of the political unit “causes a corresponding decrease of the political 
importance allotted to each individual” - he sees his opportunities to contribute and the 
relative weight of his contributions diminished while the abolition of slavery means that there 
is no longer a free population which enjoys “the leisure which resulted from the fact that 
slaves took care of most of the work.”13 That the political units of the past often required the 
systematic exclusion of certain groups in order to function effectively is a recurring theme in 
discussions of freedom, to which those arguing for the superiority of some past model of 
communal life must be alert. Constant addresses it only as a practical issue. Similarly, the 
problem of what we might call the ‘large republic’ does not alter the essence of freedom, but 
provides a pragmatic, non-exclusionary, reason for preferring a variant better suited to 
modern existence.
14
 The change is therefore amenable to reversal if pragmatic considerations 
once again render preferable collective action over individualism. 
 
1.2.3 Commerce and freedom 
 
The size of the political unit was not the decisive factor. More importantly, modern society is 
organised around commerce rather than warfare and the former, unlike the latter, does not 
“leave in men's lives intervals of inactivity.” Instead, it “inspires in men a vivid love of 
individual independence and “supplies their needs, satisfies their desires, without the 
intervention of the authorities.”15 In a commercial society, the intervention of the state is not 
merely futile - it is always, Constant assures us unconvincingly, “a trouble and an 
embarrassment.”16 The growth of commerce has usurped many of the functions of the state 
and in doing so contributed to the individualisation of liberty. No longer is active political 
                                                          
13
 Constant, note 4, at 314. 
14
 For divergent opinions on the relative virtues of large and small republics, see Montesquieu, The Spirit of the 
Laws, in Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone (eds.) Montesquieu: The Spirit of the 
Laws, Cambridge University Press (1989), at 124, and 131-2 and James Madison, Federalist no. 10, in James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Penguin (1987). Madison rejects 
Montesquieu’s conclusion as to the impossibility of a large republic on the basis of a distinction between a 
(direct) democracy and a republic (which is indirectly democratic) (at 126-7). 
15
 Constant, note 4, at 315. 
16
 Constant, note 4, at 315. 
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association a necessary condition of human freedom. This theme has a particular resonance in 
the history of republican thought, and attempts to understand and control the changes taking 
place in society as a result of the growth of commerce form an important part of the modern 
republican project.
17
 While only tenuously republican, much of the work associated with the 
Scottish Enlightenment speaks to this question.
18
 Constant’s observations are questionable - 
does commerce really teach men to love independence, or merely to love money and to 
believe that where the state does not interfere, profit is more likely? - yet in its generality, his 
claim that commerce is less compatible, if not quite incompatible, with old ideas and 
practices of political participation contains a kernel of self-evident truth.
19
  
 
Its replacement is not without cost: the danger of modern liberty is that “absorbed in the 
enjoyment of our private independence, and in the pursuit of our particular interests, we 
should surrender our right to share in political power too easily.” 20  Compared to more 
profitable activities, the pursuit of political power may have lost some of its allure, but its 
importance remains. The solution to the problems associated with each variant, Constant 
advises, is to learn the lessons of freedom both ancient and modern, and “combine the two 
together,” mixing public and private in a way which allows for the enjoyment of private 
liberty yet nurtures a desire to discharge public functions.
21
 Ancient liberty and modern 
liberty; public activity and private activity - in neither case does one alone suffice. 
Notwithstanding the damage they can do to a well-rounded view of human freedom, it seems 
the attractions of commerce were not as easily resisted as Constant hoped. Or, rather, that 
                                                          
17
 E.g., J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century, (1972) 3 The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 119. The essay is a review of two contributions to a strand of American historiography 
which had shown that “the Revolution employed - and in some measure was occasioned by - an oppositional 
ideology that had been nurtured in British politics for nearly a century” which “belonged to a tradition of 
classical republicanism and civic humanism” (at 119-20). This ideology, like the liberty of the ancients, was 
argued to have been rendered obsolete by commerce. 
18
 See, for example, chapters 3 and 4 of book 4 of John Millar’s An Historical View of English Government, 
discussed in Adam Tomkins, On Republican Constitutionalism in the Age of Commerce: Reflections from the 
Scottish Enlightenment, in Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí (eds.), Legal Republicanism: National and 
International Perspectives, Oxford University Press (2009).  
19
 See also Polanyi: “Neither freedom nor peace could be institutionalized under [19th century market economy], 
since its purpose was to create purpose and welfare, not peace and freedom,” and so the death of the market 
economy could see “regulation and control” used to “achieve not only freedom for the few, but for all.” Karl 
Polanyi. The Great Transformation, (2
nd
 ed.) Beacon Press (2001), at 255-6. This is part of a narrative which 
rejects the claim to spontaneity made on behalf of liberal laissez-faire as a method of economic organisation: 
“laissez-faire was planned” (at 141). 
20
 Constant, note 4, at 326. 
21
 Constant, note 4, at 328. 
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they have been resisted only to the extent that political activity is the handmaiden of 
commerce; that control of political power potentially facilitates private profit. 
 
1.3 Dichotomies of freedom: positive and negative 
 
Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty,”22 presents itself as an attempt at clarifying a concept 
which threatens to descend into meaninglessness, ‘liberty’ being a “term whose meaning is so 
porous that there is little interpretation it seems able to resist.”23 Berlin defines the ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ variants in terms of the question to which each provides an answer.24 Negative 
liberty tells us “[w]hat is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons - is 
or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other 
persons?”25 while positive liberty helps to ascertain “[w]hat, or who, is the source of control 
or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?”26 As defined 
here the variants are not mutually exclusive: one might be negatively free insofar as not 
interfered with in a certain metaphorical space, yet also positively free in that space because 
responsible for his own choices and actions. It is therefore a mistake to believe that one must 
choose one variant to the exclusion of the other, and yet Berlin’s essay has given rise to an 
unnecessary dichotomy, according to which one can either be positively free or negatively 
free, but never both. Better, perhaps, to regard the relationship as one of priority: one can 
enjoy freedom in both forms simultaneously, but one of the two is more desirable than the 
other. 
 
1.3.1 Negative liberty 
 
Negative liberty is achieved through the absence of interference. It is: 
 
                                                          
22
 Berlin, note 4. 
23
 Berlin, note 4, at 168. 
24
 Neither variant is monolithic; rather, they are ‘families’ of conceptions, which vary in their details. In this 
metaphor, Berlin’s articulations are merely the patres familias, albeit rather domineering ones. See Taylor, note 
10, at 211. 
25
 Berlin, note 4, at 169. 
26
 Berlin, note 4, at 169. 
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“the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented 
by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree.”27  
 
Freedom is the absence of interference; unfreedom its presence. Between exercise and 
opportunity concepts, Berlin’s negative freedom is the latter, in that the absence of obstacles 
to a specific course of action is decisive, rather than the question of whether or not it is 
pursued. We noted that in Constant’s ‘modern’ liberty, one can identify a distinction between 
limitations which reduce freedom per se, and those which reduce freedom only when 
implemented or enforced on an arbitrary basis. No such distinction is made here: whether 
sensible and reasoned, or vindictive and capricious, any rule or action which prevents a man 
from doing what he desires reduces his freedom. This is a stark definition, and its inflexibility 
has poisoned the legacy of negative liberty, for it renders impossible ‘freedom’ in the sense 
described. Such practical impossibility would seem a large price to pay, even for the alluring 
simplicity of Berlin’s negative liberty.  
 
1.3.2 Positive liberty 
 
Positive liberty relates to the human desire for autonomy - to make choices for oneself, and 
not have one’s actions determined by outside forces:  
 
“I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active 
being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by 
reference to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe 
this to be true and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that it is 
not.”28  
 
This is partly analogous to the self-government of the ancients, in that it concerns the source 
of rules and controls, but is distinct in the same way that the freedom of the ancients is 
distinct from that of the moderns: namely, the freedom of the ancients considers that rules 
will be set collectively, while modern liberty shares with positive liberty an individual focus. 
The imperative for mere autonomy, not further qualified, might conceivably be satisfied by 
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 Berlin, note 4, at 169. 
28
 Berlin, note 4, at 178. 
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collective self-control (as in the democratic city-states which Constant associates with ancient 
freedom), but if the imperative is to be satisfied at the individual level, collective self-
government is not the solution: it may be a lesser form of autonomy from the point of view of 
the individual in that it calls for compromise and sacrifice that may not be acceptable where 
his own interests are paramount. It is also, simultaneously and paradoxically, a more-
demanding standard: it implies not merely positive liberty for me, but also for those with 
whom I share that autonomy. It therefore suggests that I have as much reason to want others 
to have a self-directed life as I do myself. This implication is absent in Berlin’s positive 
liberty, the individualism of which distances it significantly in practical terms from the 
freedom of the ancients. Where Constant’s notion of what freedom meant to ‘the ancients’ is 
defined such that one must participate in order to be free, Berlin’s positive freedom makes no 
such demand - the individual can be positively free without doing anything. There is no 
requirement that subjective feelings of autonomy are objectively justifiable: a naïve or plain 
wrong assessment of the degree to which one is positively free would seem irrelevant to the 
status of that freedom. A government might satisfy its requirement not by leaving its citizens 
the possibility of controlling their own lives, but merely by repeatedly informing them that 
they do so. 
 
1.3.3 The triumph of negative liberty 
 
Berlin is not blind to this fact, and puts it at the centre of his rejection of positive liberty. He 
notes in particular the abuse carried out by totalitarian States and those others who substitute 
“the individual with his actual wishes, and needs” for “the ‘real’ man within, identified with 
the pursuit of some ideal purpose not dreamed of by his empirical self,” 29  - swapping 
subjective autonomy for some supposedly objective autonomy alien to the individual. He 
therefore rejects notions of the greater good, the general will or the inevitable march of 
history.
30
 Negative liberty - unable to collude in the false teleology of its positive variant - is 
identified as more suitable for the modern world, the value pluralism which it promotes 
rendering it a “truer and more human ideal.”31  This endorsement has contributed to the 
process whereby negative liberty has come to be seen as the ‘true’ version, lending its 
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 Berlin, note 4, at 181. 
30
 For a general critique of which, focusing on Plato, Hegel and Marx and, like Berlin, linking historicism with 
tyranny, see generally Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Routledge (2011). 
31
 Berlin, note 4, at 216. 
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simplicity and rhetorical vigour to large swathes of the political landscape. Freedom begins 
where interference ends. 
 
1.3.4 The politics of negative liberty 
 
As Berlin notes, however, negative liberty works only to prevent actual interference with the 
individual’s interests. It is entirely compatible with a situation where a party has the 
opportunity to interfere but for some contingent reason does not. The slave with a benevolent 
master is as free as any man. Nor is any distinction made between liberty which is secure - 
where interference is impossible or highly unlikely - and that which is precarious, liable to 
wax and wane with the whims of the powerful, towards whom the weak must therefore act 
with a certain obsequiousness. Both aspects suggest that such a reductive concept of liberty 
lacks the normative ‘bite’ that would allow progressive critique of situations where complex 
power networks exist, yet for contingent reasons do not give rise to tangible interference. 
Negative freedom may allow for multiple and incompatible values to subsist, but beyond that 
openness to pluralism, we begin to see why its achievement may not be of decisive value.  
 
Equally, Berlin happily admits that “Liberty in this sense is not incompatible with some kinds 
of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government,” being “principally 
concerned with the area of control, not with its source.”32 By endorsing negative liberty over 
its positive variant rather than some combination of the two - which would not necessarily be 
logically problematic - Berlin writes the democratic imperative out of his account. Self-
government may have an instrumental value in that it “may, on the whole, provide a better 
guarantee of the preservation of civil liberties than other regimes” but “there is no necessary 
connection between individual liberty and democratic rule.”33 Although the weaknesses of 
understanding freedom in this way are several, and its lessons for the reality we inhabit 
dubious, “most [liberals] unite in endorsing the modernist conception of liberty.”34 The long 
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is the endorsement of the negative variant. In particular, the idea of individual identity as constituted by social 
order is deeply problematic, for “it seems to rule out the possibility of an individual standing back from that 
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shadow cast over positive liberty by totalitarianism, as well as the underlying individualist 
bent of modern liberalism, has ensured the triumph of the only alternative Berlin considers. 
Where Constant took the middle ground, attempting to preserve what was good in both 
traditions, modern debate is often characterised by this conceptual absolutism. 
 
1.3.5 Theorists of liberal freedom 
 
The variants Berlin describes are in certain ways caricatures of positions to which few 
subscribe. Notwithstanding the impression he gives, positive liberty,  
 
“has no necessary connection with the view that freedom consists purely and 
simply in the collective control over the common life, or that there is no 
freedom worth the name outside a context of collective control”35  
 
Analyses which reject it on these grounds are therefore overly hasty, but such a 
characterisation nonetheless retains a utility as an ‘ideal type’ among a family of positive 
conceptions. On the other hand, however, the “corresponding caricatural version of negative 
liberty” has found influential adherents.36 “Liberty, or freedom,” Hobbes insists, “signifieth 
properly the absence of opposition (by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion)… 
For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which 
space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go 
further.”37 The emphasis on the external nature of those impediments is important, for “when 
the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say it wants 
the liberty, but the power, to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed 
by sickness.”38 Neither fear nor necessity vitiates freedom and thus a man who throws his 
goods overboard to save his ship and his life does so both willingly and freely, in Hobbes’ 
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 Taylor, note 10, at 212. 
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 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in Richard Tuck (ed.) Hobbes: Leviathan, Cambridge University Press (2
nd
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telling.
39
 Though this exclusion of internal factors “rules out of court one of the most 
powerful motives behind the modern defence of freedom as individual independence, viz., 
the post-Romantic idea that each person’s form of self-realization is original to him/her, and 
can therefore only be worked out independently,”40 it avoids the problem of having to rank 
motives - to distinguish between a subject’s ‘true’ desires, and those which distract from or 
frustrate those desires.
41
 It is this unwillingness to venture into the ranking of motives, 
Charles Taylor has suggested, which leads political philosophers to stick to the ‘Maginot line’ 
of strict negative liberty, even at the risk of neglecting self-realisation as a human ideal.
42
 
Negative liberty need not necessarily be as stark as Hobbes painted it, but such starkness is 
preferred, for the gains made in sacrificing it are outweighed by the complications 
introduced.
43
  
 
Bentham also endorses a definition of liberty that the caricaturist would struggle to better:  
 
“Liberty… is neither more nor less than the absence of coercion. This is the 
genuine, original and proper sense of the word liberty. The idea of it is an idea 
purely negative. It is not anything that is produced by positive Law. It exists 
without Law, and not by means of Law.”44  
 
The language of coercion here replaces Hobbes’ focus on opposition (and will itself later be 
sidelined by ‘obstruction’ in Berlin). 45   Whatever the phenomenon in question, its 
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relationship to freedom unchanging: freedom exists in its absence. The definition also betrays 
those links which exist between the question of what it means to be free and how law relates 
to freedom, which speaks to the very possibility of freedom in contemporary society. This is 
the basis of Polanyi’s critique of the liberal ideal of freedom in what he describes as a 
‘complex’ society: 
 
“liberal philosophy… claims that power and compulsion are evil, that freedom 
demands their absence from a human community. No such thing is possible... 
This leaves no alternative but either to remain faithful to an illusionary idea of 
freedom and deny the reality of society, or to accept that reality and reject the 
idea of freedom. The first is the liberal's conclusion; the latter the fascist's.”46 
 
Those who adopt Berlin’s preferred understanding of freedom - ‘liberal freedom’ 47  - 
necessarily see interference as inherently reductive of liberty and so encounter the difficulty 
Polanyi describes. As it is neither practicable nor desirable to live in a society in which no-
one is prevented from doing whatsoever he pleases, the individual must be and will be 
interfered with to some extent: one need not be a particularly acute observer of human 
psychology to know that individual drives often conflict with harmonious social existence.
48
 
It is therefore submitted that such a perspective on the law/freedom relationship profoundly 
misunderstands the nature and cause of impediments to human liberty in the world, and the 
relationship of law to freedom, both in general and with regards to its role in erecting or 
buffering those impediments. Of course, if freedom is defined in some other way the 
obligation to take one or the other of the paths Polanyi identifies - to choose between freedom 
and the reality of social existence - does not arise. 
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1.4 Republican freedom 
 
The most effective response to Berlin’s dichotomy has been to attempt to destabilise the 
categories themselves, demonstrating that his conceptual boxes cannot contain, neither 
logically nor historically, all that has been and might still be called ‘liberty’.49 Amongst these, 
republican political theory provides a profound and ultimately quite radical alternative 
understanding of freedom, requiring those who accept it to rethink the position of the 
individual within society, and providing the basis for a wide-ranging critique of liberal 
institutions. Republican freedom is, according to this counter-narrative, that version which 
was celebrated by Cicero in particular, endorsed in Roman legal thought and central to the 
classical republicanism rescued by Machiavelli,
50
 and the 17
th
 century English republicans 
who followed him. Its historical manifestations have been described by J.A.G Pocock
51
 and 
Quentin Skinner, and in the work of Philip Pettit
52
 and others it has become once more a 
living theory which competes with the dominant liberal perspective. Though in many ways 
historical (descriptive) republicanism and (normative) neo-republicanism are parallel projects 
(with the work of the most prominent exponents - Skinner and Pettit respectively - closely 
aligned), it is useful to treat them separately in acknowledgement of their different, albeit 
overlapping, aims. 
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1.4.1 Republican historiography 
 
Quentin Skinner has traced the history of neo-Roman, or republican, liberty: its classical 
roots, its revival in the early modern period, and its eventual eclipse by the idea of liberal 
freedom.
53
 As Skinner tells it, the republican ideal of freedom can be divided into two parts. 
Firstly, a theory of human freedom is tied up in a parallel theory of free-states, such that “any 
understanding of what it means for an individual citizen to possess or lose their liberty must 
be embedded within an account of what it means for a civil association to be free.”54 And, 
secondly, “what it means for an individual person to suffer a loss of liberty is for that person 
to be made a slave.”55 Slavery is a condition determined by both horizontal and vertical 
factors: how one relates to others and how one stands in relation to the state. The two facets 
are necessarily intertwined. 
 
1.4.2 The theory of free states 
 
The ‘theory of free states’ demands that “if a state or commonwealth is to count as free, the 
laws that govern it - the rules that regulate its bodily movements - must be enacted with the 
consent of all its citizens, the members of the body politic as a whole,”56 and “the government 
of a free state should ideally be such as to enable each individual citizen to exercise an equal 
right of participation in the making of laws.”57 This depiction incorporates a democratic 
imperative whose absence in the area of liberal freedom has been noted, though one that falls 
short of direct democracy. One who does not live in a free state - who has no opportunity to 
consent to the laws, nor any possibility of participating in their making - cannot be free. This 
is not liberal unfreedom: the citizen of an unfree state will not inevitably find his interests 
subject to state interference. Instead, the fact that the laws are made and public power is 
exercised without his consent means that he is constantly exposed to the possibility of 
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interference. Unlike in the case of liberal freedom, “it is never necessary to suffer… overt 
coercion in order to forfeit your civil liberty.”58 In direct contrast to the liberal conception, 
the effect of this republican perspective is that an individual can lose his freedom simply by 
being in a state of dependence: by being “open to danger of being forcibly or coercively 
deprived by the government of [his] life, liberty or estates.”59 Perhaps the clearest statement 
of this viewpoint comes from Algernon Sidney, who states that: 
  
“As liberty consists only in being subject to no man’s will, and nothing 
denotes a slave but a dependence on the will of another; if there be no other 
law in the kingdom than the will of a prince, there is no such thing as 
liberty.”60 
 
From the marriage of the theories of free individuals and of free states results the proposition 
that “if you live under any form of government that allows for the exercise of prerogative or 
discretionary powers outside the law, you will already be living as a slave.”61 The debilitating 
effect of unconsummated potential for interference is recognised where Berlin makes no 
mention of it. This idea of freedom remains, however, wedded to the presumption that it is 
the state which renders unfree. To use the rhetoric of the master and slave (a private 
relationship, largely separate in its immediate functioning from the state apparatus) but miss 
the point that private actors can themselves be the source of constraints on freedom is 
disappointing. The entry into the republican discourse of the language of slavery and freedom 
where the dominating party is the state should stand alongside, not displace, the relationships 
which the vocabulary was initially used to describe. 
 
1.4.3 The republican eclipse 
 
Republican freedom, Skinner tells us, came under attack by Hobbes and the liberal thinkers 
who followed him, and eventually “the ideological triumph of liberalism left the neo-roman 
theory largely discredited.”62 This was achieved in part through the introduction of the state 
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of nature, an idea central to much post-Hobbes political thinking but “wholly foreign to the 
Roman and Renaissance texts,”63 which treats the existence of an organised public power as 
depriving individuals of the freedom which exits in its absence. Elsewhere, Skinner has 
traced the triumph liberal freedom within the microcosm of Hobbes’s own writings, 
demonstrating that where he had previously “defined liberty … as the absence of 
impediments to motion”, in his Leviathan “the concept of an arbitrary impediment is silently 
dropped. The only impediments that take away liberty are now said to be those which have 
the effect of leaving a body physically disempowered.”64 This makes Hobbes the first thinker 
to contradict the republican theorists “by proffering an alternative definition in which the 
presence of freedom is construed entirely as absence of impediments rather than the absence 
of dependence”65 The narrative is compelling: the more subtle and nuanced understanding 
(by implication, the ‘truer’ one) was pushed aside by the Hobbesian attack, such that the neo-
Roman vision of freedom was almost entirely forgotten. With the excavation and 
reconstruction of republican freedom, Skinner suggests, we can understand the ways in which 
the liberal understanding of freedom misleads. The absolutism of Hobbes, remnants of which 
linger in Berlin’s acknowledgement of the contingency of democracy, would be thus 
overcome.
66
 
 
1.4.4 The first republican revival  
 
Skinner’s work was not alone in attempting to induce a republican revival. It appeared in the 
wake of scholarship that was ‘republican’ in character without stressing the link between 
free-states and free-people but without positing the differing conceptions of freedom as the 
axis along which the separate paradigms distinguish themselves. Bernard Bailyn’s ‘The 
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Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,’67 Gordon S. Wood's ‘The Creation of the 
American Republic,
68
 and J.G.A. Pocock’s ‘The Machiavellian Moment’69 all highlight the 
influence of certain republican concerns across time and space without taking the reductive 
path which is a compelling feature of Skinner’s republicanism.70 These works contributed to 
a reappraisal of the dominant ideals in early American history, displacing a complacent 
account of wide acceptance of Lockean themes: “The Beardian paradigm organized 
American history around a restless sea of conflicting material interests; the Hartzian around a 
stable liberal consensus; the republican around the importance of liberalism's precedents and 
rivals.”71 They inspired the hunt for republican ideas throughout history, and the mapping of 
these themes onto extant criticisms of liberal thought came to play an important role in legal 
scholarship. Where the neo-republican revival intertwines history and theory, here the 
relationship is sequential: the historical precedes the theoretical, which draws and expands 
upon it in specific contexts. This might be said to reflect the length of the shadow cast over 
American politics by the founding: he who proffers a new account of that period puts up for 
grabs all that follows. A number of attempts were made to employ republican themes to 
construct a viable alternative to the dominant liberal individualism: Michael Sandel,
72
 Charles 
Taylor
73 and others “attacked liberalism’s atomic individualism and bureaucratic 
proceduralism and argued instead for a community politics of participatory democracy built 
around a commitment to the common good,”74 rejecting the neutrality of the state with regard 
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to the good insisted on by liberals such as Rawls.
75
 This movement, lasting roughly from the 
1960s until the early-1990s, might be grouped together as the first republican revival, to 
distinguish it from the second, qualitatively different, revival led by Skinner and Pettit. 
Though the themes of the first republican revival were many, an early summary remains 
useful: “Republicanism meant maintaining public and private virtue, internal unity, social 
solidarity, and it meant constantly struggling against ‘threats’ to the ‘republican character’ of 
the nation.”76  
 
1.4.5 Vagueness and communitarianism 
 
There are significant difficulties associated with the themes of this first republican revival. 
For example, a prominent characteristic of republican thought as understood by its 
proponents in the period in question is the heavy emphasis on poorly defined intangibles.
77
 
Virtue, courage, character - all have been the focus of republican works, yet are of dubious 
utility to the task of analysing specific political formation and actually existing institutions.
78
 
Further, and relatedly, much scholarship associated with this research programme was 
characterised by its communitarian emphasis: “Among the signal themes in this alternative 
way of thinking are the dependence of the individual on the community for his or her identity 
and values, the virtues required of individuals for a community and polity to flourish, and the 
equation of individual freedom… with active participation in the process of collective will 
formation.”79  
 
Communitarianism can be understood by comparison with the claim - associated with 
Rawlsian liberalism - that society should not be founded on any particular conception of the 
good and so the role of the state is merely to secure the ‘right’. Each individual “has his or 
her conception of a good or worthwhile life” and “[t]he function of society ought to be to 
facilitate these life plans, as much as possible, and following some principle of equality.”80 
Rawls employs a ‘thin’ conception of the good, “restricted to the bare essentials,” in arguing 
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for the principles of justice, to which he opposes a separate ‘full’ theory of the good, which 
“takes principles of justice as already secured, and then uses these principles in defining the 
other moral concepts in which the notions of goodness are involved.”81 In a well-ordered 
society, “citizens hold the same principles of right” but “individuals find their good in 
different ways, and many things may be good for one person that would not be good for 
another,”82 goodness having no necessary moral content.83 
 
Within the liberal worldview there is therefore no room for a unitary socially-endorsed 
conception of the ‘good life’. Against this, communitarianism posits (on one account) that 
political institution are not merely a means of guaranteeing to the individual the space in 
which to pursue his conception of the good, but are instead “a common bulwark of citizen 
dignity,” 84  and so the ‘republic’ must be “animated by a sense of a shared immediate 
common good.”85 Communitarianism has an existence independent of republicanism, but 
insofar as it is a variant of the latter, it is described as neo-Athenian, an acknowledgement 
that its influences are to be found elsewhere in the ancient world from those of neo-Roman 
freedom. Yet communitarianism, a version of positive freedom, carries with it the attendant 
problems, particularly an uneasy relationship with value pluralism: Berlin’s reasons for 
rejecting positive freedom - the danger of switching “the individual with his actual wishes” 
for “the ‘real’ man within,”86 give reason to hesitate in suggesting that there is, or should be, 
a single understanding of the good. To the extent that it is communitarian republicanism is 
more valuable as a critique of the shortcomings of modern liberalism and the associated 
selfish individualism than as an alternative to them.  Republican pluralists can endorse the 
claim that main achievement of the work of Philip Pettit on republicanism was “to save the 
tradition from the communitarians.”87  
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1.4.6 Normative and descriptive communitarianism 
 
The foregoing account is a suitable response to the communitarian tendency in republicanism 
only if that communitarianism is understood as a normative phenomenon. Alternatively, a 
descriptive communitarianism might take two forms. The first involves the claim that 
individuals are necessarily in part constituted by their community. Such a claim is only 
weakly communitarian - it need make no explicit reference to the features of the community 
asan entity, nor any shared commitment of its members; merely that being within one 
community rather than another is part of what constitutes an individual as the person that he 
or she is.
88
 It is best understood as a corrective to abstract individualism, which purports to 
make sense of an individual’s being without reference to the temporal and geographical 
circumstances in which that individual is embedded. A second form of descriptive 
communitarianism is more closely related to its normative incarnation, involving the claim 
that there is necessarily, at the heart of every political community some form of shared value. 
Said value need not be a conception of the good: it might be a shared belonging to a national 
group, in which case theories of nationalism are communitarian,
89
 or the shared background 
conditions which make possible communication.
90
 In seeking to describe the functioning of 
communities and the extent to which the individual is constituted by membership of them, a 
descriptive communitarianism desires to comprehend the relationship between individual and 
community, rather than subordinating the former to the latter. It does not challenge neo-
republicanism’s anti-communitarian bent. 
 
1.4.7 The collapse of the first republican revival 
 
These are not the only reasons for which the second republican revival has been successful in 
supplanting the first: both Pocock’s book and the other key texts of the first republican 
revival were “difficult to the verge of unreadability, highly intellectualistic, and in many 
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respects as consensual as the consensus history they were designed to supplant.”91 Those who 
followed had considerable scope to adapt the revived republicanism for their own purposes, 
and so the first revival inaugurated proved unsustainable, being so multi-faceted as to 
undermine its coherence. It was:  
 
“swept up as short-hand for everything liberalism was not: commitment to an 
active civic life (contra liberalism's obsession with immunities and rights), to 
explicit value commitments and deliberative justice (as opposed to liberalism's 
procedural neutrality), to public, common purposes (contra liberalism's 
inability to imagine politics as anything other than interest group pluralism)”92  
 
The claim that “employed for too many ends and distended too far, [republicanism] ran the 
danger of explaining everything”93 is undoubtedly true, but one is struck also by the fleeting 
nature of many thinkers’ engagement with the first revival; the wide spread of republican 
influence correlated with a shallow penetration of its ideals.
 94
 It is perhaps not surprising that 
Skinner’s work was so successful in directing the focus of republican scholarship onto 
questions of freedom and domination: any sort of focus at all was liable to supplant the 
confused and confusing morass of ideas that republicanism had become.  
 
1.5 Pettit’s neo-republicanism 
 
Alongside Skinner’s historical work, that of Philip Pettit offers a systematised theory of 
freedom as non-domination, commending it simultaneously for its historical provenance and 
its inherent virtue.
95
 Not only is the ideal of non-domination a distinctive interpretation of 
what it means to be free, but for Pettit it has a strong claim to be the only value underlying 
our political institutions.
96
 The two are mutually independent: the political theory of neo-
republicanism stands apart from the republican historiography and must be judged on its own 
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merits. It is in Pettit’s work that republican thought achieves sufficient coherence to 
overcome the fragmentation of previous attempts to revive it and takes on what has become 
its predominant form. 
 
1.5.1 From interference to domination 
 
The central fact of the conception of freedom promoted by Pettit is its substitution, for the 
usual concern with interference, of what he describes as ‘domination’, so that instead of 
‘freedom as non-interference,’ we deal with ‘freedom as non-domination,’ where domination 
arises from the ability of one party to interfere arbitrarily - rather than to merely interfere - 
with the interests of another.
97
 This has two important consequences. On the one hand, 
interference does not render the subject unfree when executed on a non-arbitrary basis; on the 
other, where the subject is open to interference on an arbitrary basis, this potential renders her 
unfree, even if not realised in practice. The distinction between interference and domination 
allows for the possibility that an act of interference, far from being freedom-reducing, will 
reduce domination and so increase freedom.  The second point - that domination without 
interference reduces freedom - distinguishes the republican treatment of the slave with the 
benevolent master from that of liberal freedom, which considers that slave free until such 
time as the master in fact interferes with his interests.
98
 Domination without interference and 
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interference without domination; from these two simple points of divergence between 
republican and liberal freedom follow the radical consequences of republicanism.
99
  
 
Focusing, like Skinner, on the master-slave relationship as the paradigm of the dominating 
relationship, Pettit tells us that what such a relationship means in practice is that “the 
dominating party can interfere on an arbitrary basis with the choices of the dominated: can 
interfere, in particular, on the basis of an interest or an opinion that need not be shared by the 
person affected.”100 The issue of what constitutes arbitrariness becomes paramount, and Pettit 
defines it in distinctively: 
 
“An act is perpetrated on an arbitrary basis, we can say, if it is subject just to 
the arbitrium, the decision or judgement, of the agent; the agent was in a 
position to choose it or not choose it, at their pleasure… without reference to 
the interests, or the opinions, of those affected.”101  
 
Inverting this definition, we see that non-freedom-reducing interference is that which is not 
arbitrary; which takes place with reference to the interests of those affected. We now 
understand what constitutes domination and how we might seek to minimise its prevalence. 
 
1.5.2 The particularity of Pettit’s arbitrariness 
 
The definition of arbitrariness which stands at the centre of the republican conception of non-
domination is overly specific. To make use of the ideal beyond the vertical relationships to 
which it has largely been restricted, it suits us to invert it: to say that, rather than arbitrariness 
resulting from a failure to track the interests of those whose interests are being interfered with, 
that the tracking of interests in the exercise of power will indicate that the exercise of that 
power is non-arbitrary. Rather than being incorporated within the definition of arbitrariness, 
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this sort of tracking becomes a defence to a charge of the existence of an illegitimate ability 
to interfere. It is downgraded from a necessary to a merely sufficient condition which is one 
amongst many. This move makes room for those specific forms of arbitrariness which are of 
analytical utility in the contexts of horizontal relationships and law.  
 
1.6 Methodology: freedom from who? 
 
Three features of the neo-republican methodology must be highlighted. Though this is not the 
understanding promoted by Berlin, liberal freedom is an ideal which makes sense only where 
the perceived threat to liberty is the state.
102
 In the modern world, the individual’s interests 
are interfered with at all times, from all sides. To assume that all interference reduces 
freedom is to conclude that the individual is not, and cannot, be free horizontally. Not only is 
freedom from third-party interference an unachievable ideal, it is an incoherent one. Implicit, 
therefore, within opportunity conceptions of freedom is a series of assumptions as to how 
freedom might be compromised, and by whom. It is right and proper, given the context in 
which he wrote, that Berlin’s conception is oriented to the state as oppressor, but we should 
resist complacent universalization of that orientation. Pettit explicitly distinguishes between 
two forms of power which might dominate, identified according to their respective source: 
imperium, which is based on public authority, and dominium, which is private power.
103
 The 
terminology of vertical and horizontal domination might be preferred insofar as it indicates 
certain helpful legal analogies. The former has come to dominate discussions of 
republicanism from a legal perspective; a myopia which prevents neo-republicanism from 
fulfilling its potential. The present project places horizontal domination at its centre. 
 
1.6.1 Relationality 
 
A second methodological point is closely related, drawing upon a lesson offered by the 
conflict of liberal and communitarian thought. Liberalism is associated with a methodological 
individualism, which “asserts that all attempts to explain social (or individual) phenomena 
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are to be rejected … unless they are couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals.”104 A 
paradigmatic example of such a claim would be that of Bentham: 
 
“The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who 
are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the 
community then is, what? - the sum of the interests of the several members 
who compose it.”105 
 
The community has neither an existence nor an interest separate from the aggregate of its 
members. Communitarian arguments, on the other hand, in positing the existence of a 
discrete public interest apart from this process of aggregation, are necessarily committed to 
the existence of a unit of enquiry other than the individual to which to ascribe such interest. 
Each has obvious shortcomings. Methodological individualism struggles to accommodate a 
distinct public interest and so is condemned to understand politics as mere interest group 
pluralism; neither can it provide explanations of macro-level phenomena that result from 
anything other than the intentions of individuals (thereby explaining its frequent invocation in 
opposition to historical materialism), while communitarian positions threaten to reify 
metaphysical entities and in turn subsume or obliterate the individual.
106
  
 
Against these, the neo-republican ideal has a relational quality which allows one to sidestep 
the individualistic assumptions of liberal and libertarian thought without replacing them 
communitarianism’s similarly dubious presuppositions. Relational theory requires that we 
“reject the notion that one can posit discrete, pregiven units such as the individual or society 
as ultimate starting points” of our analysis107 - a rejection that has found purchase in recent 
sociological thought.
108
 Rather than being the discrete elements of a society which ‘exists’ 
merely as their aggregation, individuals are “inseparable from the transactional contexts 
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within which they are embedded.”109 Such assertion recalls Marx’s claim that “society does 
not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which 
these individuals stand”110 (but deconstructs the phenomenon so as to be able to consider the 
relations individually as well as in aggregation) and, before him, the Hegelian focus upon the 
inter-subjective dimension of selfhood, as reflected in his insistence that the self is constituted 
as such only at the point of mutual recognition with another.
111
 One effect of the relationality 
of neo-republican thought is to exclude from the idea of unfreedom any obstacle to action 
that is internal to the individual: the questions of ability and inability which, without further 
distinction, Van Parijs puts at the centre of ‘real’ freedom therefore play no role in neo-
republican freedom.
112
 
 
1.6.2 Embeddedness 
 
The incompatibility of methodological individualism with neo-republican freedom is shown 
most clearly by attempts to encode the atomic individual into its ideals. If one is free insofar 
as not interfered with in the liberal worldview, an isolated individual, alone in the world, is 
paradigmatic of the condition of freedom. Nobody interferes with him, for there is nobody to 
interfere with him. Where our ideal is the republican one, and freedom non-domination rather 
than non-interference, the result changes. A man is unfree if there is another with the 
opportunity to interfere arbitrarily with his interests. If there is no other, however, then while 
it is true that there is no-one able to arbitrarily interfere with his interests, he is not therefore 
free. His situation is merely incapable of being understood by a republicanism which sees 
him as necessarily embedded. As with Hegel’s requirement of inter-subjectivity to constitute 
the self, we conclude that man can be free only when he is not alone. 
 
The relational quality of republican freedom and its inability to speak to the condition of the 
atomised individual is linked with a sometime republican theme upon which we must once 
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again insist as a corollary of the neo-republican revival: the commitment to plurality. We 
might consider its starting point to be Aristotle’s insistence that “the state is a creation of 
nature, and that man is by nature a political animal,” even if in that case the political nature is 
held to be proven by the fact that “man is the only animal who has the gift of speech,” a 
power which “is intended to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore 
likewise the just and the unjust.”113 Arendt too places the condition of plurality - “the fact that 
men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” - at the centre of human existence: it is 
“the condition - not only the condition sine qua non, but the condition per quam - of all 
political life.”114 The condition of plurality frequently re-emerges, yet without moving to the 
forefront as a necessary condition of ‘republicanness’. It reveals an important truth which is 
obscured by individualism and which contributes to the superiority of republicanism over 
liberalism - the ability of the former to understand the individual as necessarily embedded in 
the social context, rather than treating society as the effect of the contingent proximity of 
multiple individuals. Such necessity permits the completion of our methodological circle: if 
one necessarily exists in a condition of plurality, then the question of horizontal freedom 
must be central to emancipatory project, as it is for neo-republican thought. A characteristic 
position of classical republicanism in this way recurs through logical implication in neo-
republican thought. The most important difference between the alternative accounts of liberty, 
therefore, is that the latter is tied up in this sort of social existence and thus, unlike the former, 
not hostile to and inevitably diminished by the fact of plural living. We must share the world 
in which we live, and any suggestion that it would be more desirable - that we would be freer 
- were we not required to do so, must be resisted. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
The publication of Pettit’s book marked the birth of a ‘research program,’115 the aim of which 
“is to rethink issues of legitimacy and democracy, welfare and justice, public policy and 
institutional design, from within the framework that these basic ideas provide.”116 The project 
has transferred certain themes from a historical context to the realm of living political theory 
and demonstrated how the language of domination still resonates in the modern world. It is 
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not the only republicanism: the relative clarity of the signifier in this context co-exists with 
rather than displaces the multiplicity of alternative definitions. It is with this republicanism, 
distinguished first and foremost by the understanding of freedom which it endorses and from 
which many of its associated concerns flow, that we will concern ourselves, though with the 
occasional foray back into the historical tradition in order to reflect upon some point of 
sympathy or divergence. It is a product of its past, as a measure both of what it is and what it 
is not, but transcends it.  Tempting though it is to shed the terminology in which the potential 
for confusion is carried, to do so would be a net loss for the neo-republican project. 
 
The republican ideal of freedom as non-domination provides a normative ideal suited to the 
analysis of the individual in relation both to the public power with which liberal though is 
principally concerned and the horizontal relations which exist by virtue of the necessary 
plurality of human existence. In both cases, and assuming there exists an organised public 
power, a state apparatus of some sort, then a certain degree of interference is inevitable. The 
republican ability to distinguish interference which reduces freedom from that which does not 
is therefore its primary virtue. It now falls to consider the interaction between these historical 
and vertical relations, starting with the role of law. 
36 
 
Part 1 - Chapter 2 - Freedom between anarchy and absolutism 
 
2.1 Consequences of neo-republicanism 
 
Our first chapter explained and defended the neo-republican ideal of freedom as non-
domination. This second chapter makes some observations about the consequences of that 
ideal for law. It proceeds in three stages. The first addresses the issue of law and freedom, 
arguing against the claim that law is inherently reductive of freedom. The second provides an 
alternative perspective on the issue by returning to the Hobbesian state of nature metaphor as 
a way of demonstrating the human condition; the relationship between law and freedom 
cannot be understood separately from the idea of an organised public power whose 
deployment is determined by law. The Hobbesian device of considering a world in which law 
is absent because no such power exists permits a discussion of law and freedom which 
clarifies rather than obscures. The third stage of the argument connects the republican ideal of 
non-domination to the values pursued by the idea of the rule of law. 
 
2.2 Law and freedom 
 
According to prominent liberal accounts, in keeping with the liberal conception of freedom as 
non-interference, all law, whatsoever its content, has the effect of reducing the freedom of 
those who live under it. In Bentham’s words:  
 
“As against the coercion applicable by individual to individual, no liberty can 
be given to one man but in proportion as it is taken from another. All coercive 
laws, therefore… and in particular all laws creative of liberty, are, as far as 
they go, abrogative of liberty.”1  
 
Where one takes this view, certain consequences might follow. One might reject law (and by 
implication the system of organised public power) generally - the true anarchist position 
whose problematic relationship with private property renders it now unfashionable - or 
demand that its use be kept to the minimum necessary. This might mean taking the position, 
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for example, that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others,”2 or, more 
generally, by insisting upon a night-watchman state of the type defended by Robert Nozick.
3
 
Both are well-attested within very different branches of the broad liberal tradition. 
Alternatively, one might deny the value of liberty, holding that its reduction by law is 
irrelevant, or subordinate it to some other good, so that the reduction in liberty is a price 
worth paying for the alternative good which we acquire through law, a position which can 
apply in the context both of the binary question of law or no-law, and to specific 
instantiations of law.
4
 
 
2.2.1 Individual freedom and net freedom 
 
If it is assumed both that law is a necessary social institution, and that all law is, as Bentham 
suggests, to a greater or lesser degree reductive of liberty, then one who desires the maximum 
possible liberty can endorse only those laws which alongside such reduction bring a 
countervailing increase in liberty, in which case law promotes freedom - but only indirectly, 
as a consequence of its primary, freedom-reducing, function. Berlin interprets Hobbes: 
 
“Law is always a ‘fetter’, even if its protects you from being bound in chains 
that are heavier than those of law, say, some more repressive law or custom, or 
arbitrary despotism or chaos.”5 
 
Beyond the requirement of a net increase in freedom, it is unclear what in this perspective 
prevents law from being employed in ways that are morally repugnant or create a surplus of 
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liberty only at the cost of extreme limitations on the liberty of some minority
6
 - laws, for 
example, whose effect is to systematically degrade the liberty of some section of the 
community, but which are held to be necessary to protect the liberty of the majority:
7
 
 
“If law infringes liberty as a matter of necessity, however, then all that liberty 
clearly requires of law and of the constitutional framework as a whole is that it 
does better in preventing offences against liberty than in perpetrating them… 
liberty will be consistent with a variety of what we naturally regard as 
constitutional abuses, so that a case cannot be made against such abuses on the 
ground of liberty alone.”8 
 
Looking back at the claim by Bentham cited above - “no liberty can be given to one man but 
in proportion as it is taken from another. All coercive laws, therefore… are, as far as they go, 
abrogative of liberty” - it is difficult to interpret it even this generously. If “no liberty can be 
given to one man but in proportion as it is taken from another,” then we are dealing with a 
zero-sum game, in which the net quantum of liberty is necessarily constant. The possibility of 
a net increase in liberty disappears (one man’s liberty with respect to the law may be 
increased by repeal of that law, but some other person’s is necessarily decreased).9 The law 
merely redistributes liberty, such that for every person who enjoys an increase in liberty, we 
must accept a corresponding loss, by some other person or persons, of that same extent of 
liberty. Law-making dissolves into a question of shameless favouritism: only some can 
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benefit from the freedom it bequeaths, and for those to benefit, others must lose out.
10
 The 
possibility of generalised liberty through law recedes. 
 
2.2.2 Which laws reduce freedom? 
 
It is important to be clear as to the form(s) of law at issue here. Bentham makes several 
gestures indicating that the manner in which law relates to liberty varies, and that not all laws 
are equal in their effect upon freedom. He distinguishes laws which are coercive simpliciter 
(in which case the relevant coercion is that of the state) from those which are coercive 
because they create rights and thus allow for coercion between individuals.
11
 These 
categories seem to correspond to those of criminal law and private law: though criminal law 
is vertical in orientation and private law horizontal, both are coercive and thus reductive of 
liberty, but the latter create legal rights and therefore redistributes liberty, where the former 
protect liberty only indirectly, by prohibiting conduct which itself reduces freedom.
12
 From 
the realm of coercive laws, and therefore those which reduce liberty, Bentham excludes 
“constitutional laws, and laws repealing or modifying coercive laws.”13 Whether or not one 
adopts Bentham’s specific conclusion, the acknowledgement of a relevant distinction 
between private and constitutional law is an important one. It is unfortunate that where Philip 
Pettit quotes Bentham, the parentheses within which the exclusion of constitutional law is 
contained are excised: “All coercive laws, therefore (that is, all laws but constitutional laws, 
and laws repealing or modifying coercive laws) and in particular all laws creative of liberty, 
are, as far as they go, abrogative of liberty”14 becomes “All coercive laws, therefore… and in 
particular all laws creative of liberty, are, as far as they go, abrogative of liberty.”15  This 
claim is both more interesting and more persuasive with the words in brackets left in situ; the 
possibility of a differential relation to freedom on the part of those laws which structure the 
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process by which the question of how public power is to be exercised - the second-order rules 
according to which the first-order rules are made - points the way forward for republican 
enquiry. In particular, the notion that private law redistributes freedom, based on a 
consideration of “coercion applicable by individual to individual,” is a promising insight in 
light of the concern we have identified for horizontal domination. 
 
2.2.3 Bentham against liberty 
 
Bentham’s claim must be understood in its context: a point-by-point rebuttal of the 
Declaration of Rights issued during the French Revolution. Article 2 of said declaration states 
that “The end in view of every political association is the preservation of the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to 
oppression.”16 The pretended imprescriptibility of liberty is undermined to Bentham’s eyes 
by the fact that “all rights are made at the expense of liberty.”17 It is not that one law or 
another is a greater threat to liberty: by reductio ad absurdum, all are “repugnant to these 
natural and imprescriptible rights: consequently null and void; call for resistance and 
insurrection.”18 Bentham’s argument must therefore be understood for what it is: a diatribe 
not against law (as inherently reductive of liberty) but against the notion that liberty can 
remain intact in the presence of law. An argument against liberty, not law. On one hand, 
Bentham’s conclusions are thus a consequence of the liberal conception of freedom of which 
he was an adherent
19
 - if liberty is non-interference, then yes, it would seem true that all laws, 
even that against, for example, murder, reduce freedom. On the other, this conclusion is not 
problematic for Bentham, who subordinates freedom, as all else, to utility: the net result of 
the subtraction of one of humanity’s two great ‘sovereign masters,’ pain, from the other, 
pleasure: “It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes 
and effects, are fastened to their throne.”20 We might replicate Bentham’s conclusion not by 
renouncing freedom but by reconceptualising it. We begin such a process through a 
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consideration of the state of nature, which shows itself to be unintentionally revelatory of the 
problematic of neo-republican thought in its invitation to step back from the question of law 
to that of the organised public power which law directs. We here abandon the pretence that 
one can discuss law as a discrete phenomenon apart from the body of public power which it 
directs. When we discuss law, we take for granted the existence of that power: we must be 
explicit about its relation to freedom. 
 
2.3 Hobbes’s on the state of nature 
 
We earlier noted that Quentin Skinner identified the emergence of the state of nature device 
in Hobbes’ work with the eclipse of republican freedom. Here we appropriate it for our own 
purposes. Hobbes begins from a belief in the ‘right of nature’ as being “the Liberty each man 
hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is 
to say, of his own Life.”21 He contrasts natural ‘right’, which “consisteth in liberty to do, or to 
forbeare” with ‘laws of nature’ which “determineth, and bindeth to one of them”22 - as a 
result, “Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the 
same matter are inconsistent.”23 Law reduces freedom, but as a law of nature is “a Precept, or 
generall Rule, found out by Reason,” it derives from the natural order and does not permit 
one human to reduce the liberty of others. Such laws of nature do not limit the right of man to 
that which is necessary for his own preservation, and he has as a result “a Right to every 
thing; even to one another’s body,”24 a situation in which “there can be no security to any 
man.”25  
 
This is the famous ‘state of nature’ - man’s ‘natural condition,’ in which no man is ever safe, 
even the weakest man having “strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret 
machination or by confederacy with others.”26 Men quarrel - for gain, for safety, or for 
reputation - and in the absence of a common power, the situation is one of war. Not a 
contingent and temporary war, but a war “of every man, against every man,” in which life is 
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“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”27 It is on this ground, a state of absolute freedom, 
that Hobbes constructs his Leviathan.
28
 
 
2.3.1 Constructing Leviathan 
 
To achieve security, men contract with each other to form a sovereign power over themselves, 
giving up 
 
“my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on 
this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his 
Actions in like manner.”29 
 
This artificial person is the Commonwealth, of whose acts the contracting multititude, 
 
“have made themselves everyone the Author, to the end he may use the 
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient for their Peace and 
Common Defence.”30 
 
The Commonwealth having been given existence, it makes laws of its own: these are 
“Artificiall Chains which men… have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or 
Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power, and at the other end, to their own 
Ears.”31 In civil society, freedom is to be found where the laws do not reach - there, “men 
have the Liberty, of doing what their own reason shall suggest, for the most profitable to 
themselves.”32  The “Liberty of a Subject lyeth therefore only in those things, which in 
regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted.”33 The sovereign’s laws destroy the 
freedom of those who live under it. In the absence of the sovereign they were absolutely free; 
their freedom now exists only in the interstices of the laws it makes for them. 
                                                          
27
 Hobbes, note 21, at 88-9. 
28
 Bentham’s position is similar: “As yet there is no law in the land. The legislator hath not yet entered upon his 
office. As yet he hath neither commanded nor prohibited any act. As yet all acts therefore are free: all persons as 
against the law are at liberty... Legal restraint, legal constraint and so forth are indeed unknown: but legal 
protection is unknown also” From Of Laws In General, quoted in Long, above, note 12, at 130.  
29
 Hobbes, note 21, at 120. 
30
 Hobbes, note 21, at 120. 
31
 Hobbes, note 21, at 147. 
32
 Hobbes, note 21, at 147. 
33
 Hobbes, note 21, at 147. 
43 
 
2.3.2 Freedom and law in Hobbes 
 
Those gaps as remain are wholly contingent: not only is the sovereign not bound by any 
higher law, it is not even bound by its own laws, for “having power to make, and repeale 
Laws, he may when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes 
that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before.”34 The civil laws 
being nothing other than the sovereign’s commands, they can be no impediment to its will.35 
 
The natural liberty of man in the natural condition does not therefore survive the creation of 
the sovereign power, the purpose of whose laws is “Restraint; without the which there cannot 
possibly be any Peace… Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the 
naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner as they might not hurt, but assist one 
another.”36 Hobbes’ civil laws are not subject to the limitations of neither private reason nor, 
contra Edward Coke, the ‘artificial perfection of reason’37 embodied in common law and, in 
one of Coke’s less restrained moments declared to outrank legislative enactments.38 Instead 
civil laws are limited only by the reason of the sovereign himself.
39
 We therefore encounter in 
Hobbes an unambiguous prefiguring of the argument made by Bentham. Man is free in the 
absence of law; law is introduced for the express purpose of limiting that liberty; no limits 
exist on the laws which might be made by the unbounded sovereign to which men give up 
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their freedom in return for security.
40
 Most importantly, Hobbes reconnects the existence of 
positive laws to that of an apparatus of public power whose use is determined by law; all 
claims about freedom necessarily presuppose such apparatus and cannot convince without 
reference to it. This is not the specific Austinian claim that laws ‘properly so called’ are 
merely commands backed by sanctions, but the more general claim that there exists behind 
state legal systems a coercive apparatus which underpins it. 
 
The state of nature device therefore serves to justify the absolute power of the sovereign, 
while its elevation to the highest state of human freedom lends to the move into civil society 
a lapsarian quality - the covenant between one and all is not the vindication of freedom but its 
subordination to the demands of security. When man is free he is not safe; when he is safe he 
is not free. Laws reduce freedom, which persists only where they do not reach. For the 
purposes of considering the relationship between law and freedom, however, the Hobbesian 
account is important, and to be privileged over any which blithely pronounces upon the 
question in very general terms - not for its conclusions, but because of the connection it 
makes between the effect of law upon freedom and the very existence of an organised public 
power. All accounts of law presuppose such an entity, but nothing useful can be said about 
law and freedom while it remains in the background. 
 
2.4 A republican appropriation of the state of nature 
 
The state of nature thought experiment portrays the fact of bare human plurality as a situation 
of perfect (vertical) freedom and concomitant absence of security. Substituting the neo-
republican concern for domination (i.e., arbitrary interference) for that of interference 
simpliciter, the picture changes significantly. Consider again Hobbes’s description of the 
bellum omnium contra omnes. Here, the individual lives precariously. If he is weak, nothing 
protects him against the strong. Even he is strong, he must eventually let down his guard and 
when he does, his strength will not protect him. Though the economically strong may be able 
to arrange security, their material resources will be similarly threatened: they will not even be 
‘owned’ in any sense we recognise. The claim that in the absence of some system of public 
power man is free does not convince. True, he does not find himself interfered with by the 
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(non-existent) state: there is no vertical interference, or possibility of it. He does, however, 
live at the mercy of his fellow men, each of whom can interfere with him for any reason or 
for none. Interferences with his interests need not be frequent: Hobbesian presuppositions 
about the extent to which they would take place are irrelevant. It is enough that such 
interference can take place, there not existing any organised public power to prevent it. The 
state of nature, then, contra Hobbes, is not one of freedom, but the purest state of horizontal 
unfreedom - an absolute vulnerability to Pettit’s dominium. The dawn of the state of nature 
device was central to the replacement of republican with liberal freedom, but there is no 
reason why republicanism should not push back; accept the state of nature as a useful 
counterfactual, but one which brings to light the weakness of the liberal ideal rather than 
secures its victory. The shift from liberal to republican freedom therefore turns on its head 
Hobbes’ assessment of the state of nature. 
 
A republican reconceptualisation of the issue sheds light not merely on the state of nature, in 
which there exists no organised public power, but on what is to be gained by instituting such 
a power. From a republican point of view, in ‘moving’ into civil society one does not 
renounce freedom, but instead alleviates a particular sort of unfreedom - the pure horizontal 
domination in which each individual finds him or herself open to the arbitrary interference of 
every other individual - by giving existence to a body capable of restraining that arbitrary 
interference and so rendering free those who would otherwise be unfree. How this would 
work is reasonably clear: a system of criminal law means that many of the most egregious 
interferences with others’ involve pitting oneself against public power and so risking 
punishment. Not only are bodily interests protected, but so too are those in material goods, 
which necessitates a method of distinguishing between meum and tuum, which can in fact 
only exist as legal categories in the presence of an organised public power.
41
  The scope of 
arbitrary interference by parties horizontal to oneself is reduced and freedom accordingly 
increased. The institution of an organised public power and consequent inauguration of a 
vertical relationship is therefore uniquely capable of making the difference between the pure 
horizontal domination of the state of nature and a condition of freedom: seen in this light, we 
are not sacrificing freedom but making possible its achievement. Such reconceptualisation 
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also provides significant guidance as to how the state’s powers should be put to use: given the 
inescapable fact of human plurality, the coercive apparatus associated with public power 
should be instrumentalised so as to protect individuals against arbitrary interference by others.  
 
2.4.1 Unfreedom and absolutism 
 
The republican treatment of the state of nature not only rejects the claim that it is a state of 
freedom: it similarly calls into question the claim that in giving up that freedom one achieves 
security. The Commonwealth into which man contracts is, we have seen, unlimited in its 
legislative scope - the laws being nothing more than the sovereign’s commands - and so 
Hobbes’s Leviathan is not the antithesis of republican unfreedom, but another, altogether 
more pernicious source of the domination which renders unfree in the republican worldview. 
The arbitrary interference to which the individual is open in the absence of the sovereign is 
replaced by the arbitrary interference of a power which is not only limitless but which, by 
virtue of the coercive apparatus it controls in order to protect man from man, is capable of 
significantly more harmful interference. In endorsing absolutism, Hobbes exemplifies the 
opposite pole of the range of threats against which the individual must be protected and so 
exposes the neo-republican conception of the human predicament. In the absence of public 
power, each man lives at the mercy of every other and is for that reason unfree. That 
unfreedom justifies the institution of public power, but if it exists without limit then the new, 
vertical, relation which has been inaugurated is one of unfreedom; the trade of freedom for 
security reveals itself instead a trade of pure horizontal unfreedom for pure vertical 
unfreedom. Here we find the individual: trapped between the threats posed by those with 
whom he shares the world - necessarily, not contingently - and those constituted by the 
mechanisms whose existence is justified by the need to protect him against the former. The 
solution to this dilemma is to be found in a legal order which ensures that the existence of 
public power does not render those who live under it unfree. Republicans traditionally 
referred to this project as the construction of the empire of laws. 
 
2.5 The empire of laws 
 
The empire of laws ideal follows from the link between the freedom of men and that of states, 
where the free state is the empire of laws. This particular formulation is prominent in the 
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work of James Harrington, “the most penetrating and influential” of the English 
republicans.
42
 His Commonwealth of Oceana of 1656
43
 “marks a moment of paradigmatic 
breakthrough, a major revision of English political theory and history in the light of concepts 
drawn from civic humanism and Machiavellian republicanism.”44 In it Harrington gives a de 
jure definition of government, as understood by ‘ancient prudence’ and revived by 
Machiavelli, as “an art whereby a civil society of men is instituted and preserved, upon the 
foundation of common right or interest, or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) it is the empire of 
laws, and not of men.”45 This is contrasted with the “empire of men and not of laws” (of 
which a monarchy is the central example) which exists where “the laws... are made according 
to the interest of a man, or of some few families.”46 The invocation of Aristotle is a reference 
to his claims that “it is more proper that law should govern than any one of the citizens”; that 
those who hold supreme power should “be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants 
of the laws” and not its masters.47 The negative aspect of the preference for laws over men 
can be briefly stated: to place the highest power in the hands of a man is to give it “to a wild 
beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for passion influences those who are in 
power, even the very best of men: for which reason law is reason without desire.”48 
 
2.5.1 Harrington versus Hobbes 
 
In formulating the ideal, Harrington provides a clear retort to Hobbes’ on freedom. Indeed, 
much of Oceana is best understood as a more or less direct rejection of Hobbes’ thought and 
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a corresponding promotion of the philosophy of Machiavelli, the neglect of whose work 
Harrington bemoaned.
49
 Hobbes claimed that the liberty of the commonwealth “is the same 
with that which every man then should have, if there were no civil laws nor Commonwealth 
at all,” and that though it was 
 
“written on the turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the 
word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence infer that a particular man has more 
liberty or immunity from the service of the Commonwealth there than in 
Constantinople.”50 
 
The link between human freedom and that of the state was thus denied: freedom means to be 
left alone and no form of political organisation is inherently more likely leave men alone; we 
have already encountered such an argument in Berlin’s admission that negative liberty is no 
more likely to be secured in a democracy than in other kinds of polity.
51
 Harrington rejected 
this separation of the individual freedom from constitutional order, rejoining that “wheras the 
greatest Basha is a tenant, as well of his head as of his estate, at the will of his lord, the 
meanest Lucchese that has land, is a freeholder of both, and not to be controlled but by the 
law, and that framed by every private man to no other end (or they may thank themselves) 
than to protect the liberty of every private man, which by that means comes to be the liberty 
of the commonwealth.”52  The reference to the Basha’s head, Skinner clarifies, is that he is 
“liable to lose it as soon as he speaks or acts in such a way as to cause the sultan offence.”53 
Better to be a poor man in a free state, subject only to law, than a rich man in an unfree state 
where one lives at the mercy of the person or persons whose whims determine the content of 
one’s rights and duties. The empire of law, and thus freedom, requires that power be 
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exercised in accordance with a body of law to which all contribute, so that no individual is at 
the mercy of another’s arbitrary will. 
 
Harrington therefore distinguishes liberty from the laws with liberty by the laws, on the basis 
of the same non-domination understanding of freedom revived by the neo-republicans; in 
being at the mercy only of the law, the Lucchese depends on the will of no other man and is 
therefore qualitatively freer than his counterpart in Constantinople. He is free by the law, 
rather than from it, as where there is no law, or it does not reach him. Such freedom by the 
laws reflects the republican ideal and can, contra Hobbes, be achieved only in a free state. 
Only there is the fact of organized public power non-dominating and the purpose of the move 
from state of nature to civil society vindicated.
54
 We have, therefore, two necessary 
conditions for republican freedom: some form of organized public power which is capable of 
restraining individuals, and a body of law which directs and limits the use of that power, so 
that it does not become coextensive with the caprice of some person or persons in whom 
sovereignty is invested. If it does then the achievement of horizontal freedom comes at the 
cost of vertical unfreedom. 
 
2.5.2 Constructing the empire of laws 
 
The ‘empire of laws and not of men’ is not a self-executing ideal and the manner in which it 
is translated into a set of institutional and constitutional requirements varies. We can exclude 
the crude reading whereby the ideal is achieved through the exclusion of human input in 
government: as Hobbes asks, “What man… believes the law can hurt him; that is, words, and 
paper…?”55 Such interpretation is “a naïve illusion”56 and if the empire of laws ideal is 
intended to preclude human input into either the formulation or the execution of law, Hobbes 
is correct to reject it. Harrington makes no such claim, accepting that a judge upon the bench 
is as “a gunner upon his platform is to his cannon.”57 The question of how the neo-republican 
ideal is translated into a program of constitutional design is the subject of chapter 7: here we 
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examine only the outlines of Harrington’s recommendations, in particular their dual 
institutional/constitutional dimension. 
 
2.5.3 Law which tracks interests 
 
We see firstly, in the requirement that the law be framed “by every private man,” the 
republican demand that law track the interests of those who live under it: were the law the 
creation of only some of those who were to live under it - “the will of one man, as in an 
absolute, or from the will of a few men, as in a regulated monarchy” - it would not do so, and 
freedom by the law would be impossible, with those who were permitted to make no 
contribution dependent upon the will of those who were. Such is the situation is the empire of 
men, wherein laws “are made according to the interest of a man, or of som few familys.”58 
Instead the interests of the multitude must be made present, for “the mover of the will is 
interest” and the empire of laws requires that the interest which moves the will be “the public 
interest (which is no other than common right and justice, excluding all partiality or privat 
interest).” Given the generality of the modern legal systems (i.e., in formal terms they apply 
equally to all within the relevant territory), this call for the law to be based on the interests of 
the many rather than the few adds up to a requirement for universal suffrage: “law must 
equally procede from… the will of the whole people, as in a commonwealth.”59 The empire 
of laws ideal incorporates a partial democratic imperative not present in Hobbes.  
 
2.5.4 Harrington’s institutions 
 
If the many are to be accommodated in a manner which forces the law to track their interests, 
the institutional structure must make room for them. Harrington’s does so in a version of the 
Polybian political ‘mixarchy.’60 The senate, “the debate of the commonwealth,”61 is to be 
populated by those chosen for their excellence as it “tendeth unto the advancement of the 
                                                          
58
 James Harrington, Prerogative of Popular Government [1656], Book 1, Chapter 2. 
59
 Harrington, note 58, Book 2, Chapter 1. We re-encounter here the problem associated with Rousseau’s claims 
regarding the general will, which is ambiguous as between the mere outcome of a democratic process and some 
transcendental unitary public interest not necessarily related to their individual wills. The neo-republican claim 
which will later be made, softens this difficulty via the substitution of a requirement that citizens’ interests 
merely be ‘tracked’ by the law for that which requires it to ‘procede from their wills’.  
60
 For background, comparing the Polybian variant with that of other Greeks, see David E. Hahm, The Mixed 
Constitution in Greek Thought, in Ryan K. Balot (Ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, 
Wiley-Blackwell (2000). 
61
 Harrington, note 43, at 23. 
51 
 
influence of their virtue or authority that leads the people.” 62  The legislature is to be 
bicameral, with a second body alongside this first: 
 
“as the council dividing consists of the wisdom of the commonwealth, so the 
assembly or council choosing should consist of the interest of the 
commonwealth. As the wisdom of the commonwealth is in the aristocracy, so 
the interests of the commonwealth is in the whole body of the people.”63 
 
The senate proposes, but the democratic assembly resolves, in line with Harrington’s analogy 
of the girls and the cake: “divide, says one to the other, and I will chuse; or let me divide, and 
you shall chuse.”64 Together, they make up the legislature in the Commonwealth of Oceana. 
In this brief vignette, several constitutional ideals are represented: the separation of powers, 
the notion that different subsets of the population - the one, the few, the many - are suited to 
different tasks, the tendency towards tyranny of over-centralised power. It does not, however, 
seem impossible to reconcile this schema with the Hobbesian sovereign: Harrington here 
considers the composition of the body which speaks with the sovereign’s voice, and not what 
issues from it. Hobbes’ argument is not that the sort of constitutional scheme Harrington 
endorses is not desirable, merely that is irrelevant to the freedom of those who live under it. 
 
2.5.5 Harrington’s constitutionalism 
 
Harrington’s account does not differ from Hobbes merely in its institutional dimension, 
however: also relevant to the question of freedom is the requirement of what we might 
describe as legal primacy, or constitutionalism. Alongside the two assemblies, Harrington 
posits an executive power, in acceptance of Hobbes’s point that the law as enacted “is but 
words and paper without the hands and swords of men.”65  The body in question must, 
crucially, be one which is limited by law, not outside it or excepted from its reach: “the 
liberty of a commonwealth consists in the empire of her laws, the absence wherof would 
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betray her to the lust of tyrants.”66  The executive branch cannot be unconstrained if freedom 
by law is to result: 
 
“as the hand of the magistrate is the executive power of the law, so the head 
of the magistrate is answerable to the people, that his execution be 
according to the law… the hand or sword that executes the law is in it, and 
not above it.”67 
 
Hobbes could not countenance such a notion, having constructed his sovereign so as to make 
the idea of its limitation by law a logical impossibility: this error “because it setteth the laws 
above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him; which is to 
make a new sovereign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so 
continually, without end, to the confusion, and dissolution of the commonwealth.”68 This 
recursion, however, is based upon Hobbes’ notion of a unitary and monolitihic law-giving 
sovereign who in being subject to laws is subject only to himself and thus not fettered: this 
“is not subjection,” Hobbes states, “but freedom from the laws,”69 and so the aim of limiting 
the sovereign through law lapses into incoherence.
70
 Two requirements of the empire of law 
were identified through consideration of the state of nature motif: the existence of an 
apparatus of public power and the requirement of that it be exercised through law. On the 
basis of Harrington’s critique of Hobbes, we can add a third - the requirement that public 
institutions, like those they exist to protect, be subject to the laws. The requirements of a 
public power limited by law and a separation of power between different institutions can be 
seen to be intimately related: for the reasons Hobbes gives, it makes no sense to limit a public 
authority by law if the law is merely a reflection of that same authority’s will. A separation 
between executive and legislative power is therefore a necessary concomitant of limiting the 
executive through law. Hobbes’ insistence that the form of government is irrelevant to 
freedom is dually incorrect. 
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The empire of laws renders free for the same reason that unfettered power renders unfree; 
where it exists, the arbitrary interference of the absolute sovereign does not. Hobbes, in 
defending absolutism, threatened to wash away this “antient prudence,” and one of 
Harrington’s chief aims is to defend the accumulated wisdom of the ancients against the 
Hobbesian onslaught.
71
 History has largely vindicated Harrington’s efforts in support of 
constitutionalism (in the sense of government limited by law) and in the specific form of the 
empire of laws ideal his argument has proven highly influential. Its influence can be clearly 
seen the work of John Adams, whose Thoughts on Government
72
 written in 1776 and 
designed to guide the drafting of the state constitutions even before the political form of the 
Union itself was settled, invokes the ideal as the essence of the republic: “there is no good 
government but what is republican... the very definition of a republic is ‘an empire of laws, 
and not of men.’”73 Where Harrington’s empire of laws has a dual institutional/constitutional 
dimension, Adams emphasises the former. Like Harrington, he recommends the separation of 
powers on the basis that “a single assembly, possessed of all the powers of government, 
would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily for their own 
interest, and adjudge all controversies in their own favour,” but adds to it a requirement that 
the legislature be bicameral.
74
 This is indicative of changes in the background assumptions of 
political and legal thought in the century or so - punctuated by the Glorious revolution and 
the associated constitutional limitations placed upon the English Monarch - which separates 
Adams from Harrington. The former can take for granted the limitation of the government by 
law for which Harrington, writing at a time at which this question had formed the background 
to a recent civil war, had to militate.  
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2.5.6 Situating the empire of laws 
 
The empire of laws therefore exists between the pure horizontal unfreedom of the state of 
nature and the pure vertical unfreedom of the absolutist state. The lawlessness of the state of 
nature is to be rejected, for if there is no law, it can found no empire. The unfettered power of 
a Divine Monarch or of a Hobbesian sovereign subverts the law, replacing it with the empire 
of men, the former in its most threatening form - the empire of a single man. The empire of 
laws is founded upon a division of powers (and the resulting checks and balances) as well as 
a requirement of legal authorisation and legal limitation, of which the separation of power is a 
sine qua non, which works towards republican freedom. Man cannot be free but in a free state; 
the free state is an empire of laws and not of men, because only there are individuals 
protected from the arbitrary interference of each other by a state apparatus willing and able to 
interfere and yet with that interference authorised and limited through a democratically 
legitimated body of law, ensuring that both horizontal and vertical interference is non-
arbitrary. When it is appreciated that the relevant comparator for the empire of laws is not 
solely the absolutist state, but also, on the other hand, the state of nature, it becomes clear that 
its merit is two-fold: the achievement of the horizontal freedom which is absent in the state of 
nature, and of the vertical freedom which cannot exist in the absolutist state. 
 
2.5.7 From the empire of laws to the rule of law 
 
The ideal of the rule of law has achieved within liberal thought a status like that the empire of 
laws once occupied amongst republicans. The latter as discussed in Adams and Harrington 
seems over-determined. It reflects the major constitutional disputes of the time: distinct from 
the orthodoxy but nevertheless determined by it.  In the transition from the empire of laws 
ideal to the modern rule of law, we begin to jettison the contingencies of the specific 
historical-constitutional context which informed those disputes (which is not to say that 
others do not replace them). Where the empire of law was cashed out as an institutional ideal, 
the rule of law presents itself as a universal, transferable ideal possessing a value worth 
insisting upon separately from, and achievable separately from, issues of constitutional 
design. Though not born into independence, the modern rule of law has found success 
because it is not tied to a specific institutional order. It is the distillation of an ideal which 
once belonged to the republican project, but evades some of its complexities - not because 
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they are no longer relevant but because at late stage in modern constitutional development it 
is assumed they can be taken for granted and, further, because the rule of law is thought to 
offer something of value even where they cannot. 
 
2.6 The rule of law 
  
Notwithstanding that the “apparent unanimity in support of the rule of law is a feat 
unparalleled in history”75 the rule of law is a contested concept, potentially irretrievably 
indeterminate.
76
 So much so that legal analysis might be more incisive without the 
intellectual and historical baggage which the concept brings with it, it perhaps having, Judith 
Shklar suggests, “become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use.”77 
In what follows I consider Dicey’s account of the rule of law and suggest that what he offers 
is unduly constrained by his Anglo-centric jurisprudence and so of limited universalisable 
value. I examine certain ways of categorising the ideal and suggest that the very project of 
explaining how to achieve it makes sense only in the context of a debate which starts from 
the value it is intended to promote. That value is the protection of the individual from the 
evils of arbitrary power, and so the rule of law as it exists in contemporary discourse is a 
subset of the empire of laws ideal, adapted to the reality of constitutional heterogeneity and 
the globalisation of legal discourse. 
 
2.6.1 Dicey’s rule of law 
 
Dicey has a good claim to the status of father of the rule of law, but his description is 
amongst the most criticised - famously, as an “unfortunate outburst of Anglo-Saxon 
parochialism.”78 It remains worthy of consideration, not only because Dicey gave us “the first 
prominent modern formulation and analysis of the rule of law in a liberal democratic 
system,”79 but also because his ideal is attached to an actually-existing legal system and so 
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acts as a bridge between the (institutional) empire of laws ideal and later, free-standing 
accounts of the rule of law.
80
 
 
Dicey considered the rule of law to consist of three elements. Firstly, “no man is punishable 
or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law 
established in ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In this sense the 
rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons in 
authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.”81 Secondly, “every man, 
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to 
the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals,”82 and thirdly “the general principles of the constitution 
(as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public hearing) are with us the 
result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases 
brought before the courts.”83 
 
The first aspect is intriguing. That a man might not be punished except “for a distinct breach 
of law established in ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land” is one 
thing; that this distinguishes the rule of law from “wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers” is 
a very different claim. Leaving aside arguments based upon the inherent indeterminacy of 
law,
84
 the procedural requirements seem less exacting than Dicey implies: law might meet his 
standard yet nevertheless give effect to wide or discretionary powers. This first aspect thus 
seems to marry formalism and substantivism in a not wholly coherent manner, whereby a 
procedural requirement somehow gives rise to certain substantive characteristics.
85
 In reality, 
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only the worst excesses of arbitrariness - where the legislature or courts are bypassed entirely, 
or some sort of ad hoc or personalised courts are employed instead - would be excluded by 
Dicey’s demands. Wide powers are not logically excluded at all. From the opposite direction, 
Dicey’s argument that “wherever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness, and… 
discretionary authority on the part of the government must mean insecurity for legal freedom 
in the part of its subjects,” too quickly concedes the impossibility of discretion that does not 
immediately dissolve into arbitrariness. When discretion is exercised in accordance with a 
pre-existing policy, to further the purpose for which it was granted, or in accordance with 
over-arching principles, then need not leave the ‘room for arbitrariness’ with which Dicey is 
concerned, and even if discretion could be excluded from all administrative decisions, it is 
unclear that this would be desirable.
86
 
 
This first claim goes hand in hand with Dicey’s well-known distaste for administrative law, 
to which he devotes an entire chapter of his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution and the most important aspect of which he considers to be “the protection given 
in foreign countries to servants of the State… who, whilst acting in pursuance of official 
orders, or in the bona fide attempt to discharge official duties, are guilty of acts which in 
themselves are wrongful or unlawful.”87 This concern, and the opposition between the rule of 
law and the existence of administrative law, is similarly evident in the second claim. The idea 
that a special body of law or special courts might be employed to deal with ‘vertical’ relations 
is anathema to his sensibilities and, on his view, the English constitution. An ostensibly 
uncontroversial claim - that no man should be immune from the law nor otherwise privileged 
in its application
88
 - becomes a highly tendentious argument about how to control public 
power, out of place among (admittedly, more modern) accounts of the rule of law, and 
seeming to justify the charge of parochialism.
89
 Further, it is not at all clear that a separate 
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system of administrative law is necessarily such as to exempt men from the ordinary law of 
the land on the basis of ‘rank or condition.’ Two separate claims about equality before the 
law on one hand and equality of public and private parties before a single body of law on the 
other risk becoming confused. 
 
It is in the third aspect that the peculiarity of Dicey’s understanding becomes most clear: in 
ascribing positive features of the constitution to the common law as opposed to legislative 
development, he makes an argument that does not, and often cannot, apply elsewhere. 
Beyond noting the empty self-congratulation of a common-lawyer in the face of his civil law 
rivals, it serves to recall that the rights afforded an ordinary Englishman by law in Dicey’s 
day were significantly fewer than those enjoyed by many of his foreign compatriots and those 
rights as were enjoyed were often instituted in a manner far removed from the common-law 
incrementalism whose virtues Dicey is extolling. It is therefore controversial to claim that the 
“general principles of the [United Kingdom] constitution” result from the common law: what 
of those rights embodied in, for example, Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights 1689? The 
argument is extended by noting where equal liberties are enjoyed their source is irrelevant, 
but that where the constitution starts from remedies (as in England), rights are likely to be 
more secure than where their protection begins with extended definitions that pay no heed to 
the need for remedies. Further, constitutional rights, being external to the ordinary operation 
of the law, may be suspended. Where they are part of the constitution because they make up 
part of the ordinary law, their suspension can take place by no means short of revolution.
90
 
  
2.6.2 The legacy Dicey’s rule of law 
 
Dicey’s account of the rule of law bequeaths a mixed legacy if we seek general lessons. His 
normative claims are a mix of minimalist formalism and very broad (and correspondingly 
questionable) assertions about the implications of such formalism, while some of his 
conclusions seem unsupported by his evidence. He has constructed a causal connection 
between the English constitution (assumed to be good) and the English mode of protecting 
rights (similarly) where no such connection exists - or, better, where the connection is the 
result of historical contingencies that rob Dicey’s account of any universalisable value. The 
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manifestations of the empire of laws ideal discussed above were judged unhelpful for being 
tied to specific institutional contexts. Dicey’s ideal shows signs of breaking free from that 
institutional dimension and so giving birth to a rule of law ideal which is transferable, but 
hamstrings it by suggesting that its achievement is unique to the English context and counter-
posing it to an administrative state which would shortly outgrow the box into which Dicey 
tried to put it.
91
 Its contemporary success as a constitutional value has come at the cost of the 
abandonment of both claims: the rule of law is now everywhere, and wherever it does not 
already ‘exist’, there is someone who seeks to establish it. 
 
2.7 Categorising accounts of the rule of law 
 
The rule of law can be traced back to the same phrases in Aristotle as were cited by 
Harrington in relation to the empire of laws,
92
 though translated by Dicey into liberal-legalist 
terms suited to the concerns of the late-Victorian era. Most notably, the move away from 
institutional accounts evades the difficulty of explaining why the rule of law does not require 
a universal franchise. To go beyond Dicey, it helps to consider the different forms of rule of 
law account. One separates ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’, being defined by Paul Craig as 
follows: 
 
“Formal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in which the law 
was promulgated [but] do not however seek to pass judgment upon the actual 
content of the law itself… Those who espouse substantive conceptions of the 
rule of law seek to go beyond this… Certain substantive rights are said to be 
based on, or derived from, the rule of law. The concept is used as the 
foundation for these rights, which are then used to distinguish between “good” 
laws, which comply with such rights, and “bad” laws which do not.”93 
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This is paraphrased as the claim that “formal theories focus on the proper sources and form of 
legality, while substantive theories also include requirements about the content of the law,”94 
though even this ignores that the form of law and its source are very different topics. Brian 
Tamanaha, whose paraphrase this is, has subdivided each according to their specific 
requirements such that, for example, the ‘thinnest’ formal conception is that which merely 
requires that law is the instrument through which government acts, while at its ‘thickest’, the 
ideal requires that the content of the law in question be determined by the democratic will. 
Substantive varieties range from theories which incorporate fundamental individual rights to 
those which encompass a broad social welfare requirement of substantive equality and 
welfare rights.
95
 Such a classification will have reasonably little difficulty in fitting most 
accounts of the rule of law into one or the other box, though it may be misleading: one of the 
most famous formal accounts is that of Lon Fuller, who emphasises that a series of merely 
formal requirements are demanded by the ‘inner morality’ of law. 96 The taxonomy, however, 
does nothing in itself to deepen our understanding of the rule of law: with it, we are no closer 
to identifying the essence of the ideal. 
 
2.7.1 Why the rule of law? 
 
Such classification is useful to the extent that it demonstrates the incommensurability of 
various accounts, but says nothing about what it is the rule of law is for. An analysis of the 
various rule of law accounts which starts not from its practical consequences - how is it 
cashed out in the context of an actually-existing legal system; what must we do to achieve it - 
but instead from the implicit or explicit purpose of the ideal will be at least as illuminating as 
an analysis in which that fact is treated as a secondary aspect, if it is considered at all. These 
formal and substantive requirements do not arise spontaneously, but in order to promote a 
good that must be made explicit. And if each of these sets of prescriptions is to genuinely 
represent a plausible conception of the same phenomenon - the rule of law - then each should 
be aimed at the same, or similar, ends. To start from the issue of what the rule of law is for is 
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to ensure that when the question of formal/substantive falls to be considered, we have an end 
against which to measure our preferred means. 
 
This question provides the foundation for a second manner, suggested by Martin Krygier, of 
classifying rule of law accounts.
97
 Krygier groups discussions of the rule of law according to 
their methodology, distinguishing those which are ‘anatomical’ from those which are 
‘teleological.’ Approaches which are anatomical - Krygier identifies that of Dicey, alongside 
those of Hayek
98
 and Fuller
99
 - have two primary characteristics: 
 
“first, their focus is on legal institutions and the norms and practices directly 
associated with them; second, a list of elements of such institutions and 
practices is presented as adding up to the rule of law.” 100 
 
What is central here is how the rule of law is to be achieved, with the question of why it is 
that we might seek to achieve it taken for granted or glossed over. Attention is drawn instead 
to the practices and requirements of law. But, like the question of formal versus substantive 
conceptions (which can be seen to be a further subdivision of anatomical approaches) 
anatomical approaches generally are by definition secondary to and derivative of an 
understanding of why it is that we should want to protect the rule of law: the ‘how’ within the 
rule of law debate is not free-standing debate but lapses into incoherence in the absence of an 
prior ‘why.’ The incomplete theorisation of the rule of law therefore undermines the attempt 
to translate it into a normative programme. Disagreements as to what the rule of law requires 
might be accounted for by the fact that our different principles are in fact aiming at different 
ends and our shared label is of no consequence beyond its rhetorical value. We must 
understand why we want the rule of law - what it is that we aim to achieve through its 
institution - before we can have a meaningful discussion as to how we want to go about doing 
so. 
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2.7.2 The rule of law and the arbitrary exercise of power 
 
In order to avoid the theoretical cul-de-sac into which we are led by attempts to flesh out a 
floating signifier of this sort, we can return to Krygier, who contrasts ‘anatomical’ 
approaches with those which are ‘teleological’. A teleological discussion is one which flips 
round the normal relation between how and why and attempts to give content to the signifier: 
it seeks to identify the value of the rule of law, either in isolation or as a prelude to an 
anatomical exercise of the sort described above. A teleological approach, in starting with the 
end or ends which the rule of law is intended to achieve, makes explicit that which is 
obscured or merely implicit elsewhere. The telos Krygier identifies as giving the rule of law 
its value, is “opposition to arbitrary exercise of power.”101 Krygier gives two reasons for 
which law should seek to exclude such power: “it is frightening, and… it is confusing.”102 
The rule of law as contrasted with the fact of arbitrary power is not confined to its actual 
exercise. As with Pettit’s insistence that vulnerability to arbitrary power is itself an evil - even 
where the power is not being exercised - Krygier insists upon a “very general lesson, very old 
indeed”: 
 
“if you want to avoid arbitrary exercise of power, don’t just trust to luck or 
virtue. When there is room for those with power to act repressively, they are 
sooner or later likely to. If you want to avoid it, something must be done and 
someone must be in a position to do it… the ability to restrain the ways in 
which power is exercised needs to be institutionalised.”103 
 
Although Krygier is correct to identify a methodological distinction within rule of law 
accounts, it should not be thought that the teleology of which he speaks is a contingent 
feature of those accounts, and that it remains possible to advance an argument about what the 
rule of law requires without some notion of what the rule of law is for. Krygier makes a case 
for function over form, but form demands function. Though it may be bundled together 
unhelpfully with the institutional recommendations which derive from it or merely left 
implicit, the teleology of the rule of law is ever-present, and everything ‘anatomical’ follows 
                                                          
101
 Krygier, note 97, at 58. 
102
 Krygier, note 97, at 58. 
103
 Krygier, note 97, at 59. 
63 
 
from it.
104
 The seemingly essential contestability of the rule of law is a function of the extent 
to which, in putting forward anatomical descriptions of the concept, legal thinkers have lost 
sight of its underlying purpose.  
 
2.7.3 Arbitrary power in rule of law scholarship 
 
If we return, for example, to Dicey, we see that underlying at least part of his description of 
the rule of law is a value related to that which Krygier identifies. Its effect, Dicey tells us, is 
to ensure “the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power, and the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative or even a wide 
discretionary authority on the part of the government.”105  The exclusion of the arbitrary 
exercise of power is the key achievement of the rule of law. It is this point which has 
resonated in time and space - far beyond the contingencies of Dicey’s own context and into 
the administrative state whose growth he resisted - and which is frequently the only point of 
agreement amongst otherwise divergent accounts. It is present explicitly in Raz, who, 
however, considers the ability to guide behaviour the ‘virtue’ of the rule of law, holding that 
power can be arbitrary without its behaviour-guiding function being impaired and so sets a 
stricter standard that a general opposition to arbitrary power would suggest;
106
 Friedrich 
Hayek, whose claim that the rule of law requires “the absence of legal privileges of particular 
people designated by authority, which safeguards that equality before the law which is the 
opposite of arbitrary government,” 107  is undermined by his belief that not just central 
economic planning but also the welfare state mean eventually that “somebody’s views will 
have to decide whose interests are more important; and these views must become part of the 
law of the land, a new distinction of rank which the coercive apparatus of government 
imposes upon people” - the law is reopened to status, therefore coercion, therefore 
‘serfdom’;108 and Timothy Endicott, who identifies three grounds on which law might be held 
to be arbitrary (if it “gives effect to the arbitrary will of the rulers,” if it “does not treat like 
cases alike,” and, if it is unpredictable - “if it does not tell its citizens where they stand”) 
eventually holding that the rule of law in the sense of the exclusion of arbitrary power, whilst 
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desirable, is impossible.
109
 Such exclusion is the thread which runs through a series of 
otherwise disparate accounts, connecting it back to the republican empire of laws project. 
Some of the most prominent, of course, promote this telos without naming it (or perhaps 
without even being aware of doing so); others go far beyond what is self-evidently necessary 
and assimilate it with a particular political project.
110
  
 
The rule of law works to protect the individual against arbitrary power - the same value 
which we have identified as being at the heart of the neo-republican revival and which was 
the focus of the classical republican attempts to construct an empire of laws.
111
 Where 
Harrington and the English republicans, however, and Adams following them, were obliged 
to insist upon the institutional dimension of the empire of laws - the separation of power 
between institutions and, crucially, the inclusion of the mass of the people, later thinkers, 
writing when the age of absolutism had passed, have been able to take for granted some or all 
of those fundamentals and speak to the more technical elements of legal practice - so much so 
that the reason for which we insist upon the rule of law has become secondary within the 
discourse.
112
 Now it is in the context of the complex administrative functions of the state and 
the apparatus by which they are pursued that the rule of law speaks loudest. This 
development - the shedding of the institutional dimension of the rule of law, notwithstanding 
that it has a vital role to play in the promotion of the underlying value we have identified for 
the project as a whole - has been so profound as to ground demands for the rule of law even 
where the other values of liberal-legalism are unceremoniously rejected.  
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This is demonstrated in the reflections offered by E.P. Thompson in his Whigs and Hunters, 
responding to the Marxist claim that, the law being merely “an instrument of the de facto 
ruling class,” the rule of law is “only another mask for the rule of a class” in which the 
revolutionary should take no interest.
113
  He disputes the claim to crude mystification made 
by those who critique law from the left: people “will not be mystified by the first man who 
puts on a wig” and so the law must “apply logical criteria with reference to standards of 
universality and equity.”114  If it does not, if it is “evidently partial and unjust”, then it will 
“mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class’s hegemony.”115  Even, 
then, where law acted in favour of the powerful against the powerless, for one class against 
the other, the law “mediated these class relations through legal forms, which imposed, again 
and again, inhibitions upon the actions of rulers.”116  From this we can conclude that: 
 
“there is a very large difference, which twentieth-century experience ought to 
have made clear even to the most exalted thinker, between arbitrary extra-legal 
power and the rule of law.”117  
 
This rule of law - the “inhibitions upon power imposed by law” - is for Thompson “a legacy 
as substantial as any handed down from the struggles of seventeenth century,” while the fact 
of “regulation and reconciliation of conflicts through the rule of law” is a “cultural 
achievement of universal significance.”118  Lest we fear that Thompson is ‘starry-eyed’ about 
this, he underlines that his claim is a minor, obvious one - that “there is a difference between 
arbitrary power and the rule of law” and that though “we ought to expose the shams and 
inequities which may be concealed beneath this law,” the rule of law ideal itself, the 
“imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen from power’s 
all-intrusive claims” is an “unqualified human good.”119 No matter what else might be true - 
particularly regarding the interests served by the law and the mode by which it is given 
content - we should prefer arbitrary power to be excluded by law. 
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This claim, modest compared to the proclamations of those who take a more orthodox liberal 
view of law, sparked considerable controversy.
120
 Morton Horwitz’s response is instructive: 
 
“[The rule of law] undoubtedly restrains power, but it also prevents power’s 
benevolent exercise. It creates formal equality - a not inconsiderable virtue - 
but it promotes substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that 
radically separates law from politics, means from ends, process from 
outcomes… it enables the shrewd, the calculating and the wealthy to 
manipulate its forms to their own advantage.”121   
 
It is not the claim of this work that the achievement of the rule of law in the form of the 
exclusion of the capacity for public power to be exercised on an arbitrary basis will lead to 
progressive political outcomes, nor that it will work to the advantage of the disadvantaged. It 
is, however, its claim that in a condition of plurality, there exists a need for institutions 
through which public power can be exercised, and that in order for those made free by the 
institutions of government to remain free, the power which they exercise must be exercised in 
a non-arbitrary fashion; that is, through, and in a manner limited by, law. We can therefore 
side with Thompson, and designate the rule of law as a necessary - though by itself wholly 
insufficient - condition of republican freedom. 
 
2.7.4 Republican freedom and the rule of law 
  
The meaning Pettit gives to arbitrariness is quite particular - “chosen or rejected without 
reference to the interests, or opinions, of those affected”122 - such that non-arbitrariness from 
the republican perspective is both a more exacting standard than the merely ‘non-arbitrary’ of 
ordinary language might suggest and more precise than Harrington’s implication that law is 
arbitrary if it does not ‘procede from the will’ of all persons. The exercise of power without 
reference to the interests of those who live under it is indeed a key form of arbitrariness, but 
in a legal context, it is not the only one. Locke entangled it with another: 
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“As Usurpation is the exercise of Power, which another hath a Right to; so 
Tyranny is the exercise of Power beyond Right, which no Body can have a 
Right to. And this is making the use of the Power any one has in his hands; not 
for the good of those, who are under it, but for his own private, separate 
Advantage.”123 
 
Tocqueville similarly enmeshes the two, claiming that “A distinction must be drawn between 
tyranny and arbitrary power. Tyranny may be exercised by means of the law itself, and in that 
case it is not arbitrary; arbitrary exercise may be exercised for the public good, in which case 
it is not tyrannical. Tyranny usually employs arbitrary means, but if necessary it can do 
without them.”124 In linking arbitrariness to the question of how the law is given specific 
content, Pettit has followed theorists of the rule of law in presupposing certain facts, central 
to the foregoing account, which make a similar contribution to protecting the individual 
against the existence of arbitrary power. The first is the very existence of an organised system 
of public power, without which the individual is unfree, albeit horizontally rather than 
vertically. The second is that the power exercised in the name of the public must be exercised 
through law; without legal basis it is, as Locke suggests, power without right, offending 
against the principle represented in the common law by Entick v Carrington, a principle 
whose application goes far beyond the rights of property to which Camden LJ originally tied 
it.
125
 The third is that the law must apply to public authorities themselves. Power without 
lawful authority and power against law are inherently arbitrary; both are breaches of the rule 
of law ideal and an offence against republican freedom.  
 
Pettit’s account of how law can be rendered non-arbitrary is procedural, and presupposes a 
generic formalist rule of law account if it is to not be wasted: that the law tracks the interests 
of those who live under its auspices means nothing - nothing at all - if in practice power is 
exercised without legal authority, or if the law does not bind public authorities themselves. 
He too risks losing sight of what is taken for granted in all this; of the many, preliminary 
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ways, in which the exercise of public power might be arbitrary. In either case, arbitrariness 
will result regardless of its content. Though it will not be subject to a full treatment in the 
present work, this indicates that one of the primary legal mechanisms through which 
republican freedom as non-domination will be protected is that which seeks to ensure that 
public power is exercised only with lawful authority: administrative law. It is clear, for 
example, that the ultra vires rule might be justified on such a basis; whether the other grounds 
of review known to the common law might similarly be justified is more difficult, though 
there is at least a prima facie case that challenges on the basis of due process and rationality 
are relevant to republican freedom. The question of whether or not these procedural and 
formal elements might not be augmented by substantive limits - whether or not there are 
certain things that public power cannot be capable of doing without exposing citizens to the 
threat of arbitrary power and so rendering them unfree
126
 - will be considered in our third part. 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
 
In putting forward his own account of the rule of law, Lord Bingham describes a regime in 
which the rule of law is flouted. It is striking.  Its hallmarks include: 
 
“the midnight knock on the door, the sudden disappearance, the show trial, the 
subjection of prisoners to genetic experiment, the confession extracted by 
torture, the gulag and the concentration camp, the practice of genocide or 
ethnic cleansing, the waging of aggressive war.”127 
 
The argument of this chapter is at odds with this portrayal. Certainly, many of the events 
mentioned are indeed indicative of a violation of the rule of law. However, in focusing on the 
most egregious breaches of fundamental rights, likely to offend the sensibilities of any 
observer regardless of political orientation, there is the considerable risk of obscuring those 
breaches which have a more technical dimension and the resistance of which is wholly 
without glamour. The rule of law, like the empire of laws before it, promotes the republican 
                                                          
126
 The overlap of these procedural and substantive dimensions is encapsulated in the suggestions made by 
various members of the House of Lords in Jackson v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 that there might exist 
a substantive (common law) right which prevents the deprivation of the substantive right to bring a challenge 
even on the formal grounds via an ouster clause or similar mechanism. 
127
 Bingham, note 86, at 9. 
69 
 
ideal of freedom by guarding against arbitrary government action. Most such action lacks the 
visceral impact of the examples in Bingham’s vignette. It is action that is arbitrary because 
not authorised by law; arbitrary because lacking a legally-appropriate justification, or 
otherwise unreasonable; arbitrary because in contravention of basic principles of justice 
without which arbitrariness is inevitable.  A legal system which prevents such things can be 
endorsed quite apart from issues of constitutional design. 
 
We started this chapter with an examination of Bentham’s claim about the inherently 
freedom-reducing nature of law, looking at how the republican ideal of freedom legitimates 
the existence of the public power which law controls and how that power, must be exercised 
according to central standards - commonly described under the rubric of the rule of law - if it 
is not to institute a vertical relationship of domination. The move into civil society does not, 
however, put an end to horizontal unfreedom, of which the rule of law ideal as traditionally 
framed has nothing to say. We turn to it now.  
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Part 2 - Chapter 3: Private Unfreedom and Public Power 
 
3.1 Horizontal unfreedom and public power 
 
In the first section of this work, the neo-republican ideal of freedom as non-domination was 
described. A case was made for it on the basis, in particular, of its acknowledgment of the 
individual as necessarily embedded in a social context. This was pursued in chapter 2. It was 
shown that the neo-republican ideal rejects the claim that law is inherently reductive of 
freedom. We then reconsidered Hobbes’ state of nature device. Where Hobbes saw a trade 
between freedom and security in the move into civil society, it was instead argued that he 
trades one form of unfreedom for another. The ideal which, in republican terms, justifies the 
existence of an organised public power - that of freedom as non-domination; protection 
against the arbitrary exercise of power - transpires to be identical with that which, in the form 
of the rule of law, lays down certain requirements as to the relationship between law and 
power, even prior to a consideration of the content of the law. The first of these is that there 
must exist a public power whose use law can govern. 
 
The existence of an organised public power and associated coercive apparatus is justified by 
the possibility of horizontal domination in its absence. Its exercise through, and limitation by, 
law is a function of the vertical domination which would otherwise occur - which would 
result from an unlimited or unrestrained public power. In this second part, we explore the 
forms of horizontal domination which do not merely survive but are exacerbated by the 
apparatus of public power which exists ostensibly to protect man from man. With a view to 
producing a general theory of law and horizontal domination, we start by considering two 
challenges posed in the past to republican thought which take as their focus horizontal 
relationships. Each speaks to the nature and sources of unfreedom in modern society; together 
they point towards a republican constitutionalism which protects against both horizontal and 
vertical domination. 
 
3.2 Slavery: the ideal type of horizontal unfreedom 
 
We have distinguished between horizontal and vertical domination. The effect of each is to 
create what republican writers have referred to as a condition of slavery. The master-slave 
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relationship being invoked as the antithesis of republican freedom, of course, is a horizontal 
relationship. As the paradigmatic form of the relationship at issue in talk of horizontal 
domination, it is useful to consider the features of the relationship which we recognise, albeit 
in the form of a more or less pale reflection, elsewhere. The image is a powerful one, but to 
fully conflate chattel slavery with the unequal relationships which are the subject of this 
chapter is to undermine through exaggeration. Its rhetorical strength should not be abused.  
 
In the master-slave relationship, the asymmetry of the relationship is everything. One party is 
privileged as the bearer of legal rights; the other their object. The master makes all decisions 
for the slave, acquiring and disposing of him or her at will, even gaining ownership of his or 
her offspring, while the moral and legal subjectivity of the slave is strangled. Deprived not 
merely of the ability to flourish as a human being but of the most fundamental autonomy, the 
slave knows the horror of being entirely dependent upon his master. This is true not only on 
the ordinary sense of the term, whereby the slave is reliant upon the master for food, shelter 
and other fundamentals of survival (handed over on the basis of a particularly cruel form of 
‘enlightened’ self-interest, much as one might conduct repairs to protect the value of an 
important asset) but also in the republican sense, whereby any respite is illusory, the master 
possessing the ability to interfere arbitrarily with the interests of the slave.
1
 This contingency 
is central. It will be remembered that the image of the slave with the benevolent master 
helped to distinguish liberal from republican freedom. That image must be borne in mind in 
the course of the discussion which follows. It is true of some of our examples that the fact of 
interference is intermittent and exceptional - even more so than in the case of the slave with 
the benevolent master. That the potential for arbitrary interference nevertheless persists is the 
basis on which verdicts of horizontal unfreedom - the claim that one party lives at the mercy 
of another - are arrived at.  
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3.2.1 Public power and private domination 
 
In considering the many forms of horizontal domination, it is important to first distinguish the 
situation of chattel slavery (which we take as a model; an ideal type) from what we have 
called ‘pure’ horizontal domination - that of one man by another in the absence of an 
established public authority, such as would be a feature of a hypothesised state of nature. The 
legalised form of horizontal domination is both ‘better’ and ‘worse’ - each term of course 
bearing a sense suitably adapted to the context - than that which occurs in the absence of law 
and the state. Its impurity does not amount to a dilution; instead the mediation of the 
horizontal relationship by public power puts the coercive apparatus of the state at the service 
of man against man. Here, it is not sufficient for the slave to escape, as it might be were the 
slave’s status as such based merely upon physical force, for the reach of the master’s writ 
extends as far as that of the public power which will enforce his ‘rights’ over the slave. 
Worse also in that it demands not even the minimum of strength, cunning or effort that is 
required for one to domineer over another in the absence of the state.  Finding the force of 
law behind them, the weak and foolish are just as capable of enslaving, and the fact of greater 
strength no longer serves to resist. The existence of public power therefore multiplies the 
dominion of master over slave, legitimating his personal interferences by giving them the 
force of law and offering him new modes of interfering. A prime example is found in the 
American Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which required federal officials, even if located in 
states which themselves prohibited slavery, to nevertheless return runaway slaves to their 
masters. This law placed Northerners in a position where their own institutions and legal 
structures were used to protect the interests of Southern slaveholders.
2
 No longer was it 
possible to take a passive approach to slavery: one was being compelled to actively maintain 
it. Where individual States attempted to resist that federal command, as did Wisconsin and 
Vermont, they withdrew their coercive apparatus and so limited the extent to which a 
slaveholder could expect public power to take his side in the dispute. Civil war soon followed. 
The existence of public power has not, therefore, put an end to horizontal unfreedom, but 
given  it a new breadth and depth. And though public power extends the dominion over man, 
the fact of horizontal domination within a legal system means there exist some minimal limits 
on how horizontal power can be exercised: the master can use its coercive apparatus to 
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exercise interference of which he personally would not be capable but encounters that same 
apparatus when his own interferences take a form prohibited by law.
3
  
 
Slavery, though a horizontal relationship, cannot exist in the absence of a public power which 
puts the coercive apparatus of the state at the disposal of master against slave. It is 
qualitatively different from a situation in which one party dominates another by virtue of 
physical capacity alone. Consequently, like all horizontal relationships of domination which 
are dependent upon the backing of public power (deployed according to law) to sustain them, 
it could have been and in fact was, abolished through law.
4
 The ability of the master to 
interfere and the correlative disability of the slave to resist were both artefacts of law. When 
the law no longer permits the relevant interference and permits to the slave the same power of 
resistance as any other person would enjoy - the right to meet force with force, without fear 
of encountering instead the power of the state - then arbitrary (freedom-reducing) interference 
involves infraction of the law. This account will inform all further analysis of those 
horizontal relationships of domination which subsist in the presence of law; which exist 
because the law permits them or sustains them and which, like slavery, will therefore be 
amenable (at least in part) to abolition by law. 
 
3.3 Republicanism and feminism 
 
It is from the master-slave relationship that we begin when discussing horizontal relationships 
of domination that have been, or might plausibly be, identified as worthy of attention within 
neo-republican scholarship, the relationship between master and slave demonstrating that 
many forms of horizontal domination do not exist in the interstices of the state but take it as 
                                                          
3
 For an account of the outer limits of the slaveholder’ lawful control over his slaves, see Thomas D. Morris, 
Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619-1860, University of North Carolina Press (1996), at 161-208. 
4
 In the United States abolition was effected by means of the Thirteenth Amendment, providing that “Neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Somersett's Case 
(1772) 20 State Tr 1 suggested that slavery was no part of the English common law (though it is not clear that its 
legacy accords with what was in fact decided: see Jerome Nadelhaft, The Somersett Case and Slavery: Myth, 
Reality, and Repercussions (1966) Journal of Negro History 193). The Slave Trade Act of 1807 abolished 
“the African Slave Trade, and all and all manner of dealing and trading in the Purchase, Sale, Barter, or Transfer 
of Slaves, or of Persons intended to be sold, transferred, used, or dealt with as Slaves, practiced or carried on, in, 
at, to or from any Part of the Coast or Countries of Africa.” The Slavery Abolition Act 1833 brought to an end, 
in stages, the institutions of slavery and indentured servitude themselves. 
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their sine qua non. Chattel slavery no longer exists in the majority of the world,
5
 and so we 
take the history of republican thought as a guide to areas of life in which less obvious 
domination might persist. One of these is relationships of domination in which the decisive 
factor is gender, and so we consider the relationship between republicanism and feminism.  
 
Republicanism has frequently been condemned for its aristocratic nature: many forms of 
republicanism have been and continue to be either non-democratic or only contingently 
democratic.
6
 A broader perspective encourages the suspicion that such elitism exemplifies an 
omnipresent hypocrisy: almost every thinker we find extolling the virtues of republican 
freedom does so while assuming that such freedom could not possibly apply to a certain 
section of the population, whether slaves in ancient Greece or colonial America
7
 or the 
unpropertied or women in 17
th
 century England.
8
 To deploy the ideal in the context of 
horizontal domination is impossible if this sort of discriminatory aspect is inherent within it. 
Freedom for the few that requires slavery, literal or metaphorical, for the many, is no freedom 
at all. 
 
3.3.1 Feminism against republicanism 
 
The critique of republican aristocratic exclusionism has found purchase within feminism, and 
it is clear that “[i]n its classical formulation, republicanism is far from woman-friendly.”9 
Anne Phillips has suggested that republicanism in general is “ominously dismissive of 
femininity and women,”10 and takes as a specific exemplar of this Hannah Pitkin’s work on 
Machiavelli and her observations about the place of women in it: firstly, that “women 
scarcely appear in the political writings. They are almost entirely confined to Machiavelli’s 
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plays and poetry, depicting private life or fantasy worlds,”11 but also that “nothing is more 
striking in Machiavelli’s explicit remarks on women than his contempt for the ‘weaker 
sex’.”12  Women “are somehow simultaneously both virginal or chaste and passionate or 
potentially capable of sexual abandon…They are objects of men’s desire, conquest, or of 
possession.” 13  No matter how difficult the task of effecting a reconciliation between 
feminism and a republicanism that has neglected, or demonstrated an active hostility towards, 
women, it remains possible so long as Machiavelli’s misogyny is a companion to rather than 
a result of his republican predilections or, alternatively, the causal connection between 
republicanism and misogyny is broken in replacing the many historical republicanisms with 
the singular form of the neo-republican movement. This would seem to be the case: in the 
Discourses on Livy, his most obviously republican work, women are mostly absent rather 
than disparaged and their most prominent appearance, in the claim that that “women have 
been the cause of many downfalls, and have done great damage to those who govern a city, 
and have caused many divisions”14 relates not to their own misdeeds, but to the misdeeds of 
men against them: the problems in his treatment of women do not flow directly from his 
republicanism. That correlation does not demonstrate causation is, however, insufficient 
ground for obscuring said correlation, and Machiavelli is not alone among republicans in 
having an attitude towards women which makes their neglect the better of the available 
options. It seems fair to agree that republicanism has never offered the most promising 
foundations on which to attempt to advance the position of women in society. 
 
3.3.2 Feminism against non-domination 
 
The general relationship between the many republicanisms and feminism is less important 
than is the application of the neo-republican ideal of non-domination to the position of 
women within society. Given that here many of republicanism’s most problematic features - 
“masculine images of democratic participation and public activism,”15 culminating in a belief 
that the individual should be ready and willing to take up arms for his (always his) country - 
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are absent, the relationship is immediately less tense. But the non-domination ideal’s 
historical career is tied up with this exclusionism, and so has been similarly deficient in the 
case of women as have other republican variants. Patricia Springborg has highlighted the 
patriarchal tendencies of republican thought through the work of proto-feminist thinkers who 
“had no compunction about exposing as a sham the pretence to freedom from domination as a 
universal ideal in states which institutionally excluded half of humankind.”16 She argues that 
the distinction between liberal and republican conceptions of freedom would seem to be 
overstated when one considers that historically neither was concerned by the systematic 
unfreedom of womankind:  
 
“Hobbes and Locke, by construing the public/private distinction as zones of 
freedom and unfreedom, ruled out freedom and rights in the household. 
Women, and particularly married women, were seen as ‘natural slaves’, a 
condition to which they were consigned by liberals and republicans alike.”17  
 
Women are dually excluded if republican thought is seen is this light: the majority by reason 
of belonging to the section of the population for which aristocratic variants of republicanism 
show no regard; the ‘fortunate’ few by reason of legal subordination to their husbands. If not 
caught at the first sift, most would be at the second. We are put on warning of a dual 
possibility of differential enjoyment of freedom: that between women and men, which is a 
form of domination with potential basis in both law and nature, and that between men and 
single women on one hand and married women on the other. Marriage being a legal 
institution, the latter is a differential which must exist primarily as a function of the legal 
rules in place. We see that the issue of gender domination, like the issue of slavery, likely 
implicates contingent legal rules, both at the level at which civil rights battles have been 
fought and won (such as the scope of the franchise) and at the level, more mundane but just 
as crucial, of family law. 
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3.3.3 Mary Astell 
 
To make good on the deficit of freedom in respect of women was a challenge which even the 
most populist republicanism of the times could not meet. Even an unusually democratic 
republicanism made no room for them. This was inconsistent with the logic of non-
domination - as Mary Astell, the proto-feminist on whom Sprinborg places the greatest 
emphasis, famously asked,  
 
“If all Men are born free, how is it that all Women are born Slaves? As they 
must be if the being subjected to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary 
Will of Men, be the perfect Condition of Slavery.”18  
 
The republican ideal, and the recurring image of slavery, here provides a counter to the claim 
of freedom associated with liberal thought, almost a century before Wollstonecraft stated that 
of the history of women it was sufficient to know “that she has always been either a slave or a 
despot… and.. that each of these situations equally retards the progress of reason.”19 Astell’s 
argument, chiefly against Locke, proceeds through a consideration of the analogy between 
sovereign and paterfamilias from which, in Filmer, her argument stands twice-removed. 
Where Locke had laid the foundations of a philosophy of limited government by rejecting 
Filmer’s identification of sovereign with father, he had nevertheless made sure to distinguish 
the power of “a Magistrate over a Subject” - political power - from that of “a Father over his 
Children, a Master over his Servant, a Husband over his Wife, and a Lord over his Slave.”20 
Wives owe their husbands subjection; husbands have a ‘conjugal power’ over wives, “to 
order the things of private Concernment in his Family… and to have his Will take place 
before that of his wife in all things of their common Concernment.”21 That his conjugal 
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power is not political power - that the husband has no power of life or death over her - is 
scant consolation.
22
 Locke’s interest is only that the divinely-willed subjection of Eve to 
Adam does not, contra Filmer, found a Monarchical power which requires Eve and her heirs 
to be permanently subject to Adam and his, the Divine Monarchs.
23
 Astell has little patience 
for these distinctions between actors, and their effect of discriminating between men in their 
political existence and women in their ‘private’ one. Locke and his fellow liberal 
constitutionalists are upbraided for their inconsistency:  
 
“is it not then partial in Men to the last degree to contend for, and practise, the 
Arbitrary Dominion in their Families which they abhor and exclaim against in 
the State? For if Arbitrary power is evil in itself, and an improper Method of 
Governing Rational and Free Agents, it ought not to Practis’d anywhere.”24 
 
Those who rejected the right of a single tyrant on a throne nevertheless countenanced the 
existence of tens of thousands of such tyrants, defined as by their own standard, in every 
household in the land. The ‘Reflections upon Marriage’, the “first articulated critique of the 
analogue between the marriage contract and the social contract on which early modern 
natural theories so depend,” 25  is therefore also a critique of the partial application of a 
normative standard of freedom. Notwithstanding the supposed natural condition of freedom, 
the laws placed half of the population in a situation of vulnerability to the arbitrary exercise 
of power. Men achieved freedom, but condemned women to unfreedom. The various 
conceptions of liberty, “whether articulated by Hobbesian absolutists, Filmerian 
patriarchalists, Lockean liberals, Miltonian democrats or Harringtonian republicans” did not 
imply radical change in society: in fact, each “left everything more or less as it was.”26 The 
same state of nature device which Skinner considers to have obscured republican liberty 
acted to historicise “the distinction between the law of nature and the law of nations,” 
effectively constituting the state as: 
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“a mythical public sphere in which the writ of natural law still ran, and where 
men were free and equal creatures, while allowing the arbitrary inequalities of 
ius gentium, or statutory law, to flourish unabated in the private sphere.”27 
 
3.3.4 Forms of gendered domination  
 
Though we take our lead from Astell, we must be more precise in identifying the 
phenomenon at issue here. There are three forms of gendered domination we might want to 
distinguish. The first is the domination of individual females by individual males - a personal 
relationship of domination, of the sort created by a contract of marriage at the time Astell was 
writing, with marriage effectively rendering the relationship between man and wife one of 
domination. The second is the domination of women as a gender by the state, whether or not 
it subsists on equal terms to that of men. If it does - because, for example, power is exercised 
either without legal basis or in a way which fails to track the interests of those who live under 
it - there is nothing to distinguish it from the general vertical domination by the state. If it 
does not - if it is domination of women, but not of men by the state because, for example, the 
franchise is denied to women - it is likely to appear, at first glance, similar to the third form 
of domination, that of women as a group by men as a group. If we assume the political 
community to be composed of men and women in roughly equal proportions, it is tempting to 
conflate one with the other. The effect is superficially similar: one half of the demos is 
systematically degraded in its position while the basis of the distinction - gender - is identical 
in each case. Nevertheless, for the reason given above, it is important to maintain the 
distinction: by inserting public power between the dominating party (men) and the dominated 
one (women), the strength of the domination is multiplied even if its domain is truncated. The 
sort of horizontal gendered domination which might occur in the state of nature (or wherever 
else the absence/failure of public power is such as to leave open the possibility of one section 
of society dominating another) is, again, both ‘better’ and ‘worse’ than is that which is 
possible where the domination is mediated by public power. In such a situation, the 
differential treatment in question can be formalised by law and enforced by the coercive 
apparatus of the state. 
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3.3.5 The lowest common denominator 
 
At first sight, then, we find the application of the non-domination ideal to the circumstances 
of women an appealing example of the ideal employed correctly. The potential use of Astell’s 
work to redeem republicanism - incorporating her critique of liberalism within it and thereby 
claiming her for the republican tradition - is, however, hampered by the fact that, though 
Astell’s criticisms were aimed at the emerging liberalism of the late 17th century, she argued 
not for a republican alternative, but for the superiority of monarchy: “[n]ot only was Astell 
not a republican but an out-and-out royalist, but she was not a rights theorist either” and 
attempts to claim her for either the republican or human rights traditions misidentify values 
which are in fact “the diffusion of Renaissance classical humanism.”28 Astell was a High 
Church Tory,
29
 for whom the attraction of monarchy was that it secured the freedom of 
women from men: “In bypassing the political contract made by men, Astell at once invoked 
the earlier doctrine of the divine right of monarchs over all subjects alike and… denied the 
power of all men over all women.”30 Men could not dominate women if one and all were 
dominated on equal terms by a monarch chosen by God. Similarly, the ‘contract’ of marriage 
gives rise to a relationship which civil authorities have no power to create: “[t]he power to 
authorise marriage, like the power to authorize a sovereign, is in her view a power assigned 
only to God.”31 
 
While Astell’s anti-liberal rhetoric is strongly reminiscent of modern republican arguments, 
then, her work is at cross-purposes with it, for the republicanism available to her was no 
better than its liberal competitor in securing the freedom of women from the domination of 
men, even she had not regarded it as “a species of heresy.”32 Non-interference applied only to 
the public realm; non-domination only to men. In such a context, returning to the lowest 
common denominator was rational, if doing so was the only way to resolve the disparity. But 
the history of progressive female emancipation demonstrates that there exists a solution 
which does not require the sacrifice of the ideal to an imperfect solution: the second type of 
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domination described above has largely disappeared not by increasing the arbitrariness of 
governmental power as it applies to men but by a series of reforms aimed at including women 
in the democratic process and thereby promoting the exercise of public power in a manner 
which suitably tracks their interests. Similarly, in the case of horizontal domination, we 
observe that the reconfiguration of the relative rights and obligations of man and woman can 
provide a solution which diminishes the unfreedom of women rather than merely diluting the 
freedom of all.  
 
3.4 Neo-republican redemption? 
 
Neo-republicanism speaks specifically to historically dominated groups. Pettit not only sees 
no conflict between republican and feminist ideals, but suggests that the former subsumes the 
latter into a larger project: 
 
“if the main problem for women is that cultural, legal, and institutional 
pressures combine to… place them under the thumb of men - then the ideal for 
women is precisely that of being secured against arbitrary interference.”33  
 
He refers to Astell’s famous question as proof of “the appeal of non-domination as a feminist 
ideal” and traces it through Wollstonecraft and Mill (“No slave is a slave to the same lengths, 
and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is”) into modern thought.34 Elsewhere, the central 
ideal of neo-republicanism incorporates past republican concerns under its own rubric; here 
its use as our normative lodestar permits us to incorporate concerns and themes to which 
republicanism was historically hostile. So “[n]ot only can republicanism offer a persuasive 
articulation of the central feminist claims” but this ideal, Pettit claims, is one which “has had 
a continuous history within the ranks of feminists themselves.”35 The effect is to reconceive 
the feminist project as an applied republicanism: though enjoying a distinct history, it is 
continuous with the larger neo-republican project. Pettit openly admits, however, that “[t]here 
is much to be done on this front. Whatever the progress made in modern states, women still 
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have to endure a special vulnerability in many homes, in various workplaces, and on the 
streets of different cities.”36  
 
Conflicting assessments of this application of the non-domination ideal to the status of 
women are offered by Marilyn Friedman
37
 and Nancy Hirschmann.
38
 The former suggests 
that the ideal is too broad insofar as it would seem to characterise the mother-child 
relationship as one of domination - though legal rules circumscribe the mother’s scope for 
interference with her children - and the latter that it is overly focused on individuals and 
therefore fails to capture forms of potential interference not capable of being attributed to a 
particular agent.
39
 The present work, as will be understood from the discussion above, is 
wholly cognisant of those forms of domination which are not reducible to individuals but 
instead occur in the relation between groups of actors, while nevertheless endorsing the use 
of the freedom as non-domination ideal in this context. Though the neo-republican project 
has demonstrated an ironically imperialistic tendency, it is important to leave intact what it 
finds here: its ideal, if it is part of feminist thought, must be understood as exactly that - a part, 
rather than the whole, or even its core.  
 
Neo-republicans having accepted this application of their project, it seems strange that the 
topic of gender domination has remained a minor neo-republican concern. Though Pettit’s 
claim that “Even while freedom as non-domination looked accessible only to males, it held 
out a prospect that made sense also for females”40 may well be true (though it would be better 
phrased as a hypothetical: women were largely excluded not just from the ideal, but also from 
the discussions of it), it is hardly sufficient to address the historical shortcomings of the 
tradition. That the logic was always present means little if assumptions about the world to 
which it was applied and the attitude of those who relied upon it were such as to contradict 
the logic. It does, however, provide the opportunity for neo-republicanism to learn from the 
mistakes of its forbearers, and follow its own logic through to the (belated) conclusion that 
“There is… something awry in an arrangement that saves men from a dominated status, and 
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that represents that status as degraded and demeaning, while exposing women to precisely 
that sort of standing in relation to men.”41 This conclusion can be endorsed in its generality 
even if its understated tone suggests a lingering reluctance to learn the lesson being stated. 
Does not a ‘special vulnerability’ such as Pettit describes imply a special urgency with regard 
to the factors which give rise to domination where the only meaningful difference between 
dominating and dominated parties is gender? If this question is answered in the affirmative - 
as it is submitted it must be - then feminist preoccupations move to the centre of neo-
republican attempts at reducing domination. 
 
Another aspect of the neo-republican project is likely to diminish the utility of its application 
to feminism: its inheritance of the liberal presupposition that freedom is threatened 
principally by the state. No longer is the principal source of gendered domination the 
systematic exclusion of women from the political process, even if imbalances in political 
representation remain.
42
 When it was, when women were excluded from the vote or offered it 
on different terms to their male counterparts, the primary form of gendered domination was 
vertical: the exercise of public power was systematically biased towards the interest of men, 
and its exercise on women could not be other than arbitrary. It is this form of unfreedom at 
which suffragette struggles were most directly oriented. However, this vertical domination 
was accompanied by an intermediate layer, largely contingent upon it, of horizontal 
domination: when Astell was writing about the unfreedom of women it was not as related to 
the state but to their husbands and the heads of their households, a form of unfreedom 
qualitatively distinct from that of those, for example, imprisoned by the state without legal 
authority. Pettit is therefore correct to refer to homes, places of work and the street as sites of 
domination, but wrong in his failure to distinguish unfreedom by law with unfreedom against 
law; relationships of domination which the law supports from those which involve infraction 
of the law. As with legalised slavery, we retain a special concern for the capacity for arbitrary 
interference which is dependent upon the public power law directs. Such capacity is not 
directly removed merely by the expansion of the franchise so as to allow female participation 
in the political process: this is a longer and harder process which carries on long beyond the 
victory that starts it. 
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3.4.1 Pure gender-based horizontal domination 
 
It is not difficult to see how the absence or failure of public power implies the ‘pure’ 
domination of the female gender; how, when there is no public power standing between 
private actors, women are frequently subject to the arbitrary interference with their interests 
by men. The very existence of public power is justified in the first place by the fact that in its 
absence, one encounters a situation of pervasive domination. On that basis, it should be clear 
that where conviction rates for sexual offences remain absurdly low;
43
 where sexual crime 
frequently goes unreported;
44
 where women live at the mercy of men, then public power has 
failed. The arbitrary interferences in question involve breaking the law - pitting oneself 
against organised public power - only in some abstract, theoretical sense: in practice, they 
happen so regularly, and with so few consequences, that those who interfere might be said to 
do so at their pleasure. This is not a state of nature in which the ability of one to dominate 
another results from the absence of any public power which might prevent it, but the effect is 
largely the same; women nevertheless live at the mercy of men. Nevertheless, our focus 
herein is on that domination which takes place with the tacit consent or active backing of 
public power, and so no more will be said on the topic. 
 
3.4.2 Public and private in (feminist) republicanism 
 
The argument that neo-republicanism must overcome the limitations it places on itself via its 
assumptions about the direction of dominating relationships echoes feminist concerns as to 
the hidden domination of woman in society notwithstanding the formal legal equality they 
have (largely) achieved and so “to the extent that [republicanism] conceives of independence 
as a political - rather than social or economic - condition, it is also out of tune with many later 
[feminist] preoccupations.” 45  Much such hidden domination is achieved through the 
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relegation of certain practices and relationships to a domain marked as ‘private’, away from 
the citizen-state relationship which, as an inheritance of liberal presuppositions, has been a 
focus of neo-republican thought.
46
 An approach which attempts to redress the balance 
between dominium and imperium makes possible the incorporation of an explicitly feminist 
element into the republican project, opening the project up to those areas in which 
domination persists.  
 
Attempts to tear down the barrier between public and private are therefore a recurring feature 
of feminist thought, much as they are within much critical
47
 and even orthodox
48
 legal 
literature. In arguing for a republican sympathy with these projects, we are obliged to clarify 
that neo-republicanism overcomes this barrier not by dismantling it (though its fragility must 
never be obscured), but instead by providing an ideal in which unfreedom in the private 
sphere, in one’s private relations, is just as unacceptable as that which occurs in the public 
sphere through the instrument of the state. No-one is forced out into the open, but the choice 
or the need to remain in private should not condemn any person to the sort of domination that 
has often resulted there. Though the categories of public and private remain, and with them 
the imperium/dominium distinction, they denote not spheres of human activity which remain 
closed off, the one from the other, but instead two forms of relationship which are inevitably 
interactive. Even the most traditionally ‘private’ of relationships cannot fail to be impacted by 
the mere existence of a ‘public’ power and the coercive apparatus it entails and, specifically, 
the question of the conditions under which private parties will enjoy the support of - or meet 
the resistance of - that public power in his or her dealings with various ‘others’. 
 
The importance of neo-republicanism therefore becomes clear only when it is realised that 
the difference between domination by the state on one hand and domination of women and 
the dispossessed on the other is but a shift of perspective, involving a step back which brings 
into focus the role of the state in mediating this latter domination. Not only is it true that there 
is no reason why the republican critique of dominating political systems and rulers “should 
not apply to the dominance of employers over workers or the dominance of husbands over 
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wives”49 but such applicability is what makes the neo-republican ideal of non-domination 
prime a strong candidate for a fundamental principle of social, and eventually legal, analysis. 
To take this line is to make neo-republicanism more political that it has been hitherto; more 
willing to discuss the distribution of power in actually-existing societies, and the ability of a 
given group to interfere arbitrarily with the interests of another. It moves us away from the 
sort of constitutional incrementalism which assumes that the only significant question of 
freedom is the correct relationship between citizen and state and the only law relevant to 
freedom is that which governs that relationship. Where liberal considerations of the role of 
law in vindicating freedom demonstrate a liminal quality, concerned with unfreedom which is 
exceptional, occurring at the margin of the social body in relation to individuals whose 
situation is resolutely dissimilar to that of the ordinary citizen, we are here able to shift our 
concern, via the inclusion of horizontal domination, to more generalised and pervasive forms 
of unfreedom. This is a good thing, and must be acknowledged as one. To make this move is 
to revive the link between the abstract discourse of freedom and the daily lived experience of 
real people, embedded in real systems, whose lives can be improved only where it is 
understood that the grand and the mundane are both vital - both equally vital - to the 
protection and promotion of freedom. 
 
3.5 Economic republicanism 
 
Domination by the state (as addressed by a concern for the rule of law in chapter 2 and, later, 
for issues of constitutional design) or on grounds of gender do not exhaust the scope of the 
present work. We must not unduly restrict the range of situations in which one party might 
plausibly be said to dominate another, nor the forms of domination which we wish to undo. It 
has been suggested that “Skinner’s conception of ‘republican liberty’ fails to capture the 
spectrum of debate on freedom… because it skirts the wide scope of dependence.”50 This 
failure has the effect of denying the radical potential of republican thought:  
 
“we might conclude that [Skinner’s] own deliberate detachment from social 
realities is intended to blunt the critical edge of political thought, intended to 
make it essentially innocuous, intended to weaken its challenge to power, let 
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alone to the existing social order… his historical work and his mode of 
contextualisation have the consequence, if not the intent, of narrowing the 
scope of political debate, no less today than in the English Civil War.”51 
 
This is correct, and one further example of what is excluded by the unduly circumscribed 
conception of dependence is that domination which is economic in origin, an exclusion which 
has significant consequences for the possibility of a republican engagement with 
contemporary political trends. Republicanism, in opposing itself to liberalism, is implicitly 
claiming for itself a mantle until recently worn by Marxist thought, but has had very little to 
say about that aspect of Marxist thought most likely to attract broad support: the centrality of 
economic factors to social and political processes.
52
 Looking back, there are examples of 
such an agenda in various places - leading Rousseau to examine the origins of economic 
inequality and both James Harrington and Tom Paine to make agrarian reform central to their 
own versions of republicanism
53
 - but the relevance of these factors as a whole has always 
been secondary. To pursue this thread is to find underlying neo-republicanism the same 
concerns as once led Rousseau to declare that “no citizen [should] be so very rich that he can 
buy another, and none so poor that he is compelled to sell himself,”54 a requirement which 
effectively restates the non-domination ideal. And if the basic idea from which we begin is 
correct - if domination based on economic inequality is a valid target of neo-republican 
analysis - then a glance at the world around us would suggest that this is a rich vein to mine. 
Our discipline is an inherently political one, which can be expected to say much about 
economic matters. 
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As with feminist concerns, economic domination has remained under-theorised. In attempting 
to make good on this failing, we will leave aside the majority of older republican thinking - 
that of Paine and Harrington most notably - in favour of a re-appropriation of a school of 
thought which, by virtue of its deployment of the non-domination ideal, transcends the 
context in which it was first elaborated and is of more direct relevance to the current project. 
The movement derives from the complex American discourse on slavery and freedom, 
starting from the remarkable fact that “[t]he rise of liberty and equality… was accompanied 
by the rise of slavery.  That two such contradictory developments were taking place 
simultaneously over a long period… is the central paradox of American history.”55 This 
paradox would seem to imply a strict dichotomy - freedom for the many and slavery for the 
few, with every person falling into one or the other category - and yet republican perspectives 
attempted to undermine the categories of slave and freeman by asking whether or not he who 
worked for a wage, with no property of his own, was free in any meaningful sense. This 
attempt took on the form of an ideology based around the organising concept known as ‘free 
labor’.56 It is of considerable interest when enquiring what neo-republicanism might have to 
say about freedom and economic matters.  
 
3.5.1 Free labor 
 
We have hinted earlier at work which attributes to the dominant ideas of the American 
founding a republican rather than liberal heritage. Either way, freedom was a central concept, 
and ‘free labor’ ideology represents the continuation of the revolutionary-era focus on 
freedom, in this case understood as “economic independence, ownership of productive 
property - not as an end in itself primarily, but because such independence was essential to 
participating freely in the public realm.”57 The concept: 
 
“lay at the heart of the republican ideology, and expressed a coherent social 
outlook, a model of the good society... an affirmation of the superiority of the 
social system of the North… whose achievements and destiny were almost 
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wholly the result of the dignity and opportunities which it offered the average 
labouring man.”58 
 
He who was not independent in this way, without ownership in the means of production, and 
thus reliant on a wage, could not fully participate in the political life of the republic, for the 
fact of being dependent made him “vulnerable to coercion, threatening the integrity of his 
opinions and his ballot. ‘Independence’ in pursuing one's economic calling and 
‘independence’ as a citizen were entwined.”59 The effect of this ideology was to call into 
question the viability of any polity containing a “large permanent class of propertyless 
laborers” who were dependent on the economic resources of another.60 Wage labour meant 
economic dependence, and widespread economic dependence threatened the republic itself 
by depriving it of the good citizenry needed in order to thrive. The solution, according to the 
nascent Republican party when it was still the party of republican freedom - still pursuing the 
ideology of the Free Soil Party which it replaced - was homesteading: the encouragement of 
the urban poor to improve their prospects by migrating westward, aided by a grant of public 
land available under Lincoln’s Homestead Act 1862. It was thus contingent on the 
availability of public land to grant, but provided a possibility of geographical and social 
mobility based on a principle superior to that of slavery, against whose expansion it was 
hoped homesteaders would provide an effective barrier.
61
 
 
3.5.2 Free labor against wage slavery 
 
The view that economic independence put at risk the republic which relied upon virtuous or 
otherwise ‘good’ citizens - a view capable to appealing to the ‘enlightened’ self-interest of 
the economic elites - existed alongside a more progressive analysis which fought not for the 
good of the country but for the rights of labour. Many of these advocates (before abolition): 
 
“dramatized their case against wage labor by equating it with Southern slavery 
- “wage slavery,” as they called it. Working for wages was tantamount to 
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slavery… in the sense that it denied them the economic and political 
independence essential to republican citizenship.”62  
 
This perspective sees workers reliant on wages not merely as unable to participate fully as 
citizens but as reduced, in consequence, to little better than those who were the property of 
others. The claim has a fine (and sometimes republican) pedigree. Cicero distinguished 
between those who exercised artistic skill for monetary reward and those whose labour was 
manual: 
 
“Unbecoming to a gentleman, too, and vulgar are the means of livelihood of 
all hired workmen whom we pay for mere manual labour, not for artistic skill; 
for in their case the very wage they receive is a pledge of their slavery”63 
 
The comparison between slaves and wage slaves is a feature too of Marxist discourse, Engels 
noting that while the former is sold “once and for all”, the “proletarian must sell himself daily 
and hourly” and so lacks the (admittedly miserable) security afforded to the ‘true’ slave; 
while the slave is protected from market forces, the proletarian lives at their mercy.
64
 And, 
while the abolition of slavery requires only one adjustment to the law of private property, the 
proletarian “can free himself only by abolishing private property in general.”65 The claim that 
a wage-earner is unfree therefore marks a point of overlap between the civic and neo-
republican traditions, whereby the fact of ‘wage slavery’ produces effects which are 
undesirable in both traditions - domination on the one hand and the absence of virtue or poor 
citizenship on the other - and Marxist thought, in which the problem of wage slavery would 
last as long as the recognition of private (rather than personal) property.  
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3.5.3 Slaveholders against unfree labor 
 
The argument about wage slavery was not restricted, however, to those seeking to improve 
the lot of supposedly ‘free’ labourers whose freedom was declared deficient by analogy with 
that of chattel slaves: such argument was also employed from the other side of the divide by 
southern slaveholders who contrasted the insecurity of the northern labourer with the 
condition of southern slavery, noting that: “the condition of the Negro in a state of chattel 
slavery might be abominable, but the condition of the northern white man in a state of wage 
slavery was equally abominable.” 66  Why try, so the argument went, to free the slave 
population when the conditions of the supposedly ‘free’ workers of the north were, by the 
admission of some of their own advocates, not significantly better, and likely to be made 
worse by the entry into the labor pool of emancipated slaves?
67
 Indeed, the slaveholders had a 
perverse incentive to maintain the physical condition of their slaves at a higher level than did 
the capitalist in respect of his employees. This former is an asset which can not be replaced 
without considerable cost; the latter is in theory substitutable for many others within what 
Marx called the industrial reserve army.
68
 In the absence of coercion by the state apparatus, 
the employer of a wage slave has little reason to protect his employee’s life and wellbeing. 
That the ‘wage slavery’ argument could be employed to such different ends demonstrates that 
the fundamental assumptions of the discourse were still contested: the endorsement of the 
continuation of slavery implied a rejection of anything like a non-domination ideal. 
Nevertheless, even the northern workers who could not be persuaded of the advantages of 
abolition could usually be persuaded that the extension of slavery to the west was contrary to 
their interests: 
 
“How much worse would the situation become if the western territories were 
turned over to the slaveocracy? This element regarded ‘slavery as the natural 
and normal condition of the labouring man.’ It insisted that free society was 
not only a delusion but a danger in which ‘greasy mechanics’ and ‘filthy 
operatives’ were able to organize trade associations, engage in strikes, vote, 
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and attend schools. All this foretold the day when northern states would have 
to enslave their free workers.”69 
 
Attempts to relate the impoverished labor of freemen in the north with the chattel slavery of 
the south were therefore hampered by the fact that different understandings of freedom 
caused different groups to talk past each other. If slavery was deprecated on the basis that it 
constituted a situation of dependence, why was ‘wage slavery’ acceptable? Attempts by 
slaveholders and advocates of free labor to make this case encountered abolitionists - against 
slavery, but untroubled by ‘wage slavery’ - who rejected the terms of the debate because: 
 
“they held a voluntarist not a civic understanding of freedom. In their view, 
the moral wrong of slavery was not that the slave lacked economic or political 
independence but simply that he was forced to work against his will.”70 
 
We must hesitate to map our present categories onto this debate. What Sandel describes as 
‘voluntarist’ freedom is fairly conceived as an analogue of liberal freedom, in that the forcing 
of a person to do something he has no desire to do is an interference with him or her in the 
sense to which liberal freedom is opposed. That it not merely frustrates the will but 
substitutes another’s does not alter its fundamental nature but merely heightens the offence 
against freedom. The question of whether the concerns underlying free labor can be 
assimilated with the current project’s normative ideal is more problematic. Dependence in the 
neo-republican project is viewed as mala in se, rather than wrongful only to the extent that it 
undermines the prospects for good citizenship of those who are dependent. It constitutes a 
more general demand for freedom than seemed to predominate in the free labor context, 
where the form of non-domination in issue is bounded by civic republican concerns i.e., 
rather than viewing non-domination as an a priori negative, it is so only to the extent that neo-
republicanism underpins (one variant of) civic republican thought. What is clear is that a 
perspective founded upon liberal freedom takes no issue with ‘wage slavery’, while non-
domination replicates the conclusion of free-labor advocates: not because of its consequences 
for citizenship, but for freedom: wage slavery is a form of horizontal domination. Like that 
                                                          
69
 Rayback, note 58, at 101-2. 
70
 Sandel, note 62, at 173. 
93 
 
based upon gender, it is ripe for reappraisal within the neo-republican project, with, once 
again, the role of public power taking centre stage. 
 
3.5.4 The end of labor republicanism 
 
Much explicit gender-based domination has been excised law, particularly that which was 
vertical in form. Vertical, economic-based domination was also part of many constitutional 
orders, most obviously where the franchise was based around property qualifications, and to a 
certain degree remains so. In relation to horizontal economic domination, however, it was not 
the problem which disappeared so much as the conception of it as problematic. The labor 
republican movement, like those others whose understanding of freedom was not easily 
reconciled with the prevailing system of economic relations, was eventually driven out by 
that system. With the growth in capitalism during the so-called ‘Gilded Age’ of the post-civil 
war United States,
71
  
 
“defenders of the system of wage labor would abandon the attempt to 
reconcile capitalist production with the civic conception of free labor, and take 
up the voluntarist conception instead. Wage labor is consistent with 
freedom… simply because it is voluntary, the product of an agreement 
between employer and employee.”72  
 
Where it is difficult to date the point at which liberal freedom won out over republican 
freedom (indeed, the relevant ‘victory’ is perhaps best understood as a process, starting with 
Hobbes and only ending in the middle of the 20
th
 century) it is perhaps easier to be certain of 
the point at which a voluntarist conception of freedom won out in law, for it was this same 
voluntarist conception which the “Supreme Court of the Lochner era would attribute to the 
Constitution itself.”73 In doing so, it endorsed the claim that negotiations between employer 
and employee take place between free and equal parties and that the outcome which results 
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 The ‘Gilded Age’ in American history, from roughly the end of the Civil War in 1865 until the election of 
1896, was marked by pervasive corruption and exceptional material inequality and takes its name from the novel 
by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today, (1876). The ‘new Gilded Age’ 
was applied to the culture of affluence in the late 1990s but has re-emerged in far broader usage to describe the 
situation of stark inequality that characterises the contemporary world.  
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 Sandel, note 62, at 171. 
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from those negotiations should not be interfered with by the state. Freedom of contract 
includes the freedom to agree to work long hours for starvation wages. This point ties 
together our argument about economic unfreedom (in the particular form of ‘wage slavery’) 
with the broader point about the centrality of the state’s role in reducing horizontal 
domination. 
 
3.5.5 The Slaughter-House cases 
 
In the Slaughter House cases of 1873, the US Supreme Court was called upon to judge the 
constitutionality of an Act of the Louisiana legislature banning all butchering except that 
which took place in a central slaughterhouse, thereby requiring all butchers to use only those 
facilities and pay the appropriate fee to do so.
74
 The Court upheld the statute, reading the 
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly as protecting only 
those rights enjoyed by citizens in their capacity as citizens of the United States and therefore 
not as citizens of the individual states. The threat to free labor was in this case very clearly 
mediated by the state, the monopoly granted condemning those who made a living as 
butchers to live at the mercy of others, being unable to carry on their trade independently. 
The majority opinion denied that the Fourteenth Amendment was aimed at such situations:  
 
“Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment… to transfer the security 
and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States 
to the Federal government? And where it is declared that Congress Shall have 
the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of 
Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to 
the States?”75 
 
Answering in the negative, the majority decision rendered the clause a “vain and idle 
enactment” said the dissenting Justice Field, who recognised the right of the state to 
“prescribe such regulations for every pursuit and calling of life as will promote the public 
health, secure the good order and advance the general prosperity of society” but that “the 
pursuit or calling must be free to be followed by every citizen who is within the conditions 
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designated, and will conform to the regulations.”76 The statute in question had departed from 
this imperative, such that a man could pursue his vocation only on the terms set for him by 
others: he could never be independent in the relevant sense for, by the statute, “the right of 
free labor, one of the most sacred and imprescriptible rights of man, is violated.”77 Later, 
courts “would adopt Field’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not his republican 
understanding of free labor… they understood free labor in its voluntarist sense - as the right 
of the worker to sell his labor for a wage,” seizing on a footnoted reference to the work of 
Adam Smith.
78
 The decision in the later Lochner case was merely the culmination of the 
longer process whereby the (republican) free labor ideal was interpreted out of law. 
 
In that case, Lochner v New York (1906), the US Supreme Court held a "liberty of contract" 
was implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
79
 The case involved 
a New York law that limited the number of hours that a baker could work each day to ten, 
and each week to sixty. By a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court denied that the law was 
necessary to protect the health of bakers, holding it an "unreasonable, unnecessary and 
arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract.”80 Though its 
legacy is much contested,
81
 Lochner is most famous for having inaugurated an era (to which 
it lent its name) of judicial resistance to the regulatory efforts on the part of the 
disenfranchised by an increasingly ‘interventionist’ state,82 an issue which takes on greater 
significance in the context of New Deal attempts to counter the great recession, and which 
came to an end only with the ‘switch in time that saved nine’ by Robert Owen in West Coast 
Hotel Co. v Parrish in 1937.
83
 Sandel suggests that only does the court in Lochner endorse an 
“economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain” as Holmes, dissenting, 
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claimed,
84
 but that it gave a constitutional seal of approval to a concept of freedom that had, 
until recently, struggled for supremacy with an equally plausible variant.
85
 When we talk of 
Lochner in relation to the extent of permissible interference within the outcome of free 
bargaining between legal persons, disputing only the correct location of the boundary, we 
have in a sense demonstrated the extent to which the version of freedom the court endorsed 
therein predominates. What is at stake in Lochner is not the extent to which we should 
interfere with freedom but what we understand by freedom: the liberal, voluntarist, freedom 
which underpins Lochner-era laissez-faire, or a more nuanced version of the sort at stake in 
talk of free labor, which seeks to prevent the individual from being dominated by others. 
Endorsing the latter frees one from the concession inherent in the notion that to regulate 
employment is always and everywhere an interference with freedom. 
 
3.5.6 Wage slavery and non-domination 
 
Though this discussion has advanced our argument significantly, providing an understanding 
both of wage slavery as a republican concern, and of the (unique) ability of the state to guard 
against it, we are not yet where we want to be. The works discussed to this point belong to a 
distinctive subset of the tradition which, even where it has made a mark more recently has 
done so only in the context of a civic republican project. How much of the argument holds 
true in the context of the non-domination ideal? We can start from Philip Pettit’s review of 
the book in which Sandel looks to give renewed prominence to these ideas as a means of 
providing America with a ‘public philosophy.’ Though Sandel writes at the tail end of what 
we have called the first republican revival, Pettit attempts to claim this territory for his own 
project, suggesting that free labor concerns make more sense if the underlying project is seen 
as being that of reducing domination, for it “seems artificial to construe the complaint as an 
expression of concern for the quality of the citizenry and the prospect for selfgovernment.”86 
This is correct to the extent that, thus phrased, the rejection of wage slavery takes place in 
terms which make no attempt to appeal to the ‘wage slaves’ themselves. The elites, those 
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who see themselves as guardians of the republic, desire ‘good’ citizens; those who they desire 
to mould into such citizens are more likely to desire to eat. Similarly, the ‘prospects for 
selfgovernment’ reflect a secondary desire which can be pursued only where a primary 
obstacle - the fact of being governed by another - is already removed.  
 
There exists a middle ground between slavery and a capability for self-government and it is at 
this middle ground that we must first aim. Pettit claims we will be able to avoid the 
artificiality of Sandel’s position if “we adopt [his] account of republicanism and take the 
concern with freedom as nondomination to have been at the heart of republican worries.”87 
This conflates two arguments of differing plausibility - on one hand, the idea that the non-
domination ideal is a better ‘fit’ for the political project in which labor republicans were 
engaged, to the extent that it, rather than a civic republican concern for virtue, is able to 
account for their verdict on ‘wage slavery’. On the other, the idea that non-domination might 
have in fact provided the normative thrust of the argument all along. If such a claim is 
impliedly made, it seems unsustainable. Were we, however, to proceed with our analysis on 
the basis suggested by Pettit, we would join him in concluding that the: 
 
 “dependency of employee on employer is almost bound to give the employer 
a certain power of arbitrary interference in the life of the employee… 
employees are going to assume the profile of unfree, dominated agents. They 
are going to seem no better than slaves in the extent to which they live at the 
mercy of employers… They are going to be presented… as ‘wage slaves.’”88 
 
Pettit therefore presents his neo-republicanism as capable of taking up the mantle of the labor 
republican project and vindicating it in a fashion for which civic republicanism lacks the 
conceptual resources. Our task is to demonstrate not merely that it is capable, but that such a 
shift is imperative; that law is the cause of wage slavery, and law can put an end to it. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
Not for the first time, we see that part of what makes the non-domination ideal ‘republican’ is 
the manner in which it encompasses older republican concerns. We move to an attempt to 
provide a general account of the relationship of property to freedom, attentive (as in this 
chapter) to the role of the state in mediating the relationships between individuals, with a 
view to tackling head-on the use to which the variant of freedom endorsed in Lochner is now 
put. 
 
 
99 
 
Part 2 - Chapter 4: Problems of Freedom and Property 
 
4.1 The contemporary vocabulary of freedom 
 
Given that neo-republican thought provides an alternative to prevailing liberal ideas with, at 
its centre, a distinctive conception of freedom, it is to be expected that its specific points of 
dispute with liberal thought will derive from that conception: neo-republicanism will 
challenge liberal thought wherever their different points of departure lead to different 
destinations. Considering the use to which neo-republicanism has so far been put, a single 
fact stands out above all others: a failure to engage with the neo-liberal project and that 
project’s deployment of the language of liberty. Such failure is inexplicable. Although the 
ideal of freedom was central to the brief moment of post-war consensus in the developed 
west in favour of certain legal and political reforms, aimed at the sort of tyranny which had 
defined the 1920s and 30s (and of which the United Nations declaration of Human Rights on 
one hand and the Bretton Woods system on the other might be taken as paradigmatic) that 
consensus enjoyed a monopoly of rhetoric of freedom for no time at all.  
 
Nowadays the language of freedom is largely the preserve of those who seek to disrupt the 
remnants of that system, rather than to justify or retrench it; of those who speak not against  
totalitarian regimes but social democrats, socialists, and anything that might be labelled as 
such. The freedom here is that which stood at the centre of Lochner-era laissez-faire; it is not, 
in the first place, the freedom of people, who are constituted as consumers first and human 
beings second, but that of corporations, markets and exchange. Here we witness the 
subordination to ‘freedom’ of all other values and the translation of a political dogma into a 
set of governmental fundamentals of universal validity. While the commitments associated 
with older (prominently social) liberalism persist, still based upon the logic of non-
interference, it is no longer a language of unitary freedom - a holistic conception of what it 
means for an individual to be free touching on every aspect of his or her existence - but of 
(multiple) freedoms, these various fragments now more closely equated with specific and 
limited (legal) rights than with an over-arching project; the claim to promote a unitary 
freedom is largely the preserve of those who refer specifically to the economic freedom of 
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late-modern capitalism: those who can be described, loosely but nevertheless adequately, as 
neo-liberals and libertarians.
1
 
 
4.2 Neo-liberal freedom 
 
Hayek struggles forward a coherent conception of freedom: he is unsure if he is concerned 
about mere interference as a threat to freedom or if interference threatens freedom only where 
perpetrated on an arbitrary basis. The confusion is unfortunate, but not significant, for 
Hayek’s definition of arbitrariness is so broad as to collapse the distinction, leading to 
Hayek’s identification of an antithesis between rule of law requirements and the welfare 
state.
2
 Along the axis on which neo-republicanism distinguishes its conception of freedom 
from that of liberalism, Hayek’s account therefore folds back upon itself. Milton Friedman, 
another prophet of capitalist freedom in the circumstances of cold war polarisation, provides 
a dualist account of freedom - economic and political - in which the former is both a 
component of a broader freedom and “an indispensable means towards the achievement of 
political freedom”3 and, on this basis, argues for a minimal state whose major functions are to 
“preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets.” 4 
Fundamentally, that conception is a negative one: the individual is free when left alone. Not, 
as Berlin suggests, because when left alone the individual can choose amongst multiple 
conceptions of the good but instead so as to constitute man as homo economicus. Where 20
th
 
century liberalism as taken up by Berlin and Rawls is oriented towards plural visions of the 
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 The origins of neo-liberalism can be traced to the Walter Lippman Colloquium in Paris in 1938 centred on 
discussion of Lippman’s book An Enquiry into the Principles of the Good Society. The colloquium and its 
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 F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Routledge (2001), generally, but at 75-91 in particular. 
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most to promote the implementation of conservative ideals of freedom, training many of the ‘Chicago boys’ - 
Latin-American economists trained by Friedman and Arnold Harberger at the University of Chicago who 
worked with and advised often despotic rulers, most notably General Pinochet. 
4
 Friedman, note 3, at 2. 
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good, here one good is prized above all others: unobstructed participation in the market. It is 
these ideas and the policy programmes built upon them - deregulation, the privatisation of 
utilities, private sector provision of a reduced range of public services, the pursuit of price 
stability as opposed to full employment, the reduction of welfare provision and the unfettered 
circulation of capital - which have characterised late modernity: in the developed world as 
part of the Thatcher/Reagan revolution and in the developing world as part of the World 
Bank/IMF one size fits all approach to development. 
 
4.2.1 Rhetoric and reality 
 
In tracing the history of neo-liberalism, David Harvey has identified the relationship which 
exists between its particular understanding and relentless promotion of freedom, and the 
effective transfer of wealth which results, time and time again, from the policy prescriptions 
which implement that commitment. Harvey suggests two interpretations.
5
 The first takes 
seriously the neo-liberal commitment to freedom and the economic advancement supposed to 
follow from it, treating the economic disparities which follow in its wake as an inadvertent 
by-product: it is “a utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of 
internationals capitalism” which is inseparable from the project of increasing freedom. 6 
Anyone sufficiently committed to the pursuit of freedom would be entitled to conclude that 
inequality is not just a price worth paying but indeed morally desirable. Freedom would 
reveal itself an inhuman ideal, but we would nevertheless be true to it. Alternatively, the neo-
liberal project might be thought to have as its true aim the degradation of the material 
conditions of the majority (and corresponding transfer of wealth to an economic aristocracy), 
with the discourse of freedom merely a convenient ideological cover for what is in fact “a 
political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the 
power of economic elites”7 - a narrative which, in terms of where the gains of economic 
growth have accrued, fits the facts at both the national and the global level. In light of the vast 
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historical evidence of the effects of the neo-liberal project, of which the 2008 banking crash 
(which Harvey’s book predates) is merely the latest example, the latter interpretation seems 
more convincing: the neo-liberal project “has not been very effective in revitalizing global 
capital accumulation but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some 
instances… creating the power of an economic elite.”8 The real-world effects of neo-liberal 
reforms therefore provide a strong temptation to dismiss the rhetoric of freedom in which it is 
clothed. It is nevertheless incumbent on us to take seriously the neo-liberal claim to prize 
freedom while remaining sensitive to the possibility that its policy prescriptions are motivated 
by ulterior ends. Neo-liberalism will not disappear when the incoherence of its claims are 
demonstrated, but only by dismantling that rhetorical shield can its true motivations be laid 
bare, for the acquisition by elites of consent from those who might be better understood the 
victims of ‘freedom’ rather than its beneficiaries (of which the American Tea Party 
movement is perhaps the clearest example in recent years) is all that permits the project to 
retain compatibility with democracy. 
 
Where freedom is invoked, then, in mainstream political discourse, it is at least as likely to be 
in the context of a neo-liberal as modern liberal argument, referring not to the protection of a 
zone of personal freedom against the state in which one can pursue one’s own affairs, but to 
the removal of the state - as far as possible - from the from the regulation of human activity in 
order that market activity can be pursued without obstruction. Lawyers use law to protect 
freedoms which are in fact more fundamentally threated by a political project which promotes 
freedom.  
 
4.2.2 The role of the state 
 
In more strictly libertarian thought, the state retains a role, residual and largely passive, in 
providing the framework within which that market activity takes place: here the dominant 
account is that of Nozick, whose night watchman (minimal) state is “limited to the functions 
of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of 
contracts,”9 and distinguished from a hypothetical ultra-minimal state which renounces even 
these minimally redistributive goals inherent in the mandatory taxation to pay for the 
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protection of others, providing protection “only to those who purchase its protection and 
enforcement policies.”10 Where either such state exists, the market is left to provide desired 
goods through a series of free transactions, which are free precisely because the state plays no 
role in their execution and - again on Nozick’s telling - any particular distribution of wealth 
which results is just to the extent that it derives from a series of free transactions.
11
 Neo-
liberalism augments this account by positing an active role for the state in constituting 
markets in contexts in which they will not spontaneously arise and combating the failures of 
those markets to the extent that such failures are now recognised as inevitable. This might 
mean recognising property rights which were previously not part of the law or the 
privatisation of state utilities or monopolies, while minimal intervention is demanded on the 
dual bases that the state lacks the knowledge necessary to provide for a distribution of rights 
more efficient than that which results forom market mechanisms, while any attempt at 
intervention risks being ‘captured’ by groups which wish to direct it towards their own 
private ends.
12
 
 
If neo-republicanism desires to ground a useful and genuine political project; to transcend the 
limitations of abstract theorising through which neo-liberalism burst with the dawn of the 
Thatcher-Reagan era, then it is against the neo-liberal/libertarian turn that it must posit itself 
as an alternative. It is here, rather than in the slightly outdated and complacent pluralistic 
liberalism, that the politics of neo-republicanism find their most acute rival. Where the bare 
idea of negative freedom is incomplete and unambitious, in the hands of those who suffocate 
its plurality, it becomes positively harmful. It is on this ground that neo-republicanism must 
fight. 
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 Nozick, note 9, at 26-7. In the latter case, not one but multiple protection associations would exist in order to 
vindicate individual rights. Nozick, however, contends that a situation of plural protective associations would, 
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appropriate to” private property rights, free markets, and free trade (Harvey, note 1, at 2) – is the guaranteeing of 
the “quality and integrity of money”. Such a task is in considerable tension with the pursuit of full employment 
as a macro-economic goal. 
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4.3 The distribution of property and freedom 
 
Let us return to basic principles of liberal thought. A significant blind spot of unqualified 
liberal freedom (as non-interference) is to be detected in its treatment of economic questions: 
specifically that of whether material deprivation reduces freedom. Most such analyses agree 
that it does not: as a negative conception liberal freedom is concerned only with obstructions, 
and the state of affairs in which an individual cannot do those things which he desires to do as 
a result of possessing insufficient material resources involves no such obstruction, unless the 
acquisition of the necessary resources is actively obstructed. If what prevents the desired 
exercise of one’s autonomy can be conceptualised as resulting from a lack of resources and 
the acquisition of those resources is unhindered, then one remains free. Material deprivation 
is not constitutive of, nor does it contribute to, a situation of unfreedom. This is clear in 
Berlin: 
  
“It is important to discriminate between liberty and the conditions of its 
exercise.  If a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his 
legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him, but 
it is not thereby annihilated.”13 
 
Berlin’s position, that the conflation of liberty and the conditions of its exercise smuggles 
into the concept a theory of political economy, is a reasonable one. It seems true, as Galipeau 
suggests, that “Berlin holds to the distinction for historical reasons”14: an acute awareness of 
how attempts to alter (probably by levelling out) the conditions of exercise of freedom have 
historically implied significant interference with individual liberty.
15
  
 
Rawls similarly chides those who make money a condition of the existence of freedom, rather 
than of its successful exercise: 
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 Isaiah Berlin, Five Essays on Liberty: Introduction, in Liberty, Oxford University Press (2002), at 45.  
14
 Claude J. Galipeau, Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism, Cambridge University Press (1994), at 98. 
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 Berlin was born in Tsarist Riga and lived through the Russian revolution in Petrograd: “when contemporaries 
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“The inability to take advantage of one’s rights and opportunities as a result of 
poverty and ignorance and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted 
among the constraints definitive of liberty.  I shall not, however, say this, but 
rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty.”16 
 
Rawls claims that this unequal worth of liberty is “compensated for, since the capacity of the 
less fortunate members of society to achieve their aims would be even less were they not to 
accept the existing inequalities whenever the difference principle is satisfied.” 17  The 
difference principle legitimates social and economic inequalities only “they are to be to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society,”18 and so Rawls’ argument is 
that those who are less well-placed to enjoy their liberties are the beneficiaries of any new 
inequalities - they are not being compensated for an unequal distribution of liberty but for its 
lesser worth. Given that liberty is equal, but its value not, the project of social justice from a 
Rawlsian perspective becomes that of organising the ‘basic structure’ of society - “the way in 
which major social institutions ﬁt together into one system, and how they assign fundamental 
rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arise through social cooperation”19 
- to “maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty 
shared by all.”20 The consideration of material resources succeeds rather than contributes to 
the project of securing freedom, this latter aim being achievable with no reference to material 
circumstances.  
 
Hayek is even less concerned, arguing that there exists a “confusion of liberty as power with 
liberty in its original meaning” which obscures that “whether or not I am my own master and 
can follow my own choice and whether the possibilities from which I must choose are few or 
many are two entirely different questions.”21 Philippe Van Parijs’ attempt to evade this by 
distinguishing what he calls ‘real’ freedom from the ‘formal’ freedom of negative liberty 
through the incorporation of a consideration of opportunity as the third element (alongside 
the criteria of security and self-ownership which make up ‘formal’ freedom) is undone by his 
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 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press (1971), at 204. 
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 Rawls, note 16, at 204-5. 
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 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press (1993), at 6. 
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 Rawls, note 18, at 258.  
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 Rawls, note 16, at 326. 
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 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge (1960), at 17. This is in keeping with Gray’s suggestions, 
discussed above, that Hayek is best understood as a theorist of positive freedom. 
106 
 
identification of inability resulting from lack of resources with inability resulting from 
physical incapacity.
22
 There are, we shall see, vital differences between the two, and so the 
corrective is no such thing. 
 
4.3.1 Definitional purity 
 
Neither Berlin nor Rawls, then, wishes to declare material questions irrelevant to his larger 
project, but both relegate them to the domain of freedom’s exercise; their place in the picture 
is secured, but they are banished from the foreground. The focus upon active obstruction 
within liberal freedom therefore limits the scope of any project based (exclusively) upon it. It 
allows one to draw a stark boundary between that which offends - a person unable to do as he 
desires because some other individual prevents him - from that which does not - a person 
unable to do what he desires as a result of a material deprivation which is no fault of his own. 
This is the result even where what is desired is in each case the same. In the former case, the 
individual is unfree; in the latter, he is free but contingently incapable of exercising his 
freedom. His abstract freedom exists, but is ‘nothing to him’ in Berlin’s infelicitous phrase; in 
Rawl’s terms, it is merely of lesser value than it might be. The quantum of freedom is 
unconditioned by material deprivation.  
 
To insist, as does Berlin, that this distinction is but an unfortunate consequence of definitional 
purity - that it of course remains available to us to sacrifice liberty for some other good, as he 
himself is willing to do - as long as we are willing to openly state that we do so, is not wholly 
satisfactory, not least because few putative goods are capable of challenging the rhetorical 
supremacy of the ideal of freedom. It reduces our analysis to a crude dichotomy between 
freedom-reducing active obstruction and non-freedom reducing material circumstances. But 
there remains an economically-conditioned middle ground between what a liberal would 
accept as freedom-reducing and the utter passivity that characterises the world liberals see as 
existing alongside, but not causing, the practical incapability declared irrelevant to freedom. 
This middle ground, occupied by an understanding of the distribution of wealth as reflecting 
human agency (rather than as an immutable ‘given’ of human existence), is of particular 
import given that it has been colonised by those who share Berlin’s concept of negative 
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liberty but not his willingness to countenance its sacrifice for other goods: the claim that the 
extent of freedom is not a function of one’s material resources becomes an important weapon 
in the libertarian arsenal.  
 
4.4 Liberalism, capitalism and freedom 
 
There has been advanced a view which, despite accepting the premises from which Berlin 
departs (Rawls, it will be remembered, is not strictly a theorist of negative liberty) rejects 
their standard application to this issue. G. A. Cohen, most notably, suggests that negative 
freedom is less tolerant of economic deprivation than has been assumed, and so its invocation 
in support of the practices of modern capitalism and the material inequality which results 
should attract our suspicion.
23
 One argument requires us to step back and consider the 
question of individual freedom within the context of one’s class status. Any one member of 
the proletariat, so the liberal argument goes, is capable at any time of swapping his prior 
status for that of capitalist or (more likely) petty bourgeoisie: to do so is difficult and high-
risk (failure might ruin him) but there is no a priori reason for which it might not happen. The 
absence of any obstacles to his doing so is held to be conclusive of his freedom. 
Notwithstanding his status in the meantime, he is free to become something other than what 
he is. Not so, counters Cohen, for the capitalist system is constructed so as to ensure that 
though all are free in this way, they are so only if only some of them ever choose to exercise 
that freedom.
24
 Not everyone can transcend his status in this way and so despite the absence 
of obstruction to any particular individual, the proletariat as a whole are effectively 
imprisoned by their status within the hierarchy. The ‘freedom’ of each individual obscures 
the collective unfreedom of those excluded from ownership of productive resources. The 
methodological individualism of liberalism neglects to see man in his (necessary) condition 
of plurality: by limiting itself in the view it takes of the individual, it can deny the reality of 
his situation. The individual, on the other hand, who sees beyond his own status and is aware 
of himself as one actor in a collective struggle, knows fine well that his ostensible individual 
freedom is vitiated by the collective unfreedom of those with whom he shares his existence: 
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the minimum of solidarity which necessarily derives from seeing oneself as a member of a 
certain socio-economic group reveals the poverty of the liberal position. 
 
This attempt to circumvent the logic of liberal freedom, however, is founded upon an 
oversimplified picture of class structure that has been blurred in recent years. And, even if it 
is true to say that those at the bottom are collectively unfree as part of their class, this does 
not exclude the possibility of further, individual, unfreedom within it. As John Gray points 
out, we would not normally hold that social goods were not available to any one person, 
simply because they were not available to all persons simultaneously.
25
 The consideration of 
the group status of the individual, even though he is not subsumed within that group, leaves 
him at the mercy of false assumptions about how he is affected by membership of it, and how 
he relates to others within it. Cohen is also, Ian Carter suggests, unduly optimistic about the 
ease of escape from the proletarian class, which is a much more arduous process than Cohen 
allows and “if escaping from the proletariat involves saving and working extremely hard, 
then to do so is impossible in combination with a great many actions which are performable 
by proletarians who do not try to escape.”26 To the extent that he focuses on how individual 
freedom is used to obscure collective unfreedom, Cohen looks past the fact the diluted form 
that the individual freedom takes.  
 
4.4.1 Money versus interference 
 
Cohen provides a second argument for unfreedom arising from lack of resources, not tied to 
any account of class structure, but beginning from the fact that the sort of interference 
inherent in private property as an institution can be overcome by those with sufficient 
resources: 
 
“If A owns P and B does not, then A may use P without interference and B 
will, standardly, suffer interference if he attempts to use P.  But money serves, 
in a variety of circumstances… to remove that latter interference.  Therefore 
                                                          
25
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into relationships between things, putting both capitalist and proletariat, at the mercy of impersonal forces. Man 
creates commodities, only to be ruled by their logic. John Gray, Marxian Freedom, Individual Liberty, and the 
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money confers freedom, rather than merely the ability to use it, even if 
freedom is equated with absence of interference.”27 
 
We can see that if money can overcome unfreedom it might be said, conversely, that not 
having money renders unfree. If I have the option of buying something, then not having 
money to do so might be said to mean I am not free to have it. Obviously, the more 
fundamental to my needs is the thing I wish to have but cannot afford, the more consequential 
is this lack of freedom. Beyond a certain threshold, it might be of no consequence whatsoever. 
Elsewhere, Cohen elaborates, distinguishing lack of money from lack of physical capacity: 
 
“To have money is to have freedom, and the assimilation of money to mental 
and bodily resources is a piece of unthinking fetishism, in the good old 
Marxist sense that it misrepresents social relations of constraint as things that 
people lack.”28 
 
The identification of inability resulting from economic factors with that which results from 
inherent incapacity - as by Van Parijs - cannot be sustained. This is confirmed by a 
consideration of the relational nature of freedom, in whose absence the distinction is clear: if 
I am unable because physically incapable, I will remain so even if entirely isolated from other 
persons. If, instead, I am unable to enter onto private land, for example (because to do so 
would require payment of money which I do not possess) then, were the relationship between 
me and he who stops me to disappear, so too would my incapacity. Economic inability, 
unlike inherent inability, may or may not be freedom-reducing but money can overcome the 
former and not the latter. Even starting from a liberal idea of freedom, we must reject its 
typical application to such a situation and agree that a lack of money can, and frequently will, 
render unfree. The commodification of previously non-market goods in contemporary society 
in this sense contributes to that unfreedom: the more goods whose distribution is determined 
by market functioning, the more obstacles will exist which only material resources can 
overcome, and the more consequential will be my penury. 
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4.5 A republican take on freedom and money 
 
A republican consideration of the question proves distinctive and useful. It begins from the 
point emphasised in chapter one about the relational nature of the ideal of freedom as non-
domination. Such relationality restricts the application of the ideal to a situation of at least 
minimal plurality. Where there is no real or potential interaction, no ‘other’ in respect of 
which one’s condition of freedom can be assessed, then the situation cannot be encoded 
within the republican schema and so, whatever might be said of it, it will not be said in the 
language of neo-republicanism. Applied to the context of material deprivation, it becomes 
clear that, in and of itself, such deprivation is not a source of unfreedom. Absent other factors, 
an individual alone, without the resources to meet his needs, is not unfree. In the neo-
republican context, material insufficiency is not per se freedom-reducing. 
 
4.5.1 The presupposition of plurality 
 
In order to move from an isolated individual, destitute but not enslaved by his poverty, the 
following must be added to the picture. Firstly, another economic unit, an ‘other’ whose 
presence inaugurates the relationship that is the subject of the republican judgement and so 
makes judgement possible. Such relation, however, cannot be one of domination where the 
material deprivation of our first unit is shared by our second. Where both A and B are equally 
lacking, neither’s lack will permit the other to arbitrarily interfere with his interests. In the 
state of nature, or in more prosaic conditions in which the governing institutions are 
incapable of fulfilling the protective role republican thought ascribes to them, then our 
relationship may be one of domination, for the ability to interfere arbitrarily might arise from 
some other factor - brute strength, say - but ignoring such extra-legal factors (remembering 
that the republican state seeks to exclude the possibility of legally-sanctioned relationships of 
domination but where one party is willing and able to flout the law, that exclusion will never 
be absolute) we have a relationship of something approaching equality, no matter how 
miserable and iniquitous with respect to the wider world. Each lacks, but each is, in respect of 
the other, free; whatever inability each must overcome is not a function of the other’s being. 
For material deprivation to give rise to unfreedom we must go further.  
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4.5.2 Relative inequality and republican freedom 
 
In order for the relationship in question to be one of domination, it is not enough that there be 
two individuals, one of whom lacks material resources. The second unit must be one who 
does not share the first’s predicament but enjoys greater resources, if the relationship between 
them is to constitute a relationship of domination. How much greater must they be for a 
simple relationship of relative equality to be transformed instead into one in which the 
poverty of one becomes a causal contributor to a status of unfreedom? Simply, material 
inequality becomes sufficient to render unfree when it is so great as to permit the wealthier 
party to interfere arbitrarily with the interests of the poorer. The quantification of this will be 
context-sensitive, but it will cover not just the classic monopolistic situation where one party 
owns the proverbial ‘only well in the village’ but also those situations in which one of the 
parties can meet his or her needs, fulfil his or her desires, with no reference to the wishes of 
the other, and yet that other can not, and so is bound to the first, in thrall to him or her in a 
manner ripe for exploitation. The analysis therefore depends in significant measure on what it 
is that is owned. In a world of plentiful resources, with vast quantities of the various 
necessities - land, water etc -owned either in common or not at all, any attempt by one party 
to interfere arbitrarily with the interests of another will likely be in vain. That there remains 
open to the other party other means by which he can meet his needs and fulfil his desires 
indicates that he will be able to avoid arbitrary interference and consequent unfreedom. We 
have noted how the antebellum solution to the problem of unfree labor was to make a grant of 
capital (at that point land) which would permit the requisite self-sufficiency to free workers 
from dependency on others. Where all capital rests in private hands, such a solution is 
obviously more problematic. It is not, however, an impossibility, for there is nothing inherent 
in the concept of ownership that means it must always and everywhere imply a right to 
exclude all others for any reason or for none. 
 
The potential for relative inequality to result in a relationship of domination connects a neo-
republican to Rousseau’s claim that “in the relations between man and man, the worst that 
can happen to one is to find himself at the other’s discretion.” 29  Where Rousseau was 
referring the vertical relationship between ruler and ruled, however, we here apply it to a 
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 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Victor Gourevitch (ed.), Rousseau: 'The 
Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings, Cambridge University Press (1997), at 176. Where this 
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primarily horizontal relationship (‘primarily’ rather than ‘wholly’, for reasons we shall 
shortly discuss). The lack of material resources is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition 
of such horizontal unfreedom: we side neither with liberals such as Rawls and Berlin, nor 
with the Marxist Cohen. It is, however, one amongst many sets of circumstances which have 
the potential to give rise to a horizontal relationship of domination and, perhaps, in a time 
where the political orthodoxy is neo-liberal - where progressively more is privately owned, 
and ownership brings with it fewer restrictions on what one can do with it - the most 
important such set of circumstances. 
 
4.5.3 Neo-republican freedom and poverty: two lessons 
 
We can elaborate two conclusions about republican freedom and material deprivation. The 
first is that absolute poverty is not itself, a source of unfreedom; absent another party who has 
relevantly more - that is, not just more, but more in a way which by reason of its quality or 
quantity permits arbitrary interference - the relational nature of the ideal means it does not 
bite. We are not dealing with a cheap synonym for material sufficiency: republican freedom’s 
relationality brings insufficiency within its scope as a relevant consideration where liberal 
freedom in its most influential form excludes it, but does not colonise that terrain, and so is 
more subtle than an analysis which takes material factors as its sole consideration. Wealth, 
being a central axis along which social relations operate, is relevant to freedom, but so is 
much else. 
 
The flipside of this is that even where the deprivation is not absolute - where the individual in 
question can meet his or her basic needs - but merely relative, material inequality 
nevertheless renders unfree where it permits a party with greater resources to arbitrarily 
interfere with the interests of one with lesser resources.
30
 Not all relative inequality will meet 
this condition. It is unlikely that, despite the disparity of wealth, a billionaire will, on the 
basis of his greater wealth, be able to interfere with the interests of his (merely) millionaire 
acquaintance for any reason or for none. Much relative inequality will fall within this 
category, however, and so one’s economic resources can be constituted as a contributory 
factor to a relationship of domination notwithstanding that the deprivation is not, even nearly, 
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absolute. The closer it comes to absolute deprivation, of course, the easier such interference 
will be: the potential for interference, like the severity of the potential interferences, grows as 
the person subject to it approaches the breadline - as the person whose interests are being 
interfered with struggles to meets basic needs of sustenance and shelter - but material factors 
will be relevant to freedom elsewhere. 
 
The republican ideal of non-domination therefore finds in questions of wealth an acute point 
of analytical divergence from a negative freedom which claims for itself the grandeur of the 
pursuit of freedom yet places problems of wealth and inequality out of sight and out of mind 
or, at best, gives them a secondary status. An endorsement of the non-domination ideal goes 
some way to healing the cleavage which exists between issues of freedom and those of 
equality and opens up a space for the pursuit of the latter within a project whose overall aim, 
and guiding principle, is the former. 
 
4.5.4 Equality and freedom 
 
Much recent economics literature has attempted to demonstrate that inequality is bad for the 
social body along a variety of axes, even where, in absolute terms, wealth is higher; that there 
are good reasons for pursuing equality at the cost of wealth, and so it is rational to want to 
live in a poorer but more equal society than one which is wealthier as a whole but in which 
the division of that wealth is less equal.
31
 Any such argument eventually runs up against the 
prevailing logic of liberty and the autonomous individual, with which any attempt at 
achieving a more egalitarian distribution of income is presumed incompatible, such that any 
form of redistribution can be justified only on the basis of another good that must by 
definition be hostile to freedom and so is absent in the more strident advocates of liberal 
freedom who are influential within neo-liberal and libertarian movements. The forgoing 
argument counters this claim with the suggestion that the liberty supposedly at issue provides 
only an incomplete solution to this problem and that, by the republican standard, unequal 
societies in fact encourage the proliferation of unfreedom, for where there exists significant 
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inequality, it is likely that one section of society will dominate another.
32
 It offers another 
reason to pursue a fairer division of wealth rather than maintain a misleading and unhelpful 
focus on crude aggregate measures of wealth such as GDP in evaluating the success of a 
society.
33
 From a perspective which not only admits but in fact prizes the situation of the 
isolated individual equality must necessarily be a separate and incompatible goal. Neo-
republican thought marries in a loose, yet achievable, fashion the two goals. 
 
An earlier discussion of the role played by the rhetoric of freedom within neo-liberal 
discourse noted that the consistent effect of measures taken to promote freedom has been to 
encourage material inequality and the transfer of wealth from the bottom of society to the top. 
Neo-liberalism, more than any other political outlook is therefore reliant for its coherence and 
its plausibility on the claim that wealth - both relative and absolute - is of no relevance to 
questions of freedom; that its effect upon the distribution of wealth does not undercut its 
rhetorical foundations. The foregoing account challenges this twice over: firstly by 
demonstrating that the relationship between money and freedom is more direct than is 
normally acknowledged - that the distribution of wealth is capable of reducing freedom rather 
than merely conditioning its exercise - and in the claim that, by promoting greater inequality, 
neo-liberal regimes work against their own rhetoric: rather than promoting freedom, they 
encourage unfreedom.  
 
4.6 Property and freedom 
 
This account falls foul, however, of the warning delivered earlier, which drew attention to the 
possibility that to challenge certain claims or presuppositions of neo-liberal thought is to 
implicitly accept everything logically prior to them - to conduct the argument on territory 
chosen by one’s opponent. In the current discussion, that danger is demonstrated by the fact 
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that in proffering an alternative interpretation of the relationship between a given distribution 
of property and freedom, we have tacitly accepted the existence of private property as an 
institution, without considering its own relation to freedom.
34
 
 
A belief in not merely the compatibility of private property with freedom but the existence of 
an unbreakable bond between them is the mainstream position within political philosophy 
today. This is true most obviously of those who are economically conservative. The 
libertarian Murray Rothbard, for example, holds Berlin to have erred in his definition of 
negative liberty, the “fundamental flaw” being that of having failed “to define negative 
liberty as the absence of physical interference with an individual’s person and property, with 
his just property rights broadly defined,” an error which permits Berlin to attack “pure and 
consistent laissez-faire libertarians as Cobden and Spencer on behalf of such confused and 
inconsistent classical liberals as Mill and de Tocqueville.” 35  Hayek states that private 
property is “an essential condition for the prevention of coercion, though by no means the 
only one... [it is] the first step in the delimitation of the private sphere which protects us 
against coercion.”36 But the centrality of private property is equally true at the other end of 
the political spectrum:  even Rawls’ position, anathema to those of a libertarian tendency for 
its redistributive elements, is explicitly characterised as an argument for a ‘property-owning 
democracy’, where the first of the two principles of justice which Rawls contends would be 
agreed upon from within the original position is that “each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”37 This suite of 
liberties includes amongst its number “the right to hold personal property.” Justice demands 
freedom, of which property is a fundamental part - being one of the basic liberties, it takes 
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priority over the second principle of justice (the difference principle) - and so the 
infringement of property “cannot be justified, or compensated for, by greater social and 
economic advantages.”38 It is in this sense that Rawls is more accurately characterised as pre-
distributive: once established, property holdings can be limited only on the ground of liberty 
itself, and material deprivation to reduce freedom. 
 
The distinction to be drawn between what Gaus has called ‘modern’ liberals on one hand and 
classical liberals, neo-liberals and libertarians on the other is to be found not in the 
identification of protection of property as one of the duties of the state, but in the extent to 
which these rights can be required to make way in pursuit of, e.g., the elimination of poverty: 
the former permits it while neither of the latter three would.
39 
When liberal thinkers seek to to 
protect freedom by preventing interferences with individual interests, then, the interests in 
question invariably include private property prominently among them.
40
 As a correlate, one 
of the legitimate forms which state interference can take in both liberal thought and even for 
theorists of the minimal state is to interfere so as to protect property rights: only in what we 
earlier termed an ultra-minimal state - one in which the protection of property was entrusted 
to market mechanisms in a state of competition between multiple private protection 
associations - would this represent an overreach of public power, and it is Nozick's position 
that such an ultra-minimal state would evolve, inevitably, into the minimal state he himself 
endorses.
41
 Certainly, no such thing exists in what is still sometimes called the developed 
world. 
 
What we might call capitalist freedom - a position encompassing neo-liberal, libertarian and 
anarcho-capitalist thought - therefore necessarily rests upon a vision of the world in which 
private property is central, distinguishing voluntary exchange by free and formally equal 
individuals from interference with private property by the state.
42
 Without persons A and B 
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owning certain things which they desire to exchange, they cannot consummate their capitalist 
freedom. If the decision to exchange is in the hands of anyone other than private individuals 
acting in a private capacity (though not necessarily alone) then the decision is unfree to that 
extent. Property is freedom, and the protection of property is the protection of freedom.  
 
4.6.1 Property and unfreedom 
 
And yet, as G.A. Cohen has pointed out, the very existence of private property implies a 
standing willingness to violate freedom: a commitment to the sort of interference which is 
supposed to be ruled out by the embrace of capitalist freedom and which is the very opposite 
of the mechanisms of voluntary capitalist exchange. Starting from a non-moralised 
conception of freedom (“I am pro tanto unfree whenever someone interferes with my actions 
whether or not I have a right to perform them, and whether or not my obstructor has a right 
to interfere with me”) that is immediately recognisable as what we have called ‘liberal 
freedom’, he considers the issue of property in land, noting: 
 
“The government certainly interferes with a landowner’s freedom when it 
establishes public rights of way and the rights of others to pitch tents. But it 
also interferes with the freedom of a would-be walker or a tent-pitcher when it 
prevents them from indulging their individual inclinations.”43  
 
The effect is to make clear that interferences with private property - paradigmatic of an 
invasion of freedom under the rubric of capitalist freedom - “which reduce owners’ freedom 
by transferring rights over resources to non-owners thereby increase the latter’s freedom,” 
and so “the net effect of freedom on the resource transfer is… therefore, in advance of further 
information and argument, a moot point.” 44  This is a corollary of the point we earlier 
identified in his work: that we can pay to overcome or to remove potential interference, we 
now see, is only because property involves such interference. The logic is obvious, but the 
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consequences of taking this step backwards are significant. On this basis, Cohen rejects the 
labelling of interference with property ‘interventionist’; all property implies intervention and 
to suggest otherwise “is an ideological distortion detrimental to clear thinking and friendly to 
the libertarian point of view.”45 This strikes at the heart of capitalist freedom, represented 
here by the assumption that non-interference is upheld where private property is respected by 
the state and non-owners are obstructed in their attempt to use property that is not recognised 
as their own: this cannot be true, for the latter (supposedly mandatory) is as much an 
interference as the former (which is deprecated). 
 
Cohen’s account is correct, but implies a concept of property which must be made explicit. 
The effect of a private law right or duty - like a right of ownership over property - is to place 
the public power, and its coercive apparatus, at the service of one individual in relation to 
another. It is therefore impossible in the state of nature, such rights coming into being only 
where there is a system of public power and an associated body of rules (i.e., law) for 
determining its deployment. We need the state, or something like it, if we are to distinguish 
meum from tuum, and to know what follows from the distinction. And, of course, once there 
exists public power to act as a backstop to private relationships, the capacity of one to 
interfere arbitrarily with the interests of another is multiplied many times over. The 
delegation of public power takes two forms: the first is that exemplified by the criminal law 
which implies the direct intervention of public power in the name of the public. Of more 
interest here is the delegation of the public power inherent in private law - here the delegated 
power is exercised by the party who enjoys whatever rights in law for any reason or for none, 
and even where to do so is contrary to the public interest. In the case of property the power 
which stands behind the property owner takes both forms. The criminal law punishes theft, 
some sorts of damage etc: actions which done by the person recognised as owner would be 
lawful, when done by others meet with obstruction, interference and punishment. Similarly, 
private law rules such as those on trespass put at the owner's disposal the coercive apparatus 
necessary to vindicate his or her rights (within the limits recognised by law) - again in a 
manner which entails interference with others. In both cases, those liable to encounter the 
coercive apparatus of the state are those not recognised as owners, and so Cohen, quoting 
Marx, notes that “private ownership by one person presupposes non-ownership on the part of 
other persons”; not just some other persons though - private property rights in fact apply 
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against all others, who by virtue of their status as non-owners become potential subjects of 
state interference.
46
 
 
4.6.2 Property as interference 
 
The very recognition of private property is therefore founded upon a willingness to interfere 
with the interests of some persons and not others: it functions according to the logic not of 
non-interference - as the rhetoric of capitalist freedom suggests - but of differential 
interference. The institution of private property can for this reason be conceptualised as the 
system of rules which distinguish, in relation to goods, those whose attempts to exploit them 
will be interfered with by public power, from those whose attempts will not. And much as the 
interference with non-owners protects the freedom of the owner, interference with the 
owner’s interests can augment the freedom of non-owners. Private property thus implements 
the sort of freedom-redistribution which was discussed in chapter 2: where public power acts 
to protect the interests of the owner, it reduces that of the non-owner and vice versa. The 
recognition of private property rights is not neutral in terms of liberal freedom, for its 
recognition implies a willingness to interfere: the distribution of property is simultaneously 
the distribution of non-interference - in liberal terms, of freedom. Property is freedom for 
some and unfreedom for others.
47
 
 
The maximisation of freedom as non-interference therefore cannot demand, without further 
elaboration, that the property rights of the owner be respected and protected, for the very 
existence of those rights is freedom-reducing from the point of view of non-owners to the 
extent that it is founded upon a standing willingness to interfere. If we are to retain the 
precept of capitalist freedom that freedom is promoted by the respect of private property 
rights, then we must augment the account: the overlap of the logics of freedom and property 
demands a distinction between the freedom of the owner and the freedom of the non-owner if 
the fundamental relation between property and freedom is not to be totally undermined. Why 
does the interference with an owner reduce freedom and that with a non-owner not? 
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That property implies interference is of course less problematic for neo-republicans: liberal 
freedom holds all interference to be freedom-reducing, where neo-republicanism is concerned 
only with those which are arbitrary. The non-domination ideal cannot therefore legitimate a 
priori the institution of private property, because the interference such a system implies is 
neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ per se: it can speak only to a given distribution of property, judging 
whether that distribution (and the willingness on the part of the state which secures it) is or is 
not arbitrary and the capacity for interference therefore freedom-reducing or not. If the fact of 
being an owner/non-owner was sufficient to render interference with the latter (always) and 
with the former (never) non-arbitrary, then the republican regime would accept the 
interference implied by the private property, providing an effective legitimation of the status 
quo and lining up commonplace liberal and republican verdicts on property notwithstanding 
the discrepancy between their respective normative standards. We shall consider shortly 
whether this is the case, having first examined how those who promote non-interference draw 
the distinction. 
 
4.6.3 Moralising interference 
 
The problem is to explain why, starting from a commitment to liberal freedom, interference 
with owners (confiscation, for example) is unacceptable while that with the non-owner (such 
as, say, criminalising theft) is not. Cohen suggests that libertarian writing attempts to resolve 
the matter with a ‘rights definition of freedom’, whereby “I am unfree only where someone 
[here, the state], prevents me from doing what I have a right to do,”48 and quotes Nozick: 
“Other people’s actions place limits on one’s available opportunities. Whether this makes 
one’s resulting action non-voluntary depends upon whether these others had the right to act as 
they did.” 49  This would seem to distinguish state interference which is illegitimate 
(interference with property to which people have a right) and that which is legitimate (that 
which stops people from gaining access to or exploiting property to which they have no right.) 
An account like this puts to an end to the myth of capitalism (and, more specifically, neo-
liberal society as the contemporary paradigm of capitalist development) as generalised non-
interference, for we are no longer talking about the same neutral conception of non-
interference from which we started, but a highly moralised one, intimately bound up with the 
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distribution of property. Instead, when the state does as it should, freedom as non-interference, 
rather than being a general feature of capitalist society, correlates with property: those who 
have it are not interfered with and those who do not are everywhere obstructed in their efforts 
to access it. The have-nots encounter constant obstruction from entering upon, or making use 
of, or otherwise engaging with, the property of others, but that interference is legitimated 
away via the device of moral rights in order to sustain the rhetoric of capitalism as freedom. 
Property determines the position of the line between interferences which reduce freedom and 
those which do not. 
 
4.6.4 Moralising ownership 
 
Even this more limited claim about freedom - that only interferences with that to which one 
has a moral right reduce freedom - is tendentious. Cohen accuses libertarians of inconsistency: 
the rights in question seem to be moral rights, such that, the owner having a moral right to his 
property, an interference with his enjoyment of that property is illegitimate, while a non-
owner, not enjoying such a moral right, can and indeed must, encounter interference when 
attempting to make use of others’ property, this latter interference being one of the 
fundamental functions of the state. Yet libertarians are unwilling to consider the moral status 
of interferences with private property, which are ruled illegitimate regardless of any moral 
justification which might be available: the invocation of the moralised conception of freedom 
as non-interference works in only one direction, supporting existing property owners but 
never working to the benefit of non-owners.
50
 In the absence of a coherent account of why 
owners have a moral right to their goods but non-owners do not, then we are left to fall back 
on a positivistic account which makes the moral right dependent on a prior legal right: an 
owner has a moral right to his or her property because he or she is the owner. No more is 
needed. 
 
4.6.5 The insufficiency of legality 
 
Our problem is not, however, resolved by such a shift from moral to legal rights as the feature 
which distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate interferences. Where public power 
interferes with the rights of an owner and that interference meets a minimum condition of 
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legality, then the legal right which was the basis of the moral right will disappear - one will 
be reduced, in effect, to arguing about the interference with one’s property right over a thing 
one no longer owns - and the moral right (if it correlates with ownership) is extinguished with 
it. If the moral right survives the lawful deprivation, then there can be no morally legitimate 
deprivation. It might be replied that in such a case the moral right is to a thing that one once 
owned and of which he or she was deprived illegitimately: this is circular - the deprivation is 
illegitimate because the thing of which he or she was deprived is something over which he 
she retains a moral right because the deprivation was illegitimate. Falling back upon legal 
rights takes us no closer to solving the problem of legitimating interference with non-owners 
(so as to exclude it from the category of freedom-reducing interference) while assessing as 
illegitimate the interference with an owner’s rights over property: the classical liberal position 
on property seems unsustainable, and republican perspectives have no reason to consider the 
interference inherent in property to be anything other than arbitrary. We must return to take 
seriously the task of identifying a stand-alone moral account of the relevant distinction 
between owner and non-owner which is not parasitic upon the legal recognition of ownership: 
a final attempt to save a worldview in which the protection of private property is central to 
freedom, now understood as moralised non-interference, rather than mere non-interference. 
 
4.7 Acquisition and transfer 
 
Libertarian thinkers, like liberals before them, take to offering a potential means of giving 
moral approval to a given distribution of property through the concepts of just acquisition and 
just transfer. The father of all such accounts is Locke who, arguing against Filmer’s account 
of all private property as deriving from a divine Monarch on whom God had bestowed it and 
on whom the property rights of his subjects depended,
51
 nevertheless agreed with Filmer that 
the original divine grant was to Adam. Where they diverged was in Locke’s insistence that 
property was not the private dominion of Adam - a dominion which Filmer held to have 
descended to the kings of his day. Instead, in his grant “God gave him… right in common 
with all mankind.”52 This common property does not preclude the creation of private property 
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rights - God gave men the world and its contents for the “support and comfort of their being” 
and so “there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before 
they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man.”53 The solution to this 
conundrum is found in self-ownership which stands now, as then, at the heart of liberal 
thought
54
 - the idea that “every man has a property in his own person,” and so to his own 
labour and its fruits.
55
 The eventual effect is that one’s labour is capable of transforming what 
belong to all in common into something which belongs to one alone: 
 
“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and 
left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property… it hath by this labour something 
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour 
being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a 
right to what that is once joined to.”56 
 
This possibility of obtaining a right to private property is subject to the ‘Lockean proviso’ - 
that one can acquire property only where “there is enough, and as good left in common for 
others.”57 When a Lockean argument for just acquisition is made by Nozick, however, the 
proviso takes the weaker form that “[a] process normally giving rise to a permanent 
bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of 
others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened”58: here, all other ways in 
which the position of the non-owner might be worsened are of no relevance - most 
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importantly, that which prevents legitimate acquisition of said acquisition would not leave 
sufficient common property for others that follow. The ability to become the moral owner of 
property with which one has mixed one’s labour survives subject to this weaker limit.  One 
republican response to the process of original acquisition is particularly well-known:  “How 
many crimes, wars, murder, how many miseries and horrors Mankind would have been 
spared by him who, pulling up the stakes or filling up the ditch, had cried out to his kind: 
Beware of listening to this imposter, You are lost if you forget that the fruits are everyone’s 
and the Earth no one’s.”59 
 
4.7.1 Historical entitlement theory 
 
This principle - the principle of justice in acquisition - combines with a second, curiously 
undefined, principle of justice in transfer
60
 to produce a ‘historical entitlement theory’ of 
justice in distribution, focusing not on how property is distributed at a given point in time but 
on the process by which that distribution was arrived at: 
 
“A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate 
means. The legitimate means… are specified by the principle of justice in 
transfer. The legitimate first ‘moves’ are specified by the principle of justice in 
acquisition. Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just. 
The means of change specified by the principle of justice in transfer preserve 
justice.”61  
 
Even, then, if it were accepted by libertarian thinkers that private property implies 
interference with non-owners along with the better advertised freedom of owners, the 
entitlement theory demonstrates how that distribution of interference might be morally 
justified by resulting from just acquisition and just transfer: it solves the problem of drawing 
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a bright line between owners and non-owners such as to justify the assertion that 
interferences in each category reduce and do not reduce freedom accordingly. This account 
wraps up legitimate freedom and unfreedom in a causal rather than merely correlative 
relationship; the unfreedom of a non-owner is legitimate because the owner is free to acquire 
and dispose of his property as he sees fit. Were he not, there would be no justice in transfer, 
the present distribution of property would be unjust and the moral appropriateness of the 
distribution of interference unravelled. Transposed into neo-republican terms, whereby we 
are required to diagnose not the moral appropriateness of the interference, but instead the 
arbitrariness of the potential interference and so the underlying distribution of property to 
ascertain whether the interference will take place on an arbitrary basis and therefore reduce 
freedom, an account which justifies that distribution in terms of the efforts of individuals and 
their free choices is similarly attractive. It potentially pronounces the entire distribution of 
wealth and entitlements, at a stroke, non-arbitrary and in doing so legitimates not just the 
institution of private property, but also its contemporary arrangement. 
 
4.7.2 Freedom in an owned world 
 
The present day individual stands far removed from the context in which just original 
acquisition might occur, being embedded in a context in which almost everything is already 
owned; where people, countries and companies enjoy the fruit of unjust original acquisitions 
compounded over decades and centuries, and the neo-liberal project has seen a drastic 
reduction in the range of assets held in public hands. Were we to return to an egalitarian 
baseline, were it possible to start over with the sum total of wealth distributed evenly between 
every individual on the planet, this libertarian fantasy might begin to make sense. But such a 
thing is not possible, and in conjunction with the evident injustice (or even dubious justice) of 
original acquisitions,
62
 it is neither practicable nor sensible to ignore the disparities in wealth 
between individuals and pretend that any transaction between them can be considered to 
result in a just distribution of wealth merely on the basis that it reflects their free will: even if 
consent is unvitiated, the transfer of an unjustly acquired asset cannot itself be just. A 
forward-looking justification of property holdings requires an impossible investigation into 
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the genesis of current patterns of distribution which, even it were possible, would not show us 
what we would need to see if the entitlement theory were to justify those patterns. The 
possibility of employing the entitlement theory to justify an actually-existing social 
distribution of property is zero.
63
 
 
4.7.3 Paradoxes of freedom and property 
 
Not only, then, do libertarian positions fail to acknowledge that existence of private property, 
in the sense of private ownership of goods and land which is recognised in law, and which 
will, if necessary, be backed up by the coercive resources of the state, represents a pervasive 
form of interference with individuals - mostly latent but entirely dependable in its willingness 
to exercise actual interference. They neglect that such interference far outweighs the, 
supposedly illegitimate, form of potential interference against which libertarianism sets its 
stall, for the individual ownership of one person is a corollary of the non-ownership of all 
others, an attempt by any of whom to make use of whatever property is at issue will be to put 
himself on the wrong side of public might. Even where this latter interference is 
acknowledged, the difficulty of establishing a useful normative basis for distinguishing 
between the interference which we hold legitimate and that which we cannot countenance 
demonstrates the dubiety of the commitment to freedom - a commitment placed under further 
strain by a shift of perspective from the existence of private property back to the question of 
how such property is distributed within society: the non-interference ideal finds itself 
supporting property rights even where the effect to condemn non-owners to live at the mercy 
of owners. 
 
Absent a redistributive moment - a situation of radical redistribution of property on 
egalitarian grounds which might set aside the injustice of historic acquisition and provide a 
basis for a forward-looking entitlement theory underpinned by justice in transfer - we are left 
to proceed on the basis of an incremental redistribution through taxation (much of it resisted 
by those, often themselves possessed of vast wealth, who speak the language of freedom, 
whether neo-liberal or libertarian by tendency) and, otherwise, voluntary transaction between 
formally equal individuals. Even in a world where the distribution of property is hopelessly 
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skewed, the mantra of consent becomes the justification for the interference that stands 
behind both property and the contractual arrangements which alter its distribution. The fact of 
state interference at the level of contractual enforcement is excluded from the category of 
freedom-reducing actions action because it is consented to; so too the pattern of interference 
with owners and non-owners which results from the transaction executed. Chapter 6 will 
consider the plausibility of employing consent as the basis of the distinction between 
arbitrary and non-arbitrary interference, and so giving it within the neo-republican project a 
curative status equivalent to its legitimating function in liberal thought. If property implies 
interference, can the fact of consent in the transfer of that property prevent the interference 
from being freedom-reducing? 
 
4.8 Property and freedom in the republican revival 
 
The relationship between property as an institution and neo-republican freedom has not yet 
been the subject of sustained analysis. Pettit has, however, made two related claims about 
property and freedom:  
 
“The first is that the property system and property distribution envisaged, 
however inegalitarian, is not inimical to freedom just on the grounds of being 
inegalitarian. The second is that if the property system or distribution has the 
contingent effect of allowing domination, then that makes a case for 
institutional adjustment, assuming that some beneficial adjustment is 
available.”64  
 
On both counts, this is compatible with the account presented. It is a weaker claim, however, 
specifically because in starting from the question of an inegalitarian distribution of property, 
Pettit has already accepted that private property is not an a priori source of domination, much 
as he accepts the instrumental (if not intrinsically moral) value of the market in distributing 
that property. The second claim is again unhelpfully weak: if the contingent domination 
merely provides a non-exclusionary reason (to be weighed against what? Respect for the 
outcome of market processes?) for adjusting the distribution of property, then in what sense is 
this a neo-republican argument? The seeming willingness to abandon the pursuit of non-
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domination is in part explained by the account offered of the nature of property, to which 
Pettit seems to ascribes a natural, pre-legal existence: 
 
“The property regime can have the aspect of an environment akin to the 
natural environment. Like the natural environment, it will certainly affect the 
range or ease with which people enjoy their status as undominated agents, and 
it may warrant complaint on that account, but it will not itself be a source of 
domination.”65 
 
This is an unfortunate analogy which accords to the existing distribution of wealth and 
entitlements a status of which it is wholly undeserving. Without even looking ‘behind’ the 
property regime to examine the process by which it was created, we can say with some 
certainty that it was created. Rules as to what will be recognised as property, which contracts 
will be enforced and what remedies will be available for their breach - all this was decided at 
some point, by judges, politicians, whoever, and in a way to which the minor adjustments 
human beings are capable of making to their physical environment cannot compare. This 
comparison echoes the most outrageous fallacies of liberal legalism in its potential to obscure 
the injustices of original acquisition, long histories of unjust transaction and the political 
consequences of the distribution of property. It is, intentionally or not, a tool of massive 
depoliticisation. The property regime is neither static and predictable (as the environment 
normally is) nor essentially random (as when the natural world intrudes into human life in the 
form of a volcanic eruption or a tidal wave), because it is tied up with human agency, by 
turns vexatious or capricious, or even altruistic, but subject to a thousand motivations 
unavailable to the natural world: we may live at the mercy of the natural world, but this 
means something very different from living at the mercy of another human being. The 
property regime neither arose spontaneously not did it evolve to become as it is: it was 
pushed and pulled at every turn, manipulated by actors with interests of their own. Wealth 
has a tendency to self-perpetuate, whereby practices of regulatory capture or of monopoly 
capitalism (to which, it might be argued, ‘normal’ capitalism has an undeniable propensity), 
meaning that those who derive advantage from it are likely to find greater advantage accrue 
to them over time. Pettit’s failure to recognise this leads him to adopt a republican variant of 
the conclusion reached by Berlin and Rawls, whereby property affects the value of rather 
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than the existence of freedom: “it reduces the range or the ease with which you enjoy 
freedom as non-domination” as do “natural differences of physique or intelligence or 
geography.”66 Such differences are those normally considered to result from ‘brute luck’67 
and to compare a historically conditioned property regime with these factors is alarming 
sophistry. Pettit’s account is to that extent incorrect. Property, it has been shown, does not 
itself affect freedom. Indeed, its recognition is part of a process by which the existence of an 
organised public power protects some against the arbitrary interference by others. Where the 
imbalance in its distribution is such that property holdings facilitate the arbitrary interference 
by one of another, however, it is not the value of freedom which is diminished: it is its 
existence. 
 
We will return to the question of property and, eventually, consent in order to shed further 
light on the causes of horizontal unfreedom. We must first consider, however, the role of the 
law in the direct regulation of the relation between private individuals; the foreground to 
which property acts as a backdrop. 
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Part 2 - Chapter 5: Marriage, Divorce and the Law 
 
5.1 Horizontal relationships and freedom 
 
This part 2 focuses on what I have identified as a crucial lacuna of the neo-republican revival 
- the sustained analysis of horizontal relationships of domination and, in particular, the role of 
public power in constituting those relationships. The horizontal relationships of unfreedom 
with which we concern ourselves are not, in the first place, those in which one party threatens 
to, or indeed does, transgress the law. Instead, we focus upon those in which one party 
dominates another, but the capacity for arbitrary interference is lawful; where the arbitrary 
interference in question can call upon the state, and the coercive apparatus which comes into 
being alongside an organised public power, to support it or, at least, receives the tacit 
endorsement of this public power, where it does not through sanction seek to indicate its 
disapproval or, moreover, prevent the interference from happening. It is therefore incumbent 
upon us to consider the way in which the law structures horizontal relationships - outlawing 
certain actions (such that the he who executes them puts himself on the wrong side of the law, 
and is liable to be punished), permitting other things (so that he who carries them out need 
not fear an encounter with public power) and making others mandatory (such that he who 
omits to carry them out is punished for his failure). 
 
5.1.1 The choice of case studies 
 
The state’s role in horizontal domination has so far been explored only via the institution of 
property. We will return to the implications of property for freedom in horizontal relations. In 
the meantime, we consider other means by which public power conditions private relations; 
other aspects of private relationships which cannot exist in the absence of the state and for 
which, where they render unfree, the state must shoulder some of the blame: if property is the 
background, legal regulation of these relationships is the foreground. Two case studies have 
been chosen in order to illustrate the role of law in constituting horizontal relationships of 
domination and, in turn, how such relationships have been and might be further undone. The 
case studies in question relate firstly, in the present chapter, to the relationship between 
husband and wife and secondly, in the following chapter, that between employer and 
employee. Their selection can be justified in the following terms, relating both to the internal 
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logic of the present project and to the world of which it seeks to make sense. Firstly, the focus 
on each case study constitutes a response to two of the key criticisms discussed in the context 
of republican thought generally. In the first case, consideration of the husband-wife 
relationship constitutes a direct response to feminist critiques of classical republicanism, 
relating to the latter’s disparagement or outright neglect of women, while attempting 
simultaneously to make good the failure of neo-republicanism to so far address directly the 
shortcomings of its predecessor. Most importantly, it acts as a direct response to Astell’s 
critique of the manner in which freedom was articulated as a specifically male ideal, available 
to women, if at all, only where not in law subjugated by their husband or father. This is 
important analytically, but also symbolically: it is not sufficient to merely assert, as an 
abstract proposition, that neo-republicanism has something to say here. Whatever it is must 
also be said. In the second, an exploration of the employer-employee relationship addresses 
the problem identified whereby neo-republicanism often occupies the terrain of orthodox 
liberalism via an application of its ideal to a context in which liberalism and (another version 
of) republicanism once clashed. This permits the specific version of neo-republicanism 
advanced in the present work to strengthen itself via the appropriation of the conceptual 
resources of the labor republican movement, tying these together with my own reflections 
upon the relationship between freedom and money, and the role of public power in 
constituting property. In taking this relationship as our second case study of horizontal 
domination, this work is able to contend that  neo-republicanism logically implies 
conclusions analogous to those arrived at by earlier republican thinkers (even where their 
normative bases diverge) and that neo-republican thought both can and must forge into areas 
which it has so far addressed only peripherally.  
 
Secondly, the choice of case studies and, in particular, the fact of including multiple case 
studies where it might be thought that one would suffice, can be justified in terms of the fact 
that neither alone would demonstrate the progression of the argument being made and its full 
practical implications. In making the move from the first of these case-studies to the second, 
we expand our field of vision, so as to move, tentatively, towards a more general theory of 
horizontal domination - one based not upon the existence or potential existence of a specific 
legal relationship, but of how any person’s relation to any other person may become, by 
virtue of the existence and intervention of public power, one of unfreedom. The relationality 
of the republican ideal has been the subject of repeated stress within this work: the choice and 
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ordering of case studies permits a move from the simplest of relationships - one to which 
there are only two parties, and the very existence of a relationship between them is a result of 
their own choice - via the more complicated situation in which that relationship may be 
coming to an end and it is necessary to contextualise the relationships of the parties to it to a 
variety of other actors, to a generalised, far more complex, set of actual and potential legal 
relationships whose aggregation reveals the status of the individual and answers in large part 
the question of his or her horizontal freedom. Such general applicability must be achieved if 
the fullest possible reach of the neo-republican ideal is to be arrived at. To reach the general, 
however, we must begin from the particular. 
 
Thirdly, as has been observed in our account of their position in relation to republicanism as a 
historical tradition, our two areas of consideration fundamentally differ along an axis which 
makes it necessary to show how and why the neo-republican ideal applies equally to both. 
Where the history of female domination is in large part a history of discrimination - the 
application of different rules and standards to individuals depending on their gender - and so 
progressive emancipation could in part be achieved merely by undoing that discrimination, 
substituting rules of universal applicability, it has been shown that in the case of the labor 
republican movement and the triumph of certain liberal presuppositions which killed it off, 
formal equality became a central driver of domination. In juxtaposing case studies which 
exemplify both sides of this coin - domination via discrimination and domination without 
discrimination - we seek to establish the utility of the non-domination ideal in both contexts, 
and the manner in which that utility varies from one to the other. We aim in turn to 
demonstrate that applied to such horizontal contexts, the neo-republican ideal has a normative 
dimension discrete from and superior to that of equality alone. 
 
Fourth, the choice of case studies can be justified on the basis of (albeit instinctive, 
impressionistic) beliefs as to the actual presence of unfreedom in contemporary society - 
beliefs as to how and why, as well as by whom, the average individual has found and 
continues to find his or her interests open to arbitrary interference. As will be seen, it is my 
thesis that the relationship between husband and wife has, from the point of view of neo-
republican thought, improved considerably over time. It thus provides fertile ground for an 
analysis that, in showing how the law has been used to effect that advance, goes beyond mere 
condemnation to suggest the outlines of a neo-republican programme for further 
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emancipation in that context and in others. In the meantime, by virtue of the size of the 
relevant demographics alone, any residual unfreedom in this context is liable to apply to a 
vast proportion of the population. Even if the problem as it exists now is relatively minor as 
compared to the past, its application is extremely broad; if there is horizontal domination here, 
its victims are many. The second case study, we will see, is also a story of net improvement, 
but from the point of view of horizontal non-domination the law which structures the 
relationship between employer and employee has considerable room left for improvement. In 
fact, the balance of freedom and unfreedom would, for reasons which shall be explained, 
seem to be rolling back in recent years against the direction of travel witnessed through much 
of the twentieth century; undoing some of the progress whose logic and facts will be 
explained. Property, it has been shown, grounds horizontal domination and, at the broadest 
level, the employment relation between employer and employee can be understood as the 
relationship between those who have property and those who do not; those who sell their 
labour and those who buy it. It is for that reason perhaps the most significant of all the 
horizontal relationships of domination which might be identified as subsisting in the 
contemporary western world, and the changing nature of the employment relation has only 
exacerbated its inherently problematic nature. We therefore take it as our second case study. 
 
In this context, another potential relationship of domination - one which can again be 
conceptualised as deriving almost directly from the fact of owning and not owning, and so is 
similarly entangled with the existence of public power - is sufficiently pervasive as to be a 
candidate for the sort of elaboration and analysis to which this and the following chapter are 
devoted: that between those who own property and those who do not. Prior to the 2008 crash, 
growth in many western economies was based in large part on spiralling housing costs which 
priced many out of the market and was compounded by planning laws which prevented 
demand from being met via construction of new properties. In Britain, those who could not 
afford to buy were squeezed from the other side by the selling off of social housing by 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government and the failure of successive governments to 
replace them. Many who might prefer to live in social housing are therefore are required 
instead to rent privately. In their immediate dealings with those from whom they rent, their 
dealings are structured by legal rules which lay down standard contractual terms, implicating 
the law in any relationship of domination which might subsist. The extent to which this 
confluence of legal factors might add up to a situation in which the propertyless live at the 
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mercy of property-owners is not the subject of any of our case studies, but given the numbers 
of individuals who fall into each category, as well as the fact that the wealth gap between 
them is still growing, it might well have been. It is likely that it is one of the primary forms of 
horizontal unfreedom in Britain today. Instead, within the present work, it is a relationship 
which becomes relevant principally as a backdrop to the employer-employee relationship, the 
need for the latter to pay for shelter in part necessitating the selling of his or her labour.  
 
In short, the two case studies of horizontal domination that have been chosen work to bring 
the republican tradition full-circle in permitting the alignment of its most recent form with 
older and now largely neglected branches, and demonstrating that it has brought within its 
field of vision some of the tradition’s most problematic blindspots. They evidence not just the 
fact of its application but also the range and depth of the neo-republican ideal as applied to 
man’s relationship to man and the law which structures it. 
 
5.2 Husband and wife 
 
The relationship between husband and wife (or one partner and the other in a civil partnership) 
is, then, perhaps the most obvious example of a relationship which is directly constituted by 
law. Such relationship is paradigmatic because however else their relationship might be 
recognised (most likely from a religious perspective), two persons are husband and wife or 
civil partners only to the extent that the law recognises them as such. It is of interest for 
present purposes also because it has been, as we have seen, subjected to criticism from a non-
domination standpoint. Though the relationship exists within a factual and legal matrix of 
almost infinite complexity, the limit to the number of parties directly implicated allows for 
the possibility of analysing it in some detail in order to understand the manner in which an 
alteration in the legal framework brings about an alteration in the bargaining position and, 
eventually, freedom of the parties involved. To facilitate diachronic analysis, our examples 
are drawn primarily from the Scots law of husband and wife, of which the following does not 
claim to be an exhaustive account. 
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5.2.1 Criminal law 
 
An easy place to start is those variations of the criminal law which apply where the parties 
are husband and wife. In general, the effects are few. Previously, the most important was the 
rule that a husband could not rape his wife, a rule based on Hume’s infamous statement that 
a “a man cannot himself commit a rape on his wife,” 1  seemingly influenced by Hale’s 
assertion of the same fact on the basis that “by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract 
the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”2 Bit 
by bit, though more recently than is justifiable, the courts rolled back that rule, holding firstly 
that it did not hold where the couple were living separately,
3
 and later that the “fiction of 
implied consent has no useful purpose to serve today in the law of rape in Scotland.”4 Though 
the impossibility of convicting a man for the rape of his wife did not preclude the possibility 
of convicting him for other offences, this embarrassing anachronism left an unacceptable gap 
in the protection of wives against possible domination by their husbands: we have said, and 
should repeat, that the law cannot reasonably be asked to shoulder the blame for horizontal 
unfreedom which derives from the unwillingness of certain parties to respect the boundaries 
which the law erects. The law can, however, and should, be criticized for its failure to put in 
place appropriate boundaries, such that the relevant interferences do not carry with them a 
meaningful risk of encountering the coercive apparatus of the state; where one can interfere at 
will with another’s interests and receive the state’s tacit endorsement in doing so. The current 
rule is contained within the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, which responded to 
ongoing criticism that the common law offence of rape was one which reflected the male idea 
of sexual activity by significantly expanding the range of activities which are included within 
the actus reus.
5
 Not only is marriage no longer a defence to a charge of rape, but the potential 
basis of such a charge is now far wider; the state’s coercive apparatus has clearly set its stall 
against such acts and whatever problems remain, it can no longer be said that the law signals 
to women that marriage requires them to live at the mercy of their husbands. 
 
                                                          
1
 Baron David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes, vol. I, at 305-6. 
2
 Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown,  (1736), vol. 1, at 629, quoted by Lord Lane CJ in R v 
R [1992] 1 AC 599 (HL), at 604. 
3
 HMA v Duffy 1983 SLT 7. The parties were not legally separated. 
4
 Stallard v HMA 1989 SLT 469, at 473. 
5
 Rape occurs when person A’s penis, without either the consent of person B or the reasonable belief that B 
consents, “penetrates to any extent, either intending to do so or reckless as to whether there is penetration, the 
vagina, anus or mouth of B…” Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, s.1 (1). 
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5.2.2 The consequences of marriage 
 
Elsewhere in the law, the consequences of marriage are greater. The rule, however, whereby 
a wife was under a duty to obey her husband has long since passed from this world, replaced 
by a relative equality that permits each to make most decisions independently of the other and 
prohibits the ‘reasonable chastisement’ of times past.6 Similarly, the rule that the privilege of 
choosing the marital home belonged to the husband (subject only to the proviso that his 
choice be reasonable and genuine)
7
 was abolished by the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) 
Scotland Act 1984.
8
 So too has been the duty to adhere (i.e., live together).
9
 What is 
renounced in marrying is much less than in the past, and the relative gain is very much on the 
side of the wife, who was disadvantaged by most of the rules now abolished. These 
consequences having been written out of law, and replaced with something closer to legal 
equality, the husband is obliged to make decisions jointly with his wife: the process tracks her 
interests as well as his own and public power will not back up his interferences if they are 
arbitrary. The possibility of horizontal domination recedes. The most important incapacity 
now entailed by marriage or civil partnership is of course that which prevents an individual 
entering into a further marriage or a civil partnership.
10
 Such incapacity on its own does not 
seem to constitute a relationship of domination: only in the context of an understanding of the 
means by which each is ended can a verdict be delivered. 
 
5.3 Ending a marriage 
 
The most obvious way in which the law structures the relationship between husband and wife 
once married is in the options it gives them for ending the relationship: the law cannot force 
people to love each other, nor to want to stay married, but it can determine how and why they 
can divorce: “falling out of love is neither morally nor legally a legitimate ground for 
divorce,”11 (though there is no reason it should not be). Divorce was no part of the law of 
Scotland in pre-Reformation times, though a marriage could be nullified for a wide range of 
                                                          
6
 See Eric M. Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland, W. Green (1997), at 11.018, and the references 
there. 
7
 Clive, note 6, at 11.013, and the references there. 
8
 s.4: “Any rule of law entitling the husband, as between husband and wife, to determine where the matrimonial 
home is to be, shall cease to have effect.” 
9
 Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act s.2 (1). 
10
 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 s. 6(4)(b); Civil Partnership Act 2004 s. 86(1)(d) 
11
 Alison Diduck. Law’s Families, LexisNexis (2003), at 45. 
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reasons.
12
 From the time of the Reformation, divorce on the grounds of adultery became 
available at common law and by an Act of 1573
13
 so too did divorce on grounds of 
desertion.
14
  
 
In 1912 the Gorell Commission report
15
 on the grounds for divorce suggested a number of 
reforms - principally ending the less favourable treatment of women - to the English law of 
divorce (made available by Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, prior to which divorce was 
available only via a private act of Parliament).
16
 These were eventually implemented by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, followed north of the border by the Divorce (Scotland) Act of 
the following year. This latter renewed the law governing divorce for desertion, reducing the 
period before divorce from four years down to three and added new grounds for divorce: 
cruelty, incurable insanity, sodomy and bestiality.
17
 Incurable insanity founded, for the first 
time, the possibility of divorce on a no-fault basis; the development of the law on cruelty, 
both statutory
18
 and via interpretation of the relevant provisions,
19
 meant that it too came to 
permit no-fault divorce in some circumstances. The first steps had been taken away from the 
approach according to which divorce was based on the fault of one of the parties, constituting 
punishment for wrongdoing in marriage and so, if no such wrongdoing had taken place, the 
marriage continued regardless of its status, with intolerable treatment to be tolerated unless it 
could be shown to fit within certain predetermined categories. From this point of view the 
most important of the available grounds was that of cruelty, which alone had a potential 
                                                          
12
 The fullest history of divorce in Scotland, told through a series of case studies, is Leah Leneman, Alienated 
Affections: Divorce and Separation in Scotland 1684-1830, Edinburgh University Press (1998). Leneman states 
the total number of divorce actions in this period to have been just 904 (at 10). See also Charles J. Guthrie, The 
History of Divorce in Scotland, (1910) 8 Scottish Historical Review 39. 
13
 Act of the Parliament of Scotland of 1573, c.55. 
14
 The change was made “specifically for the benefit of the Earl of Argyle, Chancellor of Scotland, who was 
married to but wanted to divorce Jean Stewart, half-sister of Mary, Queen of Scots.” Roderick Phillips, Putting 
Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society, (Cambridge University Press (1988), at 61.  
15
 Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, Report (Cd 6478, 1912). 
16
 In the absence of formal termination of marriage, the practice of wife sale flourished among the ‘lower 
orders’: see Katherine O’Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law, Weidenfeld and Nicolson (1985), at 50-53. 
Divorce via private Act of Parliament occurred at an average rate of 1 a year between 1715 and 1775 and 3 a 
year between then and the introduction of divorce. Given that the primary motivation was to ensure the supply 
of legitimate heirs, it is unsurprising that only 4 women were successful in obtaining divorce in this way: 
Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987, Oxford University Press (1990), at 300-2. Scotland, 
being more liberal, was at this time “the nearest thing to a divorce haven for the English.” Philips, note 14, at 
240. 
17
  Divorce (Scotland) Act  1938, s.1. 
18
 e.g., Divorce (Scotland) Act 1964, s.5 (2), removing insanity and absence of malice as defences to cruelty. 
19
 Gollins v Gollins [1964] AC 644, holding that intention to injure is not an essential element of cruelty; 
Williams v Williams [1964] AC 698, holding that insanity is no defence to an action for divorce on grounds of 
cruelty.  
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catch-all quality into which generic maltreatment might fall, giving a wife a way out of a 
marriage that more limited grounds such as adultery were less likely to provide - assuming 
that she was not so financially dependent that the availability of divorce was rendered 
irrelevant by crude economic reality.  
 
A Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce reported in 1950,
20
 resulting in the Divorce 
(Insanity and Desertion) Act 1958 and the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1964. The former 
liberalised insanity as a ground for divorce to reflect changing mental health practice
21
 while 
the latter widened the definition of cruelty. The report, however, demonstrated major 
disagreement as to the form that the law on divorce should take, with half  its members in 
favour of introducing marital breakdown as the sole ground of divorce and the other half 
concerned that to do so would mean that “people would come to look upon marriage less and 
less as a lifelong union and more and more one to be ended if things began to go wrong,”22 
and demanding that, for the sake of the  community, the state take a stronger interest in the 
preservation of marriage.
23
 This latter view privileges the existence of a marriage above the 
well-being of those party to it and the report met with a negative response: the hope was 
voiced that “this disappointing document may not prove to be the epitaph of divorce law 
reform.”24  
 
It did not, and in 1966 the Archbishop of Canterbury published a report entitled Putting 
Asunder - A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society. The Law Commission published its own 
report in that same year.
25
 The principles it identified for a desirable law of divorce were "the 
support of marriages which have a chance of survival" on the one hand and, on the other, "the 
decent burial with the minimum of embarrassment, humiliation and bitterness of those that 
are indubitably dead."
26
 Already, a more realistic and humane approach was evident, and the 
prospects of reform accordingly improved. The reports agreed that divorce based exclusively 
upon fault was unsatisfactory, leading to recriminations and the dwelling upon past wrongs, 
                                                          
20
 Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Report (Cmd 9568, 1956). 
21
 For the context, see O. M. Stone, Divorce (Insanity and Desertion) Act 1958, (1959) MLR 61. 
22
 Royal Commission, note 20, at [69] (iv). 
23
 Royal Commission, note 20, at [69] (vii). 
24
 Otto Kahn-Freund, Divorce Law Reform?, (1956) Modern Law Review 573, at 600, quoted in Otto Kahn-
Freund, Reform of the Grounds of Divorce—The Field of Choice, (1967) Modern Law Review 180, at 180. 
25
 Law Commission, Reform of the Grounds of Divorce - The Field of Choice (Cm. 3123, 1965). 
26
 Law Commission, note 20, at [15]. For a consideration of relationship between the two reports, see O. R. 
McGregor, Towards Divorce Law Reform, (1967) 18 British Journal of Sociology 91. 
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while requiring those who could not get out of failed marriages to form ‘illicit unions’ with 
new partners, creating difficulties for any children of the union.
27
 This underlines that the 
relationship between parties to a marriage which has been dissolved continue to relate to each 
other - will almost inevitably do so where children are involved - and so the mere fact of the 
circumstances under which divorce is possible can not provide an exhaustive answer to our 
question of the law conditions the relationship of the two parties: all else being equal, the law 
must not just make divorce available, but it must also permit divorce in a fashion which does 
not poison future interactions between the pair. The process of divorce will often be 
unpleasant enough: one should not be incentivized to remain in a marriage by the fact that the 
only way to achieve a divorce will make matters even more unpleasant than they need be. 
 
The Law Commission succeeded where its Royal counterpart had failed previously, Kahn-
Freund suggesting that the resulting report was the most competent since Gorell: “for once, 
we have a lawyers’ document which speaks in terms of cause and effect rather than in terms 
of guilt and innocence.”28 This document was the basis of the Divorce Reform Act 1969, a 
statute which split the difference between the Law Commission and a Church of England 
reports and so “reflected both a traditional obligation-based marriage and a modern 
individualistic one.”29 The law was consolidated by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The 
Scottish Law Commission had simultaneously been considering the issue
30
 and its proposals 
coloured the eventual outcome as contained in the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, which was 
passed only after the failure of seven private members bills introduced with the aim of doing 
for Scotland what the 1969 Act had for England. 
 
5.3.1 The new law of divorce 
 
The 1976 Act introduced a scheme whereby divorce could be granted only where it had been 
demonstrated that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, identifying five ways in which 
such fact could be proven: adultery; behaviour such that “the pursuer cannot reasonably be 
expected to cohabit with the defender”; desertion leading to 2 years’ non-cohabitation; 2 
                                                          
27
 Stephen Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History, Oxford University Press (2003), at 56. 
28
 Otto Kahn-Freund, Reform of the Grounds of Divorce - The Field of Choice, (1967) Modern Law Review 
180. 
29
 Diduck, note 11, at 50. 
30
 Scottish Law Commission, Divorce: The Grounds Considered, (Cm. 3256, 1967). 
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years’ non-cohabitation with consent; 5 years’ non-cohabitation.31 The law therefore moved 
significantly towards no-fault divorce (represented by the condition of irretrievable 
breakdown) while nevertheless providing a series of relatively objective tests by which the 
condition of irretrievable breakdown could be recognised, some of which required fault to be 
proven. The encouragement of reconciliation was written into law, the court being required to 
continue the action for divorce if there seemed a reasonable prospect of such a thing, with 
any cohabitation which results not counting for the purposes of the divorce action so as to 
avoid creating a disincentive for reconciliation.
32
 The rule demonstrates an attentiveness to 
incentives that is not a constant feature of the law in this area. Unreasonable behaviour, 
which has taken the place of ‘cruelty’ as the most open-ended of the fault-based grounds, is 
diminished in its significance by the availability of the new no-fault grounds. It is restricted to 
conduct since the date of marriage and, though the requirement of ‘behaviour’ must be taken 
to imply a distinction between behaviour and a state of affairs, or condition, behaviour can be 
either “active or passive” and will ground a divorce even where it “results from a mental 
abnormality.”33 The test employed in deciding whether the behaviour is such as to be able to 
ground a divorce is an interesting mix of the objective and subjective - applying an objective 
reasonableness test, but one which, through its application to ‘the pursuer’ takes into account 
the particular characteristics of that individual, as opposed to the ‘reasonable man’.34 
 
The Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 reduced the period for non-cohabitation and consent to 
1 year and that for non-cohabitation without consent to 2 years.
35
 It also removed desertion as 
a ground for divorce
36
 and provided that where an action was brought on the basis of non-
cohabitation without consent, the courts would no longer have discretion to refuse divorce in 
circumstances in which to do so would cause “grave financial harm” for the defender.37 The 
various grounds for divorce are mostly replicated in the law on civil partnerships as grounds 
for dissolution of such a partnership: unreasonable behaviour, a year’s non-cohabitation and 
consent; two years’ non-cohabitation where there is no consent.38 As with marriage, each of 
these things is taken as a sign of irretrievable breakdown of the partnership: only on that basis 
                                                          
31
 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s.1 (1) and (2). 
32
 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s.2. 
33
 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s.1 (2) (b). 
34
 Clive, note 6, at [20.017]. 
35
 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s.11 
36
 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s.12. 
37
 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s.13. 
38
 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s.44. 
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does it permit dissolution. Adultery, bearing a specific legal meaning relating to heterosexual 
parties, is not a ground for dissolution of a civil partnership, though infidelity probably 
constitutes unreasonable behaviour.
39
 
 
The law of divorce and dissolution of civil partnerships therefore rest on a strange fiction: on 
one hand, each is available only where the marriage is taken to have broken down 
irretrievably - a situation which is held to subsist if one of the four conditions is met, whether 
or not it is in fact true in the ordinary sense of the term. On the other, if a marriage or civil 
partnership has broken down beyond repair, this will not suffice to end it unless one of the 
four conditions can be met: the question, “is thus not a general one, as to whether the 
marriage has broken down irretrievably in any ordinary sense of those words, but is a 
particular question as to whether the subsequent provisions of the Act of have been 
satisfied.” 40  This reliance upon legal fictions hinders, in theory if not in practice, the 
availability of divorce: a failed marriage is no such thing in the eyes of the law unless it can 
be squeezed into one of the statutory boxes. The effect is that the simple agreement of the 
parties to a marriage or civil partnership that the relationship has failed is insufficient for the 
grant of a divorce/dissolution, even though it would seem to be indicative of its failure. This 
is problematic also because those grounds which do require fault to be proven are those 
which permit the grant of divorce with least delay: prior to the reduction of the time periods, 
many divorces were obtained on the basis of the fault of one of the parties in part because to 
proceed on a no-fault basis would have required waiting at least two years.
41
  
 
5.3.2 Bargaining, divorce and freedom 
 
In 1988 a Scottish Law Commission discussion paper, The Ground for Divorce: Should the 
law be changed?, asked whether the law introduced by the 1976 Act should be reformed. It 
noted firstly that the law was misleading (pretending that there was one ground for divorce 
when in fact there were five (now four)). This is a problem not because, as the paper suggests, 
it is misleading, but because it conflates fault based and no-fault grounds, demonstrating 
itself torn between the idea of divorce law as social policy and divorce law as legal 
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 On which, see Nicholas Bamforth, ‘The Benefits of Marriage in All But Name’? Same-Sex Couples and the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004, (2007) 19 Child and Family Law Quarterly 133, at 134-5. 
40
 Findlay v Findlay 1991 SLT 457, at 458. 
41
 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Reform of the Ground for Divorce, No. 116 (1989), at [2.2]. 
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moralism.
42
 Further, the law placed an emphasis on fault liable to lead to “an unnecessary 
dredging up of incidents which would be best forgotten, an unnecessary emphasis on blame 
and recrimination and an unnecessary increase in bitterness and hostility,” with one party 
feeling a sense of injustice at the futility of defending an action where to do so would simply 
delay the inevitable.
43
 The separation periods were possibly too long (a fault since remedied) 
and the law encouraged separation at an early stage so as to be able to procure a divorce as 
soon as possible.
44
 Most interesting was the claim that the law on divorce introduced in 1976 
‘distorted the bargaining position’ of the parties. This represents a perspective which mirrors 
the republican concern for law and horizontal domination of the present work and deserves to 
be quoted at length:  
 
“The spouse who controls the availability of divorce is placed in a strong 
bargaining position. The most obvious example is where the party who wants 
the divorce has to found on one of the separation grounds. If the other party 
consents to the divorce a period of two years' separation is enough. If he or she 
does not consent, the period is five years. Clearly the giving of consent can be 
used as a bargaining counter to extract some advantage or concession. It can 
also happen that a spouse who has committed adultery, or behaved badly, 
wants a divorce quickly but the other spouse, while recognising that the 
marriage is dead, is in no hurry for a divorce. In this situation the innocent 
spouse may be able to extract concessions (for example, abandonment of a 
claim for financial provision or for access to children) in exchange for 
agreeing to raise a divorce action.”45 
 
In 1980 the Royal Commission on Legal Services in Scotland had expressed a similar thought 
in slightly stronger terms, arguing that the non-cohabitation grounds should be merged in 
order to remove "the opportunity for what amounts to 'blackmail' in the present 
arrangements.”46 Here, legal rules laid down to implement policy as to the reasons for, and 
ease with, which divorce should be available have the effect - intended or not - of altering the 
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 For the ‘misleading’ argument, see Scottish Law Commission, The Ground for Divorce: Should the law be 
changed?, (Discussion Paper no. 76) (1988), at 1-2. 
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 SLC, note 42, at 2. 
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 SLC, note 42, at 4. 
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 SLC, note 42, at 5. 
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  Royal Commission on Legal Services in Scotland, Volume 1: Report, (Cm 7846, 1980), at 156-157. 
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relationship between the parties, affecting not just the circumstances under which they can 
divorce but the manner in which they relate to each other both before they divorce, or even if 
they never do. The Scottish Law Commission approaches the issue as though it were one of 
fairness or reasonableness, or as though these consequences might have been unforeseen and 
so would be unproblematic if adopted consciously. It is suggested instead that we approach 
the question as one of freedom, employing the republican standard of freedom as non-
domination and applying it to a horizontal relationship; to enquire whether the effect of rules 
determining the availability of divorce might not render the relationship between husband and 
wife one of horizontal unfreedom in the republican sense. 
 
5.3.3 Horizontal freedom and the conditions of divorce 
 
Neo-republican unfreedom means that in a given relationship one of the parties has the 
capacity to interfere arbitrarily with the interests of the other. If these distorted bargaining 
positions identified by the SLC leave one party able to do so, then the implication is not 
merely that there exists an unfairness, but that the relationship between husband and wife or 
partner and partner has become one of domination, either because divorce is not available or 
because its availability is determined by one party, at whose mercy the other now lives. Two 
options were put forward by the SLC as possible solutions to the faults it had identified. The 
first was a period of separation alone as the sole grounds for divorce.
47
 Such a reform had 
been recommended, with a period of 2 years suggested, by the General Assembly of the 
Church of Scotland in 1969,
48
 and by the Family Law Committee of the Law Society, which 
preferred a 1 year limit.
49
 The report noted that the period might be as short as three months - 
long enough to prevent impulsive divorce, but short enough to permit the parties to arrive at a 
final resolution of their affairs without pointless delay.
50
 The second option, divorce after the 
lapse of a period of time triggered by the giving of intention to divorce, would have 
eliminated requirements of separation and consent entirely.
51
 Such solution “would not give 
either party the power to use refusal of consent to divorce as a bargaining counter,” and 
would be “civilised, simple and economical,” though would “no longer be immediately 
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available to the victims of violence.”52 A period of 3 months was suggested as ensuring that 
temporary problems did not lead to over-hasty divorce and that necessary arrangements could 
be made.
53
 That period could be extended, but anything over a year would be “unnecessary 
and excessive.”54 The suggested reform was admirable and potentially emancipatory. 
 
Responses to the discussion paper response ranged from those who felt that divorce should be 
available on demand to those who advocated a return to the pre-1938 rules, with only 
adultery and desertion available as grounds for divorce.
55
 It concluded that the most 
important fault of the system as it then existed was the excessive length of the non-
cohabitation periods, which encouraged abuse of the behaviour grounds,
56
 and so 
recommended the dual reforms (the shortening of those periods and the removal of desertion 
as a ground) that were eventually implemented in 2006.
57
 The SLC’s concern as to the 
distortion of bargaining power was not shared by respondents, with the view expressed that 
that “it was perfectly legitimate for a spouse who had not contributed to the marriage 
breakdown in any significant way and who did not wish a divorce to be able to negotiate his 
or her consent in exchange for some financial advantage.” 58  The notion of blame still 
permeated the discourse, and if one party was put at the mercy of the other, this was 
unproblematic - as long as the party deserved it. 
 
5.3.4 The expansion of freedom 
 
By the time the 1989 report was written, however, the 1976 Act had already introduced a 
series of changes which reduced the likelihood of one party possessing the capacity for 
arbitrary interference which gives rise to a relationship of republican unfreedom: the reform 
of the law on divorce has served, as much as anything else, to increase (horizontal) freedom 
by giving a wife legal rights and options which prevent her from being compelled to tolerate, 
as it were, the intolerable. The worst is already over. This is demonstrated by comparison 
with the times in which divorce was not available and married women were incapable in law 
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of owning their own property. Subject to these dual incapacities, the wife lived at the mercy 
of the husband, with no option but to tolerate the treatment she received and no opportunity 
to build a life of her own. As Mary Astell suggested, to enter into marriage was to enter into a 
contract of slavery, to live a life of inescapable dependence on one’s husband. Worse, the 
technical unavailability of divorce in England was coupled with the possibility of achieving it 
through a private act of Parliament: the 1853 Royal Commission on Divorce concluded that 
where in Scotland divorce was by then a right, in England it was a privilege of the rich.
59
  
Money in theory may have provided an escape route granting a measure of freedom, for rich 
wives, but in practice was used mostly to allow husbands to jettison inconvenient wives 
where, in failing to deliver a son, they put at risk the family line or the integrity of its estate.
60
 
Poor wives were doubly enslaved in their relationship to their social superiors and to their 
husbands, to whom they were forever bound by law, unable to escape even had they the 
property to build a new life. 
 
5.4 The background of property 
 
As both the inability to secure a divorce and the loss of one’s property rights on marriage 
contributed to this condition of unfreedom, the reform of neither one nor the other alone 
would suffice to turn what was often a relationship of domination into one of freedom, with 
neither party living subject to the arbitrary interference of the other. Divorce without a 
suitable system for the making of financial provision is liable to force the dominated partner 
to tolerate what he or she should not, and otherwise could not, tolerate: indeed, where the 
former is available but the latter not, it is probable that the upper hand is given to the party 
with greater resources, who can rid himself of the financial obligations which come with 
marriage without  any sort of sacrifice as a corollary - the capacity for arbitrary interference 
by husband with wife derives not from her inability to leave him but from her need to act in a 
certain manner, lest he leave her.
 61
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So, though the rules on the when and why of divorce are central to the freedom of wife in 
relation to husband, they are simply the visible surface of a much deeper question, one which 
cannot be understood without a fuller appreciation of the financial aspects of the relationship 
between husband and wife - as it exists during marriage, and how the law will alter it if the 
marriage is dissolved. What in the past was inevitable - economic reality undermining the 
theoretical possibility of divorce, leading those who live at the mercy of their husbands to 
continue to do so even though, in law, a divorce might be possible - persists as a sometime 
phenomenon. Similarly, relevant, then, to our understanding of the impact of law upon the 
horizontal freedom of spouses and civil partners are those rules which govern the respective 
property rights of the parties and, crucially, the division of property on divorce. Indeed, the 
move away from fault based divorce in the 1970s saw the primary function of the court 
change: “adjusting the financial situation of divorcing parties rather than adjudicating upon 
moral notions of fault, blame or desert became the court’s preoccupation.”62  
 
5.4.1 Marital property at common law 
 
At common law, the effect of marriage in Scots law was to create what was described as a 
‘communion’ of goods: effectively, the transfer of all moveable property belonging to the 
wife (regardless of when acquired) to the husband according to the right of jus mariti, along 
with any pre-marital debt, for as long as the marriage continued to exist.
63
 Said property was 
the husband’s to deal with as he pleased and though he did not acquire ownership of the 
wife’s heritable estate, he enjoyed the legal right to administer it (the jus administrationis), 
and the ownership of rent or produce arising from it.
64
 Excluded was only the wife’s 
paraphernalia, including her dresses, jewelry and their containers.
65
 The husband, however, 
could renounce his jus mariti by way of ante-nuptial contract.
66
 Where the marriage was 
dissolved by death within a year and a day, the wife regained her property in full unless a 
child had been born (and heard to cry); otherwise, she was entitled to a third of moveable 
property if there were children to the marriage, a half if not.
67
 On divorce, the wife was 
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entitled to nothing if the ‘guilty’ party or to the same as on her husband’s death if 
‘innocent’.68 The regime for division of property on divorce was therefore an artifact of the 
same moral considerations that limited the availability of divorce itself while, short of 
divorce, the law on property set the conditions for a relationship of significant unfreedom. 
 
5.4.2 Statutory departure 
 
The entitlement of the husband to the wife’s property persisted even if the couple was 
separated or the wife had been deserted: all property which she acquired or inherited 
continued to pass automatically into the ownership of her husband.
69
 The rule was abolished 
in 1861, by an Act which provided both that property acquired by the wife other than by her 
own industry was not to be subject to the jus mariti unless the husband made reasonable 
provision out of it for the wife’s maintenance, 70  and that after the grant of a judicial 
separation, property which a wife acquired would belong to her and not pass to her husband 
and permitted her to seek an order implementing the same rule in cases of desertion.
71
 A 
statue of 1877 gave women the right to income which they earned themselves, which the 
husband came neither to own nor to administer.
72
 Simultaneously, the husband’s liability for 
the ante-nuptial debts of his wife was reduced to the value of the property he acquired in 
consequence of his marriage to her.
73
 The legal sublimation of the wife into the identity of 
her husband was progressively undone; the first steps taken towards a situation in which she 
lived with him, if not yet as an equal, then at least as a separate entity, with interests of her 
own which he could later be required by law to take into account. 
 
The Married Women’s Property (Scotland) Act 1881 abolished the right of a husband to the 
moveable property of the wife, though left intact the husband’s right to administer that 
property, meaning that though a wife now continued to own her own property following 
marriage, she still required the consent of her husband if she wished to dispose of it.
74
 No 
longer were the rent of and produce of the wife’s heritable property to become the property of 
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the husband, for his right of administration over them was abolished.
75
 The jus 
administrationis itself was abolished by a 1920 statute
76
 which also granted married woman 
the legal capacity to dispose of their property at their own will, and to enter into contracts, 
incur obligations etc. as though unmarried.
77
 The current law is contained in the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 1985 (as amended to extend the principle to civil partnerships by the Civil 
Partnerships Act 2004) which provides that neither legal institution shall affect “the 
respective rights of the parties… to their property.”78 A wife retains full capacity to contract 
notwithstanding her married status, and her vulnerability to the arbitrary interference with her 
property by her husband has been removed by virtue of this incremental legal change. The 
vulnerability was a function of contingent legal rules and so subject to unraveling by legal 
reform.  
 
5.4.3 The undue influence exception 
 
If, however, a wife enters into an obligation to a third party acting under the undue influence 
of her husband or on the basis of a misrepresentation made to her by her husband, then that 
third party may find the obligation unenforceable if it cannot be shown to have acted in good 
faith towards the wife. In Smith v Bank of Scotland
79
 a woman brought an action for the 
reduction of a security which she and her husband had jointly granted over their matrimonial 
home for a loan required for her husband’s business, in which the bank knew her to have no 
involvement. She had no opportunity to review the document, nor was she advised to take 
independent legal advice, and claimed to have signed the paperwork only on the basis of 
various misrepresentations made to her by her husband, principally that her own personal 
assets were not put at risk by the taking of the loan. The House of Lords, accepting that there 
was no reason to refuse to extend the logic of an English case, Barclays Bank Plc. v 
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O'Brien,
80
 to Scotland, held that “in circumstances where the creditor should reasonably 
suspect that there may be factors bearing on the participation of the cautioner which might 
undermine the validity of the contract through his or her intimate relationship with the debtor 
the duty [“to give the potential cautioner certain advice“] would arise and would have to be 
fulfilled if the creditor is not to be prevented from later enforcing the contract.”81 To impose 
this additional burden shows how far the pendulum has swung: where once the law placed 
certain incapacities on a woman become wife, increasing her vulnerability to the arbitrary 
interference of her husband, here it adapts so as to protect her, in law, from a vulnerability 
whose source is extra-legal. The solution to the problem of horizontal domination of wife by 
husband is not to treat the two as strangers in all things. To do so is to ignore the reality of the 
source and location of power: here it is extra-legal and it as right for law to counter as it is for 
laws which give rise to domination to be reformed. 
 
5.6 Financial provision on divorce 
 
Most relevant, then, to the freedom of parties to a marriage are the rules as to financial 
provision if it ends. The 1976 Act entitled either party to apply to the court for an order 
requiring payment of either a periodical allowance or of a capital sum,
82
 providing that the 
court will make “such order, if any, as it thinks fit, having regard to the respective means of 
the parties to the marriage and to all the circumstances of the case”83 Financial provision was 
therefore left largely at the discretion of the judge. This allowed for general continuity with 
the rules introduced by the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, which had marked a significant 
departure from the prior law, whereby the ‘guilty’ party was not entitled to any financial 
provision, being regarded in law as having died at the date the decree of divorce was granted. 
It had the potential in other cases, however, to be less generous than the system it replaced, 
which entitled an ‘innocent’ wife was entitled, on divorce, to either a third or a half of her 
husband’s property. The stark discretion inherent in the scheme under the 1976 could 
therefore be either better or worse for parties than had been the status quo ante. No verdict 
could be pronounced in the abstract, however: a Scottish Law Commission report of 1981 
drew attention to the fact that neither in the 1976 Act nor anywhere in the case law was the 
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general objective of making financial provision spelled out.
84
 The resulting flexibility was 
balanced against the fact that judges differed significantly in their approach to the issue, and 
the result was an state of affairs whereby “questions of social policy, which have very 
important financial consequences for individuals […] turn on informal understandings and 
somewhat arbitrary rules of thumb based on no ascertainable principle and known only to a 
small circle of court practitioners.”85 It was impossible to provide reliable legal advice, and 
solicitors were given incentive to enter into a fraught process of negotiation which might be 
upset once the identity of the presiding judge became known: “Such a system”, it concluded, 
“does nothing to help the parties to arrange their affairs in a mature and amicable way. It is 
calculated to increase animosity and bitterness.”86  
 
5.6.1 Perverse incentives 
 
Not only. It also provided a strong incentive to a dominated partner to stay in a relationship 
far beyond the point at which he or she would have preferred to leave: why seek a divorce 
when the question of whether or not one will be able to afford to live independently is 
decided predominantly by the process by which a case is allocated to a judge?
87
 Having 
considered a variety of objectives which might be laid down to govern the process of making 
financial provision (punishment, continuing support, relief of the public purse, the relief of 
need etc) the report concluded that no single objective was suited to underpinning a system of 
this sort.
88
 Instead, it recommended a system whereby financial provisions should be made if 
and only if justified by the fair sharing of matrimonial property or the burden of child-care; 
fair recognition of contributions and disadvantages; fair provision for adjustment to 
independence; or relief from grave financial hardship.
89
  
 
That children have an independent right of aliment or maintenance which precedes 
consideration of financial provision as between the parties to a divorce or dissolution of a 
civil partnership simplifies the question, as it means that the making of financial provision 
has as its principal subjects the parties themselves. Where an order for aliment can not 
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include a lump sum but must be a periodic payment, an order for financial provision on 
divorce reflects the ‘clean break’ ideal, and an order for payment of a periodic sum can be 
made only if the court is satisfied that an order requiring the transfer of an asset or the 
payment of a capital sum is “inappropriate or insufficient” in the circumstances.90 If one is 
made, a periodic order will lapse with either the death or the remarriage of the party in receipt 
of it.
91
 An order, whether for payment of a lump sum or a periodic order, can be made only 
where justified by the objectives outlined in the statute, and where it is reasonable with regard 
to the resources of the parties. The court therefore must make a decision in accordance with 
the new principles, but is left, via the reasonableness test, a level of discretion in doing so. 
These provisions are extended to the system of civil partnerships by schedule 28 of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004. 
 
5.6.2 The principles governing financial provision 
 
The principles recommended by the Scottish Law Commission for the underpinning of the 
system of financial provision were not implemented directly - in the Family Law (Scotland) 
1985 Act, those which apply are that the net value of matrimonial property should be fairly 
shared between the parties; that fair account should be taken of an economic advantage or 
disadvantage which falls to one party from the contributions of, or in the interest of, the other; 
that the economic burden of caring, after divorce, for a child of the marriage under the age of 
16 should be fairly shared between the parties; and that a where one party has been 
substantially financially dependent on the other then financial provision should be made to 
permit the dependent party to adjust.
92
 
 
It will be obvious how the uncertainty which preceded the 1985 Act undermined the system 
of bargaining relations which was inadvertently implemented by the 1976 Act. One of the 
major considerations when thought is given to ending a marriage, must be the financial 
situation in which one will be left. If no financial provision is going to be made at the point of 
the grant of divorce, or if there is a radical uncertainty with regards to the outcome which will 
follow from the essentially discretionary legal rules which apply, then the grounds upon 
which the divorce can be granted are of less relevance: there is a considerable incentive for 
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those who would otherwise leave a marriage to remain within it and attempt to tolerate the 
situation in which he or she finds himself. From this point of view, the current system would 
seem to meet a minimum requirement of republican freedom: the financial provisions made 
will not normally be so poor that one party is compelled to live at the mercy of the other 
rather than face intolerable circumstances. This is not, of course, the same as saying that a 
wife will leave a marriage into a situation she would objectively desire to be in: it is simply 
that an intolerable financial situation outside of a marriage is no more (but certainly no less) 
intolerable than such a situation inside a marriage.  A wife need not be as well off after 
divorce as before it - in the prevailing system of economic organization, such an outcome is a 
hope too far. What she must not be is so badly off after it, that she has no choice but to 
remain within it; the law must not condemn her to horizontal unfreedom. 
 
5.7 The matrimonial home 
 
A more specific issue relevant to republican freedom is occupation of the matrimonial home, 
legal rules regarding which will be central to the question of whether it is practical for one 
party to leave the other. If title to the matrimonial home is taken in the name of one party 
alone, then that person is the owner of the property, and the fact of marriage does not alter 
that directly. If taken in joint names, the home is common property, and each of the multiple 
owners owns a half share of the value of the property, which he or she is entitled to dispose of 
at any point, without either the knowledge of the partner or that party’s consent. At common 
law, ownership comes with a right to the exclusive possession of one’s property which, from 
the husband’s point of view, was not overridden by the fact of marriage or the mutual duty of 
aliment between partners. From the wife’s point of view, however, until the statutory reforms 
outlined above, the husband’s common law right of administration over her heritable property 
entitled him to exclude her from a home she herself owned. Where she did not, the process 
was even easier: in MacLure v MacLure the Court of Session held that a husband (who 
intended to continue to fulfill his duty of aliment) was entitled to an order requiring his wife 
to leave the hotel of which he was the tenant (and in which they lived as a couple), at threat 
of forceful ejection by officers of the Court.
93
 This depended, the Lord President held, “not 
upon his right as a husband, but upon his ordinary right of property in the house.”94  
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In 1978, a Scottish Law Commission discussion paper argued that the common law rules, out 
of step with most European and commonwealth systems, were unjust to one party (in most 
cases the wife), unrealistic in that they treated husband and wife as though strangers to each 
other, and out of date.
95
 The need to remedy this general unfairness was compounded by a 
desire to promote a more specific social objective: protecting women from domestic violence. 
The common law rules meant that women were compelled to endure violence because “they 
have nowhere else to go” and “cannot protect themselves by ejecting their husbands because 
the title to the home is normally in his name or in joint names.”96 It recommended that 
“where one spouse only is entitled or permitted to occupy a matrimonial home exclusively 
the other spouse should by virtue of marriage have a statutory right of occupancy.”97 The 
common law rules were, in accordance with these recommendations, usurped by the 
Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981. That statute creates the 
categories of ‘entitled’ and ‘non-entitled’ party to a marriage or civil partnership (the former 
the owner or tenant of the matrimonial home; the latter not) and grants to the non-entitled 
party a right to continue occupation of that home or, if not in occupation, to enter into and 
occupy it.
98
 While these rights subsist, they are not defeated by the disposal of the property, 
and so a third-party purchaser of a home in relation to which a non-entitled partner has a right 
of occupation takes the home subject to that right. 
99
 In such circumstances, the purchaser is 
not entitled to occupy the property unless the non-entitled spouse has consented to the 
dealing.
100
 The non-entitled spouse’s occupancy right can be defeated if the transaction 
between entitled spouse and this third party is for value and in good faith, the latter being 
demonstrated by a written declaration that no occupancy rights under the Act in relation to 
the property were possessed at the time of the dealing.
101
 
 
Not only though, does the 1981 Act grant a right of continuing occupation to a non-owner 
spouse. It also takes the bigger step of permitting the exclusion of either partner from the 
matrimonial home. The court, under s.4(2) of the Act: 
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“shall make an exclusion order if it appears to the court that the making of the 
order for the protection of the applicant or any child of the family from any 
conduct or threatened or reasonably apprehended conduct of the non-applicant 
spouse which is or would be injurious to the physical or mental health of the 
applicant or child,”  
 
unless, having regard to all the circumstances of the case it would be unjustified or 
unreasonable to do so.
102
  
 
5.7.1 The quality of interference 
 
The major benefit of this statutory departure from the standard rules of property will again 
accrue to the wife, historically the vulnerable partner in a marriage, and help ensure that she 
does not live at the mercy of her partner.  Let us appreciate two points about this new scheme. 
The first is that the departure from the common law position does not constitute an equivalent 
departure from some sort of pre-legal, natural, order: the bundle of rights associated with 
ownership is always and everywhere contingent, existing not as an inalienable corollary of 
ownership, but only insofar as recognised by law. There is no a priori reason that ownership 
should imply the possibility of excluding other parties - that it has normally done so is 
probably a function of the identity of those who traditionally determined the rules of property 
- and, concomitantly, no reason why the law should not, as here, provide other parties with a 
right incompatible with the ‘normal’ rights of ownership.  
 
Secondly, in no sense is the reach of public power extended by the modifications made to 
each spouse’s bundle of rights. Instead, the coercive apparatus of the state, whose democratic 
legitimacy distinguishes it from all other sources (but not instances) of coercion in society, is 
put at the service of one party where in the past it had been put at the service of the other: the 
modification is qualitative. If unfreedom is constituted by interference on the part of public 
power, there is no more unfreedom here than in a scheme of property that would be endorsed 
by classical liberalism. And if, as I suggest, we are obliged by both theory and practice to 
take seriously horizontal unfreedom - the unfreedom of the wife as to her husband, and vice 
versa - then at no cost of vertical (liberal) freedom we achieve a notable diminution in the 
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prevalence of domination in society: the possibility of a party having to tolerate domestic 
violence or any other form of unacceptable treatment for reason of having nowhere else to go 
is greatly reduced. The state - which recognises property rights; without which property rights 
as we know them would not exist - can promote the freedom of its citizens by altering the 
specific consequences which flow from ownership. 
 
5.8 Effects of legal reform 
 
As elsewhere in this work, our focus in this chapter has been that of the domination for which 
law is responsible, according to the logic that such domination is the type of which is best 
suited to being undone by law. Where law is the cause, so too can law be the solution. The 
promotion of human freedom (in the horizontal sense) through law is not, however, as limited 
a goal as it might at first seem. Important empirical work upon the conditions under which 
divorce is available suggests that the wider social ramifications are of an importance which 
far outranks the abstract ‘freedom’ which might be achieved. One central piece of research 
argues that contemporary divorce law acts as “a framework within which divorcing couples 
can themselves determine their postdissolution rights and responsibilities,”103 and so when 
they negotiate a settlement in relation to money or the custody of children they do not do so 
“in a vacuum.” Instead, “they bargain in the shadow of the law.”104 The framework we have 
described, the rules laying down the conditions under which public power, whose exercise is 
determined by law,  
 
“give each parent certain claims based on  what each would  get  if  the  case 
went  to  trial.  In  other words, the  outcome that the  law will  impose  if no  
agreement is  reached gives each parent certain  bargaining  chips - an  
endowment  of  sort”105 
 
Traditional law and economics perspectives view this process through the prism of the 
distribution of wealth and considerations of economic efficiency; the account offered above 
suggests that what is really at issue is the distribution of freedom. What matters, however, is 
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that changing rules so as to facilitate freedom brings with it concrete, measurable gains. In 
the context of American divorce law, the fact that the introduction of unilateral divorce took 
place on a state by state basis permits comparison both between jurisdictions which had and 
had not introduced it and in the same jurisdiction over time; before and after the introduction 
of unilateral divorce.
106
 The results were striking: 
  
“Changes in divorce law led to one spouse being able to obtain a divorce 
without his or her partner’s consent. Examining state panel data on suicide, 
domestic violence, and murder, we ﬁnd a striking decline in female suicide 
and domestic violence rates arising from the advent of unilateral divorce. Total 
female suicide declined by around 20 percent in the long run in states that 
adopted unilateral divorce”107 
 
When we use the law as a tool to grant freedom, we reduce the frequency with which  
individuals, find themselves living at the mercy of others, will suffer the consequences of 
having no other option - no way to get out and nowhere else to go. When we argue for a 
freedom we do it in the knowledge that this means to militate for psychological security and 
against desperation, and that this is something far bigger, far more important, than the issue 
of who gets what or whether any given rule is as efficient as it might be. Domination and 
non-domination translate into real, measurable, outcomes. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
On consideration of the trajectory of the rules of law relating to marital property, the 
availability of divorce and financial provision on divorce can, it is suggested, be understood 
as having the effect of the increasing the freedom of the wife, the party previously most 
disadvantaged by legal inequality. It did so by altering the legal background against which 
and legal framework within which she relates to her husband, moving away from a system 
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where, within certain loose and generous limits, he had a vast  capacity to interfere with her 
interests at his own pleasure, to one in which in which he can no longer be confident in his 
ability to do so without violating the law. The law now permits her to extricate herself from 
the legal relationship into which she has entered knowing that she is unlikely to be intolerably 
less well off if she does so. This is not, however, about the extent of state involvement in the 
relationship - marriage is a legal institution and there is only so far the state could retreat 
before what was left was not marriage at all: where it was reduced to a religious institution 
without legal consequence. The variation in the involvement of public power is not 
quantitative: it is qualitative. Where many advocates of freedom would have us believe that 
human freedom is promoted by the retreat of the state down to a minimal role, the example of 
divorce suggests otherwise. By taking seriously the twin claims that one can be unfree 
horizontally (as, here, between husband and wife or one partner and the other in a civil 
partnership) and that interference by one party with the interests of another is neither 
unambiguously good or unambiguously bad, but to be deprecated only where the perpetrator 
has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis, we see that the careful recalibration of the 
circumstances under which public power will be made available to one party to ‘use’ against 
another can increase the freedom of individuals without altering the net level of state 
involvement. Rules on marriage and divorce are a prime example of the current thesis 
specifically because the domination was, to a considerable extent, a function of contingent 
legal rules. 
 
We saw too, though, that the direct legal regulation of the relationship between husband and 
wife could not add up to an exhaustive account of the role of law in constituting domination. 
Vital too is the background distribution of property. Were Pettit correct in his assertion that 
the law of property is akin to the natural environment, it would constitute a hard limit upon 
the ability of law to undo relationships of domination - at least without, to embrace the 
metaphor, calling in the bulldozers: we would be seeking to use law to fulfil a function for 
which it was fundamentally unsuited. As we have seen, and will see again, this is not the case: 
the law is central not just to the existence of private property but also the conditions attached 
to it: who owns what, and what that means. Property, the general, inescapable background 
which conditions all relationships is no less suited to legal intervention in pursuit of non-
domination that is a specific legal relationship such as that between husband and wife and, 
moreover, intervention in that context can promote freedom far more broadly than can 
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alterations to a relationship which subsists between two (and only two) individuals. Changing 
rules as to the availability of divorce can free a wife from the domination of her husband, or 
vice versa, but it cannot undo any relationship of domination in which they might stand to 
broader society. An exploration of the rules of property, as well as reflection upon its 
distribution, suggest a method of promoting non-domination more generally. 
 
The progress demonstrated by the law in this area derives not from the inevitable progress of 
human society on which it is parasitic, nor from the unfolding of some historical process 
leading to a predetermined end. It is the contingent result a constantly evolving set of societal 
attitudes and reflects the overlap of a variety of incompletely theorized positions reflected 
through the prism of the (sometimes) democratic process and the timely updating of the 
common law. This democratic process is of considerable importance, to which we shall 
return: we have shown how horizontal non-domination has been promoted, but it remains to 
contextualise that process in relation to the question of vertical (non-) domination. We cannot 
predict that the legal position of wife, husband, civil partners etc as it will exist in future, nor 
be complacent that the undeniable improvements of the past have set any sort of template for 
future development. Having reconceptualised some of the key developments as normatively 
desirable according to a particular understanding of freedom, we are in a position to suggest 
what might need to be done in order to further promote the republican freedom whose 
increase has been the result of the reforms hitherto. The same law which once rendered 
unfree by putting the coercive apparatus of the state at the disposal of husbands regardless of 
the nature of the interference they perpetrated with the interests of their wives or by 
neglecting to bring its coercive apparatus to bear where certain interference with one’s 
interest took place in a domain designated as ‘private,’ has spread freedom by refusing to 
back up, and at times resisting, certain interferences: by considering areas in which a capacity 
for arbitrary interference exists and seeking to subvert this capacity, the law can continue on 
an emancipatory trajectory. Where, however, it rolls back the programme of wealth 
redistribution via taxation and welfare payments (often in pursuit of the ‘freedom’ of those 
who would have to pay the tax), it undercuts that programme: it threatens a situation in which, 
regardless of the foreground rules by which husband and wife interact, the background 
distribution is such as to mean one lives at the mercy of the other. The specific rules of law 
which, in Astell’s time, condemned wives to live at their husband’s mercy having been 
largely undone, the horizontal relationship is less likely to be one of domination. There 
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remains, however, much that could and should be done. That, instead, we are required to 
defend the status quo against reversal, says much about the relative strength of liberal and 
republican discourses of freedom.  
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Part 2 - Chapter 6: Law, Freedom and Property; The Case of Employees 
 
6.1 From the specific to the general 
The previous chapter considered a special case of potential horizontal unfreedom in modern 
society, explaining the manner in which, due to their relationship being constituted by law, 
the law was capable of altering the conditions under which public power would be made 
available to one party against the other (both directly and in relation to material things) so as 
to turn what had historically been a relationship of domination into one of freedom, both 
where that domination had been a function of law and, sometimes, where it had not. Astell’s 
observations on the application of the republican ideal of freedom to the relationship between 
husband and wife, insofar as their truth was a function of law, could be addressed by law; 
public power’s role in endorsing arbitrary interferences - either actively or passively - or in 
prohibiting resistance thereto, has been and could be further undone.   
 
The law on divorce and dissolution is, however, sui generis by reason of relating to a pair of 
highly particularistic legal relationships. Marriages and civil partnerships must be formed by 
two (and only two) parties who meet a variety of criteria more demanding than those for legal 
relationships such as that of contract. The two relationships are similarly particular in their 
relationship to the background distribution of wealth and entitlements: though formed against 
it and mostly respectful of it, such that the legal rights (property and otherwise) of the parties 
to such a relationship are (now) largely left intact by the formation of the marriage/civil 
partnership, the ending of each relationship is capable of radically altering that background 
distribution, such that the intervention by public power, at least in relation to material things, 
might take place on a very different basis after dissolution. One effect of this radical 
discontinuity is to promote freedom: in the first place that of the party in the inferior position 
in relation to the other but more generally in relation to all those other actors that the former 
party might encounter. A woman who has missed out on educational and employment 
opportunities should not leave a marriage and find herself jumping from the frying pan of 
spousal domination into the fire of wider social domination, though if neither party had any 
assets to begin with, then there is of course nothing to redistribute and the result is likely to 
be a dual unfreedom which mere tweaking of one’s legal rights cannot undo. The potentially 
radical alteration of the conditions of interference by public power is readily justified, and not 
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only from the perspective of republican freedom: it is now a prominent feature of schemes of 
family law.  
 
The scope for a radical discontinuity of property rights is therefore freedom-increasing in a 
manner commensurate with the social importance attributed to the relationship to which it 
applies. We have used it as an example of how the freedom of a given individual might be 
increased without the overall extent of the interference by public power being altered, either 
up or down. We can use it for a second purpose: that of highlighting the potential for 
unfreedom in any legal relationship in which there does not apply any such discontinuity - 
where parties contract against a background distribution of wealth and entitlements which is 
stable, altered only to the extent provided for by their transaction or by laws of general 
application. It is for exactly the purpose of such alteration that the ‘typical’ contract is entered 
into. In generalizing outwards from the very specific legal relationships of marriage and civil 
partnerships, we take as our next example of legal analysis such a relationship: that which 
exists between employer and employee, in which the relevant alteration to the distribution of 
property derives from the paying to the employee of a wage, in return for services rendered to 
the employer. This was the second of the two sorts of horizontal domination identified as 
challenging the state-oriented orthodoxy of both liberalism and neo-republicanism: that 
which the labor republicans identified as (potential) ‘wage slavery’. 
 
6.2 The employer/employee relationship 
 
Compared to a marriage a relationship of employment can be entered into under a far broader 
range of circumstances: more or less any person can be an employer, and any an employee; 
relationships of employment can overlap, being formed and dissolved with far less ceremony 
and far more easily than is a marriage or a civil partnership.  Easier to enter and easier to 
leave. In the form in which the two challenges of horizontal domination - marital domination 
and ‘wage slavery’ - were originally presented, they differ in a further fashion, which 
demonstrates why the latter has far greater contemporary resonance than does the former. In 
Astell’s day (and long beyond it) the primary (though never sole) contribution to the situation 
of relative inequality of the two parties and the relationship of domination consequent upon it 
was the differential treatment of husband and wife in law: legal discrimination was at the 
heart of one party’s ability to arbitrarily interfere with the interests of the other. Only as this 
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different treatment receded, and husband and wife began to be treated in law as (almost) 
equals, did the underlying problem of unequal distribution of wealth emerge as the primary 
target of legal adjustment. The problem of wage slavery as formulated by labor republican 
thinkers, on the other hand, was never a problem of legal discrimination - unlike the self-
evidently inegalitarian and obnoxious chattel slavery to which it was variously compared and 
contrasted. Instead, wage slavery was primarily a problem of formal equality in the context of 
material inequality - the paradigmatic case being a worker without access to productive 
capital - and, we have seen, it was the triumph of a specific conception of  formal inequality 
that marked the end of the labor republican challenge to the problem of wage slavery: an 
understanding of freedom had been constitutionalized in which the problem of wage slavery 
disappeared through regularization. Absent the republican conception of freedom, the 
problem could no longer be made coherent. The gap left by this defeat is one that thought 
based upon liberal freedom has never adequately filled - being, I have contended, 
fundamentally unsuited to the task. Where domination had derived from legal discrimination, 
the removal of that discrimination made a significant contribution to the process of undoing 
domination: where it did not, and does not, the domination was not so easily unravelled. 
 
6.2.1 Property, material needs and employment 
 
We have suggested that part of what makes law the primary contributor to the existence of 
domination - far more than, for example, social factors - is the fact that ‘everything’ (by 
which one means primarily the means by which one might materially support oneself) is 
already owned. The rules laying down the conditions under which and the identity of the 
parties on behalf of whom public power will intervene with regards to material goods, 
moveable and immovable, is therefore the single most important factor in determining the 
ability of an employer to coerce a potential employee to accept the terms offered. Though 
economic considerations might be relevant to the decision to marry, the contract of marriage 
is not usually a mechanism through which one meets one’s material needs, while those same 
material needs - the various biological imperatives and the need for shelter etc. - are the 
primary reason for which one enters into a relationship of employment: everything being 
owned, one’s attempts to fulfil those needs without property of one’s own will invariably 
involve a confrontation with the state’s coercive apparatus in its role of guardian of 
ownership according to the logic of differential interference explained in chapter 4, while to 
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(lawfully) acquire the property that one can then exchange for the material goods necessary to 
meet one’s biological needs will usually involve the sale of one’s labour. The role of public 
power in securing property, as well as the conditions under which it does so, is therefore part 
of the inescapable background of the decision to enter into a relationship of employment at 
all. That its direct regulation then further conditions the relationship between employer and 
employee - determining whether or not it is one of freedom - is hardly surprising. 
 
6.3 A theory of (republican) freedom and law 
 
The idea that law manages the relationship between employer and employee resembles in 
certain key respects that of Otto Kahn-Freund in his 1972 Hamlyn lectures, where he defines 
law in functional terms, as aimed at “the regulation of social power.”1 Power, understood as 
“the capacity effectively to direct the behaviour of others” is unevenly distributed, the result 
of a confluence of a variety of interacting and overlapping factors, among which the law is 
only one: power “is sometimes supported and sometimes restrained, and sometimes even 
created by the law, but the law is not the principle source of social power.”2 It is at this social 
power, regardless of its origin, that law (for Kahn-Freund’s purposes, labour law) takes aim, 
without concern for the identity of the party which exercises the power. Specifically, the 
principal purpose of labour law is “to regulate, to support, and to restrain the power of 
management and the power of organised labour.”3 
Kahn-Freund is correct in his insistence that not all power derives from law: this was 
particularly true in a class-dominated society which had not yet felt the force of the neo-
liberal reforms of the 1980s and which hung tightly to the symbolic and cultural capital 
which acted as keys to unlock entry into the higher orders. And though those same class 
categories linger on in Britain today it is no longer reasonable to suggest, as Kahn-Freund 
does, that law is not the principal source of social power: in a world in which almost 
everything - and certainly the vast majority of productive resources - is privately owned, and 
the Lockean injunction - “as much and as good” - has been violated, the relative property 
holdings of those who have and those who do not are the primary source of the power of the 
former over the latter and the primary source of all power (and concomitant relationships of 
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domination) based upon relative inequality. Given that not merely the existence of these 
rights (one owns an item of property if and only if the law recognises that person as the 
owner) but also the specific conditions of ownership (what one can and cannot do with one’s 
own property) is an artefact of law, we can see that it is the law which determines, in the first 
place, the relative power of management and labour. To be clear: not all of the power which 
exists in society derives from law, but a significant, perhaps decisive, fraction, does so derive, 
and that fraction is, by nature of its source, uniquely amenable to restraint through law. What 
the law can do only with difficulty elsewhere, it can do with relative ease within the domain 
of its own construction. To see why, we must connect back together some of our earlier 
themes - the idea that law is logically anterior to the existence of an organised public power 
(whose deployment it determines), and the notion that property is defined by a willingness to 
interfere on the part of the owner against the non-owner - in order to answer our earlier 
question as to the possibility of consent justifying the particular scheme of interferences 
which exist.  
 
6.3.1 Weber, violence and private law 
 
In his essay on the vocation of politics, Weber offered a tremendously influential definition 
of the state in terms of its means, and specifically its recourse to physical force:   
 
“Violence is, of course, not the normal or sole means used by the state. There 
is no question of that. But it is the means specific to the state… In the past the 
most diverse kinds of association - beginning with the clan - have regarded 
physical violence as a quite normal instrument. Nowadays, by contrast, we 
have to say that a state is that human community which (successfully) lays 
claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain 
territory.”4  
 
Leaving aside the use of force against external agencies, whether waging war abroad or a 
defensive campaign at home, Weber’s definition is most obviously correct when considering 
the criminal law, which determines the conditions under which the force on which the state 
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Political Writings, Cambridge University Press (1994), at 309. 
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has a monopoly will be deployed against individuals in the public’s name. At this stage it 
remains true that the violence not only belongs to the state, as Weber suggests, but also that it 
is exercised for the state’s own purposes: to protect something that the state claims represents 
the public interest as a discrete phenomenon, or private interests to the extent that it is 
necessary to promote that same public interest. That the ‘public’ interest in practice correlates 
strongly with the interests of certain groups in society, notably the property-owning classes, 
threatens to undermine this description only at the point at which legitimacy invoked; it does 
not render inaccurate the description of the use of force nor the fact of the claim to legitimacy.  
 
But this monopoly on violence is not confined to making sense of criminal sanction. It is 
useful too in understanding the nature of public and private law respectively, as long as it is 
understood that the violence in question, the actual use of force, includes a more general low-
level threat of coercion that is encountered by the individual day to day to which actual force 
acts as a backstop. Weber’s definition connects the state’s own claim to legitimate violence to 
the use of violence by others: the state’s monopoly is over the ‘right’ to employ violence, 
rather than its actual use - it does not prevent others from employing force, but demands that 
they do so only with its acquiescence: “the specific feature of the present is that the right to 
use physical violence is attributed to any and all other associations or individuals only to the 
extent that the state for its part permits this to happen. The state is… the sole source of the 
'right' to use violence.”5 The state which deploys its monopoly on the use of force for the 
public good via the criminal law also ‘lends’ it to private parties to use one against the other. 
 
Let us be clear about the nature of this claim, linking it back to the hypothetical state of 
nature. Not only does a system for the regularized exercise of public power deploy that power 
in pursuit of the public interest, but it is a characteristic feature of the modern (well-
functioning) state that the existence of such power excludes resort to force by any other agent 
except to the extent sanctioned by the state. Such sanctioning - the specific acquiescence to or 
assistance in the use of force by the state - takes place in the first place through its legal 
system. The principal example of the state doing so is not, however, as Weber seems to 
suggest, the situation in which the private individual him or herself uses force on the say-so 
of the state, which identifies that specific act of violence as legitimate. This is negative 
sanctioning: one individual kills another in self-defence and the state chooses not to punish 
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the act, thus giving it the mark of legitimacy which is the sole preserve of the state. This is 
perhaps the most important example only where ‘violence’ is used in its broader sense.  
 
Where the monopoly on legitimate violence is instead understood more loosely as coercion 
backed by the (ultimate and frequently uninvoked) use of force, the state’s primary method of 
attribution of the right to use force against one’s fellow man is through private law rights and 
obligations: the willingness to interfere on the part of owners against non-owners which G.A. 
Cohen argued is central to the existence of private property. Seen in this light, the ordinary 
private law determines in the first place the conditions under which the state will lend its 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to private parties for use horizontally, 
determining when there will be interference and, conversely, when there will be non-
interference. We have, in this and preceding chapters made this argument in relation to 
property, the law on which permits us to identify the parties on whose behalf, as well as the 
conditions under which, the coercive apparatus of the state - the mechanisms through which it 
deploys its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence - will intervene. But we have extended 
that analysis to the laws on divorce and its effect upon certain aspects of labour law. In each, 
the parties interact in a conditioned by a knowledge of and belief about what they can and can 
not lawfully do; when the state’s coercive apparatus will intervene and on whose behalf.  
 
6.3.2 Property as sovereignty 
 
Given this gloss, Weber’s argument finds a later echo in the work of Morris Cohen, who 
identifies property with ‘sovereignty.’6 Property, he says, “is a relation not between an owner 
and a thing, but between the owner and other individuals in relation to things.”7 Specifically, 
“the essence of private power is always the right to exclude others.” To overcome that 
exclusion, one must either ‘overcome’ the law (by breaking it) or ‘overcome’ the owner, by 
giving him what he wants in return: 
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“If, then, somebody wants to use the food, the house, the land, or the plough 
that the law calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the extent that these 
things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me a 
power, limited but real, to make him do what I want.”8 
 
Cohen’s account of property takes what is latent in Weber’s account of the state - that it lends 
that force to others via its own coercive apparatus - and adds something to it. The fact that 
behind private property lies the monopoly of force does not mean that one is a priori 
prevented from obtaining it: the relationship between individuals and things is not eternally 
binary. Instead, the fact that the sovereignty of the state is, through property, delegated or lent 
to the individual, permits the ‘sovereign’ individual a leverage that he, absent public power, 
could not achieve. Property functions to put state power at the disposal of private parties 
against other private parties, not just in terms of excluding them from accessing or exploiting 
that property but, as a derivative, in arms-length interactions between owner and non-owner. 
The differential interferences, as determined by law, constitute a power that is, in its primary 
orientation, horizontal. Cohen, “summarizing almost a generation of American legal and 
social thought emphasizing the coercive character of property,”9 thereby provides a basis for 
understanding how the public power inherent in the constitution and protection of property 
becomes relevant to the horizontal freedom of private individuals. 
 
6.3.3 From property to rights 
 
In the hands of Cohen’s son, Felix, this argument is extended to the question of legal rights 
and concepts generally, becoming a critique of the ‘transcendental nonsense’ associated with 
discussion thereof. Just as there was no special, pre-existing characteristic of property which 
resulted in its being recognized as such by the courts - in the context of intellectual property, 
“[l]egal language portrays courts as examining commercial words and finding, somewhere 
inhering in them, property rights” 10 - so too with concepts such as ‘fair value’ and ‘due 
process,’ which are discussed as though they have some existence apart from law to which 
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the law must then necessarily refer. But these are merely examples of a process which 
pervades legal discourse: 
 
“In every field of  law we should find peculiar concepts which are not  defined 
either in terms  of  empirical fact  or  in terms  of  ethics  but which  are  used  
to  answer  empirical  and  ethical  questions  alike,  and thus  bar the  way to 
intelligent  investigation  of  social  fact  and  social policy… Legal arguments 
couched in these terms are necessarily circular, since  these  terms  are  
themselves  creations  of law,  and  such arguments add precisely as much to  
our knowledge  as  Moliere's physician's  discovery that  opium  puts  men  to 
sleep  because  it  contains  a dormitive principle.”11 
 
The argument that property is a delegation of sovereignty is thereby reconceptualised to 
demonstrate that not just property but legal concepts generally cannot be made sense of apart 
from the question of sovereignty and its delegation: property is the name we give to those 
circumstances in which the law permits the delegation of public power. We can define 
property only through induction - the identification of and generalization from those 
circumstances in which the courts put the public power at the service of private actors against 
other private actors. Felix Cohen identified a series of legal writers who realized this and so 
rejected the “traditional legal thought-ways” and their reliance on “legal magic and word-
jugglery.”12 The method which united them he called the ‘functional approach’ and was 
deployed to redefine law - most famously by Holmes as the “prophecies of what the courts 
will do in fact”13 - to query the nature of rules, which when washed “in cynical acid” can, like 
all other legal problems, “be thus interpreted as a question concerning the positive behavior 
of judges,”14 and to explain and critique legal decisions. This last use is of interest here, for it 
is ambiguous in a fashion relevant to the account of the nature of private law so far advanced. 
The fact of predicting what the behaviour of judges does not imply that a judge will in fact be 
called upon to decide the issue in question: often the issue will be so well understood that 
there is no need for litigation to know what the outcome will be. Among the many factors 
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influencing my decision not to steal my neighbour’s car is the (certain) knowledge that the 
judge, applying the relevant law, will find that it is his, not mine, and that my taking of it 
amounts to theft: I will find myself confronted by the coercive apparatus of the state - the 
legitimate use of the violence its monopoly on which Weber used to define it. Judges, 
applying the law, determine the circumstances in which public power will be brought to bear, 
but most of what we need to know about those circumstances can be known independently of 
any judicial decision-making. Not only is property sovereignty, but the question of what is 
property is not determined by anything outside of law. 
 
6.3.4 From power to consent 
 
The two Cohens therefore exemplify a pragmatic approach which foreswears 
transcendentalism in legal concepts and suggests that the only way to define such concepts is 
on the basis of an inductive method which demonstrates formalist deduction to be frequently 
under-determined. Legal concepts, as ‘identified’ by courts, describe the circumstances in 
which, and the conditions under which, public power - sovereignty - will be put in the hands 
of private actors, rather than anything which physically exists in the world: the law 
determines how the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is, in last resort, 
deployed, and the fact of such deployment is not determined by but in fact determines, the 
concepts which dominate legal discourse. 
 
We have not yet progressed significantly from the account of property attributed to G.A. 
Cohen in chapter 4. We know that private property implies a standing willingness on the part 
of public power to intervene at the behest of one party (the owner) against all others (the non-
owners) to the extent determined by the conditions of ownership, which like the issue of 
ownership itself is a question of law, and which are never absolute. We know also that this 
fact gives the party recognized as owner a certain leverage over the non-owner. The 
Weberian state, with its monopoly on violence, thus gives rise to a pervasive horizontal 
power - if not in the broad Foucauldian form, then certainly in one more complex than the 
top-down image of juridical power, to which Foucault sought to add disciplinary power and 
bio-power, would suggest.
15
 We stand at the same point at which we left Nozickian 
entitlement theory, which attempts to justify the distribution of property (and consequent 
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 E.g., Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: 1 - The Will to Knowledge, Penguin Books (1998) at 135-43. 
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interference with the interests of others, such that interferences with owners are illegitimate, 
those with non-owners not) on the basis of the just acquisition and transfer of the property in 
question. We must determine whether the deployment of the state’s coercive apparatus, the 
interferences by public power acting for private interests, can be rendered non-arbitrary and 
therefore irreproachable, by virtue of deriving from consent. In liberal, libertarian and neo-
liberal perspectives, consent is of the highest priority - it alone is capable of rendering just 
alterations in the legal position of the individual: that he or she consents is usually held to 
preclude any intervention by the state (beyond that which, in securing property rights, is 
logically prior to any change of those rights, and that required in order to enforce the 
contracts which result from the mutual exercise of consent.) If property is sovereignty, can 
the power which the recognition of property by the state gives one man against all others be 
rendered non-arbitrary by consent? All turns on this. 
 
6.3.5 Consent and coercion 
 
This focus on freedom and consent - the use of the latter to justify both the interference with 
the former by horizontal parties and, more often, to demand non-interference by the state - 
was challenged by another of Felix Cohen’s functional thinkers, the lawyer-economist Robert 
Hale. Hale painted a picture of law in which the idea that regulatory intervention of property 
rights was illegitimate was undermined by an account of property similar to Cohen’s, 
conceiving of a right of property as involving a certain power over others on the part of the 
owner.
16
 If the former wishes to overcome the power of the owner, this latter is able to 
demand something in return: 
 
“This power is a power to release a pressure which the law of property exerts 
on the liberty of others.  If the pressure is great, the owner may be able to 
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 Hale’s principal works are: Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State (1923) 38 Political 
Science Quarterly 470; Force and the State: A Comparison of ‘Political’ and ‘Economic’ Compulsion (1935) 35 
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(1991) 15 Legal Studies Forum 327 (1991). Hale belongs resolutely to the aspect of legal realism which goes 
beyond the critique of formalism with which it has become associated, to encompass an “attack on the 
public/private distinction… [and] the idea of the self-regulating market.”: Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism 
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compel the others to pay him a big price for their release; if the pressure is 
slight, he can collect but a small income from his ownership.  In either case, he 
is paid for releasing a pressure exerted by the government - the law.  The law 
has delegated to him a discretionary power over the rights and duties of 
others.”17 
 
This claim - that law grants a power in return for the non-exercise of which the owner can 
coerce some concession from non-owners - feeds into an argument about the supposed 
illegitimacy of coercion and the consequent need for a laissez-faire approach, as endorsed in 
Lochner, in which coercion is minimised; the Lochner-era dissents of Holmes “marked, for 
Hale, the demise of Spencerian economic austerity in the courts… [they were] tentative 
allusions to a broader anti-classical economic tradition” on which Hale drew.18 Coercion, 
Hale suggests, does not first arise when the two parties to a transaction, be they buyer and 
seller, employer and employee, etc., find their agreements limited by rules of general 
application which take precedence over what they would have otherwise agreed to do (as 
when the wage which the parties would have negotiated is substituted with a minimum wage 
set by the state or when, as in Lochner, a maximum length of working day is laid down in law) 
but instead is always already a feature of all negotiating which takes place within a legal 
system, whether or not there is an immediate, supervening action by the state: 
 
“The owner can remove the legal duty under which the non-owner labors with 
respect to the owner's property.  He can remove it, or keep it in force, at his 
discretion.  To keep it in force may or may not have unpleasant consequences 
to the non-owner-consequences which spring from the law's creation of legal 
duty.  To avoid these consequences, the  non-owner  may  be  willing to  obey  
the  will  of  the  owner,  provided that  the obedience is not in itself more 
unpleasant than the consequences to be  avoided… the conduct is motivated, 
not by any desire to do the act  in question, but by a desire to escape a more 
disagreeable alternative”19 
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 Robert Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, (1922) 22 Columbia Law Review 209,  
at 214. 
18
 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press (1995), at 107-8. 
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 Hale, Coercion, note 16, at 472. 
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From worker’s point of view, this coercion is particularly acute: “He must eat. While there is 
no law against eating… there is a law which forbids him to eat any food which actually exists 
in the community - and that law is the law of property.”20 The effect is that, unless he can 
produce food of his own, “the law compels him to starve if he has no wages, and to go 
without wages unless he obeys the behests of some employer.” Self-sufficiency is rendered 
difficult, if not impossible, by the same law of property, which forbids the individual from 
cultivating land he does not own.  
 
The worker is in this way coerced into working by an employer who is able to exercise 
coercion in the specific form he does only because the law is as it is: the system of coercion is 
structured by law generally and underpinned by property law in particular. It will be 
remembered that the solution of the Republican party to the problem of unfree labor was to 
make grants of public land, thereby undoing the coercive hold of landowners over their 
labourers - Hale’s account unpicks the logic of that solution. It also permits an answer out 
earlier question about coercion. The claim that the interference implied by property and the 
power it gives man over man can be justified on the basis that no changes are made to the 
circumstances under which public power will intervene, except to the extent agreed by the 
parties, does not hold up; that there is ‘consent’ does not mean there is no coercion and where 
there is coercion there is no a priori reason to respect the outcome of the process as morally 
justified (as does liberal thought) or as non-arbitrary and so not reductive of freedom. 
 
6.3.6 The mutuality of coercion 
 
The coercion Hale describes does not, however, act in one direction only: continuing with the 
example of employers, he notes that both those to whom they sell and those they employ can 
exercise a reciprocal coercion of their own, “the customers through their law-given power, to 
withhold access to their cash, the laborers through their actual power (neither created nor 
destroyed by law) to withhold their services.”21 In each case, the employer is to a greater or 
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 Hale, Coercion, note 16, at 473. See also Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, (1933) 46 Harvard Law 
Review 553, at 569: “The working-man has no real power to negotiate or confer with the corporation as to the 
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process, held to be sui generis; it does not owe its existence to law, though the conditions under which it may be 
sold, as well as the identity of those permitted to sell their labour, are eminently legal questions. In describing 
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lesser degree coerced to give them something of his own in order to overcome their coercive 
capacity. Where popular sentiment (and much economic theory) sees a system of free 
bargaining, a process separate from the state’s influence (and all the better for it), Hale sees a 
process of mutual coercion made both possible and necessary by the law, which determines 
the conditions under which public power will intervene on behalf of each party against the 
other: I can force others to pay me if they wish to own or make use of my property because if 
they do not, the state will intervene to protect my interests; simultaneously, they attempt to 
coerce me into giving it up through use the options they have in terms of the property the law 
recognises to them and what it is that they are permitted to do with it. This recalls our point 
about the options available to husband and wife as set by the law on divorce and property, 
and points the way to the solution of unfree labor. 
 
6.4 The law and coercion 
 
The law, then, provides the backdrop to the bargaining power of individuals, the conditions 
of coercion. It determines the distribution of wealth, which “depends on the relative power of 
coercion which the different members of the community can exert against one another. 
Income is the price paid for not using one's coercive weapon”22  and the value of property, 
which is “is merely a measure of the strength of the bargaining power of the person who 
owns the one or renders the other, under the particular legal rights with which the law endows 
him, and the legal restrictions which it places on others.”23 The role of law in conditioning 
coercive capacity therefore includes the creation of such fundamentals as the rules of 
property: the fact that the law will recognise property rights in something means that owners 
can rely on the power of the state to back up such rights. A contemporary example might be 
the increasing recognition of a right of privacy, which is accompanied by a legal remedy for 
breach of privacy: the individual can derive income by agreeing not to call upon this legal 
remedy.  Where previously a newspaper which wanted to invade the privacy of an individual 
could either attempt to circumvent whatever barriers were erected by that individual knowing 
that to do so would not put them face to face with public power, which was usually agnostic 
as to the whole affair, the legal reconfiguration which means that a person taking the former 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the coercive process as mutual or reciprocal, Hale was demonstrating greater insight than Cohen (see note 20) 
and so provides a basis for the rebalancing of the relationship. 
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 Hale, Coercion, note 16, at 478. 
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option risks finding himself on the wrong side of the law and thus the payment becomes 
necessary rather than optional - the conditions of coercion have changed and as the law 
expands its recognition of a wrong of invasion of privacy, one can expect the prices obtained 
by celebrities for allowing access to their private lives to increase. Restrictions about the sorts 
of private agreement the state will and will not enforce thus act to limit the agreements which 
private parties can make expecting public power to back their transaction. But not just 
restrictions - so too permissions, rules which permit certain conduct but which, in contrast 
with prohibitions, are often not thought of as rules at all, with the contrast that their 
distributional consequences escape scrutiny.
24
 Reflection on this point makes clear that 
inaction is a policy, and the law is responsible for the outcome, at least in the abstract sense 
that the law “could have made it otherwise.”25 
 
We therefore find in Hale’s work both the idea of mutual and reciprocal coercion, and the 
idea that value of rights is a function of conditions of coercion - those options available to 
parties which will keep them on the right side of the law - which themselves are an artefact of 
law. Public and private cannot be kept separate, and laissez-faire, which claims to do so, is as 
much a regulatory system as any other.
26
 The law, the body of rules which direct public 
power, is everywhere implicated in private relations, playing a far larger casual role than 
either liberalism or Marxism would normally admit.
27
 Questions about the regulation of the 
market can “be answered only by reference to moral and policy considerations; they cannot 
be answered merely by reference to the general principles of private property or freedom of 
contract.”28 
 
6.4.1 Bargaining in the shadow of law 
 
The result of a bargaining process is therefore not an instantiation of freedom, but the product 
of relative coercive capability as conditioned by the legal framework. Where a relationship of 
domination exists, it does so because of bargaining conditions put in place through law, 
which have effect against a background of property which is itself a more or less direct 
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function of law. There is nothing ‘natural’ about such relationships: they are a product of law, 
amenable to amelioration through law. The legal realist demand that law be considered as a 
policy instrument and studied in terms of its social effects cannot be denied. More 
importantly, we now see the difficulty with both liberal perspectives which seek to justify a 
given distribution of wealth and entitlements on the basis that it results from a series of 
exercises of the free will of individuals, including both the sort of Nozickean entitlement 
theory and Spencerian laissez-faire at issue in Lochner on one hand and, on the other, the 
claim floated earlier whereby the interference with the interests of non-owners which 
correlates with the non-interference with non-owners in a system of private property might be 
non-arbitrary (within the republican worldview) by reason of that pattern of interferences 
being the outcome of the free exercise of that same consent. The Halean account suggests that 
neither of these positions is sustainable. The ‘consent’ is no such thing, merely the result of 
mutual processes of coercion that are themselves determined by (a) the current distribution of 
wealth and entitlements, and (b) the coercive options open to each individual under the 
(contingent) legal rules which subsist at the time. It is not just a question of what I can do or 
not do lawfully at the present moment - it is an issue of what I can do it with; what assets are 
mine by law to leverage against you and what are yours to put to work in coercing me.  
 
Public power, first justified herein on the basis of the unfreedom which would exist if it did 
not - the pure horizontal domination of a hypothetical state of nature - now itself grounds the 
(legitimate, irresistible) domination which might exist as a function of property holdings and 
the coercive capacity which follows from them. The claim to naturalism, that the outcome of 
free bargaining processes is to be protected, even revered, as the expression of individual 
autonomy, holds no water. Instead, all bargaining takes place in conditions under which the 
possibility of uncoerced consent is already circumscribed by law. The law, by protecting 
property, poisons all which comes after it, permitting those with property a greater range of 
coercive opportunities than those without and insulating them from the material needs which 
work to undermine the reciprocal coercive options available to these latter - the employee’s 
option of withholding his or her labour means very little in a context in which the result will 
be starvation. In a world in which ‘everything’ is already owned, protected by the standing 
willingness of the state to intervene on behalf of its owner under the conditions specified by 
law, free consent is impossible, and what replaces it, mutual coercion, will work in favour of 
those who own the most. Particularly advantaged are those to whom we referred earlier, who 
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can meet their material needs without reference to others; who need not sell their labour to 
survive. Particularly disadvantaged are those who cannot meet their own material needs and 
so have little coercive capacity with which to resist that of those from whom they seek 
employment. None of this is inherent in the concept of property, and all of it is amenable to 
amendment through law: 
  
“With different rules as to the assignment of property rights, particularly by 
way of inheritance or government grants, we could have just as little 
governmental interference with freedom of contract, but a very different 
pattern of economic relationships.”29 
 
One of the advantages claimed for public power is that it can enforce bargains which would 
not be enforced in the state of nature, but in the presence of that public power and the 
property regime it upholds, the state is everywhere already implicated. To then call for it to 
respect, on the logic of non-interference, the outcome of processes of coercion which it 
founds, is false and dangerous. It becomes paramount to ensure that the power in question 
does not force one to live at the mercy of another. Having rendered free, it must not be 
allowed to render unfree. 
 
6.4.2 Law and domination 
 
We arrive at a picture in which law sets the bargaining conditions of a horizontal relationship. 
Where that relationship is a dominating one - where one party can interfere arbitrarily with 
the interests of another - it is because of the asymmetric nature of the coercive tools available 
to each party, of which the most obvious will normally be a function of their respective 
property holdings. Conversely, where the law permits courses of action that attempt to even 
up the bargaining situation - by allowing, for example, the many workers the opportunity to 
combine and negotiate collectively and to take action up to and including that of striking in 
order that the otherwise insurmountable difference in strength between worker and employer 
is in part negated - it can undo such relationships. The question is not whether the law will be 
such as to involve public power; it is whether the involvement of public power will take place 
under conditions calculated to ossify, enhance or unravel relationships of domination.  
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Pettit’s claim, encountered earlier, that the distribution of property is akin to the natural 
environment when it is in fact man made and inescapably contingent therefore acts to 
underplay the relationship of unfreedom which can exist between employer and potential 
employee by disguising the role of public power in constituting the distribution of property 
(and other duties and entitlements) which acts as a frame to their negotiations. The claim too 
that a well-functioning market might avoid this situation by protecting the particular 
individual from domination by a similar potential employer is similarly fatuous:
30
 even in 
these circumstances, the employee bargains on the basis of his resources and the resources 
which the law, by recognising them as the private property of others, keeps from him. In a 
well-functioning market, the relationship of unfreedom might be impersonal, applying as 
between the individual and the class of potential employers as a group rather than one of 
them in particular, but he lives no less at their mercy for that reason alone.
31
 He is often left 
to aspire to the status of ‘wage slave’, which if he is to achieve he must accept the conditions 
offered to him by he who is willing to buy his labour - a form of unfreedom compounded by 
the dual neo-liberal prongs of reduced social safety nets and reduced regulation of the 
conditions upon which employment can lawfully take place: minimum wage laws can 
therefore be understood as having the effect of ensuring that the potential employee, in thrall 
to those who have employment to offer, does not live entirely at their mercy, as the Lochner-
style focus on formal equality would encourage.  
 
6.5 The freedom of employees 
 
The individual is at the mercy of the class of potential employers because the law of property 
prevents him from fulfilling his material needs and thereby facilitates the process by which 
potential employers are able to coerce him into accepting employment upon terms which he 
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would not otherwise accept. That he is not required to work for starvation wages is a function 
of laws diametrically opposed to the logic of Lochner-era laissez-faire. But this situation of 
domination does not end when the range of potential employers is closed off through the 
crystallisation of a contractual relationship between an individual and an employer. The 
involvement of the law in determining whether the relationship one of domination or not does 
not cease. Instead it continues, though between the parties to the employment relationship 
and the background of property we have interposed the law of contract and the body of rules 
known as labour law. We will consider it along two related axes which are central to the 
question of whether or not the employee, having assumed that status, comes to live at the 
mercy not, any longer, of the category of potential employers, but of his or her specific 
employer. The first is the conditions under which employment can be lawfully terminated. 
That such rule is relevant to freedom will be readily appreciated upon consideration of the 
situation at the extreme end of the available spectrum - so-called ‘at will’ employment, which 
can be terminated at any time and for any reason. In this case, the employee is truly at the 
mercy of his or her employer, obliged to tolerate what would otherwise be intolerable; to 
deny him or herself for fear of upsetting the person on whose contingent good grace he or she 
is entirely dependent. The second axis concerns the actions the law permits employees to take 
in order to redress the almost inevitable imbalance which exists between them and employers 
and so, hopefully, to rebalance the relationship away from being one of unfreedom in which 
neither party can interfere arbitrarily with the interests of the other without infringing the law: 
industrial action generally, and the right to strike in particular.  
 
6.5.1 Ending employment 
 
Dismissal matters. It “deprives individual workers of their major source of income and [and] 
of membership of the most significant community in their life… in many instances, the 
disciplinary power of an employer is equivalent or greater in its effects to that exercised by 
the criminal courts.”32 In the United States, where ”unlike almost every other industrialized 
country” there has never been “a general protection against unfair dismissal or discharge 
without just cause, nor even any period of notice,” the effect has been that of “endowing 
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employers with divine rights over their employees.”33 The emergence of the at will doctrine 
in an 1877 treatise was accepted “without question or discussion,”34  variously attributed to 
its coincidence with the laissez-faire orthodoxy of the time
35
 or as capitalist resistance to the 
emergence of a managerial class which threatened its interests.
36
 The rule now functions 
according statutory exceptions, both state and federal, and three major common law 
exceptions - that the employee is wrongfully discharged when it is contrary to a public policy 
of the state as found in “a State constitution, statute or administrative rule.”37; when the facts 
of employment give rise to an implied contract of employment between employer and 
employee of which dismissal is in breach; and where a ‘covenant of good faith’ is read into 
the employment relationships, such that either dismissal requires ‘just cause’ or that bad faith 
terminations are unlawful.
38
 These three exceptions are recognised in progressively fewer 
states, with some recognising none. Dealings between employer and employee are structured 
by the knowledge that the employment relationship can be ended at any time, for (almost) 
any reason. The employee enjoys no psychological security whatsoever and, combined with 
the traditionally lesser level of social protection available in the United States, there is much 
reason to be concerned for the freedom of the individual in relation to his or her employer. It 
is correct, of course, that at will employment works in both directions, that the same doctrine 
which permits employers to dismiss employers without reason or notice will allow employees 
to walk away from their employment at the time and for the reason of their choosing: the 
options open to each within the Halean process of mutual coercion are formally symmetrical. 
And, indeed, in a select few cases, probably highly-skilled workers, it is foreseeable that this 
would work to their advantage; to place them in a position to interfere with their employer’s 
interests on an arbitrary basis. Nevertheless, such cases must by definition be exceptional - 
the distribution of property and the nature of the labour market - particularly where price 
stability has replaced full employment as the primary macroeconomic goal - are such that this 
will work against the individual far more often than it will work in his favour. Further, the 
degree of interference which an individual can perpetrate against a corporate entity - even 
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where the doctrine works in his or her favour - is likely to be significantly less than can be 
perpetrated upon the individual.  
 
If at will employment - that which can be ended unilaterally by the employer - stands at one 
end of our spectrum, at the other would be that which cannot be ended at all or, more 
realistically, which can be ended only with the consent of the employee. In the former case, 
the relationship is one of domination in the manner suggested by Pettit’s re-reading of 
Sandel’s account of labor republicanism: the employer is left with a broad ability to interfere 
with the interests of the employee who, like the slave with the benevolent master, knows 
what is necessary to avoid incurring the wrath of the party upon whom he is effectively 
reliant in order to continue to meet his material needs.
39
 To the advantages commonly 
identified for at will employment - its motivating effect upon employees, the flexibility it 
permits employers and the low cost of administering a system in which dismissal cannot be 
challenged - we must oppose the implications for the freedom of the employee in relation to 
the employer.
40
 In the latter, the relationship is reversed, though the extent of the interference 
which the employee can perpetrate is never likely to be as great: an employee not working 
does not usually rank alongside an employee being summarily dismissed. In seeking to 
balance out the relationship between the two, such that neither lives at the mercy of the other 
would hope to find a body of legal rules which stand somewhere between the two extremes.  
 
We can distinguish between procedural and substantive aspects of the dismissal process. 
Insistence upon correct process is a good - for correct process excludes some of the most 
common forms of arbitrariness - but we can only ensure that the interference in question (the 
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termination of the employment relationship) is not arbitrary through control of its motive.
41
 
The relevant convention of the International Labour Organisation (not ratified by the United 
Kingdom)
42
 requires that employment not be terminated “unless there is a valid reason for 
such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the 
operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service,”43 thereby constituting 
‘capacity,’ ‘conduct’ and ‘operational requirements’ as the three grounds upon which 
employment can legitimately be terminated. It also provides a non-exhaustive list of reasons 
which are not valid grounds upon which to terminate employment - membership of a union or 
participation in its activities; seeking to vindicate one’s legal rights; “race, colour, sex, 
marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin”; taking maternity leave 44  - and requires that a dismissal be 
challengeable before a “court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee or arbitrator.” 45  A 
suitable remedy - either declaration that the termination is invalid and/or reinstatement or 
compensation, in that order of priority - must be available.
46
 These dual requirements of good 
cause and the possibility of legal challenge would significantly rebalance the employer-
employee relationship in comparison to strict at will employment; the employer’s sharpest 
coercive tool - the termination of the employment relationship - is blunted by a legal rule 
which means liability will arise from its use other than under the specific conditions laid 
down. The possibility that the employee is required to live at the mercy of his employer 
would be commensurately reduced.  
 
English law distinguishes wrongful from unfair dismissal: the former term indicates that 
dismissal has taken place in breach of the contract between employer and employee; the latter 
indicates that it was in breach of the applicable statutory protections.
47
 Though the two types 
of claim coexist, the former is limited by the express terms of the contract and anything that 
the common law implies or statute writes into it. The common law recognises, for example, 
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45
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 For background to the introduction into law of unfair dismissal rules, see Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, 
Labour Legislation and Public Policy: A Contemporary History, Clarendon Press (1993), at 194-211. The 
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an implied contractual term to the effect that reasonable notice of dismissal must be given.
48
 
For the purposes of unfair dismissal, substantive reasons are divided between those which are 
automatically unfair, potentially fair, and automatically fair. The middle category includes 
conduct, capability, redundancy and “some other substantial reason” and permits dismissal 
only if the employer acts reasonably. Statutory notice requirements apply;
49
 statutory 
disciplinary and grievance procedures which, by virtue of the Employment Act 2002 were 
inserted into all contracts of employment were repealed by the Employment Act 2008,
50
 
Remedies for unfair dismissal include reinstatement
51
 or re-engagement in comparable 
employment.
52
  
 
The coexistence of contractual and statutory grounds for challenging a dismissal underlies 
once again that there does not exist an intervention/non-intervention dichotomy, such that the 
possibility of a challenge on statutory grounds interposes the state between employer and 
employee in a relationship that would otherwise be ‘pure’, unsullied by the supposedly 
freedom-reducing use of public power. Instead, public power is always already implicated, 
inseparable from the specific contractual agreement between the parties which it will be 
expected to enforce and the background system of property relations against which the 
contract in question was formed. The availability of statutory grounds of challenge merely 
extends the contractual protection, reflecting the fact that the employee’ bargaining position 
in relation to the employer will normally be such that the employee is unlikely to achieve a 
level of contractual protection that will work to remove the employer from a position of 
domination over him. The statutory provisions therefore promote freedom as non-domination 
not by permitting challenge where none would otherwise be available, and not by having the 
state intervene where it would otherwise not, but instead by changing the conditions under 
which power (already an inextricable part of this whole relation) will effect a direct 
intervention. Public power - the state and its coercive apparatus whose deployment is 
governed by law - is implicated in the existence of relationships of domination, and so where 
the conditions of its deployment change, freedom can be promoted. 
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6.5.2 The ‘right’ to strike at common law 
 
Once legal protection against arbitrary dismissal is accounted for, it falls to consider the tools 
which the law permits to each party in within their coercive bargaining. In recognition of the 
fact that an individual acting alone will struggle to exert a level of coercion at all capable of 
cancelling out or even overcoming the coercive tools available to the employer to use against 
him or her - the withdrawal of labour individually working against, rather than for, his 
interests - the rebalancing of the relationship will normally require that employees be 
permitted to act in concert. The primary coercive mechanism has therefore traditionally been 
the right to strike. At common law, a strike involves a breach of contract by the employee 
striking,
53
 while calling on others to strike amounts to the common law tort of inducement to 
breach a contract of service: 
 
“A person who wrongfully and maliciously…. interrupts the relation 
subsisting between master and servant by procuring the servant to depart from 
his master’s service… commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible at 
law.”54 
 
Alongside this tort, that of conspiracy to injure was suitable for application in circumstances 
where there did not exist a contract between those taking industrial action and those harmed 
by it.
55
 The work of unions in promoting the welfare of their members was undermined by 
the imposition on them of vicarious liability for any of their agents who might have 
committed these or other torts in the course of organising a strike or other industrial action.
56
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Indeed, the actions of trade unions were likely to constitute criminal rather than mere civil 
wrong until the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 which decriminalised any 
“agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or procure to be done any act in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen” where the 
act, if done by an individual, would not be criminal.
57
 This effected a substitution of the form 
- civil for criminal - in which striking workers would encounter the coercive apparatus of the 
state, but left intact the law on “riot, unlawful assembly, breach of the peace, or sedition, or 
any offence against the State or the Sovereign” which acted to bound the forms of lawful 
action by striking workers.
58
 
 
The prospects for any action which might permit the employees acting together, to exercise a 
level of mutual Halean coercion against the employer capable of redressing the imbalance 
created by  his considerable coercion over them - work or starve! - were thus poor: the 
deployment of their most potent weapon put them at odds with the law, which took the side 
of their employer, as it took the side of property owners against them when they attempted to 
meet their material needs directly. For this reason, they must frequently have lived at the 
mercy of those who employed them, accepting their lot, on the basis that no man acting 
individually enjoyed the necessary leverage to resist arbitrary interference. There is no 
‘natural’ pre-legal extent of coercion which can be privileged for that reason; the contingent 
legal rules which existed reflected a policy perspective which strongly privileged the interests 
of organised capital. 
 
6.5.3 Statutory departure 
 
In 1906, the newly elected Liberal government legislated to provide legal immunity to trade 
unions taking industrial action, such that public power would not be made available on the 
part of employers against employees and trade union officials in relation to what the common 
law recognised as conspiracy: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
strengthen the theses they were intended to destroy.” Harold J. Laski, Judicial Review of Social Policy in 
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“An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination of by two or more 
persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not be 
actionable unless the act if done without any such agreement or combination 
would be actionable.”59 
 
No longer would otherwise lawful activity attract civil liability merely because it involved 
co-ordinated action between multiple persons: the individual could through combination 
transcend the limits to his individual coercive capacity. Similarly, inducement to breach 
contract and interference with trade were rendered non-actionable, and trade union funds 
given significant protection against the liability established by the Taff Vale case.
60
 Though it 
by no means introduced a regularised system for the pursuit of industrial action, the removal 
of these liabilities through the introduction of (their Hohfeldian jural opposite) an immunity 
for striking workers had the effect of reducing the range of actions which brought those 
workers into confrontation with the system of public power and, consequently, of increasing 
their freedom with regard to their employers. The balance of mutual coercion described by 
Hale had tipped back towards them, lessening the capacity of the employers to arbitrarily 
interfere with their interests. Here, by staying its hand in a context where it previously 
worked to oppose trade union activity, the state tacitly endorses that activity and renders the 
worker more free in relation to his employer. Questions of ‘ordinary’ law are shown again to 
be central to individual (republican) freedom.  
 
There was not, notably, any legal ‘right’ to strike, an absence explained as being consequent 
upon the very late formation of a political party directly allied to the labour movement - in 
the absence of such a party “a largely non-ideological trade union movement asked for and 
obtained simply the removal of the obstacles to unrestricted operation of the collective 
bargaining system.” 61  Though such a right would have been no more secure against 
legislative caprice than is any other in the context of Parliamentary supremacy, it would have 
rendered more difficult subsequent judicial attempts to turn back the tide of emancipatory 
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developments. This system of statutory immunity for enumerated common law torts was 
particularly problematic when juxtaposed with the curious pace of common law evolution. In 
Rookes v Barnard, the House of Lords “reinvented”62 the tort of intimidation, constituted 
here by the union using “a threat to break their contracts with their employer as a weapon to 
make him do something which he was lawfully entitled to do but which they knew would 
cause loss to the plaintiff.” 63  Rookes had been a draughtsman working for the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation in a closed shop. He left his union, which threatened to strike 
if BOAC did not end his employment with them: BOAC did so, entirely lawfully, and 
Rookes, having no recourse to law against it, instead sought damages from the union’s 
officials. Lord Reid stated that:  
 
“Intimidation of any kind appears to me highly objectionable. The law was not 
slow to prevent it when violence or threats of violence were the most effective 
means. Now the subtle means are at least as equally effective I see no reason 
why the law should turn a blind eye to them. We have to tolerate intimidation 
by means which have been held to be lawful but these I would stop.”64 
 
The Halean rejoinder is obvious: this perspective sees only the coercion of one party, 
ignoring that the very contract of employment is based upon a mutual relationship of coercion 
- the workers may attempt to ‘intimidate’ their employer into taking action he is lawfully 
permitted to do, but so does their employer ‘intimidate’ them into working for him knowing 
that the alternative is less pleasant. Given that usually an employer will  possess capital and 
the employee not, it is reasonable for the law to permit to the worker a broader spectrum of 
coercion where to do so works in favour of the dominated rather than the dominating party. 
In their decision here “the Law Lords changed the law as radically in the complex fields of 
industrial relations as any statute.”65 Its effect was reversed by the Labour Government’s 
Trade Disputes Act 1965.  
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Again, in Torquay Hotel Co v Cousins, the Court of Appeal limited the meaning of ‘trade 
dispute’ in the context of establishing immunity for an economic tort. Lord Denning, 
speaking more broadly than the rest of the court, was willing to extend the Lumley and Gye 
principle to “deliberate and direct interference with a contract without that causing any 
breach.”66 In 1974, the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act recast the by now traditional 
immunity in light of the ever-expanding range of relevant torts recognised by the common 
law. This process continued through the 1980s.
67
 The current law in this area is found in the 
Trade Dispute and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) which re-enacts a 
variant of the famous provision of the 1906 Act, influenced by the specific form it took in the 
1974 Act yet less generous with its immunity.
68
 Section 244 of TULRCA defines a trade 
dispute, requiring that the dispute be “between workers and their employer,” and defining it 
such that it is insufficient for the dispute to relate to one of the specified topics (which 
include inter alia the terms and conditions of employment and the engagement and dismissal 
of employee). Instead, the dispute, in order to achieve the status of a ‘trade dispute’ and the 
possibility of immunity, must relate ‘wholly or mainly’ one of these topics, such that where a 
strike takes place against a political background to which an issue of employment conditions 
acts as the metaphorical straw for the camel’s back, then there exists a real risk that the strike 
will not be protected. The extended range of coercive mechanisms is available only in 
specific circumstances, meaning that even if the direct employer-employee relationship is 
altered in its equilibrium, the employee will be less well protected in his dealings with those 
other parties with whom his fate is bound up in modern society. 
 
6.6 Justifying the right to strike 
 
Labour law traditionally struggles with the question of exactly how to justify the right to 
strike - on what basis it is a good to be protected or enhanced? Laski framed it in terms of the 
needs of workers to draw attention to their cause, a requirement which makes the 
inconvenience caused central to, rather than mere by-product of, the strike action:  
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“When trade unions seek for what they regard as justice, one of their most 
powerful sources of strength is the awakening of the slow and inert public to a 
sense of the position… to do this, in a real world, it must inconvenience the 
public, that awkward giant has no sense of its obligations until it is made 
uncomfortable.”69  
 
The right to strike is thus a right to cause inconvenience for the sake of publicity. To resist it 
for the sake of public convenience is to give life, Laski suggests, to a form of “industrial 
servitude.” Anne Davies, canvassing different modes of justification, has noted that, although 
industrial action has no direct economic benefits of its own (defined, presumably, from the 
perspective of efficiency), it is central to the process of collective bargaining,
70
 and so 
economists who “see collective bargaining as damaging to firms because it enables workers 
to extract excessive pay rises are opposed to industrial action” while, on the other hand 
“[t]hose who see collective bargaining as beneficial are more tolerant of industrial action.”71 
Rights-based approaches make a more positive case for industrial action and a right to strike 
is recognised by several international instruments which, however, to the extent that the link 
the right to strike to processes of collective bargaining, impliedly place certain limits upon 
the reasons for which the right can be exercise and the identity of those who can enjoy it.
72
  
 
The right to strike is not explicitly protected by the ECHR and its relationship with the most 
obvious place for it - the right to freedom of assembly under Article 11 - has traditionally 
been complex. In Demir and Baykara v Turkey,
73
 however, the Grand Chamber noted that 
where it had originally held that “Article 11 did not secure any particular treatment of trade 
unions, such as a right for them to enter into collective agreements,”74 its own case law was 
marked by two evolutionary principles: taking into consideration “the totality of the measures 
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taken by the State concerned in order to secure trade-union freedom” and the refusal to 
countenance “restrictions that affect the essential elements of trade-union freedom, without 
which that freedom would become devoid of substance.”75 On the basis of a consideration of 
intervening developments, the Grand Chamber considered the case an opportune moment to 
revisit its previous jurisprudence, and held that: 
 
“having regard to the developments in labour law, both international and 
national, and to the practice of Contracting States in such matters, the right to 
bargain collectively with the employer has, in principle, become one of the 
essential elements of the “right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of [one's] interests” set forth in Article 11 of the Convention.”76 
 
The English courts have considered the question of whether the restrictions imposed  by 
TULRCA on the ability of trade unions to take lawful strike actions are an unjustified 
interference with this (qualified) right, a question which turns on the proportionality of the 
interference they undoubtedly constitute: are the procedural requirements at issue, divided 
into those “aimed at ensuring the democratic validity of industrial action” and those “which 
require disclosure of information, in particular to the employer” disproportionate by reason of 
their “complexity, detail and rigidity”? 77 The Court of Appeal in that case held that neither 
the requirement to inform the employer of the outcome of the ballot as soon as reasonably 
practical nor to explain to the employer how figures relating to the employees to be balloted 
and those to strike were are arrived at were disproportionate restrictions with the right and 
there was therefore no need for them to be ‘read down’ in accordance with s.3 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.
78
 A s.4 declaration of incompatibility was not sought. The imposition of 
complex procedural requirements which must be met if one is to stay on the right side of 
public power makes unnecessarily difficult the utilisation of the coercive tools the law claims 
to make available to employees against their employers: as is often the case in the law, they 
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are used to separate theory from practice, with the latter tilted considerably further towards 
the interest of employers and employees, as a result, less free than they should be. 
 
6.6.1 The right to strike and forced labour 
 
In law, therefore, the right to freedom of assembly is that human right which most directly 
grounds the right to strike. It is not, however, the only option. Davis also identifies the 
possibility of founding the right to strike upon the right to be free from forced labour, the 
servitude invoked by Laski. Freedom from forced labour is protected under Article 4 of the 
Convention, which provides that “No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory 
labour.” The logic by which this might be extended to imply a right to strike is that “if a 
country operates a strike ban, then it is in effect forcing workers to do their jobs even when 
they do not want to.”79 Two arguments are identified against this proposition: that workers 
can still resign their jobs, and that while the right not to work may be justified on the basis of 
a right to be free from  forced labour, it is not clear that the right to return to work at a point 
of one’s own choosing is similarly justified.80  The first exemplifies mistakes of the sort 
argued against by Hale (who identified coercion where others saw freedom) and made by 
Pettit in his identification of a property regime with the natural environment. Where a worker 
who quits would be left with no income he is not meaningfully free to do so, and the property 
regime which coerces him into not quitting - the fact that if he does so he will be unable to 
meet his material needs - is neither a pre-legal given nor a necessary outcome of the existence 
of a legal system. It is contingent, and yet where it exists, the absence of a right to strike will 
for many people indicate that their labour is forced: the theoretical possibility of quitting is 
precluded by the background distribution of property and the always-impending exercise of 
public power which sustains it. In the absence of a guaranteed basic income or the radical 
reform of the modern system of property rights, the right to strike is indeed an important 
aspect of freedom from forced labour, as it is for republican freedom generally. Its absence 
will be the proximate cause of unfreedom, and though it is necessarily a poor relation of 
meaningful property reform, it is far more politically palatable than is such reform. 
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6.6.2 The partiality of collective laissez-faire 
 
Since the 1950s, the predominant model of labour law in the United Kingdom has been 
‘collective laissez-faire,’ a phrase associated with Otto Kahn-Freund, who drew attention to 
the relative dearth of legal regulation of labour relations. In their stead, collective laissez-faire 
was the approach tacitly endorsed by those on both sides of the ‘conflict’. It meant:  
 
“allowing free play to the collective forces of society and [limiting] the 
intervention of the law to those marginal areas in which the disparity of… the 
forces of organised labour and of organised management, is so great as to 
prevent the successful operation of what is so very characteristically called 
‘negotiating machinery.’”81  
 
The British labour movement, unexpectedly heir to a 19
th
 century liberalism as well as to 
more predictable currents of socialism, Kahn-Freund suggests, demonstrated an “aversion to 
legislative intervention, its disinclination to rely on legal sanctions, its almost passionate 
belief in the autonomy of industrial forces,” an attitude which spread to employers, the civil 
service, and even the courts, such that the political influence of management and labour as 
organised groupings was vastly more important to their relation with each other than was 
law.
82
 What law did exist was ‘negative’ in its outlook, designed to remove the impediments 
to the system of collective laissez-faire which were inherent in a common law system which 
has not made room for it,
83
 and without which, the system of bargaining “would have been 
subject to detailed regulation by the common law, to the point where self-regulation would 
have appeared to be a wholly one-sided system in the employer’s favour.” 84  
 
The essence of collective laissez-faire, suggested Keith Ewing in a reappraisal 40 years later 
is “by definition one of political indifference, in the sense that while the state may remove the 
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impediments which prevent trade unions from operating, it is largely indifferent to the 
success or failure of trade-union organization.”85 Ewing accepts the premise of that what 
legal intervention took place “was limited in scope and scale”86 but suggests that in reality the 
level of intervention was greater than is normally assumed, even if in order to see this “it is 
necessary to transcend the tendency of lawyers to see social life through the prism of 
legislation”87 and develop an awareness of other forms of state intervention. The sorts of 
legal intervention Ewing has in mind, however - administrative law alongside the legal 
regulation of specific industries - do not exhaust the legal mechanisms relevant to the 
question we have asked here. Two come to mind. Firstly, the law of property which structures 
the background distribution of wealth and entitlements against which employer and employee 
negotiate and otherwise interact. Collective laissez-faire cannot be understood except as 
against that background: once understood, it will be seen that very little is being left alone - 
the logic of non-interference is not at work when the state is at every moment willing to 
intervene to uphold the distribution of property which fundamentally separates capital from 
labour; those who need work from those who need not. Secondly, the growing importance of 
the welfare state, indicative of a growing willingness to redistribute and redirect some of that 
property, is similarly central to a full picture - it can have the effect of reducing the coercive 
hold of employer over employee and in turn requiring that fewer reciprocal coercive options 
be made available to employees in order to rebalance that: if housing, healthcare and 
sustenance are provided to those out of work, then the threat of losing one’s job, however 
serious it might be, is not as serious as it would otherwise be. Though specific legislative 
endeavours were reasonably uncommon, necessitated usually by the need to respond to the 
more obviously political interventions of the judiciary rather than by a desire to regulate, the 
law was central to freedom as it waxed and waned: had it not been - had the background of 
property not been progressively altered and had not the conditions of employment been 
regulated by statute - it is likely that more specific legal regulation of the right to strike would 
have been necessary. The use of public force to protect property made (and makes) it 
inevitable. 
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6.7 Free labor in the republican revival 
 
For the most part the neo-republican revival has not yet rediscovered the themes of labor 
republicanism, and is content to proceed on the basis that the notion of formal equality which 
triumphed over labor republicanism is acceptable, and perhaps even integral to, the neo-
republican project.
88
 Our earlier consideration of money and freedom suggests this is 
mistaken, and occasionally neo-republican thinkers have signalled the possibility of saying 
something more radical. So, for example, one particular form of economic domination 
identified by Pettit as caught within the ambit of non-domination is that which is liable to 
occur within the employer-employee relationship, in a manner which channels the labor 
republican movement: “The image of workers as wage slaves casts them as dependent on the 
grace and mercy of their employer, and as required to court paths of caution and deference in 
dealing, individually or collectively, with their bosses… it is premised on the appeal… of the 
idea that workers should not be exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference, that they 
should enjoy freedom as non-domination.”89 And, as a panacea to domination in the labour 
relationship, Pettit highlights the necessity of the right to strike: “Let us suppose that 
individual contracts of employment are wrested from workers under the spectre of destitution, 
and that they put the employer in a position of domination relative to employees. The resort 
to collective action, in such a situation, may represent the only hope of winning freedom as 
non-domination for those who are employed.”90 The foregoing account has connected this 
claim to the existence of a public power which mediates horizontal relations, showing how 
the state grounds horizontal domination and how its laws can be used to undo such 
unfreedom. 
 
Pettit has also applied the principle of freedom as non-domination to two specific questions 
related to an economic context. Firstly, the question of whether non-domination might not 
justify a guaranteed universal basic income. “The argument is straightforward. Others will 
control me, if only in the merely invigilatory fashion, only to the extent that the division of 
powers between us means that they can interfere with me at will - that is, without prevention - 
and at tolerable cost, i.e. with a degree of impunity. If I am not assured a basic income, there 
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will be many areas where the wealthier could interfere with me at tolerable cost, without their 
being confronted by legal prevention of that interference.”91 We have thus stepped back from 
a situation in which the dominating party is a specific, identifiable one, to a situation of 
generalised anonymous domination which is unrelated to a pre-existing legal relationship 
such as was at issue in the employer-employee example. Instead, the arguably dominated 
individual is so in relation to a class of people, the domination resulting from the theoretical 
ability of employers to foist upon the unemployed terms which they accept only because the 
alternative is to do without food and shelter. From this follows the idea that economic 
republicanism might number among its demands a universal basic income. A basic income 
would, so the argument goes, prevent an employee in an overcrowded labour pool from being 
forced to accept intolerable conditions for fear of starvation by giving him something to fall 
back on. It becomes a last line of defence against the dominating potential of capital over 
labour, an alternative to the system-specific coercive weapons on which this chapter and the 
last have focused.  
 
But the domination against which a basic income provides protection is not limited to such 
situations of directly economic domination. Take, for example, a woman who is financially 
dependent upon her husband. Insofar as this is the case, she is dominated by him, forced to 
live within any limits he might place upon her in the absence of a viable alternative. While 
the law may provide various protections for this woman, many of which were discussed in a 
previous chapter, a guaranteed basic income would provide her with the leverage with which 
to cancel out the domination, as well as, perhaps, the tools with which to resist the need to 
marry merely to provide financial security.
92
 It is for that reason capable of counteracting at 
least some of the forms of gendered domination discussed earlier, suggesting that many forms 
of unfreedom which do not derive directly from economic facts can nevertheless be plausibly 
framed as resulting from an absence of economic resources and the limited life choices which 
result from it. It must therefore be noted that notwithstanding that it remains under-theorised, 
neo-republicanism has acknowledged the existence of - though not the centrality which is 
afforded to it by the present work - of economic domination as a phenomenon, and has made 
some tentative steps in the direction of specific policy prescriptions. The content of these 
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policy prescriptions aligns with the argument made earlier regarding the state’s role in respect 
of freedom, which is not solely that assigned to it by liberal thought but instead that of an 
actor uniquely placed to prevent it. The state may be the great Leviathan, but it possesses a 
unique capacity to promote freedom. A guaranteed basic income would represent a major 
leap within our political systems but redistributes within the system, rather than upsetting the 
system itself and, crucially, provides for a more generalised freedom as non-domination than 
can system-specific amendments to rights and duties. 
 
6.8 What happens when the state ‘retreats’? 
 
The foregoing account of the contribution of property and contract to the understanding of 
(particularly horizontal) relationships of domination - the manner in which these phenomena 
determine the conditions under which the coercive apparatus of the state will be put at the 
service of private actors - permits insight into what happens when the state retreats, and why 
that retreat cannot be justified by recourse to the language of freedom: neo-liberal and liberal 
rhetoric about the shrinking state and the increase in freedom which results shows itself to be 
highly misleading. 
When the state actively regulates - when it varies the civil rights and obligations of those who 
negotiate under its auspices - it should do so principally so as to reduce the imbalance 
between the parties which stand in a horizontal relationship to each other: to render less likely 
the possibility that in any given horizontal relationship, one party lives at the mercy of the 
other. The purpose of the state’s intervention should be guided generally by the same 
principles that Kahn-Freund identified for labour law: “to regulate, to support, and to 
restrain,” so as to rebalance the relationship between the dominating party and the dominated. 
This is true of legal intervention, the changing of the rules so as to alter the rights and duties 
of the parties and to place limits on or override the private ordering on which they would fall 
back if the outcome of the process of mutual coercion against a given background of property 
was left intact. It is also true, however, of those institutions associated with the modern 
administrative state. Where social security or other benefits ensure that a worker who is 
dismissed will not be left destitute - not evicted from his home or left to starve - then his 
bargaining position with respect to his employer is improved, and the likelihood that he will 
tolerate the intolerable, accept arbitrary interferences with his interests, on the basis that the 
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alternative is even worse, is diminished. An abused wife need not live at the mercy of her 
husband if the state provides her with the resources - material and otherwise - that would 
permit her to leave when she might otherwise be forced to stay. The administrative state and 
its close relative, the welfare state, in short, is capable - uniquely so - of promoting horizontal 
freedom by improving the bargaining position of disadvantaged or otherwise downtrodden 
actors. When it is unravelled as part of the a neo-liberal programme of reform that speaks the 
language of freedom (as non-interference) there is a certain irony to the process - a 
worldview which insists the state is the only entity which meaningfully reduces freedom acts 
to promote a more widespread, more insidious form of horizontal unfreedom. 
 
What, then, when the state retreats, as it has done and threatens to do further in the last 
decades? We have invoked, repeatedly, the state of nature as a hypothetical picture of life in 
the absence of the state and its apparatus. It must be emphasised that the state’s supposed 
retreat, whether due to the learned helplessness of politics in the face of capital, or a neo-
liberal/libertarian tendency, does not yet liberate the individual, once and for all, from the 
possibility of vertical domination and thrust man into this state of pure horizontal domination. 
Instead, the ‘retreating’ state leaves behind its coercive apparatus, to continue back up the 
outcomes of private ordering, though now with far fewer restrictions on the when and where 
that power will step in: where the state does not actively re-regulate, does not make a 
conscious attempt to rebalance horizontal relationships, public power is still being put to 
work to enforce private agreements, which for the reasons we have discussed are inevitably 
imbalanced. Were we genuinely committed to non-interference by the state, so that not only 
its specific regulation of particular relationships was abandoned but its entire coercive 
apparatus was dismantled, three advantages would be discernible: 
 
Firstly, the imbalances in property which condition the outcome of contractual negotiation 
would disappear. Without some sort of public power to recognise as belonging to this person 
or to that, there can be no private property: as such, the inequality in bargaining position 
which renders impossible a truly free bargaining position would not exist. Secondly, the 
making of agreements would not take place in the shadow of the state: there would be no 
coercive apparatus to call upon for the enforcement of the outcomes of negotiations - the 
individual seeking to enforce them would be required to do so personally or through some 
private arrangement. Thirdly, the absence of the state would entail the absence of a system of 
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criminal justice and as such the ability of a party to resist the power through whatever means 
were available to him; not being able to call upon a monopolistic wielder of violence, the 
enforcing individual potentially runs up against the violence of the contracting party. The 
‘withdrawal’ of the state, then, the supposed (re)opening of a space of freedom for the 
individual is no such thing: it merely represents a retreat of the state from its central function 
- that of protecting the individual from the unfreedom of his fellow man - and so ends up 
encouraging that very same unfreedom. It is no wonder that the property-owning classes are 
so fond of this partial withdrawal: it leaves them all of the advantages, and none of the 
disadvantages, of state power. They are protected by the mechanisms of criminal justice 
(from which privatisation now permits them to profit) against potential domination by those 
who might otherwise take their property from them without paying, without in turn paying 
for the welfare institutions and abiding by the regulatory rules which would protect those 
without property against relationships in which the direction of domination was reversed. A 
true concern for freedom as non-interference - one which had the courage of its own 
misplaced convictions - would see the state dismantled and the property rights in enforces 
(now recognised as simply rules as to the direction and timing of interference) washed away. 
That it does not - that the property regime and the potential for domination to which it gives 
rise are hung on to - suggests that what is often framed as a desire for freedom is better 
understood as a desire to dominate others: to see the have-nots forced to live at the mercy of 
the haves. What this means is that while a commitment to horizontal freedom does not 
preclude the recognition of private property, even in the form of productive capital, the 
recognition of that capital puts in place the conditions for a situation of horizontal domination. 
Because the coercive options available to each party are determined by law against a 
background distribution of property whose effect is itself determined by law, the recognition 
of private property, if it is not to become freedom-reducing, must be accompanied by 
measures - the redistribution of  property or the making available of novel coercive tools to 
those who would otherwise be the victims of that domination - that redress the imbalance that 
public power, in recognising property, has created. 
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Part 3 - Chapter 7: The Failures of Republican Constitutionalism 
 
7.1 Republicanism and constitutional design 
 
Liberal-democratic constitutionalism is remarkable in its convergence on a model in which 
the similarities far outweigh the differences. Though its makeup varies significantly, as does 
its relationship with the executive organ, constitutional orders include almost as a matter of 
necessity a democratic legislature responsible for making rules of general application, 
sometimes alone, sometimes in conjunction with other bodies to which is recognised 
authority for a sub-state geographical entity on specified subject matters. This is the aspect of 
liberal constitutionalism which reflects a belief in, or the assertion of, equality between man 
and woman, rich and poor, one race or religion and all others. In recognition of the dangers of 
an unlimited legislative competence, this democratic element is more and more frequently 
augmented by a set of fundamental legal rights which delineate certain areas of individual 
(and sometimes group) life which act to frame the law-making power of the democratic 
organs, sacrificing their right to do whatever they may wish at the altar of freedom. This 
combination of democracy and rights, where the latter is counterpoint to the former, relegates 
the pursuit of freedom to a secondary position, behind the more generalised value of equality, 
and reflects both the inevitability of interference (liberal constitutionalism does not, because 
it cannot, seek to pursue a generalised non-interference) and the notion that freedom within 
the constitution is liminal, exceptional, and relates exclusively to the relationship between the 
individual and the state. 
 
In seeking to replace this with a neo-republican constitutionalism, we are guided by our 
account of how law - what we have called ordinary law - relates to freedom, offered in part 2. 
Our break with liberal constitutionalism to that extent derives from the central position 
accorded to horizontal domination. In our discussion of the state of nature device, we 
described the human condition in terms of the apparatus man puts in place to protect him 
from his fellow man, and the threat that apparatus itself poses to his freedom. The 
constitutional structure of the republican state derives from this diagnosis its central task: 
how to organise input into public power such that the state neither dominates its citizens nor 
permits them to dominate one another. Freedom is everywhere in the constitution, not merely 
at its margins as a feature of the relationship between citizen and state; not as something 
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which becomes relevant exceptionally, at the point at which the state acts beyond right. The 
questions of republican constitutionalism can be answered only following an account, such as 
that offered in part 2, of the way in which the law structures horizontal freedom and 
unfreedom. 
 
7.1.1 The failure of non-domination as a constitutional ideal 
 
Non-domination as a constitutional ideal has been largely wasted. It has given rise to a mix of 
normative theorising which differs minimally from liberal prescriptions and, worse, to 
alternative theoretical justifications for an unsatisfactory status quo; it has been mapped onto 
existing debates rather than giving rise to genuinely novel ones, adding fuel to dying fires 
rather than igniting new ones; overall, it has offered little to live up to the radical heritage of 
the tradition, nor even to suggest that its resurrection in recent years is a worthy exercise of 
intellectual labour. This failure will be discussed in the context of debates as to the ideal of 
non-domination’s relationship with both democracy and with constitutional review of 
legislation, but it is one that might as easily be demonstrated in the context of monarchy, with 
whose continued existence neo-republicanism is surprisingly content.
1
 The neo-republican 
state looks much like an idealized liberal-democracy. This is neither satisfactory, nor true to 
its own logic.  This failure is not, however, logically distinct from the failure to which we 
devoted part 2 of this work - that of not taking serious the phenomenon of horizontal 
domination and the role of public power in permitting and promoting it - but is consequent 
upon it. Forgotten in the process of designing the republican constitution have been those 
who live at the mercy not of the state, but of their fellow men. 
 
7.2 Republicanism, democracy and elitism 
 
The ambiguity of the relationship between republicanism and democracy is evident 
throughout history, particularly in terms of the existence of what have been termed ‘elitist’ 
and ‘popular’ versions of the republican ideal.2 Ancient republicanism was elitist in a variety 
of ways, most obviously in requiring the slavery of some in order that others might be free - 
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the fundamental distinction of republicanism, then, between freeman and slave “was a 
distinction appropriate to a slave society and to say that this primary distinction characterizes 
all slave societies is more or less tautological.”3 To start with this distinction, however, is not 
to accept the inevitability of the existence of slaves; to make it an acceptable basis of a social 
order, one need only demonstrate that the existence of freemen does not imply or require that 
of slaves. The republican tradition has always struggled to fulfill this condition, however, 
even outwith the slave societies in which it arose.  
 
The traditional elitism of republican ideas persisted into their rebirth as an important facet of 
English and American thought, even where the institution of slavery had not itself survived. 
As such, “early modern republican thinkers denied that republican states were to be 
'democratic' in the broad sense of being genuinely popular (where practically every adult 
male, no matter how poor, would be enfranchised). While they could agree that 
republicanism meant government by the people, they disagreed over who constituted 'the 
people'.” 4  In this vein, Quentin Skinner collects the pronouncements of various English 
republicans: Marchamont Nedham refers to the “confused promiscuous body of the people”; 
Milton calls them “exorbitant and excessive”; Henry Neville suggests that they are “less 
sober, less considering and less careful” than they would have to be to be trusted with a share 
in governing power; of pure democracy, Algernon Sidney says simply “I know of no such 
thing; and if it be in the world, I have nothing to say of it.”5 If, then, the republican strand in 
American historiography is correct,
6
 and the ‘founding fathers’ were more influenced by 
republican than liberal ideas, it is the elitist current of the former that understood “We the 
People” in such a way as to tolerate slavery - going so far as to count ‘all other persons’ as 
three-fifths of a person for the purpose of the apportionment of Representatives in the House 
and direct taxes: the only way in which agreement between slave and non-slave states could 
be reached.
7
 Republicanism managed to be both ostensibly democratic in theory and 
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profoundly undemocratic in practice: we have already encountered this as the ‘central 
paradox’ of American freedom.8 
 
Importantly for our purposes, however, is the possibility that this coexistence of a concern for 
freedom with a willingness to tolerate slavery or to exclude from the ideal large sections of 
the population was neither contingent nor coincidental. John McCormick suggests that 
Republican thought in general has “always justified serious constraining or constriction of 
democracy or governo largo; in both the old and new forms of governo stretto, the few are 
granted ascendence over a still politically ‘included’ but subordinated many,”9 and this is true 
of ‘Italian’ republicans of both ancient and modern times, who are not only “antidemocratic 
and oligarchically inclined,” but can also “be situated in close proximity to subversions or 
usurpations of popular governments.” 10  Seen in this light, the consistently undemocratic 
nature of republican thought might be seen as central to it - perhaps where any other aspect is 
highlighted, we are in fact disrespecting the tradition, and the republican tradition is to that 
extent betrayed by attempts to reconceptualise it as a democratic constitutional ideal. The 
slavery/freedom paradox was, on this view, hardly paradoxical at all. Graham Maddox 
reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting that republicanism’s democratic content was wholly 
contingent, for the very notion of the res publica was intended to provide post-monarchical 
states with a “new legitimacy” which would replace that of the king but was mere rhetoric:  
 
“it all depended on how the power of public authority was to be channelled. It 
was quite possible… for an elitist ruling group to exclude large sections of the 
population from an effective share of power. It was only those who were not 
excluded who could hope to enjoy the fruits of non-domination.”11  
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In making the link between inclusion and non-domination, Maddox demonstrates that, 
conversely, exclusion implies domination. We see that a democracy that is not all-
encompassing can be justified only if it can be shown that not all deserve to be free. 
 
7.2.1 Justifying republican elitism 
 
Republican elitism was generally justified on economic grounds, by reference to the 
impossibility of those who were not their own masters contributing responsibly to the 
political community, or to the likelihood that, given an equal share of political power, they 
would have an incentive to abolish property: “It was generally held in early modern times 
that 'the people' were the 'virtuous' - men of independent means who were not beholden to the 
influence of other men. In short, the virtuous were property-holders or masters of households 
or businesses.”12 This interpretation was common to many of the English republicans: “James 
Harrington, Milton and even Nedham all proposed models of government which excluded the 
common people from meaningful participation.”13 When the Parliamentary forces debated the 
constitutional settlement which they hoped to impose upon Charles I at St Mary’s Church in 
Putney, this aristocratic element was represented by the Grandees, who argued for a restricted 
franchise (“no man hath a right to an interest or share in the disposing of the affairs of the 
kingdom... that hath not a permanent fixed interest in this kingdom”)14 as a rejoinder to 
Rainborough’s claim that “the poorest hee that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest 
hee… the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that Government that 
he hath not had a voice to put Himself under.”15 We earlier considered the phenomenon of 
labor republicanism and its insistence that wage labour (or ‘wage slavery’) was an evil in that 
it exposed the worker to the dominating potential of his employer, stunting his development 
as a citizen and rendering him unsuited to a stake in the republic. This republican elitism is 
the corollary of that idea in constitutional terms: where the labor republicans sought to 
dismantle the system of wage labor, constitutional thinkers, starting from the same premise, 
reaffirmed the necessary exclusiveness of the franchise. If the system of property is such that 
a majority of the population is unsuited to political participation, the solution is to maintain 
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an elitism which, conveniently, prevented that reform of the property system from ever taking 
place. Not having property, the masses were excluded from the political process which might 
have permitted them to access it. 
 
The question of whether it is desirable to permit popular access to the levers of government is 
an echo of earlier republican themes. Machiavelli asks whether the “guardianship of liberty” 
is best entrusted to the common people (as by Rome) or the nobility (as by Sparta and, in his 
day, Venice).
16
 As a question of reason, both aristocracy and democracy have certain merits. 
The former sates the ambition of the elites by giving them a greater role to play in the 
exercise of power, and excludes from such power “the restless minds of the plebeians that is 
the cause of countless conflicts and disagreements in any republic…”17 The latter reflects that 
the common people maintain only “the desire not to be dominated” unlike the “desire to 
dominate” of their noble compatriots; their “stronger will to live in liberty” makes it 
“reasonable to think that they will take better care of it, and, being incapable of appropriating 
it for themselves, they will not permit others to do so.”18  Having thus hedged his bets, 
Machiavelli slips into his realist guise and notes that the duration of liberty in Sparta and 
Venice as compared to Rome suggests that the nobility is the better choice,
19
 stating openly 
the pragmatic consideration that remained central to the resistance of the expansion of the 
franchise, right up to the point at which it finally took place. 
 
7.2.2 Intrinsic and instrumental justifications of democracy 
 
Where republican political theory has indicated a democratic bent, it has done so hesitantly 
and inconsistently. David Held draws a distinction between developmental and protective 
republicanism: “In the broadest sense, developmental theorists stress the intrinsic value of 
political participation for the development of citizens as human beings, while protective 
theorists stress its instrumental importance for the protection of citizen’s aims and 
objectives.”20 This distinction is an important one, but the former also has an instrumental 
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dimension that Held’s classification threatens to obscure - it is equally possible to insist upon 
participation as a good in itself, notwithstanding the kind of good that we could and should 
continue to insist upon even if our every instinct about its effect was demonstrated to be false. 
It is this latter sense in which the distinction Held identifies exists within the contemporary 
literature; inherent versus instrumental goods rather than goods which develop individuals as 
citizens versus those which protect or assist in the achievements of their aims. 
 
Instrumental logic takes on a different meaning here than in relation to those other goods 
historically associated with ‘the republic.’ Many of these were well-suited to such logic in 
that the relevant goods were intangibles which might be ‘fostered’; which might increase or 
diminish over time, depending on whether the polity functioned as intended. What these 
intangibles have in common is that their achievement is not immediate - one does not 
institute a system of governance and immediately find that one has created a virtuous 
community; instead the virtue develops over time. Against this, the achievement of non-
domination is an immediate good, so that the causal relationship between the constitution and 
non-domination lacks the temporal dimension that is an aspect of civic republicanism. A 
constitutional system is either constitutive of republican freedom - in that it prevents arbitrary 
interference by the state with the interests of its citizens - or it is not. If it is not, then it cannot 
be said to promoted, encourage or foster such freedom. If it is, then it fulfils this role by 
definition, and not contingently; immediately, and not through the passage of time. On the 
other hand, the second end we have identified for the republican constitution - providing a 
system of private law and obligations which protects and promotes the freedom of those who 
were previously or would otherwise be, horizontally unfree - returns to the picture the 
question of time. The contributions of the republican constitution to the two forms of freedom 
therefore diverge in their temporal dimension. Vertical domination is undone by a 
constitutional order which either excludes the arbitrary exercise of public power or does not. 
Its horizontal counterpart, however, is constituted by an already-existing system of private 
rules which themselves regulate against the background of an established distribution of 
property and other rights. This creates an inertia which attempts to undo horizontal 
domination must overcome, and whose overcoming will take time. We thus connect 
republican constitutionalism back to part 2’s account of law and horizontal domination. The 
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exclusion of some from the franchise on the basis of gender which renders vertically unfree, 
and of others on the basis of property holdings which condemns the poor to live at the mercy 
of public power, also founds the possibility of horizontal domination of those who are 
excluded by those who participate. The various legal reforms which we have surveyed and 
which have had the effect of promoting horizontal domination - the reform of divorce law, 
the occasional intervention in support of workers’ rights and, framing it all, the minimal 
redistribution of property via the welfare state - must be understood as in part the 
consequence of the same changes. The achievement of human freedom has been and 
continues to be likely to be secured only as a result of the prior achievement of political 
freedom. 
 
7.3 Neo-republicanism and democracy 
 
Neo-republicanism insists upon its democratic credentials. No variant fails to make room for 
the democratic ideal, and the difficulty associated with the non-interference ideal (that, 
containing no democratic imperative, it does not itself ground an insistence upon the 
mechanisms of liberal democracy with which it is normally associated) is avoided. More 
important is the question of how the democratic imperative is justified: what is its 
relationship with non-domination and on which side of the intrinsic/instrumental split does it 
fall? Viroli reminds us explicitly that the classical republicanism on which he draws is “not a 
theory of democracy” but instead “a theory of political liberty” which “considers citizens’ 
participation in sovereign deliberation necessary only when it remains within well-defined 
boundaries.”21 Agreeing with this assessment would mean that the exact point at which those 
boundaries are situated decides for us the question of whether the theory of political liberty 
demands a constitutional order that is minimally democratic and therefore unacceptable to 
modern sensibilities; mildly democratic and therefore not usefully distinct from the modern 
western status quo; or radically democratic, such that in form or content, neo-republican 
democracy provides something that neither its forebears nor its liberal counterparts can offer. 
Viroli’s focus upon ‘political’ liberty restrains him, however, within the state-citizen 
paradigm such that the participation upon which he considers republicanism to insist is not 
calculated to fulfil the role our analysis in part 2 has identified for democracy, of facilitating 
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 Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism, Henry Holt & Company (2003), at 8. 
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horizontal as well as vertical freedom, in recognition of neo-republicanism’s status as a 
theory of human, as well as political, liberty.  
 
Skinner, on the other hand, brings democracy to the centre of his republicanism, via the 
linkage between free men and free states. It will be remembered that Skinner defines a free 
state as one in which all citizens have a role in the formulation of the laws: “if a state or 
commonwealth is to count as free, the laws that govern must be enacted with the consent of 
all its citizens, the members of the body politic as a whole”22 and “the government of a free 
state should ideally be such as to enable each individual citizen to exercise an equal right of 
participation in the making of laws.”23 By then associating human freedom with life in a free 
state, Skinner’s republicanism makes some form of democracy a prerequisite of republican 
government. Where there is no democracy, the state is unfree; where the state is unfree, so 
are its citizens. There is no possibility for the separation of human freedom from the right of 
democratic participation. Democracy is not a good worth insisting upon alongside freedom, 
nor the one true path to freedom; democracy constitutes freedom. It does so, however, by 
requiring the consent of citizens: not on the basis of any particular substance of the laws 
which will thereby result; not because democracy, as political freedom, encourages the 
enactment of law which promotes human freedom. The form of democracy Skinner identifies 
in his theory of free states is therefore overly formalistic: it may constitute a situation of 
vertical non-domination but we learn nothing about any contribution it might make to the 
ideal of horizontal non-domination. 
 
Against this, Pettit sides with Viroli in arguing that republicanism is not a theory of 
democracy, the value of which he recognizes instrumentally: “Democratic participation may 
be essential to the republic, but that it is because it is necessary for promoting the enjoyment 
of freedom as non-domination, not because of its independent attractions: not because 
freedom, as a positive conception would suggest, is nothing more or less than the right of 
democratic participation.”24 This is an unhelpful framing of the issue, inasmuch as it ignores 
the possibility of a positive conception in which democracy is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the constitution of freedom. But what kind of democracy is envisaged? 
Accepting that “any system of law leaves decision-making power in the hands of various 
                                                          
22
 Skinner, note 1, at 27. 
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 Skinner, note 1, at 30. 
24
 Pettit, note 1, at 8. 
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public authorities,” Pettit demands that the “decisions in question should be made on a basis 
that rules out arbitrary power.” Power will be exercised arbitrarily wherever “the decisions 
they make can be based on their private, perhaps sectional, interests or on their private, 
perhaps sectional ideas as to what their brief - their brief qua legislator, administrator or judge 
- requires.”25 The aim becomes that, not of designing a system where certain individuals do 
not have the power to act according to such interests, but a counter-factual one of ensuring 
that decisions made on the basis of the wrong type of interest can be challenged - ongoing 
contestability providing a legitimation that cannot be achieved by the consent which 
Skinner’s reconstruction of the free state requires (which will in the case of some decisions 
be manifested only in a “vanishingly weak” sense) or historical justification: 
 
“The non-arbitrariness of public decisions comes of their meeting… the 
condition of being such that if they conflict with the perceived ideas of the 
citizens, then the citizens can effectively contest them.”26  
 
The requirement that decisions be made through “deliberation that includes all the major 
voices of difference within the community,”27 and is open to ongoing contestation, lends to 
the process a Darwinian quality: “democracy provides an environment for the selection of 
laws which ensure that survivors are generally satisfactory… they may be presumed to 
answer to the interests and the ideas of people at large.” In keeping with the themes of the 
first republican revival, Pettit’s contestatory democracy is explicitly counterpoised to the 
interest group pluralism (wherein citizens are understood as self-interested maximisers of 
value and the state’s officials as providers of that value, so as to achieve the maximum 
possible satisfaction of aggregated preferences) which stimulated the work of thinkers such as 
Sunstein, for “to make naked preference into the motor of social life is to expose all weakly 
placed individuals to the naked preferences of the stronger.”28 Instead, the republican ideal 
puts reason, rather than bare preference, “requiring public decision-makers to make their 
decisions, and to make them transparently, on the basis of certain neutral considerations.”29 
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 Pettit, note 1, at 183-4. 
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 Pettit, note 1, at 185. 
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 Pettit, note 1, at 200. 
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 Pettit, note 1, at 205. 
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 Pettit, note 1, at 203. This phrasing recalls the so-called process school of American jurisprudence, and in 
particular the attempt by Herbert Wechlser to blunt the judicial trespass onto the terrain of democratic politics 
via a requirement that judges make their decisions on the basis of ‘neutral principles’: reasons that in their 
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Pettit’s prescriptions remain at this level of abstraction, and even then it is not clear that 
contestatory democracy will do the work he wants it to: McCormick notes many republicans 
who shared Pettit’s normative basis “specifically criticized as instruments of their own 
domination institutions very similar to the ones Pettit endorses as guarantees against this 
domination.”30 In trying times to avoid ‘populism’, Pettit demands too little and consequently 
aligns himself with “aristocratic philosopher-statesmen [and] the literati who rather dutifully 
served the former’s interest.”31 The claim is that neo-republicanism, far from having moved 
beyond the elitism of traditional republicanism has in fact failed to learn its lessons and so 
ended up repeating its mistakes. Pettit stops short of bare populism, but only at the cost of 
reasserting aristocratic rule. 
 
Bellamy returns to our earlier point about the superiority of republican to liberal freedom in 
terms of ability to justify a democratic imperative. The latter struggles to explain why people 
must sacrifice private freedom for political participation, and so accepts the possibility of 
non-democratic governance, if that is the form which best guarantees the general freedom, 
and specific liberties, which liberal freedom prizes. The republican ideal of freedom as non-
domination, on the other hand, cannot accept inequality between ruler and ruled: such a 
situation will render the ruled unfree in that it exposes them to arbitrary will of their rulers. It 
requires a form of collective decision-making, for “only under some such system of collective 
self-rule will their interests and opinions be treated with equal concern and respect in ways 
which are non-dominating.”32 Faced with a choice between demanding such equal concern 
and respect in outcome or in procedure, Bellamy suggests that democracy is justified on a 
procedural basis that it is the only plausible candidate for “an equitable process for deciding 
between individuals’ often competing claims,”33 and not “because it necessarily produces 
decisions that all consider substantively equitable.”34 Agreeable outcomes are not guaranteed, 
nor should they be, for defining the standard by which these outcomes are judged and making 
inter-personal comparisons is impossible.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.” Herbert Wechsler, Towards 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, (1959) 73 Harvard Law Review 1, at 19. 
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 McCormick, note 9, at 165. 
31
 McCormick, note 9, at 165. 
32
 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy, 
Cambridge University Press (2007), at 211-2. 
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 Bellamy, note 32, at 212. 
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7.3.1 A republican failure? 
 
The extent to which neo-republican thinkers exert themselves to define democracy and 
establish the true nature of its relationship with neo-republicanism becomes disappointing 
when it is recognised that the democracy in question is largely indistinguishable from 
standard liberal-democratic constitutionalism. The republican theorist is not demanding a 
republican constitution, but establishing that it can be unproblematically reconciled with the 
status quo, and quibbling as to exactly why this is so; neo-republicanism fits its theoretical 
framework to existing arrangements rather than providing an ideal to which the real-world 
must be adapted.  
 
If republican democracy seeks to go beyond democracy as we currently experience it, what 
might it look like? The place from which to begin is the account offered in part 2 of this 
thesis, which suggests that for an individual to be free, it is not sufficient to be free in relation 
to the state - as most neo-republican scholarship seems to suggest - but that to this political 
freedom must be added a human freedom: the relationship between man and man, between 
man and woman, between man and all those to whom he stands in a horizontal relationship, 
must also be free. Public power, as directed by law, must never ground the ability of one to 
interfere arbitrarily with the interests of another. This demand makes two contributions to our 
account of the relationship between freedom and democracy. Firstly, it permits us to explain 
in neo-republican terms, the growth of freedom in modern societies on the basis of its relation 
to democracy. When the franchise has been extended, there has been, in succession, an 
alteration of the two features of a political-legal system which were in part 2 identified as 
being instrumental to the process of freeing historically dominated groups - the amending of 
the private rights and obligations of, say, wives in relation to husbands, or employees to 
employers, and the redistribution of property via a system of welfare provision which lessens 
the possibility of those categories of person (but also others) having to live at the mercy of 
others. Those who were historically dominated by the state by reason of their exclusion from 
the franchise were also dominated horizontally by those whose access to legislative and 
executive power allowed them to ossify a body of private law which had the effect of 
condemning others to live at their mercy. Secondly, the insertion of this additional normative 
ideal into the process of considering the nature of the republic’s constitution - aimed now at 
human rather than merely political freedom - provides a standard that is not only higher 
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(freedom as an all-pervasive legal project rather than one that is embodied solely by 
mechanisms of rights protection), but better focused. We now consider democracy in light of 
the knowledge that it is endorsed for its ability also to promote horizontal freedom. Its 
strengths and its failings are to be judged in that light. 
 
7.3.2 Conclusion 
 
It was noted in the context of the neo-liberal challenge to the legitimacy state intervention 
that to enter into the debate is to lose it: where one is forced to start by justifying the very 
existence of the state, ground is conceded, and the difficulty of arguing for the extent of 
intervention one might wish to see increases exponentially. A similar point might be made in 
the context of the neo-republican promotion of democracy. Previously noted for its 
ambivalence towards (if not outright hostility to) the democratic ideal, republican scholarship 
has dwelt upon the fact that it has shed this skin and now embraces democracy as either 
constitutive of, or instrumental to, the achievement of the non-domination ideal. This 
defensive poise is inimical to an attempt to transcend the limitations of our prevailing modes 
of constitutional organization. The failure to recognise the constitutional order - public law 
generally - as the midwife of the body of private law rules which is determinative of coercive 
options and so, the horizontal freedom of individuals, leads to a certain complacency with 
regards to the democratic process: it is assumed that where there is a general input into the 
choice of representative the vertical relationship is, at least in rough terms, one of freedom 
but there is little concern for how that connection might be distorted or what the consequence 
(in terms of horizontal freedom) of such distortion would be. This theme will be taken up in 
our final chapter. 
 
7.4 Republicanism and rights review of legislation 
 
It remains to consider neo-republicanism’s position with regard to the other central plank of 
modern liberal-democratic constitutions, the use of fundamental rights norms to limits the 
legitimate output of the democratic organ and protect freedom. Taking a moment here to 
define our terms is important - the literature on this point variously claims to be discussing 
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‘rights review,’35 ‘judicial review’36 and ‘constitutional review’37 and it is not always obvious 
that the same phenomenon is at issue in each case. Judicial review refers, usually, to the legal 
oversight of the exercise of executive power; constitutional review differs in that it relates not 
to ordinary law and the power exercised under it, but instead to the relationship between 
legislative and executive action on one hand and some form of ‘higher’ or ‘fundamental’ law, 
usually that of a constitution, on the other. Nevertheless, the label ‘judicial review’ is capable 
of referring to a broader phenomenon, which would seem to include constitutional review 
alongside ordinary review of legislative and executive action, and insofar as the question for 
judges is the extent to which actions or laws fall within the grant of power made via the 
constitution (on one hand) or legislation (on the other), the form of decision making is similar. 
That the fundamental constitutional provisions in question will often relate to rights accounts 
for the overlap between this and rights review, but rights review, concerning fundamental 
rights rather than ordinary of legality, gives the judicial task a different nature. The 
phenomenon discussed here, ‘rights review of legislation', is a subset of the overlap of these 
categories - like constitutional review, it relates to compatibility with higher-order provisions 
such as a constitution, and like rights-review, it concerns rights, but where rights review 
would normally refer to both legislative and executive action, the form of review that merits 
most attention and which proves most controversial is limited to that of legislation.
38
 Some 
brief reasons can be provided in justification of this restriction. The first is that the executive, 
though it may be formed out of and overlap with the legislature, is not always directly elected 
(where it is, the elected element is likely to be partial, as in the United States). Given that 
most legal powers of the executive will derive from acts of the legislature, their review by the 
courts can be justified to a considerable degree upon democratic grounds - holding the 
                                                          
35
 E.g., Janet Heibert, Interpreting a Bill of Rights: The Importance of Legislative Rights Review, (2005) 35 
British Journal of Political Science 235.  
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 E.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, (2006)115 Yale Law Journal 1346.  
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 E.g., Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act, Cambridge University Press 
(2009). Kavanagh uses ‘constitutional review’ to refer to “the courts’ powers to review primary legislation 
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character of the HRA itself” (at 5).  
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 This distinction is noted in law in, for example, the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act, s.6 of which 
prohibits ‘public authorities’ from acting incompatibly with convention rights, but which is subject to the 
defence that primary legislation required them to act in that way (s.6 (2)). This distinguishes executive action 
which is unlawful because incompatible with convention rights from that which is incompatible with convention 
rights but nonetheless lawful because mandated by Parliament.  
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executive to the limits imposed on it by the representative organ
39
 - while review of that 
legislation itself is, by design, an anti-democratic (or anti-majoritarian, if that is not the same 
thing) procedure. If an executive action taken in pursuance of a power delegated to it by the 
legislature breaches rights without falling foul of ordinary principles of judicial review, the 
fault lies with the legislature rather than the executive.  
 
7.4.1 Rights review in liberal democracy 
 
Discussion of republicanism and rights review of legislation takes places against the 
background of debates regarding the latter’s compatibly with democracy generally, a debate 
often characterized as that between legal and political constitutionalism.
40
 Where legal 
constitutionalism requires, amongst other things, strong judicial review, political 
constitutionalism would seem to demand either that fundamental legal rights play no part in 
these processes (being merely “the statement of a political conflict pretending to be a 
resolution of it”)41 or, that their involvement is limited to underpinning weak review, with the 
role of the legislative branch augmented rather than usurped and its supremacy left intact.  
Such debate goes back at least as far as the 1970s, and the push for the incorporation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, a course of action held 
incompatible with the then-dominant ‘political constitution.’42 Though incorporation has been 
widely welcomed, including by notable former opponents,
43
 political constitutionalism has 
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survived it. It remains a vibrant position, though increasingly prompted to self-reflection 
rather than external critique.
44
 
 
An intermediate position identifies three Anglophone jurisdictions - Canada, New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom - in which the form of rights-review available is ‘weak’  (the courts 
possess no power to strike down legislation) and suggests that they together constitute a ‘New 
Commonwealth Model’ of constitutionalism which “self-consciously departs from the 
American model by seeking to reconcile and balance the rival claims [to legislative and 
constitutional supremacy], to create a middle ground between them rather than adopt a 
wholesale transfer from one to the other.”45  On this reading, the success of the Human Rights 
Act in reconciling rights protection with Parliamentary sovereignty can be attributed in part 
to the availability of other examples upon which to draw. A second, related, manner of 
viewing the issue emphasises the extent to which constitutional settlements such as that in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 prompt legal and political institutions to enter into a dialogue.
46
 Here 
the point is not which form of institution should win out, but that a successful legal challenge 
requires a political organ to reflect upon or re-justify its decision to interfere with rights. 
 
7.4.2 Rights review - principle and pragmatism 
 
Amongst arguments against political constitutionalism advanced within mainstream 
constitutional thought, we might distinguish between the principled and the consequentialist. 
J.A.G. Griffith, who supplied the keystone of political constitutionalism, also contributed 
greatly to consequentialist understandings of the position in an indirect fashion through his 
work on the political attitudes of the judiciary.
47
 Allied to a judicial record which did not 
suggest a propensity to vindicate the freedom(s) which give purpose to constitutional 
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review,
48
 this scholarship had the effect of demonstrating why political constitutionalism was 
likely to produce ‘better’ outcomes than its legal rival. Not only was it the case that where 
freedom had been expanded, empirical evaluation suggested that it was the political rather 
than the legal branches which deserved credit, it was the case that very often attempts by 
those same political institutions to expand liberty had been thwarted by the courts for 
spurious reasons. The idea that the judiciary could be guardians of liberty was not only false, 
but doubly so when the claim took the form of a contrast between judicial and political actors. 
And yet such claims were often made: political institutions were claimed to be inherently 
prone to short term thinking and open to the sort of populist rabble-rousing and crude 
political calculations that ended with the rights of unpopular minorities being sacrificed at the 
altar of the ‘public good’. Only judges could be trusted to protect them, to improve outcomes 
on the axis of non-interference in the name of a rule of law ideal which was acquiring a thick 
substantive element, something far beyond Dicey’s mix and match of formalism and 
substantivism, requiring a body of fundamental rights law with priority over the outcome of 
the political process.  
 
Where such consequentialist thinking was apparent, the good which each ‘side’ sought was 
the same: this was not a dispute as to ends, but how to achieve them. The principle of the 
issue is more subtle. One of the most basic reasons for taking a political constitutionalist 
position would be a general scepticism towards the idea of human rights. Such scepticism 
takes many forms, several of which will automatically rule out of bounds the notion that such 
rights can and should be protected through law.
49
 However, support for the protection of 
rights in law does not have as a prerequisite a belief in moral rights, and so rights-scepticism 
requires some extension before it constitutes a meaningful argument against rights review. 
One of the most prominent sceptics of legal- (or rights-) constitutionalism founds his 
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argument (at least in part) on rights.
50
 One need not reject the protection of fundamental 
rights through law merely because one does not credit them with a natural, pre-legal 
existence. Conversely, a belief in their existence does not logically necessitate their 
protection in law. The existence or non-existence of such rights does not provide a principled 
argument for either a legal or political constitutionalism. Most of the latter such arguments 
are built instead upon democracy, in two senses. Firstly, to the extent that democracy roughly 
equates to majority rule, a counter-majoritarian system, which places certain acts outwith the 
legitimate sphere of action of a legislative majority, is by definition incompatible with it. 
Strong review takes power from the people and gives it to the court; it removes decision-
making on fundamental issues from the hands of the people or their elected representatives 
and gives it instead to a small judicial elite who are unlikely to be representative
51
 and, even 
if they are not, are not usefully accountable.
52
 This work has endorsed ‘ordinary’ judicial 
review, but here the issues to be adjudicated upon are controversial precisely because of the 
manner in which they differ from ordinary questions of legality. This is relevant also to the 
second invocation of the principle of democracy, which counsels political decision-making 
over legal-decision making on the basis of its procedural superiority. Where courts will 
usually employ an adversarial system in which claims are advanced in an absolute fashion 
and either accepted or rejected by the judge, political procedures allow greater scope for 
multiple interlocutors; differing and contrasting forms of reasoning; consensus and 
compromise etc., and thus seem better adapted to making decisions complicated by what 
have been called ‘the circumstances of politics’53 or the allocation of scarce resources, or the 
reconciliation of multiple incompatible conceptions of the good. Rights review has a 
tendency to distort the rhetoric of civil discourse, prompting both a legalization of politics, as 
parties seek to win in court battles that they have lost at the ballot box, and a corresponding 
politicization of law, as judges are forced rule on political debates on which they have no 
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expertise, potentially leading to demands that they submit to some form of political 
accountability.
54
  
 
7.5 Political constitutionalism 
 
Political constitutionalism, therefore, is normatively justifiable on either principled grounds -
institutional factors which can be diluted but never overcome, and philosophical 
considerations, relating to the status of rights - or pragmatic grounds, the latter available 
particularly to those who shared with J.A.G. Griffith the sort of political views which seemed 
entirely at odds with the judicial record. A strong normative political constitutionalism is 
likely to include both elements. Their exact balance is liable to be made clear by any 
alteration in the factual matrix which underpin its consequentialist aspect. Such alteration is 
exemplified by what is widely considered to be an improved, if still patchy, judicial record in 
recent years, and so the question becomes: do such improvements weaken, or even precipitate 
the abandonment of, a normative commitment to political constitutionalism?
55
  
 
If so, if a belief that judges have, perhaps by reason of a widening access to the bench 
particularly and the legal profession more generally, or perhaps because the Human Rights 
Act has caused them to shed some of their illiberal tendencies, allows us to reconcile 
ourselves with their increased prominence within the constitution and newfound status as 
guardians of liberty, then it is perhaps the case that our normative commitments are not as 
strong as they once seemed. If a courtroom is an inferior site of decision-making than a 
legislative chamber by reason of its adversarial system and deafness to non-legal rationalities, 
then it is so whether the judges are making decisions which please or decisions which appal 
us. Similarly, those who believed that statements of rights are merely political claims in an 
unconvincing metaphysical garb, which have a tendency to degrade the discourse into which 
they are introduced, should be able to acknowledge that this remains true even when these 
rights have been written into law and instrumentalised in a (mostly) pleasing fashion. 
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Alterations in the factual background may also explain the increasing deployment of rhetoric 
once suited to the political left by those on the right. So, for instance, the ‘third-way’ pursued 
by New Labour, represented most obviously by the abandonment of Clause IV of its 
constitution, lessened the extent to which conservative forces were reliant upon the judiciary 
to act as a block to any potential socialist measures and to protect, as a last barrier, the 
interests of the establishment more generally. Though the extent of consensus between the 
Labour and Conservative parties in Britain in the late 1990s should not be over-stated, the 
likelihood of an ideological clash crystallising into a dispute between political and legal 
actors receded. When disputes do arise, they often see the main political parties aligned 
against the judiciary, a state of affairs largely resulting from the introduction of the Human 
Rights Act and worsened by the frequent infringements of those rights which have been 
supposedly necessitated by attempts to obstruct terrorism, as well as a growing disrespect for 
the rule of law in areas such as immigration.
56
 This state of affairs has been compounded by 
the fact that, in partially transposing the ECHR into domestic law, a new court became 
relevant to the domestic legal system,
57
 which acts in a manner likely to disturb any 
complacent generalisations about how a pragmatic constitutionalist (of whatever stripe) 
should view courts. A commitment to ‘law and order’ is now as likely to lead one into 
conflict with courts as to attract the support of the judiciary. 
 
We therefore find a strong anti-court rhetoric emanating from the right of the political 
spectrum indicating that there, as on the left, the judicial record, as well as its possible future 
direction, may have catalysed a rethink of attitudes towards the relative merits of political and 
legal actors and processes. This pragmatic re-evaluation is problematic. Its limits are 
undefined and so it encounters the problems inherent in all consequentialist thinking. If we 
are content with greater judicial involvement in decision-making, particularly as represented 
by decision-making in the area of fundamental rights, because the decisions being made at a 
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given moment in time are politically acceptable, how far are we from accepting the exclusion 
of democratic input from decision-making where we feel that judges and legal processes are 
likely to result in ‘better’ decisions in all or most cases? Political constitutionalism has a 
democratic core, and yet the pragmatic reconsideration on the basis of an improving judicial 
record tends towards juristocracy.
58
 A limit must exist, but we have no a priori means by 
which to locate it. If political constitutionalism, given a new lease of life by its reappearance 
in a changed political context, is to maintain any semblance of respectability as a normative 
position, it must show itself to be something more than a contingent and temporary comment 
upon the judicial record at a given point in time and identify its core of principle. 
 
7.5.1 Politics versus law 
 
Regardless of the normative incompatibility of political and legal constitutionalism, they 
share certain presuppositions about law and politics. This involves the presentation of them as 
discrete and therefore mutually exclusive: what is essentially political cannot, by definition, 
be legal, and vice versa.  The distinction must be advanced on institutional grounds, i.e. what 
makes law and politics distinct is that they are practices associated with certain sorts of 
institutions. Law is associated with the courtroom, its paradigmatic home, and the practices 
thereof - an adversarial process, between two parties whose arguments, if they are to be 
‘heard’ by the court, must be couched in suitably legal terms, and whose resolution is left to a 
judge. The judge is a neutral participant whose continuing authority requires that the decision 
be couched in suitably ‘legal’ terms. Courts are defined by the imposition of limits on 
standing and can usually adjudicate only in cases where there is a live controversy, one of the 
parties to which is minded (and permitted) to bring the issue before it. Courts are similarly 
restricted in the range of remedies they can provide, usually limited to vindicating the rights 
of the parties to the case at hand and, where the case in question reaches the appellate level, 
perhaps also parties who will later present the same issue for resolution in the lower courts. 
What they cannot do is reconsider the law on a particular topic in its generality and so, if 
necessary, overhaul the entire edifice, nor place the law in its social context so as to judge 
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what it is desirable to do (which is not to say that such considerations do not play a role in the 
adjudicative process - merely that they are not addressed holistically). Where this last 
exercise is carried out, it is either in marginal or controversial cases, or it takes place under 
the cover of darkness, being hidden by the court under a veneer of legalism so as not to 
undermine its legitimacy.  
 
Political institutions on the other hand, operate through very different mechanisms: they may 
seek out problems to be solved, and enjoy the fact-finding capacity and democratic mandate 
which makes it both possible and proper to (re)consider entire areas of law in the context of 
public policy considerations and with the benefit of empirical evidence as to the law’s effect 
on the social body. The ‘remedies’ such institutions can provide are limited largely by their 
own ambition and the brute reality upon which they are to be imposed. Such an institutional 
distinction of the legal and the political obviates the need to distinguish the phenomena upon 
the basis of the form of rationality peculiar to each - a position which was historically 
influential (most clearly as a crude formalism to which few if any now subscribe) but came 
under challenge by the realists, the crits and, to a much lesser degree, even orthodox 
positivists. It now survives mainly in the form of a Dworkinian approach more popular 
outside jurisprudential circles than within.
59
 Institutional distinctions operate on a relatively 
objective level, at least in core cases. 
 
Those patterns of thought which seek to legitimate or critique the practices of rights-review 
of legislation are united in keeping law and politics apart. But the relationship is more 
complex; thus defined, law and politics are not separate, but in fact frame and are contingent 
upon each other. Law is made by political institutions, whose very right to make rules, and 
the conditions - procedural and substantive - under which they must do so, are artefacts of the 
law. This means that the zero-sum strand of thought in (particularly political) constitutional 
thought whereby a constitution is either political or legal or, a weaker claim, that the greater 
the political element the lesser the legal, and vice versa.
60
 It also, however, goes beyond those 
accounts which see the legal and the political as (merely) coexistent, and tells us something 
important about the use of law to protect rights. The first is that for the rights to be part of law 
in the first place, a political victory must have been won - the Human Rights Act, for example, 
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is part of domestic law in the United Kingdom only because the Labour Party in government 
chose to employ its political leverage to enact it: the law is not its own cause but is caused by 
politics. Secondly, and notwithstanding the natural inertia of law, the continued availability 
of rights in law is the function of a failure or an unwillingness to mobilise political actors to 
the extent of removing them. In the United Kingdom, this would require nothing more than 
any would any other legislative enactment or repeal, but even in a jurisdiction such as the 
United States where it would require a special process of supermajorities and state 
ratifications, the fact that the constitution continues to contain the specific rights that it does 
is only the contingent result of a failure to mobilise political will. This explains why it is right 
and proper that the rule of law be adhered to - if the executive does not wish to do or not do 
as the law requires, it is welcome to seek to have the law changed. In a parliamentary system 
like the United Kingdom, the executive is in a privileged position to do so. If it cannot have 
the law changed because it cannot vault the political hurdles, it is not entitled to invoke 
democratic considerations in support of its breach of law. This ensures that the executive 
pays the ‘political cost’ for that which it wishes to do.61 In the context of the on-going 
controversy regarding the issue of votes for prisoners, the government is welcome to ask 
Parliament to repeal the Human Rights Act in order to undo its domestic effect, rendering the 
rights it protects unavailable in the domestic courts, or to withdraw from the convention on 
Human Rights to which the UK voluntarily acceded in 1950 and a right of individual petition 
to which it has recognised since 1966. That it is not willing to do so, not willing to pay the 
political price at home and abroad, is not the fault of the Court of Human Rights. It also, 
however, demonstrates the naiveté of relying upon rights to protect against the vagaries of the 
popular will: not only do rights normally exist as the result of an exercise of that will via the 
political process, but their continued existence is contingent upon that same will not being 
exercised to remove them. In the long run, all of the relevant battles have been won 
politically, and if the political will turns against unpopular minorities with sufficient vigour, 
all the legal rights in the world will not protect them. It is for this reason that political 
constitutionalists have the better of the argument: even if rights protection has law and legal 
processes as its proximate cause, their continued availability in law is a function of political 
acts, institutions and process. No mechanism of entrenchment will ever change this, for even 
the presence of rights in a written constitution subject to amendment only by supermajority 
can be overcome through the dissolution of the power constituted in the legal order and a 
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return to the radical openness of constituent power. At all points, the victory which must be 
won and the defeat which must not be suffered, is one of politics. 
 
7.6 From liberalism to republicanism 
 
A republican consideration of the issue begins from the claim that by admitting the practices 
of rights review into the republican constitution, we give life to a situation of domination in 
which the dominating party is the judiciary - those who, when called upon to decide whether 
the legislation which emanates from the democratic organs is compatible with the rights 
protected, effectively possess the power to overrule the popular will. This claim necessarily 
portrays this process as qualitatively different from the ordinary role of the judiciary in 
applying the law (a process which promotes the legislative will rather than frustrating it). 
Worse, where the practices of rights review in question are, in their substance, amendable 
only by supermajority, the effect will be to have modern day political activity finding itself at 
the mercy of the priorities of long-dead individuals, as in the United States where the political 
discourse is often dominated by the consensus arrived at by a group of white men, as seen 
through the lens of competing interpretive approaches developed by other groups of (mostly) 
white men over successive centuries. Where its most outrageous elements have been 
consigned to history, the law was not leading but following - like the Owl of Minerva 
recognising the truth of what had been only as it began to fade from view. In this picture, 
rights review forces the people as a whole to live at the mercy of a document which 
determines the boundaries of what their governing institutions can and cannot do, as 
interpreted by judges whose political perspective can never be entirely kept at bay. Taken 
seriously, it would demand that no such rights were written into law. 
 
Adam Tomkins comes perhaps closest to this outright rejection of the mechanisms of rights 
review, starting from the proposition that "there is a great tension between the ideals of 
republicanism and that most cherished of American constitutional practices, judicial review.” 
He links his project to Griffith’s political constitutionalism, but where Griffith declined to 
claim that political constitutionalism was normatively required - that “the constitution is no 
more and no less than what happens” and therefore that “everything that happens is 
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constitutional”62  - Tomkins, starting from this ‘tension’, finds in republicanism an ideal 
against which legal constitutionalism can be assessed and, ultimately, rejected in favour of 
political constitutionalism: “It is through republican political philosophy that we can obtain a 
normative foundation for our practices of responsible government and political 
accountability.” 63  Where others make rights review an indirect form of participation, 
Tomkins argues instead that the republican ideal sets the bar sufficiently high as to exclude it 
entirely: “Republicanism is concerned not with government-through-judiciary but with self-
government through processes of informed, public-spirited deliberation.”64 Rights review, 
which withdraws power from the community at large and denies the public interest a role in 
the decision making procedure (where it would tend to subvert strict legality), finds no place. 
This is buttressed by a further consideration of the issue from a non-domination perspective 
which, unlike concerns about self-government and deliberation, is distinctly neo-republican:  
 
“The point of freedom is not that is should never be interfered with but that, 
when it is (necessarily, inevitably) interfered with, the interference comes 
from a source whose authority over us is legitimate rather than illegitimate. 
Legitimate authority, for a republican, is authority without domination. This 
means authority that is neither arbitrary nor capricious, but which is reasoned 
and is contestable at the instigation of those who are subject to it.”65  
 
The difficulty of bringing proceedings, as well as the restricted range of remedies on offer in 
the courts would seem to render the judiciary illegitimate by this standard, even before 
problems such as the unrepresentative nature of the judiciary are brought into the equation.  
 
Pettit demonstrates impatience with ‘populists’ who believe that power is to be maintained 
wholly within the legislative organs because they “think that any leakage of law-making 
power, whether in the direction of the judiciary and the executive, has to represent an 
inherent evil; it means that the law is made by someone other than the people or their 
representatives.”66 Having rejected populism in his consideration of democracy, he similarly 
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rejects such objections to the practices of the rights-constitutionalism, considered by him an 
attempt to push the virtues of self-government beyond what is required to secure non-
domination and into the territory of positive freedom. Pettit’s positive argument for the sort 
of counter-majoritarian protection of which rights review is a central example (he notes also 
bicameralism and a supermajority requirement for constitutional amendment) is 
straightforward: 
 
“Majorities are easily formed… and majoritarian agents will exercise more or 
less arbitrary powers if their will is unconstrained. Let the laws be subject to 
ready majoritarian amendment, then, and the laws will lend themselves to 
more or less arbitrary control; they will cease to represent a secure guarantee 
against domination by government.”67 
 
On the surface this is convincing: as we are reminded, counter-majoritarian measures arise 
from a belief that mere majority support (particularly as refracted through the distorting lens 
of a non-proportional electoral system) is not equivalent to  ‘goodness’ in law - an alternative 
value is called for and supplied, in neo-republicanism, by non-domination. There are, 
however, problems here. It is not clear that it is correct that majority decision making leads to 
“more or less” arbitrary decisions and, if it does, why are majority decisions which do not 
infringe rights any more acceptable that those which do? If majority decision-making is 
sufficient to give interferences an arbitrary character, republicanism has a problem with all 
majoritarian decision-making processes. By what process are we to determine the identity of 
the interests which receive this special protection; the contexts in which majoritarian 
decision-making slides from acceptability into unacceptability? Further, we have argued that 
the relationship between the legal and the political is such that the law is the contingent 
outcome of the political process. For this reason it would be insufficient to have legal rights 
which were capable of overriding legislation, but which themselves were capable of being 
over-ridden by the ordinary legislative process: they must presumably be entrenched, 
therefore subject to amendment only by supermajority. This does not remove the problem so 
much as lessen the frequency with which it becomes apparent: even those entrenched rights 
will themselves be contingent on the inability of political processes (albeit more demanding 
ones) being mobilised against them. Ordinary majorities cannot therefore tyrannise ordinary 
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minorities, but the tyrannical capacity of super majorities is undisturbed and all the more 
dangerous. The more the rights are needed, the less likely they will be able to fulfil the role 
for which they were designed. Political, not legal, processes will determine whether public 
power reduces freedom. Why, then, does Pettit adopt the legal constitutionalist solution of 
attempting to circumscribe politics by law, rather than to strengthen the political processes 
upon which law is ultimately contingent themselves?
68
 And of course, this entire argument 
assumes that the roles which are protected through law are rights which we would want to be 
protected. The US constitution suggests that we cannot take that point for granted, and if it 
turns out that the rights are not so desirable, their entrenchment is even more problematic. 
 
Though not derived from the non-domination ideal, Isuelt Honohan’s observations on the 
topic are a useful counterpoint. Pettit had noted that what was distinctive about 
republicanism’s view of the role to be played by rights was the relatively weak normative 
standard they embodied in comparison to the general role of freedom in republican thought, 
and the comparatively minor role legal rights play in securing freedom compared to their role 
in liberal thought. Honohan endorses the notion that unlike liberal thought, “[r]epublicanism 
is not essentially rights-based, and it does not conceive of rights in the sense of absolute, 
individual, natural, pre-political, or moral constraints of individuals against a secondary 
political order.” 69  This fact is not determinative of how the abstract theory should be 
translated into a set of specific constitutional proposals, however: that it “is not a rights-based 
theory does not determine the status of judicial review.”70 For that reason, Honohan moves 
towards the same conclusion at which Pettit had arrived: rights review is compatible with the 
standards of republicanism. But, moreover, it makes a considerable contribution to the 
protection of freedom and so, ultimately, comes to be seen as positively desirable. Republican 
constitutionalism is a paradigm of the situation in which legal rights are held to be desirable 
notwithstanding the rejection of pre-political moral rights, the exact converse of Waldron’s 
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project. The principle fails to rule it out and a consideration of consequences - of whether 
rights review of legislation rather than bare majoritarian democracy would do more for non-
domination - commends it. 
 
Honohan frames the supposed incompatibility between rights review and democracy in a 
distinctive way, suggesting that judicial review might be conceptualised as a constraint on 
legislative, rather than popular, sovereignty, where the latter rather than the former is the 
essence of democracy. Rights review is incompatible only with one instantiation of the wider 
concept of self-government, much as “the ‘last word’ of the judiciary on the constitution is 
ultimately part of a wider political process,”71 an reminder of the fact that where the requisite 
political will exists, the decision of a court will not be what it seems: rather than a final and 
immutable answer to the question asked, it is the ‘law’ only until the applicable law is 
changed. The mutual framing of the legal and the political upon which we have insisted 
becomes an argument for rights review which operates by minimising the significance of its 
effects in practice. The political will prevails as long as it is patient and able to fulfil the more 
demanding criteria required by constitutional amendment as compared to the ordinary 
legislative procedure. For this reason, Honohan suggests that where judicial review is 
combined with a more flexible amendment procedure (perhaps including, she suggests, 
parties other than the legislature) the republican requirement of self-government might be 
fulfilled.
72
 This is a counter-intuitive conclusion given that the lesser flexibility of the 
constitution is presumably intended in part to frustrate the sort of damage that an ordinary 
majority in the legislature might do: why insist upon embedded rights if we place alongside 
them a flexible amendment procedure that undercuts their constitutional status? The answer 
of course is a nagging doubt as to the democratic credentials of rights review - an itch which 
cannot be scratched and is only postponed through the erection of distinctions which purport 
to show how mechanisms of rights review can be anything but anti-democratic. Again, it is 
not clear why our focus is on imposing a legal solution to a problem which requires stronger 
political institutions. 
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7.6.1 The arbitrariness of rights 
 
Liberal democracy, in attempting to secure the individual against the state, does not protect 
freedom. Instead, it protects freedoms - a series of particular interests which are identified as 
deserving of special protection. There is no universal agreement on the interests in question, 
though some recur across time and space, while others are more particular. Even those which 
are found in a number of rights documents vary dramatically in their scope and framing. We 
have seen already that Pettit does not answer the question of how the particular interests 
which he claims should be protected through counter-majoritarian mechanisms within the 
republican constitution should be identified. Bellamy places this lacuna at the heart of his 
rejection of rights review of legislation and its two “depoliticising strategies.” The first 
consists of “seeking to establish boundaries to the political sphere, designating certain values 
and areas as beyond the realm of politics” so that “political bodies and their agents ought not 
to interfere with individuals”73 in ways which violate their rights: essentially the phenomenon 
previously labelled ‘rights-constitutionalism’. However, there is no sphere outside of politics 
and so, says Bellamy, “the attempt to depoliticise certain areas of social life proves 
impossible.”74 It is, we might add, the most political of acts, not, now, because of the identity 
of those to whom we ascribe decision-making capability, but merely because that capability 
is withdrawn from the political organs and their political process; attempting to do this, as 
rights-constitutionalism does, is “itself arbitrary and produces arbitrary rule that is 
dominating and potentially oppressive.”75 The republican constitution, aimed at preventing 
domination, must reject rights-constitutionalism, a source of domination.  
 
It is therefore insufficient to declare a desire that rights review form part of our institutional 
structures: we must also be able to decide in a non-arbitrary fashion what the content of the 
rights should be. Bellamy suggests that two conditions of universality (“able to sustain in a 
plausible manner their claim to be fundamental and universal conditions of a just social order 
which are capable of applying equally to all individuals”) and sufficient determinacy 
(“precise enough for us to be able to apply them to concrete circumstances, and the criteria 
defining what counts as a right stringent enough to prevent each and every goal or preference 
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that we have becoming the subject of a human right”) apply.76 Given the impossibility of 
satisfying both of these criteria, Honohan’s (‘rights are not inherent in the republican ideal, 
but are worth having anyway’) is rendered illegitimate. The depoliticizing effect brought 
about by the creation of a fundamental legal rights can only be applied arbitrarily so should 
not be applied at all. This observation brings into sharp relief the fact that arguments for 
rights-review are often unconcerned by the content of the rights protected. This is a strange 
omission and a prominent critique of rights review focuses on the manner in which certain 
rights consistently come to dominate the practices.
77
 The relationship between rights and 
freedom will vary according to the content of the rights in question, a fact whose truth is 
demonstrated by a consideration of the role the first half of this chapter assigned to processes 
of democracy: that of ensuring that public power does not come to be available for one 
private party to use to dominate another. The next chapter will proceed on this basis.  
 
7.7 Conclusion - on democracy and rights 
 
We have considered the application of the ideal of non-domination to the field of 
constitutional theory, noting the many ways in which it can contributing to the discipline, 
many of them paths already travelled, others strangely neglected in the literature. It has been 
argued that the record of republican constitutionalism has often been one of undistinguished 
replication of liberal orthodoxy but that this failure is not fatal to the enterprise. The focus in 
the literature on domination deriving from imperium and the corresponding neglect of that 
which results from dominium is, however, unfortunate, and suggest our next steps. In the 
following chapters we will consider a republican constitutionalism which starts from the 
problem of horizontal domination. 
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Part 3 - Chapter 8: Rights versus Freedom: The Right to Property 
 
8.1 Rights  
 
In chapter 7, we canvassed issues of constitutional design within republican constitutionalism.  
It was suggested that the reason for the failure of neo-republican constitutionalism - its 
frequent repetition, in republican terms, of liberalism’s questions and, more problematically, 
of liberalism’s answers - is that it has failed incorporate the necessary concern for horizontal 
unfreedom, having inherited the liberal presupposition that the individual, to be free, need be 
protected only from the state. This chapter and the next consider the neo-republican 
constitution in light of the problem of horizontal domination and, in particular, the conclusion 
reached in part 2: that the primary source of horizontal unfreedom is property, and that the 
state, having recognised property and thereby put its coercive apparatus at the disposal of 
man against man, is obliged to ensure that the distribution of property does not found a 
relationship of domination. For that reason, both chapters deal with the theme of property: 
firstly in relation to the right to property and then in relation to the role of money within the 
political process. 
 
8.1.1 The neo-liberal state and relationships of freedom 
 
In the post-war period and perhaps before it, it was reasonable to fear the state first and 
foremost, and perhaps solely. But what was once a perhaps justifiable assumption as to the 
identity of parties liable to infringe freedom is now, as far as the many of the major liberal-
democracies are concerned, a relic of a world that has begun to pass into history. Too much 
constitutional theorising relies on unstated assumptions as to the continuity of the old model 
activist state which must be restrained, or at least overseen with increasing vigilance, and 
takes as proof of this fact the increased activity of the state in relation to, for example, 
national-security. The current work rejects this assumption. Its claim is not a denial of the 
freedom-reducing nature of much of the state’s activity, nor of its special status amongst a 
multiplicity of heterogeneous threats to freedom; one cannot, however, read over from those 
areas of its activity in which the state can and does do too much to those in which the 
available evidence suggests it is more likely doing too little.  More particularly, one cannot 
observe (correctly) that the state remains liable to reduce freedom and presume on that basis 
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that it alone is liable to do so. This is not to downplay the major interferences which the state 
continues to perpetrate on a small number of individuals and on certain groups as a matter of 
course. Those interferences have become increasingly well-targeted and efficient, and are a 
legitimate and indeed compelling target of those who value freedom. It is merely to 
understand the true nature of unfreedom as it features in the lived experience of the average 
citizen, who is not as a matter of course locked up, ‘rendered’ to some far-off land and 
tortured there; nor even is he likely to be the target of the more general excesses of the 
surveillance state that has emerged domestically. For the common man, his unfreedom is 
more likely in relation to the employer who exploits him in return for a wage he cannot afford 
to live on; the landlord who jacks up the price of his rent at every opportunity - or, worse, a 
bank which offered him a sum for his mortgage and then contributed to the development of 
an economic collapse which undermines his ability to repay it. In each scenario, the situation 
of economic imbalance into which the average child is born means that anything other than 
this horizontal unfreedom is unthinkable - it can be overcome, certainly, but normally only by 
the few, and certainly never by all. For this average person, unlike the suspected terrorist, 
member of the suspect community, or more general ‘other’ against which the resources of the 
state are too-often directed, the problem is not that public power overreaches - not that the 
state does too much, but that it does too little - or that what it does exacerbates these 
inequalities rather than reducing them. The situation which results from this failure to act and 
the renunciation of the actively regulatory role the state is uniquely placed to play is very 
often one of unfreedom, just as much as the unfreedom of those who more directly encounter 
the coercive apparatus of the state: to fail to see this is bad enough, but to justify the rolling 
back of the state on the grounds of freedom is unforgivable. 
 
Keeping in mind always the relational nature of the concept - freedom and unfreedom are not 
properties of an individual but instead statements about the how that individual stands in 
relation to some other entity - we have sought to shed light on the role of law in directly 
constituting the specific relations - such as that of husband and wife - which may or may not 
transpire to be relationships of unfreedom. This roles includes setting the rules which 
determine how the legal relation is formed; the circumstances under which it may be ended, 
and the specific consequences which follow in law from formation and dissolution - in short, 
the conditions under which the coercive apparatus of the state will intervene, and the identity 
of the parties against whom and on whose behalf they will do so. Most such relations, 
230 
 
however, are not so directly regulated as is that between husband and wife. Instead, they 
occur against a background distribution of wealth and other legal entitlements which 
similarly implicate public power, and which therefore already determine the circumstances of 
the intervention of public power and which condition even ostensibly ‘free bargaining’ 
between ‘equal’ individuals, as our consideration of the impact upon horizontal freedom of 
certain key rules of labour law has hopefully shown. This background permits for the 
generalisation of our argument about horizontal unfreedom in private relationships: if such a 
relationship is one of unfreedom (i.e., if one party is permitted to arbitrarily interfere with 
another’s’ interests and can rely on either (a) not confronting a form of public power set on 
preventing the interference or punishing it ex post, or (b) garnering the support of that same 
public power for that interference) it is invariably because the law - which determines 
criminality, ownership, rights and obligations etc - is as it is. Freedom, then, is not primarily a 
function of the extent of public power, but of the conditions, set by law, under which that 
public power will intervene, against a background of property in which public power is 
inescapably implicated. 
 
8.2 The right to property and freedom 
 
We have spoken of the problems inherent in the idea of using rights to protect freedom. The 
overarching difficulty of such an approach is that the rights available in law are available 
only as the outcome of a political process: they derive from a victory of either ordinary 
politics or constitutional politics, and remain available in law only until a political victory of 
the same sort is won by those who desire that the right no longer be available. Legal rights 
are to that extent best understood as a semi-permanent concretisation of a political victory 
which attempts to preserve a fleeting political consensus upon which further progress might 
be built. They indicate an interim success rather than an end to the ongoing war. For that 
reason, their role in the protection of freedom is real but derivative, secondary to the political 
processes and disputes by which they come to exist. They contribute to freedom, both as non-
interference and as non-domination, but in neither case are primary. Such, at least, is the case 
for the standard liberal rights: to privacy, to freedom of religion, or expression or association.  
 
This is not necessarily the case for the specific right which we choose to take as the focus of 
this chapter, however: the right to property. Instead, it is our argument that while the right to 
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property might provide this same sort of contingent, semi-permanent guarantee of non-
interference or non-domination, as the case may be, to those who own property, considered 
from the point of view of those to whom it applies as a whole, its contribution is better 
understood as dual and conflicting. Given that ownership implies the state’s willingness to 
interfere with all non-owners, then to the extent that a legal right guarantees non-interference 
with the owner, it prevents interference calculated to promote the interests of the non-owner. 
What this means is that a legal right protecting the distribution of property is not merely 
unlikely to promote freedom, nor to advance its achievement equally in relation to all persons, 
but will promote non-interference differentially in proportion to the property that each person 
does or does not own. If, as we have suggested, property, and particularly the iniquitous 
distribution thereof, is a key element of horizontal relationships of domination, then this 
treatment of property by rights not merely puts in place a differential vertical relationship 
with regards to property, but will potentially act to obstruct the reconfiguration of the 
distribution of property. This gives the legal right to property a specific importance to our 
project far beyond that of the other rights within the system: a fuller consideration is 
necessary if we are to understand its exact role. This chapter will aim to provide that fuller 
consideration. 
 
It might be argued that such an account, and in particular the singling out of one legal right 
amongst many, is incompatible with the foregoing presentation of the relationship between 
fundamental rights and democratic politics; that if all rights which exist in law do so as the 
result of a democratic process, then this must be equally true for the right to property. If so, 
then the problem of the right’s continued existence in law is itself a problem not so much of 
law as of democratic politics. And in a sense this is correct: whether subsisting in ordinary 
law, or in a higher-order fundamental law, the right to property has the same contingent 
existence as do all others. But the same distribution of property which gives this right its 
added importance form the perspective of horizontal non-domination threatens to distort the 
political process via which this result would be achieved: the right’s existence may be 
contingent but, as we shall see in chapter 9, it is also self-perpetuating. This combination of 
circumstances, whereby property is protected by a right whose existence in law is determined 
by a politics which itself is potentially guided, or in fact distorted, by that same property both 
justifies and indeed necessitates a consideration of the issue from both angles: that of the 
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right which protects property, and of the democracy which is troubled by it. Hence the 
consideration of the former in this chapter and the latter in the next. 
8.2.1 The history of the legal right to property 
 
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 included a provision 
stating that “The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to 
oppression." The idea of a natural and imprescriptible right to property implies the possibility 
of a settled distribution of property which logically precedes the legal apparatus which is 
concerned merely to recognise and protect it. Absent a fuller understanding of how one 
acquires such a natural right, of the sort provided with varying degrees of success by Locke
1
 
and Nozick,
2
 the notion of a natural right to property is both indeterminate and insufficient. 
Such a point was made in response to the declaration of the existence of property rights by 
Bentham, who asked: 
 
“Good: but in relation to what subject? for as to proprietary rights - without a 
subject to which they are referable - without a subject in or in relation to 
which they can be exercised - they will hardly be of much value, they will 
hardly be worth taking care of, with so much solemnity.”3  
 
More coherent is the other central mention of property in the 1789 declaration, which states 
that “Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except 
where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on 
condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.” Such 
provision finds parallels in a variety of other legal declarations: that found in the Fifth 
Amendment to the US Constitution takes the less ostentatious form of a prohibition on the 
deprivation of property “without due process of law” and prevents public authorities from 
taking “private property... for public use, without just compensation.” Nevertheless, by 
juxtaposing a provision which ascribes to property the status of a natural right and one which 
makes alterations to the structure dependent on law, the French declaration highlights some 
                                                          
1
 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, Cambridge University Press (1988), at 285-302. 
2
 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books (1974), at 149-231. 
3
 Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in Jeremy Waldron (Ed.), ‘Nonsense Upon Stilts’: Bentham, Burke 
and Marx on the Rights of Man, Taylor & Francis (1987) at 57. 
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of the problems inherent in the concept of a legal right to property, which will become clearer 
when we turn to examples of the law on this topic. 
 
A prohibition on deprivation (except under specified circumstances) may be coupled with a 
more general right to own property, as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
grants the right “to own property alone as well as in association with others,” meaning, it 
seems, little more than that no-one is excluded from the category of persons who may own 
property - not that any particular persons necessarily will in fact own particular property, or 
anything at all.
4
 Taken together with the two forms of the right to property exemplified by the 
1789 declaration, this provisions means we can find real-world examples of three of the four 
potential forms of the right to property identified by Jeremy Waldron: immunities against 
expropriation (as in the Fifth Amendment); natural property rights (as in the claim that 
property is a ‘natural and imprescribtible right’); and eligibility to hold property (as in the 
UNDHR).
5
 The fourth, the general right to have private property, is mostly unknown to law - 
“found more in philosophical monographs than in political constitutions,” as Waldron states6 
- and must be distinguished from a right to universal property ownership where the property 
is held not individually but in common. It has nevertheless begun to emerge as a feature of 
modern constitutions, albeit limited to specific forms of property (such as housing) rather 
than property in general.
7
 
 
8.3 Article 1 of Protocol 1 
 
The variant of the right to property in the ECHR scheme is found in Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the Convention (A1P1), which was intended to fill some of the gaps left by the 
hurried drafting of the convention itself and, in particular, the exclusion of rights to property, 
                                                          
4
 UNDHR, Article 17. The other mention of property is as one of the grounds upon which it is not permissible to 
distinguish in the enjoyment of the various rights and freedoms (Article 2). 
5
 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Clarendon Press (1988), at 16-24. 
6
 Waldron, note 5, at 23. 
7
 E.g., s.26(1) of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) states that “Everyone has the right to have access to 
adequate housing.” This implements the logic of the UNDHR, Article 25 of which provides that “Everyone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control.” Despite the landmark decision in Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 which 
seemed to vindicate the constitutionalisation of such a right by holding that the state was obliged to take positive 
action to provide housing, the claimant in eventually died 8 years later, still homeless: see Jeff King, Judging 
Social Rights, Cambridge University Press (2012), at 63. 
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education and free election.
8
 The inclusion of the right to property was opposed in particular 
by the United Kingdom and Sweden.
9
 Reasons given for opposition included the claim that 
the right to property was out of place in a list of civil and political rights, and that inclusion 
potentially opened up the economic policies of contracting parties to review by an 
international tribunal.
10
 Before the latter had even entered into force, as it did on the 3rd of 
September 1953, the Protocol was being drafted; it was opened for signature on the 20th 
March 1952 and entered into force on the 18th of May 1954.
11
 Drafting proved difficult - an 
early draft made reference to ‘arbitrary confiscation’ as being disallowed, but floundered on a 
suggested definition of arbitrariness as being ruled out by the payment of compensation.
12
 
Similarly abandoned was, intriguingly, an attempt to define legitimate interference with the 
right in terms only of the use, rather than the ownership, of property, which would have 
entailed a significantly higher - and possibly unworkable - level of protection for 
possessions.
13
 In its final version, the full text of the Article reads:  
 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.  
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties.” 
 
                                                          
8
 For an account of the circumstances of the drafting, see Theo R. G. van Banning, The Human Right to 
Property, Interstentia (2002), at 64-78. See also Danny Nicol, The Constitutional Protection of Capitalism, Hart 
Publishing (2010), at 134-6. Nicol makes two points of importance for present purposes – firstly, that a 
deliberate choice was made to exclude from A1P1 a right to compensation upon deprivation and, secondly, that 
by the time the First Protocol was signed by the United Kingdom, a Conservative government had replaced the 
post-war Labour government whose enthusiasm for nationalisation caused it to view the right to property as 
particularly problematic. 
9
 R. Anthony Salgado, Protection of Nationals' Rights to Property Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 27 Virginia Journal of International Law 865, at 881-2.  
10
 Salgado, note 9, at 882. 
11
 Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From Its Inception to the Creation of 
a Permanent Court of Human Rights, Oxford University Press (2010), at 100. 
12
 A. H. Robertson, The European Convention on Human Rights: Recent Developments, (1951) 28 British 
Yearbook of International Law 359 , at 361 
13
 Robertson, note 12, at 361 
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Unsurprisingly, given the gap which exists between the rhetoric of negative freedom and the 
reality of necessary interference within the human condition of plurality, the wording of 
A1P1 acknowledges its limitable nature. It does so, however, in a manner which is distinct 
from the standard conditions for justified interference with one’s convention rights, as 
evinced by Articles 8-11 of the Convention itself. Under those, any interference must, to be 
justified, take place in pursuit of a specified ‘legitimate aim’ from amongst those (generous) 
aims identified in, and varying between, the various Articles. Moreover, the legitimate 
interference must take place ‘in accordance with law’ or ‘in a manner prescribed by law’ - a 
requirement which comprises both bare legality, so that no interference can be legitimate if 
carried out without legal authority, and certain standards of precision and accessibility 
designed to ensure that any interference is non-arbitrary.
14
 Most importantly, however, the 
interference must be ‘necessary in a democratic society.’ The requirement of necessity in 
practice implements a proportionality test - a rule which can mean either that there must be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the ends pursued and the means chosen or, 
more strictly, that an interference is legitimate if and only if necessary to achieve the 
(legitimate) aim pursued, this latter interpretation representing what is known in the EU 
context as the ‘least restrictive means’ test.15 The addition of the reference to a ‘democratic 
society’ reflects the belief that in such a society, fewer interferences will be considered 
necessary than in other forms of political organisation. From the general ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ test it therefore follows that the more pressing is the aim being pursued, 
the greater the interference that can be effected, but that if there is a less restrictive means 
available for the pursuit of the identified aim - if the same effect could be achieved with a 
lesser interference - then the greater interference is not, by definition, necessary, and is likely 
forbidden. The court considered the strength of the phrase ‘necessary’ as compared to various 
                                                          
14
 So, for example, “the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is 
adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case… a norm cannot be regarded as 'law' 
unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if 
need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail.” The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (No. 1) (1979) 2 EHRR 
245, at 49. See also Malone v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14. 
15
 In EU law, the principle of proportionality is found in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, which 
provides that “The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality” 
(5(1)) and that “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.” (5(2)). For an overview, see Gráinne de Búrca, The 
Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, (1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105. 
236 
 
plausible alternative tests in Handyside v United Kingdom,
16
 positioning it at the stricter end 
of the range employed throughout the convention: 
 
“whilst the adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 (2), is not 
synonymous with ‘indispensable’, neither has it the flexibility of such 
expressions as ‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable.’”17 
 
The relative strictness of proportionality scrutiny is exemplified by the Strasbourg court’s 
judgment in Smith and Grady v the United Kingdom.
18
 In the Court of Appeal, the 
administrative discharge of four soldiers on the grounds of their sexuality had been (in those 
pre-Human Rights Act days) tested for its rationality, with the Master of the Rolls, Sir 
Thomas Bingham, accepting that because the human rights of the applicants were infringed, a 
greater justification would be required to justify the rationality of the decision,
 19
 but holding 
that even by this stricter standard, the decision to discharge was not irrational.
20
 The 
Strasbourg court held that there had been an Article 8 violation and that, because the 
domestic courts had applied the threshold of irrationality (albeit modified in response to the 
interference with rights) the applicants had been denied their right to an effective remedy 
under Article 13: “the threshold at which the High Court and the Court of Appeal could find 
the Ministry of Defence policy irrational was placed so high that it effectively excluded any 
consideration by the domestic courts of the question of whether the interference with the 
applicants’ rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to the national 
security and public order aims pursued.”21 The proportionality requirement in the context of 
the ECHR varies, but even its weaker form necessitates a stricter scrutiny than traditionally 
permitted in English administrative law. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737. 
17
 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, at 754. 
18
 (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 493. 
19
 [1996] QB 517, at 554. Sir Thomas Bingham MR regarded the test, adopted from the submissions of David 
(now Lord) Pannick for the applicants, as a distillation of the principles laid down in  R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] A.C. 514 and R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696. 
20
 [1996] QB 517, at 558. 
21
 (2000) 29 EHRR 493, at 543. 
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8.3.1 The conditions for legitimate control 
 
This general scheme of proportionality is not part of A1P1, which, on its face, lays down 
different conditions for the control of the use of property and for the deprivation of that same 
property. Control of use must be effected through law, but the only further limitation is that 
the state must deem the particular controls placed upon the use of property to be necessary 
“in accordance with the general interest.” It is unclear whether the clause on taxes and 
contributions of penalties modifies all of “to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest” or only the second or third 
parts of it. The former seems unlikely, as it would remove from the levying of taxes the 
requirement of legality. The latter, the notion that “to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties” substitutes for “in accordance with the general interest” implies an 
absurdity: it leaves us with “to control the use of property […] to secure the payment of taxes 
or other contributions or penalties” which suggests a right to control property insofar as 
necessary to collect taxes, rather than the slightly more urgent right to levy taxes (which 
surely constitute a deprivation) in the first place. It seems, therefore, that instead the “to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties” is an alternative to “to control 
the use of property in accordance with the general interest”, leaving us with “to enforce such 
laws as it deems necessary […] to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties” and that the requirement of legality imposed by the phrase “such laws” is intended 
to apply alike to the imposition of taxes and penalties.  
 
8.3.2 The conditions for legitimate deprivation 
 
The conditions for legitimate deprivation determine that it is legitimate only where both 
lawful (referring both to general principles of international law and to plain ‘law’ - the 
domestic law of the contracting party) and in the public interest. Taken at face value, the 
conditions for the lawful deprivation of property are pleasingly weak: unlike the most 
prominent qualified rights discussed above, here the grounds upon which an interference can 
be justified are not limited to a series of specified situations - the legitimate aims, such as 
‘public order’ or ‘public health or morals’ which are given in the second paragraphs of 
Articles 7-11. This would seem to permit deprivation on the basis of legislative ends not 
countenanced by those Articles: social justice, perhaps. At its extremes, it might be the cases 
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that one can truthfully say that, objectively, it is in the public interest that a particular person 
no longer owns a certain thing. Nor is there a textual requirement equivalent to the “necessary 
in a democratic society” clause which in practice determines the outcome of the majority of 
cases involving those same qualified rights: the proportionality test which that clause 
implements would therefore seem to be absent from the list of conditions for justification. 
 
8.3.3 The public interest in deprivation 
 
Instead, the sole explicit requirement beyond that of legality is that deprivation be “in the 
public interest.” There are several possible interpretations of this - the first is that the 
deprivation is required to contribute in some fashion to the public interest, regardless of 
whatever drawbacks it may entail. This threshold is too low to be practicable, particularly if 
public interest is defined subjectively and so decided by the state’s authorities themselves. 
Such interpretation would effectively establish the rule that deprivation occurs on the say so 
of the state, but that rule is already included in the requirement of legality. A second plausible 
interpretation is that the public interest in deprivation need only be greater than the public 
interest in non-deprivation: in utilitarian terms, this would ensure the only negative utility 
relevant to the legitimacy of deprivation is that which relates to the public generally, rather 
than to the property owner, the harm to whose private interest would, on this reading, be 
irrelevant. Such public disutility might result from, e.g., any uncertainty introduced into the 
scheme of domestic property rights by an act of expropriation, avoidance of which is a 
prominent aspect of practically-oriented conceptions of the rule of law in the contemporary 
world. Therefore, to the extent that an act is seen as justified, or even necessary, it many have 
no negative consequences as far as the public interest is concerned if faith in the scheme of 
property rights would remain intact. Alternatively, “in the public interest” might be 
interpreted as requiring that the public interest be balanced against its assumed counterpart, 
the private interest - constituted by the enjoyment of the right established by A1P1, in 
determining whether or not a deprivation is a legitimate interference with the right in question. 
This interpretation directly confronts the subjective disutility of the individual whose right to 
enjoy his or her possessions is being interfered with the public interest in deprivation and so 
is the interpretation which best fits with the purpose of A1P1 as suggested by its first 
sentence - to protect the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possession - and which best reflects the 
heightened interest one has in one’s own possessions, which will usually provide a practical 
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or emotional utility that far outweighs any potential contribution that their expropriation 
might make to the public interest. Even weighing public against private interests will justify 
deprivation only in exceptional cases. 
 
There are two points that should be emphasised about the text of A1P1. The first is that, taken 
literally, it suggests that deprivation can never be justified on the basis that it contributes to 
the specific interests of a particular private actor or actors: only if the case can be translated 
into public interest terms will it be capable of over-riding the private interest of the owner in 
the enjoyment of his or her possessions and justifying deprivation. The second is that each of 
the plausible interpretations offered here takes us to be working with a form of balance: a 
creative or perverse interpretation might alter the answer to the specific question of what 
exactly is being balanced against what, but there is nothing in the wording of A1P1 which is 
equivalent, even nearly so, to the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ requirement found in 
Articles 7-11 of the convention and on which has been founded the test for proportionality. 
So, the converse of the first point, that deprivation can never be justified in terms of the 
private interest, but instead must find a public interest argument, is that where the deprivation 
is, on balance, in the public interest, the relationship between it and any particular aim would 
seem irrelevant.  
 
8.4 The A1P1 jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights.  
 
The Court of Human Rights has interpreted A1P1 in a manner which tracks but complicates 
its plain textual existence. That it has been required to interpret the provision to address novel 
claims and unforeseen circumstances is not problematic; that in doing so it has strengthened 
the position of property owners vis-à-vis those who stand to them, potentially, in a 
relationship of horizontal unfreedom is more so.
22
 Starting with the Sporrong and Lönnroth v 
Sweden,
23
 the Court has repeatedly held that the Article comprises 3 distinct rules.
24
 The first 
sentence of the first paragraph - “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions” - contains the first rule, which is of a “general nature”, and 
                                                          
22
 Danny Nicol calls this a “judicial upgrade” of the right (note 8, at 138), suggesting that it is part of a pattern 
whereby transnational legal regimes act to prevent nation-states from pursuing policies which conflict with 
certain requirements of neo-liberalism. 
23
 (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
24
 (1982) 5 EHRR 35, at [61]. 
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“enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property.” The second sentence - “No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law” - lays down the rule 
we have previously identified regarding the conditions for the legitimate deprivation of 
property. Similarly, the second paragraph institutes the second rule identified above: the 
conditions for the legitimate control of the use of property.
25
 The second and third rules are 
considered in the jurisprudence of the court to be specific instantiations of the first rule and so 
are to be interpreted in the light of the general principle it lays down.
26
 Measures which are 
intended to pursue goals other than directly control the use of property are dealt with under 
the first rule.
27
 
 
8.4.1 Justifying an interference 
 
When the Court is considering whether any given interference with the 3 rules it enumerated 
in Sporrong is justified it will refer to the ‘fair balance test’, described as follows: 
 
“the Court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the 
demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights… The search for this balance 
is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is also reflected in the structure 
of Article 1”28 
 
The description of this as a fair balance test reflects the fact that the conceptual scheme of the 
conditions for legitimate deprivation differ significantly from those in Articles 7 to 11 of the 
convention with their tripartite ‘proportionality’ test. It is unfortunate, then, that the test has 
come to be assimilated with - in the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights and the 
United Kingdom’s domestic courts alike29 - with that of proportionality. In Sporrong, the 
Court emphasised that part of what was unacceptable about the treatment of the applicants 
                                                          
25
 (1982) 5 EHRR 35, at [61]. 
26
  James v United Kingdom, (1986) 8 EHRR 123, at [37]. 
27
 E.g., Erkner and Hofaur v Austria (1987) 9 EHRR 464. 
28
 (1982) 5 EHRR 35, at [61]. 
29
 Unsurprisingly, in light of the combination of the requirement to ‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court in s.2 of the Human Rights Act and the ‘Ullah principle’ which governs its use and works to 
strengthen the s.2 requirement in the context of issues which Strasbourg has addressed. For the Ullah principle, 
see R v Special Adjudicator (ex parte Ullah) [2004] UKHL 26, at [20], per Lord Bingham.  
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was that they “bore an individual and excessive burden,” the language of proportionality not 
yet being employed.
30
 When the Court revisited that discussion in James and Others v United 
Kingdom,
31
 it made the link between the two vocabularies explicit, stating that there must 
exist a relationship of proportionality between means and ends, and that this requirement had 
been “expressed in other terms in the Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment by the notion of the 
‘fair balance’ that must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”32 
The Court thereby retrospectively reconceptualised the fair balance test as including one of 
proportionality, and the ‘individual and excessive burden’ of the applicants in Sporrong was 
now identified as the paradigm of disproportionality, rather than as an example of an unfair 
balance. The proportionality requirement has been frequently restated, and the primary reason 
for which the Court will hold that a fair balance has not been struck is that the interference 
challenged did not meet this requirement of proportionality. 
 
The Court has occasionally suggested that what it is imposing here under heading of a 
proportionality requirement is not in fact a proportionality requirement of the type which 
exists elsewhere in the Convention. In James v United Kingdom, it addressed the claim that 
the availability of an alternative (less onerous) method of achieving the same aim was 
indicative that the measures in fact taken were not necessary and therefore disproportionate. 
Under the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ clause which recurs in Articles 7-11, this 
would be taken to indicate that the interference was not proportionate. Here, however, the 
Court suggested that a consideration of alternative forms of interference represented an 
attempt to read “a test of strict necessity into the Article, an interpretation which the Court 
does not find warranted” - instead:  
 
“The availability of alternative solutions does not in itself render the 
[interference] unjustified; it constitutes one factor, along with others, relevant 
for determining whether the means chosen could be regarded as reasonable 
and suited to achieving the legitimate aim being pursued, having regard to the 
need to strike a "fair balance"
33
 
                                                          
30
 (1982) 5 EHRR 35, at [73]. 
31
 (1986) 8 EHRR 123. 
32
 (1986) 8 EHRR 123, at [50]. 
33
 (1986) 8 EHRR 123, at [51]. 
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Taken seriously, this aspect of the court’s jurisprudence pushes back against the heightened 
scrutiny potentially introduced by its shift from fair balance to proportionality, leading to 
what we might describe, in language the court itself occasionally employs, a requirement of 
reasonable proportionality, rather than strict necessity. Under such a requirement the 
means/ends calculation is still the subject of judicial scrutiny, and so we are closer to a 
typical proportionality test than to the image of a fair balance test that the text of A1P1 
suggests is appropriate. The requirement is looser, however, than would be a strict 
proportionality requirement, in that there are a variety of means which bear a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality and so there is no compulsion to choose the least intrusive 
option. It is not clear that the move from fair balance to proportionality is justified (implying, 
as it does, a heightened scrutiny); it is not, however, as grievous an injustice as would have 
been a move to strict proportionality.
34
 
 
8.4.2 Possessions 
 
Scrutinising the deprivation or controls on the use of possessions presupposes a method of 
identifying what is a possession and who it is that the possessions belong to. This question is 
therefore of central importance the application of A1P1, but logically prior to it and so no 
part of the court’s explicit consideration of the issue. In keeping with the broader French term 
‘biens’ used in that version of the Convention, the Court has been clear that ‘possessions’ is 
an autonomous concept, “certainly not limited to ownership of physical goods.”35 It can apply 
to what is described generally as an asset, and it is sufficient for the purposes of the Article to 
demonstrate that one enjoys a legal interest with, crucially, an economic value.
36
 A legal right, 
for example, can be a possession for the purposes of A1P1 (and, indeed, where one seeks to 
invoke A1P1, it is necessary that ownership be recognised as a matter of domestic law.
37
 This 
positivistic requirement prevents A1P1 claims from being transformed into the language of 
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natural right and thereby frees the courts from an impossible inquiry into the moral 
foundations of the right of which the applicant claims to have been deprived. It also, however, 
gives the system of rights protection a bias towards the interests of those who are recognised 
as the legal owners of property. Also potentially possessions for the purposes of A1P1 are a 
legal entitlement to rental income,
38
 the goodwill or clientele of a business,
39
 a license to sell 
certain products,
40
 and intellectual property.
41
  
 
This makes sense - these legal rights are merely a variation of the general scheme of property, 
whereby the fact that something ‘belongs’ to me or you is a function of legal rules: this 
extension of the concepts is therefore logically sound, though where it is implemented, the 
effect is to significantly extend what would otherwise be the scope of the protection offered 
by A1P1. Excluded, however, are those possessions which are not yet sufficiently established 
in their existence, such as the right to income which has not yet been earned.
42
 Where the 
status of a right under domestic law is not established beyond doubt, the right, in order to 
count as a possession, must be something more than a mere ‘hope’: there must exist a 
‘legitimate expectation’ which has a more concrete status. So, for example, in Kopecký v 
Slovakia,
43
 the applicant claimed that his A1P1 rights had been interfered with, but the future 
possession had been contingent upon the applicant satisfying a domestic court that certain 
statutory requirements were fulfilled. The Strasbourg Court noted that its jurisprudence “does 
not contemplate the existence of a ’genuine dispute’ or an ‘arguable claim’ as a criterion for 
determining whether there is a ‘legitimate expectation’ protected by [A1P1]... where the 
proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim it may be regarded as an ‘asset’ only where it 
has a sufficient basis in national law, for example where there is settled case-law of the 
domestic courts confirming it.”44 The effect of this is to create a continuum representing the 
crystallisation of a legal right as it moves from representing a hope towards something actual 
rather than merely speculative, with ‘a significant basis in law’ marking the threshold beyond 
which the legal right enjoys the protection of A1P1. There is thus an incentive for public 
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decision makers to deprive private actors of a right before that right is well settled, for when 
that happens, it becomes an interference with the A1P1 right and the relevant requirements of 
justification kick in.  
 
8.4.3 Public interest between fair balance and proportionality 
 
The fact that the proportionality requirement has been imposed by the Court of Human Rights 
upon a textual structure that does not at first sight imply it, has the effect of distorting the 
process by which proportionality is judged.  The conditions for justified deprivation under 
A1P1 are not restricted to the pursuit of a series of predetermined aims (as in the contexts in 
which the proportionality requirement is based upon the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
phrasing) but instead makes reference to a concept (the public interest) broad enough to take 
in not just all of the specific legitimate aims references in Articles 8-11, but also, it would 
seem, any other legitimate aim of the state, excluding a priori only those actions which are 
specifically taken in order to confer a purely private benefit.
45
 This should, if the distinction 
is respected, leave greater scope for legitimate interference with the A1P1 right(s) than is 
available in relation to those rights where justification is restricted to a specified list, which 
can only ever be a subset of the full range of aims that the state might want to pursue.
46
 The 
difference is likely to be marginal, however, given that those rights of which legitimate 
interference is restricted to a given set of predetermined ends are nevertheless generous in the 
ends they specify (both in their general substance and specific phrasing), and because the 
Court is similarly generous in its interpretation of the question - few challenges succeed as a 
result of the inability of the contracting party to identify a legitimate aim which would 
encompasses the actions it has taken. Nevertheless, this consideration is indicative of the 
issues raised by the Court’s presumption that a requirement of proportionality can be imposed 
even where the language of the convention does not demand it. 
                                                          
45
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8.4.4 Fair balance and proportionality 
 
Even once the aim of interference has been identified, there is no reason in the text of A1P1 
to assume that a certain relation need subsist between the aim and the method of its pursuit: 
the specific relationship of proportionality implied by the phrase ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ should be no part of a fair balancing test, which would seem to permit interferences 
that fulfil the public interest requirement whether or not they are proportionate to the specific 
ends pursued. Only by substituting proportionality for fair balance does the means/ends nexus 
come into play.  
 
The effect of this substitution is compounded by the creation of an association between the 
requirement of proportionality and the specific phraseology of ‘an individual and excessive’ 
burden from Sporrong. The deprivation of property will always constitute an individual 
burden on its owner under a system of private property, and so ‘individual’ here must be 
assumed to mean applying only to a specific or small number of persons. There is a danger 
lurking here, for the more iniquitous the distribution of property in any given legal system, 
the more likely it is that any given in deprivation for the purposes of redistribution will fall 
upon a small number of persons - if an ‘individual’ burden demonstrates that the interference 
is disproportionate, there will come a point at which the conditions for legitimate deprivation 
run up against a system of property where the only deprivations that are not ‘individual’ are 
those which have as their subject the have-nots, rather than the haves. The ‘excessive’ test is 
similarly troubling, in that it that it can be understood to indicate that the burden is measured 
by reference to the amount of property of which the owner is deprived; a better understanding 
would consider not what is taken, but what is left, either absolutely, or in terms of its relation 
to the quantity of property of which the owner has been deprived. The more one owns, the 
greater the deprivation should be permissible, particularly in light of what has been said about 
the extent to which material inequality’s status as a primary constitutive factor in many 
relationships of horizontal unfreedom. Attempts to limit vertical (liberal) unfreedom through 
restrictions upon the actions of public authorities contribute to the ossification of horizontal 
relationships of (republican) unfreedom. 
 
246 
 
The effective substitution of the proportionality test for that of a mere balancing test raises 
the bar for legitimate interference with the right. This is difficult to accept as correct. Rights 
discourse struggles to reconcile the rhetoric of negative freedom (as non-interference) on 
which it is based with the bare reality that the fact of social existence renders impossible any 
hope of that freedom ever being respected. Much of human rights law is about filling that gap 
with details as to the specific conditions as to how and why the rights may be infiringed - all 
the while sticking to a vocabulary of freedom that is less and less suited to describing the 
reality. The necessity of interference means it must be accepted but regularised as part of the 
wider rule of law requirement. What we see in the jurisprudence of the court of human rights 
is a progressive denial of that reality through restrictions on legitimate interference which 
themselves threaten the practicality of that social existence by potentially cementing an 
inequality which is unsustainable in the long-term and in the meantime renders those who are 
without wealth unfree in relation to those who are. 
 
8.4.5 Compensation 
 
Perhaps the aspect of the Court’s A1P1 jurisprudence which is most difficult to accept is that 
relating to compensation. The right contains within it a compensatory principle which is 
similar to that found in general international law (in relation to non-nationals only), to which 
reference is made in the second of the three rules: without such a principle, which can be 
evaded only in exceptional circumstances, “the protection of the right of property... would be 
largely illusory and ineffective...”47 Such a conclusion is justified on the basis not that it 
would not be in the public interest to deprive without compensation (it will surely frequently 
be in the public interest to not have to pay compensation), but that “the taking of property 
without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would normally constitute a 
disproportionate interference which could not be considered justifiable.”48 This is a clear 
example of the requirement of proportionality (even ‘reasonable’ proportionality, without any 
suggestion of a strict necessity test) rendering the conditions for legitimate interference more 
difficult to meet. This statement was followed by an acknowledgement that ‘an amount 
reasonably related to its value’ does not equate to full value and that certain objectives of the 
public interest “such as pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to 
                                                          
47
 Lithgow v United Kingdom, (1986) 8 EHRR 329, at [120]. 
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 (1986) 8 EHRR 329, at [121]. 
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achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market 
value.”49 Only in exceptional circumstances will less than full value be acceptable and the 
Court’s decisions include examples of it requiring the payment of compensation even where 
extremely strong considerations of this type are at issue. Where the interference is a control 
on the use of property rather than a deprivation thereof, the payment of compensation will 
generally result in a finding that there has been no violation of A1P1, but unlike in cases of 
deprivation, it is not necessary, as a rule, to pay compensation in order to have struck a fair 
balance, notwithstanding that the control of the use may have consequences for the economic 
value of the property.
50
  
 
8.5 Stran Greek Refineries 
 
One can multiply examples of circumstances in which the entitlement to compensation has 
been upheld notwithstanding the seemingly exceptional nature of the circumstances in which 
the deprivation was carried out. In the Stran Greek Refineries case,
51
 the Greek state, while 
under military rule, had concluded a contract for the construction of a crude oil refinery; 
following the return to democracy, the contract was terminated on the basis that it was 
prejudicial to the national economy. The state instigated an arbitration procedure and then, 
after the arbitration board had made an award of compensation against it, legislated to 
deprive the arbitration award of effect. The Greek government’s offered to the court by way 
of explanation the rationale that “[t]he democratic legislature had been under a duty to 
eradicate from public life the residual traces of measures taken by the military regime. [The 
other party to the contract] had been a giant of the economy and the scheme that he had 
envisaged had at the time been on a huge scale for a country the size of Greece. Moreover, 
the announcement of the scheme had led, before the fall of the military regime, to one of the 
largest anti-dictatorship demonstrations.”52 The Court accepted that “the brutal practices of 
the military regime weighed more heavily on the scales of public interest than claims based 
on transactions concluded with that regime” but noted to the contrary that it would be “unjust 
if every legal relationship entered into with a dictatorial regime was regarded as invalid when 
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the regime came to an end.”53 Even though there was no doubt that the economic interests of 
the State required the contract to be cancelled, the cancellation of the arbitration award was 
held to be a violation of the A1P1 rights of the applicant.
54
 The property interests of a 
wealthy businessman were privileged above those of the Greek people, who were in this way 
called upon to pay for the deeds of a regime they had no hand in choosing. This is the side to 
human rights protection which is often obscured by a discourse which puts at its forefront the 
ability of legal rights to protect the weak and vulnerable. Legal rights are a tool like any other 
and cannot be assumed to promote an unambiguous social and moral good. 
 
8.5.1 What are exceptional circumstances? 
 
This is not to say that ‘exceptional circumstances’ can never be demonstrated. The leading 
case in which the non-payment of compensation was not held to breach the requirements for 
justification of deprivation is Jahn and others v Germany.
55
 The applicants were the heirs of 
so-called ‘new farmers’ who had been settled in Soviet-occupied East Germany in 1945 on 
land specified for agricultural cultivation. In 1990, as part of the impending move towards a 
free-market economy, restrictions on disposal of the land were removed, making the farmers 
the owners of the land they occupied, regardless of the use to which it was being put at that 
point. In 1992, after German unification, a new reform, aimed at ensuring that those who 
were not making agricultural use of the land did not unfairly benefit, required the applicants 
to assign the land to the tax authorities, without compensation. The Chamber of the Court 
held unanimously that the 1992 reform was not a justified deprivation of property and so 
there had been a violation of the applicants’ A1P1 rights.56 The Grand Chamber disagreed: 
given that the deprivation was lawful and non-arbitrary, “the lack of compensation did not of 
itself make the State's taking of the applicants' property unlawful.”57 It entered instead into a 
consideration of the historical context of the case, noting that the property rights of the ‘new 
farmers’ were a reflection of the collectivist system rather than standard property rights, and 
that “if the GDR authorities had consistently applied the rules in force at the time, the 
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applicants, who were not farming the land themselves and were not members of an 
agricultural cooperative, would not have been in a position to keep it.”58 Deprivation without 
compensation is, as we have seen, permissible only in exceptional circumstances, but “the 
State has a wide margin of appreciation when passing laws in the context of a change of 
political and economic regime.” 59  The German unification process was particularly 
distinctive in this regard and three factors eventually lead the Grand Chamber to hold that 
lack of compensation did not upset the fair balance that the domestic authorities were 
required to strike: firstly, “the circumstances of the enactment of the Modrow Law [the 1990 
reform], which was passed by a parliament that had not been democratically elected, during a 
transitional period between two regimes that was inevitably marked by upheavals and 
uncertainties.”; secondly, the German authorities had more important issues to resolve and 
cannot have been expected to apprehend the need to remedy an unjust land reform 
immediately following reunification; and, thirdly, “the [unified] parliament cannot be deemed 
to have been unreasonable in considering that it had a duty to correct the effects of the 
Modrow Law for reasons of social justice” - specifically, the acquisition of property rights 
under the 1990 reform was a ‘windfall’ and so “the fact that this correction was made without 
paying any compensation was not disproportionate.”60 The language of the Grand Chamber’s 
judgment, however, strongly underlines the ‘uniqueness’ of the context of German 
unification: this is unfortunate, for if one is willing (as one should) to recognise that existence 
of certain property rights as the result of a ‘windfall’ is not exceptional, but in fact a common 
feature of the existence of private property and, in particular, the neo-liberal policies of many 
Western countries in recent years, which have seen state assets sold off below market value, 
this exceptionality would seem less obvious.
61
 Were this more fully appreciated, the refusal 
of compensation in the public interest would be a permissible feature of a legitimate 
deprivation much more frequently than it has been and, probably, will continue to be. It is 
perhaps telling that in the context of its summary of its finding on the point as to the 
legitimacy of the interference, the Grand Chamber, states that “the lack of any compensation 
does not upset the “fair balance” that has to be struck between the protection of property and 
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the requirements of the general interest.”62 That finding is much more easily digested when 
the language of fair balance is retained than it would be in the terms of proportionality; we 
could expect to see more like it if the court were more comfortable sticking to that 
vocabulary.
63
 
 
8.6 The progressive undermining of legitimate deprivation 
 
A general right to compensation, subject to exceptions in cases so extreme they will almost 
never occur, goes a long way to undermining the conditions for legitimate deprivation: the 
state can never deprive a private individual of his property in an absolute sense, only 
exchange it for something of an equal economic value. This ignores both the extent to which 
the very value of the property may have been augmented or indeed created by the state, and 
the fact that the public interest will at times be served, quite legitimately, by the expropriation 
of property for the purpose of its redistribution, over and above the relatively modest system 
of redistribution facilitated by taxation. What this means is that while the state can give away 
public property and can create value where none existed before, it can (almost) never reverse 
the process. We have seen that the absence of a restricted list of specified ends means that, on 
paper at least, the right to property can be restricted in pursuit of a broader and more 
ambitious set of public interest aims. The right to compensation smuggled in by the court as 
part of the shift from a textually-grounded fair balance test to one which emulates the 
proportionality requirement elsewhere determines this looser standard, The state is permitted 
to expropriate, but it will normally be required to leave you no less well off than you were to 
begin with. What without a general presumption in favour of compensation might be 
defended as encouraging contestability in its presence becomes a strong presumption in 
favour of the status quo, largely undermining the wider range of grounds for legitimate 
interference with A1P1 rights, the most important of which will thereby be placed out of 
reach by the compensation requirement: our earlier example of social justice falling perfectly 
within this category. 
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8.7 The positivism of property 
 
The absolutist logic of freedom as non-interference is unsuited to the human condition of 
plurality and so many of the interests that are protected by rights are inevitably restricted, 
such that the law seeks to regularise rather than exclude interference with them. This is true 
of all those natural interests which are not logically unrelated to the fact of living in a 
political environment. It applies in a far stronger form, however, to those interests like the 
right to property which are not part of man’s natural existence, but come into being only 
where there exists a system of public power. For it is only when such a system exists that it 
becomes meaningful to speak of a thing as belonging to this person or to that one, or to speak 
of somebody having this or that legal right. This is the view expressed by Bentham, who 
insisted that “there is no such thing as natural property… it is entirely the work of law.”64 The 
two phenomena are both co-original and mutually dependent: “Property and law are born 
together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, 
and property ceases.”65 As in our earlier consideration of Bentham, we must here insist that 
what is important is not merely law, but the existence of an organised public power whose 
deployment it governs. Such a positivistic perspective does not preclude the possibility of 
discussing, in a different register, the existence and extent of one’s moral right over certain 
possessions, or to certain things, but it does capture the reality of what a property right 
implies. Property law, along with the law of contract, answers the question of who it is to 
whom state will lend its coercive capacity - its monopoly on legitimate violence - and under 
what conditions. To say I own a piece of property ‘x’ means that if somebody else attempts to 
take ‘x’ without my consent, the state will deploy the mechanisms of its criminal law against 
that person. It means roughly that when I contract to sell ‘x’ in conformity with the 
conditions laid down by law, the state will recognise, and if necessary, enforce that 
transaction and, at the apposite moment, become available to intervene on behalf of the 
person who now, under its law, is the owner. Conversely, if anyone else attempts to similarly 
contract with that which is legally recognised as mine, the state will not normally enforce it. 
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8.7.1 The inescapability of restrictions upon property 
 
So property law does not just identify the party to which the state’s coercive apparatus will be 
lent: it similarly lays down the conditions under which public power will come to the 
assistance of that power. This is true in the first place of the criminal law, which goes a long 
way to regulating the use that can be made of one’s property, but more generally to private 
law rules which regulate, for example, the conditions under which a disposal must take place 
if it is to be recognised by law. The truth of this statement implies a further argument about 
the nature of the right to the enjoyment on one’s property: it is never unrestricted, but always 
and everywhere limited to enjoyment, disposal, transfer or loan etc, according to the 
conditions laid down by the ordinary law of property. This fact - that ownership is an artefact 
of law, caused by it and therefore subject to the conditions it imposes - explains the common 
thread between those different legal rights to which A1P1 applies: moveable and immovable 
property, contractual rights and everything recognised as a possession demonstrated that for 
the purposes of A1P1, a possession is something to which the applicant has a legal right. If 
the right is legal, it is an artefact of the legal system, and so all of these are things which 
‘exist’ only because the law of the land, at a certain point, says they do. 
 
8.7.2 Deprivation in the light of positivism 
 
This background - the fact that not only is ownership determined by law, but that the law also 
by definition places limits of what one can do with one’s property, not exceptionally or 
intermittently, but as part of the very institution of property itself - demonstrates why the 
legal right to property has such a vexed existence. Consider the earlier cited propositions of 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which juxtaposes two 
provisions with different bases and in doing so exemplifies the confusion that a mixing of 
registers can precipitate. It firstly asserts that property is a natural (so pre-legal) right, which 
it is the purpose of any political association to protect, and secondly asserts that no 
deprivation can be effected by law without compensation. But how are we to answer the 
question of who owns what if not by law? We are left to rely upon the idea that law is obliged 
to recognise pre-existing natural rights and that, having done so, it is limited in its capacity to 
disturb them. But this involves freezing the value of the distribution of rights and obligations 
at a certain point in time: the same questions of moral desert which are at work in the 
253 
 
recognition of property - the unquestioning transmutation of a pre-legal moral claim into a 
moral right, backed by public force - are excluded in the consideration of deprivations. A 
move away from this mixing of registers - an attempt to protect the right to property without 
mixing registers (without, that is, claiming that property is to be protected through law 
because it precedes law) does not solve the problem of unjustifiably privileging the 
distribution of wealth at a particular point in time. 
 
8.7.3 What is a deprivation? 
 
Let us consider what it means to deprive someone of his possessions in light of this account 
of the nature of property rights. We first have something ‘a’ which is the possession of person 
‘b’, meaning that under the relevant legal system, ‘b’ is recognised as having a legal right to 
‘a’, which in turn can be translated into the proposition that in certain defined circumstances, 
public power can be objectively expected to intervene on behalf of ‘a’ against any other 
person, and not on behalf of any other person. Assuming that the necessary condition of 
legality is met (as we can agree it should be in all cases, regardless of the right involved, 
without prejudicing a discussion of the normative desirability of each right), then a 
deprivation involves changing the law so that person ‘b’ no longer has, under that legal 
system, a right to ‘a’ meaning, again, that there are no longer any circumstances in which 
public power will intervene on b’s behalf against others, and perhaps, that the law now 
identifies some other person as owner, and therefore the person to whom the state’s coercive 
apparatus will be lent if necessary. In a crude, albeit telling sense, we are left here with an 
absurdity: one has a legal right to peaceful ownership of one’s possessions as recognised by 
law, but where a deprivation has taken place by means of the ordinary law, they are no longer, 
as far as that law is concerned, one’s possessions. This confirms what we probably already 
suspected: that a positivistic account of property encounters a legal right, A1P1, which cannot 
be understood in similarly positivistic terms.
66
 Nor though, does it seem that there is an 
explicit moral dimension to the concept of ownership implicit in A1P1 - the Court’s approach 
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does not involve asking, in general terms, who it is that has a moral right to a given thing, of 
which he or she was previously the legally recognised owner: we do not return to the 1789 
declaration’s solution of asking who was the owner before law, or who would be the owner 
without law, for,  we see now, such a question makes no sense.  
 
8.7.4 Considering the issue diachronically 
 
Instead, we are left to understand that the problem can only be understood diachronically. At 
a given point in time, T1, the domestic legal system recognised a certain person as the owner 
of a certain thing. The law, however, has been changed, whether by legislative act or judicial 
decision, such that at a later point in time, T2, the law no longer recognises that person as 
owner. It is sufficient to establish the ownership at point T1 (indeed in most cases the 
question is not explicitly dealt with)
67
 and it is no part of the pattern of decision making under 
A1P1 to question how it was that the right in question came to belong to the applicant; how it 
was that the possession at issue came to be that of the person who now challenges the 
deprivation.
68
 Instead, the question asked is whether there has been a deprivation - if there 
has, then it will by definition be illegitimate if unlawful or, in almost all cases, if 
compensation has not been paid. And yet a failure to confront that first question means that 
we will never be sufficiently cognisant of the role of the state in constructing and amending 
the current distribution of rights and obligations. It leads to a situation in which it seems that 
the state may award property (rights) to one person or another - not just in the general sense 
that all legal rights imply a recognition by law, but also in the specific sense that particular 
persons can be granted rights over particular things - but not deprive those persons of that 
same property (rights): it gives but it cannot take away, A1P1 being “essentially a guarantor 
of the existing distribution of property.”69 As was suggested when considering the Greek 
                                                          
67
 The exception would be those cases in which ownership is not accepted by the domestic authorities of the 
contracting party and so it is necessary to distinguish between a mere hope and a legitimate expectation 
(possibly on the basis of settled case law) of a sufficiently concrete nature to amount to a possession. See the 
discussion above. 
68
 Waldron canvasses arguments of this sort in Hume, Bentham and Margaret Radin, who justify property in 
terms of the human need for legal stability and so are substantive correlatives of formalistic rule of law 
conceptions but notes that such arguments promote the stability of property rights generally, and not private 
property rights specifically. He concludes that it is preferable to keep the advantages of private property separate 
from those of the rule of law: “Arguing in Rule-of-Law terms for property, markets, and economic freedom is 
simply too distracting. It bogs us down in debates about substantive conceptions and about the sticks in the 
bundle that are specially privileged as a matter of legality.” Waldron, note 67, at 54-75. 
69
 Nicol, note 8, at 137. 
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monasteries case, above, the status quo is irrationally privileged. Quoting Bentham again, 
though of course responding to a declaration of property as natural right: 
 
 “according to this clause, whatever proprietary rights, whatever property a 
man once has, no matter how, being imprescriptible, can never be taken away 
from him by any law: or of what use or meaning is the clause? So that the 
moment it is acknowledged in relation to any article, that such article is my 
property, no matter how or when it became so, that moment it is 
acknowledged that it can never be taken away from me…“70  
 
To the article of the declaration governing the conditions for a legitimate deprivation, 
Bentham, eternally utilitarian, replies that the problem of deprivation is “one of those 
questions of detail that requires to be settled, and is capable of being settled, by 
considerations of utility deducible from quiet and sober investigation.”71 His comments on 
the reference to necessity are a useful reminder of the absurdity of that concept - or anything 
close to it - applied to the question of deprivation of property: “Does necessity order the 
making of new streets, new roads, new bridges, new canals? ... If not, there is an end to all 
improvement in these lines.”72 We might ask, in the same vein, whether the public interest 
might not require that the majority of the population not be forced to live at the mercy of the 
small minority which now possess a grossly disproportionate quantity of the wealth in the 
United Kingdom today.  
 
This problem is particularly acute in the context of explicit transfers of property from public 
to private hands: A1P1 protects the right of a private individual to property which is privately 
held, but therefore fails to protect property which is common to all, meaning that the sum 
total of common property can be reduced and that of private actors augmented without 
confronting any of the obstacles that A1P1 sets up for those who are signatories to the First 
Protocol wishing to conduct the opposite operation. There can only ever be a net increase in 
the quantity of property in private hands. Neo-liberal initiatives such as the privatisation of 
                                                          
70
 Bentham, note 3, at 58. 
71
 Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in Phillipp R. Schofield and Catherine Pease-Watkin (eds.), Rights, 
Representation, and Reform: Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution, Oxford 
University Press (2002), at 375. 
72
 Bentham, note 71, at 375. 
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various amenities are rendered all but irreversible (in light of the requirement of 
compensation) and, given taxation is an accepted exception to the right to property, the 
Article might be considered to incentivise high taxation, for once settled in the hands of a 
private actor, the state's options for the redistribution of property are severely limited. There 
is a similar difficulty in the idea of a right to not have the use of one’s property controlled, for 
the use of property is always and everywhere already controlled. What the right must refer to 
then, is not controls themselves, but to new controls on the use of one’s possessions - to 
controls that were not previously part of the bundle of rights attached to one’s possessions, 
but which now are; controls can be reduced without the possibility of challenge by those who 
are thereby disadvantaged, but not increased. 
 
8.8 Conclusion 
 
It is the argument of this thesis that the public law contribution to the project of protecting 
freedom is principally made through democratic processes, rather than rights, as is normally 
suggested. For the average citizen, the most important relationships of freedom and 
unfreedom are those with parties to which they stand horizontally and it is democratic 
mechanisms which are best able, in the future as in the past, to address that unfreedom. 
Democratic mechanisms determine the content of private law, which sets the conditions 
under which one private actor will be able to call upon and make use of the coercive 
apparatus of the state against another and controls the mechanisms of wealth ‘redistribution’ 
through taxation and expenditure. They are therefore central to the project of procuring that 
freedom that is most lacking in modern society. From this point of view, rights to property, 
such as the found in Article 1 of Protocol 1, are more likely to inhibit the pursuit of freedom 
than promote it. Requirements of legality are to be welcomed for, as we have seen, the 
exercise of power without legal basis is by definition arbitrary. Less central, but still 
justifiable, is the requirement the deprivation be in the public interest - deprivation will 
frequently be desirable as much because of its contribution to the interests of other private 
actors, quite apart from whether or not it is in the interests of the wider public interest, and 
the right should more clearly reflect that. The slide by which the fair balance test becomes a 
stricter proportionality test renders more difficult this pursuit of freedom and contributes to 
paradoxes inherent in the legal protection of legal rights. It was argued in chapter 7 that legal 
rights are not capable of doing the work assigned to them, in part because they are the 
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outcome of political processes and their continued availability in law is contingent on the 
failure to employ the political process to remove or repeal them. This remains true in the case 
of A1P1 - the United Kingdom could withdraw from the protocol or remove A1P1 from the 
list of convention rights in the Human Rights Act 1998. That it does not seek to do either is 
not surprising: where the political discourse denigrates rights, it is the rights of foreigners, 
prisoners and Muslims which are usually at issue - not those of the owners of property: a 
group who are not normally under-represented in the political process. The democratic 
process is sufficiently permeable to wealth that the radical redistribution of that wealth, 
though it would revive an old strand of republican theorising and promote the horizontal 
freedom the masses of the population by freeing them from the domination of their wealthy 
peers, is unlikely to become a priority. The following chapter examines some of the hows and 
whys of that process. 
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Part 3 - Chapter 9:  Democracy, Freedom and Money 
 
9.1 Democracy and freedom 
 
In contextualising the normative commitments of modern republican thought, a distinction 
was drawn early in this thesis between civic republicanism - the ideas of which were 
prominent within the revival of republican thought in the 1980s and 90s - and the neo-
republicanism whose emergence in the mid to late 1990s I have termed the second republican 
revival. One of the arguments made for the superiority of the latter over the former was its 
relative coherence - though undoubtedly important, many of the central concepts of civic 
republicanism are inherently vague and so often insufficiently precise to attempt to translate 
into practice. The comparative merit of the neo-republican ideal, however, is not merely that 
it is relatively precise, well-suited to analysis of actually-existing legal systems and political 
institutions, but that it is framed in such a way as to bring within it, by logical implication, 
certain of those civic republican themes and commitments. The key example of such logical 
implication was the manner in which the relational nature of neo-republican understanding of 
freedom (the non-domination ideal) captures the older republican commitment to plurality in 
that it remains coherent only in a context in which multiple persons co-exist: an important 
theme of the tradition recurs in a purer form as a corollary of the non-domination ideal. This 
is, however, merely one of many points at which the specific neo-republican ideal implies a 
shared commitment to ideas that have historically been important elsewhere in the tradition. 
This chapter concerns another. 
 
Our argument has moved on significantly since the neo-republican ideal was introduced and 
defended, and part 2 of this thesis was devoted to the application of the neo-republican non-
domination requirement to the context of the horizontal relationships between private parties. 
Its conclusion spoke to the centrality to the existence or non-existence of individual freedom 
of what we called ‘ordinary’ law - the private law of rights and obligations which, against a 
background distribution of property and other private law rights, structures the bargaining 
relationship between one individual and another and so determines, in large part, whether and 
to what extent individuals must live at the mercy of others. The elaboration of a republican 
constitutionalism, it has been argued, can take place only against this background - one of the 
key functions of public law is to specify the process by which ‘ordinary’ law is made, and the 
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conditions to which it must adhere. Only by considering the form of constitutional order best 
suited to the production of non-arbitrary outcomes can we tie together our themes of 
horizontal and vertical domination. On that basis, we have argued that the right to property, to 
the extent that it hinders the redistribution of property which might otherwise condemn men 
to live at the mercy of other men, potentially inhibits rather than promotes the pursuit of 
freedom - cementing the arbitrary power enjoyed by some of those who own property to 
interfere with the interests of some of those who do not. Instead, we have argued for the 
centrality of democratic processes in preventing and undoing domination, their importance 
being confirmed by the fact that even those rights which exist in law do so as the contingent 
outcome of political processes. In short, democratic processes have historically been and 
continue to be the only way to redress the imbalance in the coercive options (including the 
distribution of property) available to private parties against one another, which must take 
place if we are to achieve our goal of securing freedom that meets the dual - horizontal and 
vertical - standards of neo-republican thought.  But while the manner in which rights such as 
that to property place off-limits certain substantive facets of life, protecting them from 
legislative interference, it does not suffice to consider what democratic politics can and 
cannot do at a formal level - what is within its reach and what falls outside; to examine its 
substance and neglect its process. This involves a consideration of the effectiveness of the 
democratic process in ensuring that the exercise of public power, either directly or because of 
its role in mediating - defining, underpinning or enhancing - the exercise of power by one 
private individual against another, tracks the interests of those against whom power is 
exercised. We now turn to that task. 
 
9.2 Democracy in the United Kingdom 
 
When Lord Hailsham issued his rallying call to those who might join him in putting right the 
United Kingdom’s constitution, he was clear that the incorporation of fundamental rights into 
the edifice was only one part of a solution to a constitutional malaise the roots of which lay 
“not in an excess of democracy but in too little.”1 There remain two obvious ways in which, 
post-Human Rights Act, this remains true. Neither is the focus of this chapter, though it is 
useful to summarise them, for reform of each would work to improve the extent to which the 
direct exercise of public power, and the ‘delegation’ of that power to private persons to use 
                                                          
1
 Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma Of Democracy: Diagnosis And Prescription, Collins (1978), at 226. 
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against others, would track the interests (and so render non-arbitrary) the interference with 
the interests of those against whom that power is exercised. In raising issues of democracy, 
that is, they inevitably raise issues of freedom. 
 
9.2.1 The House of Lords 
 
The introductory text to the Parliament Act 1911 references the reasons for its own enactment, 
amongst which is the fact that “it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords as it at 
present exists a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis, but 
such substitution cannot be immediately brought into operation.”2 It is in this sense that we 
are, to this day, living in an ‘interim constitution’3 whose twilight had seemed to be marked 
by the House of Lords Act 1998, and its removal of all but 92 of the hereditary peers from the 
upper chamber. The reform was never completed and several attempts to do so have failed.
4
 
No attempt will, or should, succeed which does not alter the relationship between the two 
chambers: if the House of Lords is to be more democratically legitimate than the Commons - 
and if it is not, there should be no reform - then it should not be inferior to it. Equally, the 
need to make up for the potential loss of expertise in the Lords should be fulfilled by making 
the Lords a more formidable obstacle to the legislative process than it currently is. This 
would mean a clear understanding that the Salisbury-Addison convention did not apply as 
between the Commons and a reformed House of Lords
5
 and the repeal of the provisions of 
                                                          
2
 In Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, Baroness Hale claims, at [148], that the statement was 
included “[i]n deference to Sir Edward Grey,” who was Foreign Secretary at the time and had “something of an 
obsession” with turning the Lords into a ‘popular’ chamber: Vernon Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the 
Constitution, Clarendon Press (1997), at 123, citing, G.H.L. LeMay, The Victorian Constitution, Gerald 
Duckworth & Co (1979), at 214. 
3
 Bogdanor attributes the phrase to Asquith, citing an unpublished memo from Asquith’s papers in the British 
Library: Bogdanor, note 2, at 123 
4
 See, for example, The Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords,  A House for the Future (Cm 
4534, 2000) and the resulting White Paper, The House of Lords - Completing the Reform (Cm 5291, 2001); 
Public Administration Select Committee, The Second Chamber: Continuing the Reform (2001-02, HC 494-I); 
Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform, First Report, (2003-03, HL Paper 17, HC 171), which set out 
seven options for a reformed Lords; Department for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: Next Steps 
for the House of Lords (CP 14/03); HM Government, The House of Lords: Reform (Cm 7027, 2007), proposing 
free votes on a series of options, none of which attracted majority support in both Commons and Lords when the 
votes were held in March 2007; and, mostly recently, the House of Lords Reform Draft Bill (Cm 8077, 2011) 
which has since been abandoned. Generally, see Chris Ballinger, The House of Lords 1911-2011: A Century of 
Non-Reform, Hart Publishing (2012) and Peter Dorey and Alexandra Kelso (eds.), House of Lords Reform Since 
1911: Must the Lords Go?, Palgrave Macmillan (2011). 
5
 The Salisbury-Addison convention derives from an agreement between the Leaders of the Labour and 
Conservative parties in the House of Lords following a general election in 1945 in which Labour had won a 
minor victory but anticipated difficulties in achieving its legislative agenda due to Conservative domination of 
the upper chamber. 
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the Parliament Acts which permit the Commons and Monarch, acting together, to legislate 
without the consent of the Lords.
6
  
 
This would restore to the Lords the ability to do more than merely delay for up to one month 
Bills certified as Money Bills by the Speaker - a restriction which reflects long-standing 
convention, the failure of the Lords to adhere to which (through the rejection of the ‘peoples’ 
budget’ of 1909) sparking the constitutional crisis which lead to the enactment of the 
Parliament Act 1911. To accept this point leads naturally to the question of whether it would 
also be appropriate to rebalance the authority of Commons and Lords in matters of supply 
over and above that dealt with by the Parliaments Acts; whether the Commons’ financial 
privilege should be withdrawn from it. That privilege, which derives most obviously from 
resolutions of the House of 1671 and 1678
7
 means that a ‘Money resolution’ is required for 
any Bill that requires expenditure, while a ‘Ways and Means resolution’ is required for 
taxation: both are in the gift of the Commons, which must waive its privilege if the Lords are 
to amend a Bill which does either thing.
8
 The 17
th
 century struggles between Crown and 
Parliament revolved in many ways around the question of who should be entitled to authorise 
taxation and were eventually resolved in Parliament’s favour.9 It is logical and desirable that 
while the House of Lords remains an essentially aristocratic chamber, it has only a very 
limited role in taxation and expenditure, but were it reformed as a wholly democratic body, 
such rationale would cease to bite; were it reformed such that it was more democratic that the 
House of Commons, the Lords might become the best hope of promoting a more egalitarian 
distribution of property. A convention with its roots in centuries old constitutional struggle 
should not be permitted to obstruct that. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Parliament Act 1911, s.2, as amended by the Parliament Act 1949, s.1. 
7
 “That, in all Aids given to the King, by the Commons, the Rate or Tax ought not to be altered by the Lords,” 
(resolution of the House of Commons, 16 April 1971); “That all Aids and Supplies, and Aids to his Majesty in 
Parliament, are the sole Gift of the Commons,” (extract from a resolution of the House of Commons, 3  July 
1678). 
8
 See Malcolm Jack et al (eds.), Erskine May’s Parliamentary Practice (24th ed.), LexisNexis (2011), at 792-4; 
House of Lords Constitution Committee, Money Bills and Commons Financial Privilege (HL 2010-11, 97). 
9
 Some of the most famous instantiations of this quarrel resulted in Darnell’s Case (1627 ) St Tr 1 and R.v 
Hampden (1637) 3 St.Tr. 825, the former declaring the illegality of taxation (here, the granting of a forced loan) 
without Parliamentary approval, the latter upholding the legality of the Ship Money.   
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9.2.2 The electoral system 
 
Similarly, if one is committed to ensuring that minority interests are protected, it is not clear 
why one should seek to employ legal mechanisms to limit a legislature whose democratic 
credentials remain suspect, rather than seeking to improve those credentials; why the solution 
to the problem of insufficient political accountability lies in the imposition of legal obstacles 
rather than the strengthening of those which are political. Regardless of how it might relate to 
a reformed House of Lords, the House of Commons continues to be populated according to a 
process which, in the name of strong government and clarity, distorts the input of electorate, 
consistently underrepresenting minority perspectives and working to cement a neo-liberal 
consensus in British politics even as social policies, at least where not in conflict with these 
economic considerations, have coalesced at the progressive end of the spectrum. A 1997 New 
Labour manifesto promise committed the party to a referendum on voting reform which 
never materialised. Instead, the Jenkins Commission,
10
 having been tasked with 
recommending a ‘broadly proportional’ system, argued for the alternative vote top-up system 
but did not see its proposals result in legislation. By 2010, the mood had shifted such that the 
Labour Party was willing to endorse a referendum on the alternative vote system (minus the 
top-up element), a commitment which also found its way into the coalition agreement 
between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, even though the latter had in its 
manifesto indicated a preference for the single transferrable vote. The comprehensive defeat 
of the proposal in the May 2011 referendum makes any further attempt at reform in the near 
future unlikely, but as with Lords reform, it is possible that a solution in this area would 
promote the ends of freedom (whether defined in this project’s republican terms or those of 
non-interference) while maintaining the advantages of the political process over rights-based 
solutions. A neo-republican perspective, committed to the protection of freedom by ensuring 
that public power is exercised in a way which tracks the interests of those living under it, 
would be advised to start here. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Independent Commission on the Voting System, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting 
System, (Cm  4090, 1998) 
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9.3 Virtue and corruption 
 
These two specific difficulties feed into the narrative advanced only indirectly; they are 
relevant to republican freedom without being central to the neo-republican project. More 
directly in keeping with our conclusion in part 2 regarding the manner in which the 
distribution of property grounds the possibility of horizontal domination is a consideration of 
the relationship of property to democratic politics. For that reason, we turn now to the role of 
money within the political process; more specifically, the potential of money to distort the 
democratic process which we have endorsed from within neo-republicanism for the specific 
reason that it permits the interferences which individuals undergo at the hands of public and 
private power to track those individuals’ interests - to ensure that interferences take place on 
a non-arbitrary basis. Money’s entry into the equation threatens to undermine this by bringing 
about a situation in which some interests are privileged over others and public power is put at 
the service of some (who possess property) against others (who do not). In examining the 
potential of money to distort politics, we thus progress the narrative of part 2: if the same 
iniquitous distribution which grounds horizontal domination also acts to prevent the 
democratic process from progressively unravelling that horizontal domination, then the 
problem is compounded and he existence of horizontal domination self-perpetuating. Like the 
two democratic failings already identified, then, we are dealing with a factor which speaks to 
the arbitrariness of the power exercised by public institutions, or put by them at the disposal 
of private individuals. Unlike these failings, however, this factor is similarly implicated in 
horizontal domination and so the issue becomes a neo-republican concern over and above any 
general fear for the quality and purity of democracy. We are again reminded of the point 
earlier insisted upon, whereby the liberal ideal of freedom as non-interference does not itself 
imply any particular demands regarding the configuration of our governing arrangements: 
one is no more likely to be free, in this sense, in any one type of polity than in any other. We 
here extend that logic - the distortion of the political process by money is, like the nature of 
that process, not per se liable to alter the extent of freedom enjoyed by those living under it. 
The same cannot be said of money within the neo-republican constitution, for it distorts the 
democratic process which prevents the exercise of public power from having a freedom-
reducing nature. The role of money within politics is, like the issue of democracy itself, a 
question of freedom.  
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Significantly, however, in making this point, we also come full circle on the republican 
tradition, again encountering a context within which the unitary normative commitment of 
neo-republicanism ties it together with older republican themes such that they can once again 
become part of the programme though now in a better-defined and more clearly-reasoned 
fashion. The central idea here is the theme of (republican) virtue and, more obviously, its 
antithesis - corruption.  
 
9.3.1 Virtue 
 
Virtue is central to the republican project - though Pettit and Skinner have reconceptualised it 
as a tradition which derives its status as such from a particular conception of freedom, Blair 
Worden has claimed, instead, that it is “as a politics of virtue that republicanism most clearly 
defines itself.”11 Virtue can be and, within the extended history of republicanism has been, 
understood in a variety of fashions, exemplifying the difficulties of coherence and definition 
which we earlier noted to have acted to undermine the instrumental utility of civic republican 
ideas. The concept’s roots are resolutely in the classical world,12 though complicated in its 
status as a republican phenomenon by Machiavelli’s implicit, but insistent, differentiation of 
political and moral virtue which acknowledged that what was good for the polity was not 
always that which it was right or proper for the individual to pursue
13
 - moral virtue was 
distinct from political virtue and the Thomist assimilation of civic virtue with Christian 
morality was overcome.
14
 The American founding, whose Machiavellian roots, via the 
English republicans, we have already noted, was a project haunted by the need to achieve and 
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 Blair Worden, Marchamont Nedham and the Beginnings of English Republicanism, 1649-1656, in David 
Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, Stanford University Press (1995), 
at 46. 
12
 See, for example, Cicero, endorsing Plato in De Officiis I.85:  “those who are about to take charge of public 
affairs should… fix their gaze so firmly on what is beneficial to citizens that whatever they do, they do with that 
in mind, forgetful of their own advantage…  [they should] care for the whole body of the republic rather than 
protect one part and neglect the rest.”  
13
 For an overview of wildly divergent interpretations of Machiavelli’s thought, culminating in the claim that, 
for Machiavelli, “Public life has its own morality, to which Christian principles (or any absolute personal 
values) tend to be a gratuitous obstacle... it approves, or at least permits, the use of force where it is needed to 
promote the ends of political society”, see Isaiah Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, in his Against The 
Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, Pimlico (1997), at 66.  
14
 Machiavelli’s virtue (virtù) “may be broadly defined as that quality of energy, vitality and courage which 
enables man to achieve greatness and power in the face of the impersonal force of fortune” – Nicolai Rubinstein, 
Italian Political Thought, 1450-1530, in J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie (eds.), The Cambridge History of Political 
Thought (1450-1700), Cambridge University Press (1994), at 45. As this definition suggests, central to the 
Machiavellian project is the understanding of how virtù interacts with those political forces outside of man’s 
control. See also, S. M. Shumer, Machiavelli: Republican Politics and Its Corruption, (1979) 7 Political Theory 
5. 
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protect and encourage virtue, for fear of the collapse of the republic - a fear which required 
those who wrote the constitution to address head-on Montesquieu’s assertions about the 
impossibility of ensuring virtue within a large republic.
15
 Madison devoted much energy to 
impeding the effects of factionalism, noting the complaint that “the public good is too often 
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties… measures are too often decided, not according to 
the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested 
and overbearing majority” but regarding the causes of factions as “sown in the nature of 
man” and so impossible to remove.16 Minority factions might be overcome through normal 
majoritarian politics. Where the faction comprised a majority, the democratic process might 
“enable it to sacrifice to its ruling passion both the public good and the rights of other 
citizens.”17 Here Madison puts faith in the institutions of representative democracy - what he 
describes as a republic, in opposition to a democracy - to act as a “republican remedy for the 
diseases most incident to republican government.”18 In this case, the large scale of the polity, 
which Montesquieu considered a disadvantage, is reconceived as a specific contributor to the 
protection of virtue:  
 
“Extend the sphere [of the state] and you take in a greater variety of parties in 
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a 
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common 
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own 
strength and to act in unison with each other.”19  
 
This same need to encourage virtue (in particular, to consider the method by which a 
common good other than the mere aggregate of divergent and competing private interests 
might become the subject of political action) has resonated through to the present day as a 
persistent counterpoint to the liberal characterisation of the self-interested rational 
calculator.
20
 A specific focus upon virtue has, however, in recent times been central only to 
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 See above, 1.2.2, and note 14 below it. 
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 James Madison, Federalist no. 10, in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist 
Papers, Penguin (1987), at124-25. 
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 Madison, note 16, at 125. 
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 Madison, note 16, at 128. 
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 Madison, note 16, at 127. 
20
 See Michelman: “One possible way of making sense of this is by conceiving of politics as a process in which 
private-regarding ‘men’ become public-regarding citizens and thus members of a people. It would be by virtue 
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forms of republicanism which fall upon a divergent branch of the tradition from that which is 
the focus of the present work.
21
 In order to bring it back within the neo-republican project, we 
must be clear how we understand it, situating our neo-republican concern for virtue amongst 
themes such as the pursuit of glory on behalf of the republic; the pursuit of the public interest 
as opposed to private advantage and success in martial pursuits. In order to avoid the 
problems of definition associated with these civic republican ideas and to capture the broad 
overlap of these different senses, we can here define virtue in negative terms as the antithesis 
of self-interest appropriate to the exercise of public power; as the exercise of public power in 
a manner other than that calculated to procure private advantage, thereby siding with Cicero 
and Madison over Machiavelli.
22
 In formulating it negatively, we avoid the difficulties 
attracted by any definition based upon a discrete and unitary public interest. Whether or not 
such a thing exists, it remains undeniable that its substance is irreconcilably contested, and to 
make it the focus of virtue is to beg a number of questions.    
 
9.3.2 Corruption in republican thought 
 
As with virtue, there are many ways of conceptualising corruption within the neo-republican 
tradition. Many of its variants can be included under the umbrella of the exercise of power in 
pursuit of private interests to the exclusion of the public good - the res publica, or 
commonwealth which should be the focus of those wielding political power. The specific 
private interests which might be the illegitimate focus within this pejorative account, which 
would indicate that virtue had been squeezed out by corruption, can be framed broadly - 
power might be exercised to promote the interests of ethnic or religious groupings or even of 
a particular gender - but all of this is made less likely by a broad franchise. If it is not - if a 
majority is minded to tyrannise a minority even where that minority is properly represented 
within the democratic process - then it may indicate that the polity in question is not viable as 
a site of republican constitutionalism. This is a problem not of constitutionalism but of 
politics, which only an evolution in political attitudes can undo. Even in a democratic context, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of that people-making quality that the process would confer upon its law-like issue the character of law binding 
upon all as self-given.” Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 1493, at 1502. 
21
 The clearest example, published in the same year as Pettit’s most important work, is Richard Dagger, Civic 
Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism, Oxford University Press (1997).   
22
 Defining virtue in this fashion makes clear why, as alluded to in chapter 1, the republican tradition came into 
tension with the rise of commerce, whose good function was and is thought to rely more or less entirely upon 
such self-interest.  
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however, in which an unimpeachable formal equality exists - where the electorate and their 
representatives are blind to the characteristics which have grounded discriminatory exercises 
of public power in the past - there remains the possibility that money will subvert the 
democratic process. Thus we match our understanding of corruption to that proposed for 
virtue, this latter having been defined in relation to the former. Where the corruption with 
which we concern ourselves concerns money, as here, we encounter another reason for 
identifying virtue and corruption in terms of the presence or absence of self-interest as a 
motivating factor - where an action is taken in return for direct financial gain, it becomes 
much easier to state with confidence that it is done in pursuit of self-interest; there is an 
objectivity to the diagnosis which excludes the possibility that what is being done represents 
nothing more than a good-faith disagreement as to what it is that the public interest requires. 
There is of course a valid distinction to be made between a direct financial inducement 
offered to a public official in order to have him or her act in a certain way and that same 
official acting in a way that is nevertheless of benefit to him or her. This latter cannot be 
counted amongst examples of corruption in the sense used here; to include it is to imply the 
existence of an objective public interest which is not that being pursued and to claim 
privileged access to a person’s internal motivations. It is, furthermore, incompatible with the 
idea of and justification for democracy advanced herein. The corollary of this concession is 
that where a direct financial inducement is offered and accepted, the label of corruption can 
be applied whether or not the individual in question would have acted the way he or she did 
without said inducement. Corruption has no necessary connection to the adherence to, or 
failure to adhere to, the rules laid down. This, then, is the focus of our analysis, tying together 
our themes of property, domination and the virtue and corruption emphasised by older 
incarnations of republican thought, the role of money in the political process and the 
possibility that it is used to motivate some to act to promote their own interest and so 
undermine the neo-republican justification of democracy as a guarantor of (neo-republican) 
freedom. 
 
9.3.3  The irrelevance of the psychological 
 
Against this background understanding of virtue and corruption, we see that Madison’s 
remarks on human nature, quoted above, encapsulate an important idea about the 
psychological presuppositions of political thought. Perspectives on human freedom are 
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invariably strongly influenced by instincts, often unspoken, as to human nature - we have 
seen this in Hobbes’ state of nature device, which is used by him to demonstrate, given man’s 
natural dispositions, the incompatibility of freedom with security. Though Hobbes would 
seem to overstate the case, in reconceptualising the hypothetical state of nature as a state not 
of freedom but of pure horizontal unfreedom we might seem to have accepted the 
fundamentals of his argument and the consequent belief that at least some individuals would 
be liable to prey upon others in the absence of an institutional set-up which prevented them 
from doing so. This broad perspective is mirrored elsewhere in the tradition, which “has 
always taken a pessimistic view of the corruptibility of human beings in positions of power”23 
- evidenced, Pettit notes, by certain dicta of Machiavelli: 
 
“it is necessary for anyone who organizes a republic and establishes laws in it 
to take for granted that all men are evil and that they will always act according 
to the wickedness of their nature, whenever they have the opportunity.”24 
 
But in our response to Machiavelli on corruptibility, as in our response to Hobbes on security, 
the distinctiveness of the neo-republican conception of freedom becomes crucial here. The 
fact that freedom is reduced when one has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with the 
interests of another whether or not that interference takes place means that even if one rejects 
this pessimism - if one believes that individuals in the state of nature would not likely pose a 
physical threat to one another; that individuals holing political power would probably not 
abuse it - there is nevertheless an obligation to put in place the apparatus which would 
prevent it. What matters is whether or not the unwelcome event or events could take place - 
not whether they would in fact take place. Our psychological intuitions are of no consequence. 
We must guard against the corruption of the political process even if we have no reason to 
believe the individuals who feature within it have any propensity to corruption. This is not, of 
course, to say that we can ever hope to exclude absolutely such corruption. As in our earlier 
discussion about how the existence of public power can be justified in terms of the horizontal 
domination does not mean that in its presence no arbitrary interference will take place - a 
need for reform arises when the necessary rules do not exist or are not enforced, not merely 
because some will, inevitably, break them anyway - so too here: the point is not to make sure 
                                                          
23
 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford University Press (1997), at 210. 
24
 Pettit, note 23, at 210. 
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that there is no corruption within the political process, but to make such that what corruption 
takes place involves breaking the rules which exist in order to prevent it. Where it does not 
involve breaking the rules, the potential exists for the democratic process to be subverted by 
self-interest, thereby calling into question the freedom of those who live under it. Having 
clarified this, we have in place the groundwork necessary to assess the adequacy of the rules 
relating to money’s place in democratic politics in the United Kingdom.  
 
9.4 MPs and money 
 
Wealth is, then, the factor which, as well as grounding much horizontal domination, most 
directly threatens the proper conduct of the democratic process. The insidious effect of 
money on democracy does not begin or end at the level of the party - the party’s income and 
expenditure is of course relevant, and to the extent that it dictates, or attempts to dictate,
25
 
policy to its candidates and Parliamentary members, questions of its financial arrangements 
are an obvious focus of attention. The law on party income and expenses has been the subject 
of frequent amendment in recent decades. To the constituency-centred expenditure limits on 
candidates
26
 and third parties
27
 found in the Representation of the People Act 1983 have been 
added a series of nationally determined limits by the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), with limits similarly imposed on both political parties and 
third parties.
28
 PPERA also established the Electoral Commission,
29
 with which political 
parties must be registered in order to field candidates at all major elections.
30
 Key office 
holders must be registered with the Commission,
31
 and it must supply a scheme for its 
financial structure for the Commission’s approval.32 The Treasurer of the party is obliged to 
                                                          
25
 A commonplace of political discourse as indulged in by lawyers and judges particularly sees party discipline 
as dominating the political process, and thereby undermining the political process of accountability on which the 
so-called ‘Westminster model’ of governance is based, encapsulated in Lord Steyn’s ominous invocation of a 
‘complaisant House of Commons’ in Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, at [102]. Empirical work, 
however, strongly disputes the accuracy of this narrative (see, e.g., Philip Cowley, Revolts and Rebellions: 
Parliamentary Voting Under Blair, Politico’s (2002), and his The Rebels: How Blair Mislaid His Majority, 
Politico's (2005)). See also Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, Hart (2005), at 136-139, and Danny 
Nicol, Professor Tomkins’ House of Mavericks, [2006] Public Law 467. 
26
 Representation of the People Act 1983 (ROPA 1983), s.76, as amended. 
27
 ROPA 1983, s.75, as amended. 
28
 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), parts V and VI respectively. 
29
 PPERA, s.1. 
30
 PPERA, s.22. 
31
 PPERA, s.24. 
32
 PPERA, s.26. 
270 
 
submit quarterly reports of donations made to the party,
33
 as well as an annual statement of 
accounts.
34
 The act also places restriction on who may make such donations: individuals are 
required to be on the electoral register and companies must be registered under the companies 
Act and incorporated in a member state of the European Union.
35
 These rules can be 
understood as preventing a situation whereby certain interests are promoted in a manner 
which distorts the democratic process; even where actors are permitted to seek influence viat 
the insertion of money into the process, a scheme of transparency means that it does so in a 
manner of which the public has means to know. The possibility of the exercise of public 
power tracking not the interests of the electorate but of a property-holding subset thereof is 
thus circumscribed, though not wholly excluded. 
 
PPERA’s reforms have already been demonstrated insufficient. Most notably, the ‘cash for 
Honours’ scandal, which saw a number of individuals who had previously made high-value 
loans to the Labour Party nominated for peerages, lead to the amendment of the rules on the 
making of loans to political parties so as to close the loophole which meant that loans at a 
commercial rate, did not have to be declared.
36
 Parties’ on-going and ever-increasing need for 
funds suggests that they will continue to push the boundaries set by law as far as possible. A 
move to public-funding, perhaps in return for a cap on donations, has been suggested as a 
solution.
37
  In all of this, the role of trade union affiliation fees remains controversial, and the 
most likely stumbling block for reform,
38
 with those who do not rely upon them attempting to 
have them treated in law as equivalent to private donations by individuals and corporations 
and those who do arguing that there exists a qualitative difference which justifies differential 
legal treatment. On the basis of the account offered earlier, a neo-republican analysis would 
support such a differential treatment, in recognition of the fact that individuals who are 
disadvantaged by their relative lack of wealth should be able, where necessary, to act in 
concert to attempt to redress the imbalance which exists in relation to those who own 
property: funding by trade unions promotes rather than inhibits the exercise of power in the 
                                                          
33
 PPERA, s.62. 
34
 PPERA, s.42. 
35
 PPERA, s.54. 
36
 Part 4A of the 2000 Act, inserted by s.61 of the Electoral Administration Act 2006. 
37
 See, e.g., The Committee on Standards in Public Life, Political Party Finance: Ending the Big Donor 
Culture, (Cm 8208, 2011) at 12, recommending a cap of £10,000 per donor per year. 
38
 Committee on Standards in Public Life, note 23, at 12, recommending the payment of trade union affiliation 
fees be subject to the standard £10,000 cap, unless the unions chose to move to an opt-in system for trade union, 
with fees paid to any political party representing the number of members who had opted in, and not being 
capable of being held back for any reason.  
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interests of those who are horizontally dominated. In sum, considered at the party level, the 
role of money in politics - both receipts and expenditure - is heavily regulated, and is the 
subject of considerable journalistic interest. This is not to say that we should not seek to 
reduce further the role of money in the process - we should, as far as practicably possible, for 
the very possibility of it being used to prevent the exercise of public power from tracking the 
interests of those against whom that power is exercised is, we have seen, enough to render 
those who do not have money unfree in relation to those who do - but that the role of money 
here is not yet so damaging as to justify the belief that party finance reform is the solution to 
the endemic problems of the political process, as has recently been argued in the American 
context.
39
 
 
9.4.1 Money and individuals 
 
At the level of the individual politician, attention has been focused in particular on the 
acquisition of public funds through illegal or immoral means - a corruption whose sole 
beneficiary is the individual himself, not directly calculated to distort the democratic process 
and so not necessarily sufficient to undermine the neo-republican justification of democracy. 
Most prominently, the expenses scandal of 2009 marked a new low point in public opinion of 
Parliament and Parliamentarians in recent decades.
40
 The combination of the widespread 
abuse of allowances and expenses, the brazenness of some of the claims made and the fact 
that the misuse of funds served no purpose other than the enrichment of MPs (and 
occasionally members of their families)
41
 provoked backlash which saw many MPs lose their 
seats at the 2010 election, others imprisoned,
42
 and precipitated a hurried overhaul of a failing 
system into another that has not demonstrated the sort of durability that one would expect 
from well-designed reform.
43
 Responses to the affair indicated that the public in general 
considered it both more outrageous than equivalent scandals where the aim was to raise funds 
for the party, and as justifying their cynical view of politics.  
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 Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress - and a Plan to Stop It, Twelve (2011).  
40
 See Alexandra Kelso, Parliament on its Knees: MPs Expenses and the Crisis of Transparency at Westminster, 
(2009) Political Quarterly 329. 
41
 Though the most prominent case of such intra-familial generosity predated the main expenses scandal: see 
Committee on Standards and Privileges, Conduct of Mr Derek Conway, (HC 2007-08, 280) on the conduct of 
Derek Conway. 
42
 Those convicted included four MPs (David Chaytor, Eric Illsley, Elliot Morley, Jim Devine) and two peers 
(Lord Taylor of Warwick and Paul White, Baron Hanningfield). 
43
 The reform was effected by the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, itself significantly amended by the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. 
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It is difficult to reconcile the level of public anger that the expenses scandal attracted with the 
relative lack of concern for the more general and on-going enrichment of MPs from other, 
private, sources. The theme of this thesis is that, measured by their breadth, the most 
important relationships of unfreedom encountered by the average private individual are not 
those in which he or she stands before the state, but rather his or her private relationships. 
Those private relationships, and so the freedom of any one individual in relation to any other, 
are structured by private law, which is itself the product of constitutional - most importantly 
political - processes. The democratic aspect of the constitution derives its importance, in this 
view, from its centrality to the question of how private power, and so human freedom will be 
distributed: it is the outcome of democratic decision-making which determines when, and 
under what circumstances, the State’s coercive apparatus will be deployed. Public law is the 
midwife of private law, which is itself in large part determinative of the extent of individual 
freedom. Enrichment from private sources, like enrichment from public funds, indicative of 
action motivated by self-interest (and so falls on the wrong side of the virtue/corruption 
divide we have identified), but due to the possibility that the public power being exercised is 
thereby not merely neglected but in fact distorted, corruption of the former sort is freedom-
reducing in a way that the latter, which attracts greater public opprobrium, is not. 
 
9.4.2 Relevant offences 
 
The identity of the specific offences for which MPs might be liable if acting corruptly was for 
many years a source of some considerable confusion. Though misbehaviour in or misuse of a 
public office is an offence at common law,
44
 MPs are (probably) not holders of public office 
and so not subject to it.
45
 Though use is still made of the offence, a former Director of Public 
                                                          
44
 The elements of the offence are restated in Attorney General’s Reference (No.3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 
868. 
45
 E.g., the report of the Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life in 1976 stated that “nor does 
membership of Parliament, as such, constitute public office for the purposes of the common law.” (Cmnd 6524, 
1976), at [307]. Zellick disagrees with what he describes as the ‘virtual unanimity’ in this belief: see Graham 
Zellick, Bribery of Members of Parliament and the Criminal Law, [1979] Public Law 31 at 32 and 34-40. See 
also Dawn Oliver, Regulating the Conduct of MPs. The British Experience of Corruption, (1997) 45 Political 
Studies 539, at 541. Oliver quotes from the unreported 1992 case R v Currie, Jurasek, Brooks, Greenway and 
Plasser Railway Machinery (GB) Ltd. The judgement of the court can now be found in A.W. Bradley, 
Parliamentary Privilege and the Law of Corruption, [1998] Public Law 356. The judge directed the jury to 
reach a not guilty verdict in relation to some defendants, while no evidence was offered against the Member, 
who was therefore also acquitted.  
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Prosecutions described it as having been “dredged up from the Middle Ages.”46  Despite their 
being front and centre in terms of public visibility, as well as amongst those public officials 
whose wrongdoing could do most damage to public and private interests alike, the common 
law could not cope with a crooked MP with the same deftness with which it routinely deals 
with a corrupt policeman. This is problematic - even though an MP is one legislator amongst 
hundreds, the potential reach of his or her corruption, via legislation of general application 
and semi-permanent duration, is far greater than that of the average public servant. 
 
Compounding this, it was unclear if the House of Commons was a public body for the 
purposes of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and if MPs were ‘agents’ for the 
purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.
47
 Only more specific offences, such as 
the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925, enacted following a Royal Commission 
Report into the sale of Honours by Lloyd George, which makes it an offence to sell “the grant 
of a dignity or title of honour to any person,” were unambiguous in their application to 
certain forms of corruption. Even that, it has been suggested, “simply regularized the 
practice” to which it was supposed to put an end.48 To date, the only conviction under the 
1925 Act has been that of Lloyd George’s ‘fixer’ Maundy Gregory in 1933; prosecutions 
were considered but not brought in relation to the 2005 ‘cash for Honours’ affair.49 Given that 
the granting of honours is not particularly central to the exercise or distribution of public 
power and even the loans for peerages scandal, which implicated the exercise of legislative 
functions via the right to a seat in the House of Lords, does so only minimally, it is to be 
regretted that it is the focus of the clearest legislative attempt to prevent corruption. The 
symbolism of this focus upon the superficial is important. 
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 Quoted in the Report of the  Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill (2002-2003, HL  157, HC 705), at 
[45]. 
47
 See, e.g., Jacob Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted, Cambridge University Press (2010), at 84, and Law 
Commission, Reforming Bribery (Law Com No 313, 2008), at 67, note 20.  
48
 Alan Doig, Political Corruption in the United Kingdom, in Martin Bull and James Newell (Eds.), Corruption 
in Contemporary Politics, Palgrave Macmillan (2003), at 178. 
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 For further detail on the Gregory case, see Committee on Standards in Public Life, The Funding of Political 
Parties, (Cm 4057, 1998), chapter 14. Lloyd George sold “twenty-six peerages, 130 baronetcies, 481 
knighthoods and over 25,000 OBEs until the racket finally crumbled on the award of honours… to a convicted 
food hoarder, a war-time profiteer, a crook, a ‘technical’ traitor, and a tax-evader.” Alan Doig, Westminster 
Babylon: Sex, Money and Scandal in British Politics, Allison & Busby (1990), at 41. 
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9.4.3 The Bribery Act 2010 
 
Though the criminal law’s attention has long been focused elsewhere, the previous situation 
of unacceptable uncertainty with regards to the relevant offences no longer prevails. Many of 
the various statutory and common law offences of bribery were replaced by a consolidated 
Bribery Act 2010, which repealed, inter alia, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 
and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.
50
 The Bribery Act applies explicitly to those “in 
public service of the Crown.”51 From the perspective of those receiving a bribe, an offence is 
committed if a person: 
 
- “agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage intending that, 
in consequence, a relevant function or activity should be performed 
improperly” whether by himself or another;52 
 
- “requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage,” and  
“the request, agreement or acceptance itself constitutes the improper 
performance” by that person of a relevant function or activity;53 
 
- “requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage as a 
reward for the improper performance” (whether by that person or another) 
of a relevant function or activity;
54
 
 
- in anticipation of or in consequence of “requesting, agreeing to receive or 
accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant function or activity is 
                                                          
50
 The Nolan Commission suggested in 1995 that the Law Commission should examine the law on bribery. It 
did so, and published proposals for reform in a 1998 paper (Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption, (Law 
Com No 248, 1998). A white paper based on those proposals (Home Office, Raising Standards and Upholding 
Integrity: the Prevention of Corruption, (Cm 4759, 2000)) preceded the publication of draft legislation (Home 
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Following a consultation exercise, the project was returned to the Law Commission, which published its report 
Reforming Bribery (Law Com No. 313, 2008) several years later.  
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 Bribery Act 2010, s.16 
52
 s.2(3). 
53
 s.2(4). 
54
 s.2(5). 
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performed improperly” by that person or by another person at the first 
persons’ request or with his assent or acquiescence.55 
 
A ‘relevant function’ includes “a function of a public nature” alongside those connected to 
businesses, those performed in the course of one’s employment and those performed on 
behalf of a body of persons,
56
 provided it also meets one of three conditions: that it is 
expected to be performed in good faith, or impartially, or that by virtue of performing it, the 
person who does so is in a position of trust.
57
 The expectation test is objective: it is “a test of 
what a reasonable person in the United Kingdom would expect in relation to the performance 
of the type of function or activity concerned.”58 A relevant function or activity which is so by 
virtue of the expectation that it be performed in good faith or impartially is performed 
improperly if that expectation is not met in the performance of the activity, or if it is not 
performed at all and such failure is a breach of the expectation of good faith or impartiality.
59
 
If we take the core case of a bribe in a Parliamentary context, where an MP is given a cash 
sum in order to make a certain speech in the course of a debate, or vote in a particular fashion 
in a division, it seems clear that it would be caught by the Bribery Act 2010, according to the 
following process of reasoning: an MP is performing a relevant function - one of a public 
nature, regarding which there is an expectation that it be performed in good faith - in 
contributing to debates and voting in the House. If he or she accepts a bribe (a ‘financial 
advantage’) in anticipation of performing that function improperly, in this case meaning not 
in good faith - so perhaps in accordance with the briber’s instructions, rather than the MP’s 
own conscience or understanding of the public good - then the fourth offence outlined above 
has been committed. If the neo-republican focus on excluding the arbitrary exercise of public 
power requires legal rules which prohibit outright bribery - the most obvious manner by 
which the exercise of power might become arbitrary - we seem now to have, just about, 
arrived at the necessary point, at least in term of the rules which exist in law. 
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 s.2(6). 
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9.5 Parliamentary privilege and the criminal law 
 
The long-standing lack of clarity which predated the enactment of the Bribery Act was not 
restricted to the question of what offences might apply: similar confusion existed as to the 
possibility of prosecuting offences related to their Parliamentary role, in relation to which 
certain immunities have long existed under the general heading of Parliamentary privilege. 
The relevant immunity is not general. MPs have no general privilege of freedom from arrest 
that will be permitted to prevent the administration of justice
60
 nor a general immunity from 
either criminal or civil prosecution.
 61
 Previously, they enjoyed immunity from being 
impleaded, meaning that no civil action could be raised against them, but by means of a series 
of four statutes, beginning with the Privilege of Parliament Act 1700 and ending with the 
Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770, this privilege was truncated and finally abolished.
62
 Left 
intact was the privilege of immunity from civil arrest during sittings of Parliament and for 
forty days either side, but such immunity was reduced to a state of minimal importance 
following the abolition of imprisonment for debt by the Debtors Act 1869. 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of any sort of general immunity, the privileges of Parliament are 
such that doubts have been expressed as to possibility of prosecuting MPs for offences which 
relate to their duties. Some of these were dispelled by the decision of the Supreme Court in R 
v Chaytor.
63
 Therein, two claims were advanced as to the existence of a parliamentary 
privilege which would exclude the jurisdiction of the Crown Court to try three MPs for 
charges of theft by false accounting arising out of the 2009 expenses scandal. The first of 
these was that to permit jurisdiction would violate article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, which 
provides that the “Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not 
to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament”64; the second that an 
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 Erskine May, note 8, at 245. 
61
 Erskine May, note 8, at 245-9. 
62
 The interpretation of the 1770 Act was the subject of a reference by the Queen to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council under s.4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833. The reference was made at the request of the 
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treated the issuing of a writ against an MP in respect of a speech of his in Parliament as a breach of its privilege 
- negatively: Re Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770 [1958] A.C. 331. The circumstances are discussed in S. A. de 
Smith, Parliamentary Privilege and the Bill of Rights, (1958) Modern Law Review 465. 
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 [2010] UKSC 52. For the prior expression of  such doubts see, e.g., Rowbottom, note 47, at 84. 
64
 The ‘cash for questions’ affair, discussed below, had as one of its stranger consequences the enactment of a 
statutory rule which permits someone whose actions would otherwise be covered by privilege to waive that 
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older privilege of Parliament - its “exclusive cognisance” - gives each House sole jurisdiction 
to manage and resolve its own affairs, even though it has been clear for many centuries that 
the Commons has no power to try a criminal offence.
65
 The jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
to rule on the existence and extent of Parliament’s privilege is well-established.66  
 
In Chaytor, a panel of nine judges in the Supreme Court unanimously rejected both claims to 
privilege and confirmed the jurisdiction of the Crown Court over the conduct alleged. Lord 
Phillips noted that though privilege is absolute,
67
 there exist sound policy reasons for giving it 
a narrow scope and it should not be interpreted so as to exclude the possibility of the House 
referring to the police criminal offences potentially committed in relation to the conduct of 
administration in Parliament.
68
  Lord Rodger held that the issue was reducible to the question 
of whether the alleged offences were an example of “ordinary crimes”69 and concluded that 
they were indeed, for there was “nothing in the allegations against the appellants which 
relates in any way to the legislative or deliberative processes of the House of Commons or of 
its Members, however widely construed.”70 Significant, but not dispositive, was the fact that 
the House had not itself sought to assert its privilege in this case, but had instead cooperated 
with the authorities.
71
 The Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, enacted following the expenses 
scandal, deals with the issue by providing that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed by 
any court in the United Kingdom as affecting Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689.”72 The 
decision in Chaytor would therefore seem to go some way to ensuring that not only are the 
tools necessary to exclude corruption in place, but that their application is not thwarted by the 
legitimate constitutional need to protect the legislature from the interference of the courts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
privilege for the purposes of a defamation action: Defamation Act 1996, s.13. The rule was enacted to permit 
Neil Hamilton MP to pursue his ill-fated libel action against the Guardian newspaper. 
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9.5.1 Bribery and the decision in Chaytor 
 
Rather unfortunately, however, the applicability of the decision in Chaytor to any potential 
bribery prosecution under the 2010 Act is not self-evident. That there remains doubt on this 
point is a function of the tortured process of legislative reform in this area. The long gestation 
of the Bribery Act saw the question of bribery's relationship to privilege considered at many 
points. In 1999, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege recommended that 
“[m]embers of both Houses should be brought within the criminal law of bribery by 
legislation containing a provision to the effect that evidence relating to an offence committed 
or alleged to be committed under the relevant sections shall be admissible notwithstanding 
article 9 [of the Bill of Rights].”73 The significance of such a change was downplayed, as 
“there will be few prosecutions of members, because we believe there are few instances of 
corruption of members... [and] in only a small proportion of any prosecutions will it be 
necessary to question proceedings in Parliament.”74 The former point demonstrates a certain 
complacency, perhaps encouraged by the difficulty of identifying an offense which clearly 
applied to such corruption. If so, it is useful to underline once more that the need for clearly 
applicable, enforceable, law is independent of whether actual corruption is assumed to, or 
does, exist.  
 
A clause to a similar effect contained in draft legislation in 2003 was criticised by a Joint 
Committee report, which accepted the necessity of clarifying the relationship between 
privilege and bribery but not the form in which it was proposed to do so.
75
 The bill was, 
however, abandoned and the matter left unresolved. When the project returned to the House 
in the form of the draft Bribery Bill in 2008, included was a clause which would have made 
“the word or conduct of an MP or peer admissible in proceedings for a bribery offence under 
the Bill where the MP or peer is a defendant or co-defendant notwithstanding any enactment 
or rule of law including Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689.”76 A Joint Committee report 
noted, however, that the Parliamentary Standards Bill (now the Parliamentary Standards Act 
2009) which was proceeding through Parliament contemporaneously contained a clause 
relating to privilege which dealt with the same issue in a different manner and that, given the 
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importance of the issue, a piecemeal reform was not acceptable.
77
 It therefore reaffirmed the 
conclusion of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in 1999 that specific legislation 
should be brought forward to confirm the scope of the privilege.
78
 The clause in the 
Parliamentary Standards Bill did not make it into law, and given what has followed, it is 
unfortunate that the decision was taken to exclude the clarification from the 2010 Act. 
 
A Bill reforming and clarifying the privilege was promised in the Queen’s Speech in 2010 
and a Green paper published in April 2012, as much because of concerns about Member’s 
statements in the House breaching so-called super-injunctions as because of privilege’s 
contribution to the difficulty of prosecuting MPs.
79
 The Green Paper consists of draft clauses 
rather than an entire Bill, but one of the clauses provides that: 
 
“No enactment or rule of law preventing the freedom of speech and debates or 
proceedings in Parliament being impeached or questioned in any court or 
place out of Parliament is to prevent any evidence being admissible in 
proceedings for an offence.”80 
 
In light of the fact that, applied generally, such a clause would undo undermine article 9, a 
draft schedule contained a list of offences to which the clause would not apply, amongst 
which is misconduct in a public office.
81
 The offence is excluded because of its uncertain 
scope, which might permit police to substitute it for one of the other excluded offences and so 
subvert the will of Parliament, which would be particularly undesirable given that the offence 
attracts a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
82
 Following the invocation of misconduct 
in a public office as part of the Damian Green affair,
83
 the Committee on Issues of Privilege 
recommended that the Law Commission be asked to revisit the offence - it had previously 
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recommended that the offence be put on a statutory footing.
84
 The Law Commission is due to 
report in 2016.
85
 Bribery under the 2010 Act is not excluded from the scope of the clause. 
 
The consultation started by the Green Paper closed on 30 September 2012 and it is to be 
hoped that reform follows imminently. In the meantime, the House of Lords has called for the 
appointment of a Joint Committee,
86
 and the Commons has agreed.
87
 The Joint Committee is 
to report on 25
th
 of April 2013. Until an explicit statement of the limits on privilege is enacted, 
however, we are left in a deeply unsatisfactory state of flux. Much of the old law was swept 
away by the Bribery Act 2010, which provides clarity as to the nature of the applicable 
offences which was previously lacking; clarity which co-exists with uncertainty about its 
relationship with privilege, the question being whether or not it is possible to carry out a 
persecution for bribery of an MP under the 2010 Act without moving from an Article 9 
compliant trial (as in Chaytor) to one which, in the words of Lord Rodger requires an 
investigation into what he described as the “legislative or deliberative processes of the House 
of Commons.”88 Given that the lack of any relation between the offences in Chaytor and 
these processes was central to the decision that the privilege did not apply, it seems likely that 
a bribery prosecution would be held by the courts to avoid a violation of privilege only if it 
could similarly be executed without reference to (more specifically, without ‘calling into 
question’) proceedings in Parliament. 
 
9.5.2 Proceedings in Parliament 
 
The question therefore arises of how to understand the term ‘proceeding in Parliament’ as 
used in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. Its primary meaning, Erskine May suggests, is “some 
formal action, usually a decision, taken by the House in its collective capacity,”89 while a 
Member takes part in proceedings “usually by speech, but also by various recognized forms 
of formal action, such as voting, giving notice of a motion, or presenting a petition or report 
from a committee, most of such actions being time-saving substitutes for speaking."
90
 Not 
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everything done in Parliament is a ‘proceeding in Parliament,’ though Parliament itself has 
taken a wide view of the matter: a 1939 Select Committee held it to include “everything said 
or done by a member in the exercise of his functions as a member in a committee of either 
House, as well as everything said or done in either House in the transaction of parliamentary 
business.”91 Further, “cases may be easily imagined of communications between one Member 
and another or between a Member and a minister so closely related to some matter pending in 
or expected to be brought before the House that, although they do not take place in the 
Chamber or a committee room, they form part of the business of the House.”92 The decision 
of the Committee of Privileges in 1957 that this definition was correct and therefore a letter 
written by an MP to a Minister criticising the administration of a nationalised industry was 
rejected by the House and described by de Smith as an “essay in liberal interpretation.”93 The 
showing of a film in Parliament was considered by the Committee of Privileges to not 
constitute a proceeding in Parliament.
94
 Various committees have recommended statutory 
clarification of the question.
95
 The most recent, prior to the current attempt, was that of the 
Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in 1999, which recommended legislation based 
upon the Australian Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987. 
 
Until legislation is introduced, the question is one of statutory interpretation and so the 
province of the courts
96
 (paying careful attention, however, to what is said on the matter by 
Parliament)
97
 who have considered the matter at various points.
98
 In Chaytor, Lord Rodger, 
reviewing the authorities, concluded that the activity at issue there, the submission of claims 
for expenses did "not form part of, nor is it incidental to, the core or essential business of 
Parliament, which consists of collective deliberation and decision making,” and is therefore 
“an incident of the administration of Parliament; it is not part of the proceedings in 
Parliament.”99 The same cannot be said, however, of what we have described as a core case 
of bribery which would certainly be caught by the 2010 Act: where an MP accepts a bribe 
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and in consequence votes for a certain result - a vote in Parliament will surely be part of its 
“collective deliberation and decision making.” 
 
A way round this impasse is offered by remarks made when this question was considered as a 
prelude to the trial of Harry Greenway MP for common law bribery. Buckley J suggested that 
it would be possible to prove the charge without reference to proceedings in Parliament, for 
the corrupt act is complete when the bribe is taken:  
 
“If, as is alleged here, a bribe is given and taken by a member of Parliament, 
to use his position dishonestly… the crime is complete. It owes nothing to any 
speech, debate or proceedings in Parliament. Proof of the element of 
corruption in the transaction is another and quite separate consideration. 
Privilege might well prevent any inquiry by a court into Parliamentary debates 
or proceedings. However, it is not a necessary ingredient of the crime that the 
bribe worked. A jury will usually be asked to infer corruption from the nature 
of and circumstances in which the gift was given. I cannot see that Article 9 in 
any way prevents that.”100 
 
Though that trial collapsed and any prosecution now would be under the 2010 Act these dicta 
point the way forward for prosecution of the offence, outlined above, of accepting a bribe. 
Three of the four offences established in s.2 of the Act  relate to the ‘requesting, agreeing to 
receive or accepting’ of a financial or other advantage - if this is done under the conditions 
laid down, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the ‘relevant function or activity’ is indeed 
improperly performed.
101
 It seems the best understanding is that prosecutions of these 
specific offences will be possible without contravening the Bill of Rights. Only the fourth 
offence defines the offence in terms of the relevant function or activity having been, in actual 
fact, performed improperly. Only under that provision would the prosecution of an MP 
require evidence to be lead as to his or her conduct. If that conduct relates to activity in the 
House which fall within the concept of ‘proceedings in Parliament’ then the Bill of Rights 
would preclude it. 
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Nevertheless, these comments are necessarily speculative, and it is remarkable that we find 
ourselves in a situation whereby the major piece of legislation which applies (for the first 
time unambiguously) to alleged corrupt acts by MPs cannot be said to clearly permit their 
prosecution without violating the Bill of Rights. The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices 
Act 1889 and the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1906 and 1916 having been repealed by the 
Bribery Act, we cannot even be sure if the offence next most likely to be used to guard 
against corruption, misconduct in a public office, applies to MPs and, even it does, its 
shortcomings are widely recognised. Given that a corrupt act in Parliament is as potentially 
relevant to individual freedom as is overreach of public power, distorting the relation between 
man and man in making it more or less possible for an individual to call upon public power in 
relations with the other, such questions are of central rather than peripheral importance: they 
are questions of freedom, and are to be treated as such. They may not possess the glamour of 
fundamental rights issues, but are for that very reason worthy of attention: that the bizarre 
lacuna identified above has been permitted to persist indicates that they will not attract 
sufficient attention in the natural course of political reform in order to be remedied. We have 
said that what renders unfree within the neo-republican tradition is not the fact of arbitrary 
interference, but the possibility of it. One is unfree if one’s interests could be interfered with 
on such a basis, whether or not this interference takes place. Democratic mechanisms prevent 
arbitrariness, and their subversion potentially restores it. That the law relating to the 
corruption of legislators is so uncertain might, from this point of view, be considered to 
render unfree in that it implies the absence of clearly defined legal obstacles to the subversion 
of the democratic process via the legislator’s pursuit of his or her self-interest and so the 
exposure of the citizen to the arbitrary deployment of public power against him or her. If it 
does not render unfree it is only due to the operation of non-legal mechanisms which also 
contribute to, without necessarily achieving in full, the task of ensuring that public power is 
not exercised in a manner designed to promote the self-interest of those exercising it. We turn 
to those now. 
 
9.6 Parliamentary rules 
 
Alongside the criminal law, Parliament sets its own standards, both for the prevention of 
bribery and to regulate the acceptance of (lawful) payments to its Members. We can call these 
conventions to indicate that they are enforced politically, rather than legally, even though 
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they, like many modern constitutional conventions, are in most cases the result of specific 
declarations and written rules rather than the organic, temporally established conventions 
which are a distinctive feature of the constitution. Infractions of the relevant rules are dealt 
with as contempt and may result in expulsion from the House. If the system works to 
augment or, where necessary, make good the failings identified in, the criminal law, all is not 
necessarily lost. A consideration of some of the cases is therefore both necessary and 
instructive.  
 
In 1695, in response to him having accepted a payment of 1000 guineas from the City of 
London for the promotion of an Orphan’s Bill,102 the Speaker of the Commons, Sir John 
Trevor, was expelled. The House resolved that "the offer of money or other advantage to any 
Member of Parliament for the promoting of any matter whatsoever, depending or to be 
transacted in Parliament, is a high crime and misdemeanour."
103
 Also expelled was the 
chairman of the Committee set up to consider the Bill. The affair precipitated an enquiry into 
a slush fund which the East India Company used to make payments to those willing to help it 
retain its statutory monopoly.
104
 The resolution put in place a sanction that was “as rarely and 
arbitrarily applied as were other standards concerning personal conduct.”105  
 
The 1695 resolution remains in force and is quoted in the appendix of the Guide to the Rules 
relating to the Conduct of Members along with an 1858 resolution which covers the corollary 
of such an offer - the misconduct of the MP in acceptance in accepting it: "It is contrary to the 
usage and derogatory to the dignity of this House, that any of its Members should bring 
forward, promote or advocate, in this House, any proceeding or measure in which he may 
have acted or been concerned for or in consideration of any pecuniary fee or reward."
106
 The 
fact that the resolution relating to misconduct of the Member as bribee postdates that which 
highlights the misdeed of the briber has a certain symbolic resonance and is in keeping with 
the impression given by a consideration of some of the 20
th
 century cases on contempt. These 
relate principally to those attempting to influence Members, rather than the Members 
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permitting themselves to be influenced, or at least giving that impression. In 1943, a letter 
sent to Tom Smith MP by the National Marketing Company with a cheque for £5 so as to 
permit him to attend that company’s trial for the purchase of fuel economisers without a 
license and then, perhaps, to raise that matter in the House, was reported to the Committee of 
Privileges. The Committee's report concluded that the matter was not one of contempt, 
however ill-advised.
107
  In 1945, a complaint was made to the Committee by George Reakes, 
Member for Wallasey about a letter he had received from a Donald Henderson, offering a 
cheque for 100 guineas to his constituency association if Reakes were to help resolve certain 
“farming difficulties” to his satisfaction. The Committee held the conduct objectionable but 
that it did not constitute contempt.
108
 
 
Periodic reviews into specific instances of misbehaviour by those inside of or outside 
Parliament were accompanied by broader inquiries, which time and again failed to bring 
about the broader change in attitudes and practices that the facts they uncovered suggested 
was required. In 1948 the Lynskey Tribunal had reported on the behaviour of Sidney Stanley, 
who had been providing hospitality to junior and senior government figures with the intention 
of corrupting them.
109
 Lynskey has been described as the “reaffirmation of the integrity of the 
British Civil Service and of the political morality of the member of Parliament,”110 but, less 
positively, as having been “criticized for the lack of specific criminal charges, lack of appeal 
against its conclusions, the nature and relevance of the evidence, and the procedures used.”111 
Following the report of the tribunal, a committee, proposed by Attlee, examined wider issues 
of corruption in connection with lobby. While acknowledging the possibility of corruption, 
the committee was able to offer as a solution “only vigilance and good sense.”112 One need 
not be a particularly pessimistic observer of human psychology to believe that vigilance and 
good sense are likely to prove insufficient in this regard. To rely upon them in the place of 
actual mechanisms for the prevention of corruption is to demonstrate a reckless indifference 
to the freedom of the citizenry. 
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Again in 1974, a Royal Commission on Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Salmon
113
 
was convened, in partial response to the Poulson affair,
114
 which “became synonymous with 
entrenched and extensive networks of local government corruption and influence-peddling 
although it also encompassed Parliament and several public sector organizations.”115 It had 
already provoked an inquiry focusing upon these issues in the context of local government 
(the Redcliffe-Maud inquiry)
116
 and two Parliamentary inquiries. Between them, the Salmon 
and Redcliffe-Maud inquiries produced “a long list of eminently sensible, if mundane, 
recommendations,” of which few were implemented, and even those which were 
implemented “were not implemented systematically, or monitored later for effectiveness or 
review.”117 In fact, they were not even debated in the House of Commons, much as Lynskey 
had not been debated at all.
118
 The picture which emerges is of political system whose 
failings were brought to its attention with sufficient frequency that a failure to put them right 
was negligent rather than careless. Though none of the modern examples are particularly 
egregious, this seems to result as much from chance as from anything else. It was certainly 
not the result of a culture firmly committed to ensuring the purity of the democratic process; 
in neo-republican terms, to ensuring the non-arbitrary exercise of public power to the end of 
ensuring freedom. A political culture reckless as to the possibility of corruption leaves 
citizens vertically unfree by definition and potentially horizontally unfree by virtue of its 
outputs; the pursuit of the non-domination ideal reconnects us to the old republican concern 
for virtue and its antithesis, corruption. 
 
9.7 The need for a register of interests 
 
An on-going difficulty in identifying the operation of an improper influence in the conduct of 
politics was the absence of transparency as to extra-parliamentary sources of income. The 
arrival of a well-developed system of disclosure of financial interests was a long time coming, 
hampered by the drawing of unsustainable distinctions between what was and was not 
relevant to the integrity of parliamentary processes. In 1947, the Committee of Privileges 
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issued a report into the case of W.J. Brown, MP for Rugby and Parliamentary General 
Secretary of the Civil Service Clerical Association, a trade union.
119
 Brown’s written contract 
with the Association permitted him to terminate the contract with 6 months’ notice, but there 
was no parallel provision for the union. When it desired to do so, therefore, the Association 
was required to enter into negotiations with Brown as to suitable terms, an action which was 
reported to the Committee of Privileges as indicating an improper attempt to influence Brown 
in the exercise of his duties. The Committee split on Party lines - the Labour Members voting 
as a majority that the agreement had not fettered Brown’s complete freedom of action, and a 
draft report, supported by the non-Labour members, concluding that improper pressure had 
been brought to bear. The Committee’s report declared that “an outside body is... not 
entitled... to seek to control the conduct of a Member or to punish him for what he has done 
as a Member.”120 On debate in Parliament, the motion introduced by the Chair again saw a 
split on Party lines, the House resolving that: 
 
“it is inconsistent with the dignity of the House, with the duty of a Member to 
his constituents, and with the maintenance of the privilege of freedom of 
speech, for any Member of this House to enter into any contractual agreement 
with an outside body, controlling or limiting the Member’s complete 
independence and freedom of action in Parliament or stipulating that he shall 
act in any way as the representative of such outside body in regard to any 
matters to be transacted in Parliament.”121 
 
The principle is a sound one, but its terms leave little room for an explanation as to why else 
one might wish to offer money and, indeed, why an MP might be willing to accept it: if there 
can be no contractual limitation on the Member’s freedom of action, nor can the Member act 
as a representative of an outside body, the only space left is one based on nods and winks, 
benefiting from the plausible deniability which exists in the absence of a binding agreement. 
Attempts in 1975 by the Yorkshire area Council of the National Union of Miners to 
determine how MPs which it sponsored should vote on certain issues by threatening to 
withdraw its sponsorship should they vote against its interests were held to constitute “a 
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serious contempt, which represented a continuing threat to Members’ freedom of speech and 
action.”122 This is part of a pattern whereby rules on contempt were applied to trade unions 
with what seems to be, at least in retrospect, more vigour when compared to their application 
to more general business interests. Members whose freedom of action was left intact - those, 
perhaps, who accepted money offered with the aim of achieving an objective which they 
were already minded to promote, but now did so with greater zeal - were unaffected by this 
stance. It was at best, therefore, only a partial solution to the problem of insufficient 
safeguards against corruption.  
 
The rules were evolving, but this regime left major gaps into which money could flow. In 
1961, an article by the serving MP Francis Noel-Baker in Parliamentary Affairs had drawn 
attention to what he described as a ‘grey zone’ which had developed in the regulation of 
MPs’ affairs.123 Though MPs were being paid (as they have been since 1911)124 Noel-Baker 
opined that the failure of Parliament to provide the facilities necessary to fulfil their presumed 
role left MPs with an unfortunate choice - “they must either do all their routine work 
themselves, with extreme inefficiency; or they must earn money from outside Parliament to 
pay for the facilities they need.”125 In these circumstances, the offer of outside sources of 
income were becoming more and more attractive - “particularly if they envolve fees, retainers 
or expenses without an obligation to keep ‘office hours’ and demand no special 
qualifications. Even more attractive to some Members is a private appointment (as ‘advisor’ 
or ‘consultant’) that need not become generally known.”126 The result was a new form of 
largely invisible (and unprovable) political corruption which existing rules on declaration 
could not prevent, not applying to questions in Parliament, or MPs’ correspondence and - 
worst of all where MPs were PR men with a single business relationship through which they 
provided services to a range of clients - not obliging the disclosure of a relationship between 
one’s employer and a specific client with an interest in the matter at hand.127 Among his 
proposals for reform, Noel-Baker numbered improved salaries and facilities for MPs, but also 
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the introduction of a register “whereby each Member would be required to make regular, 
public returns of all fees received for services to business or other interests.”128 The solution, 
was not to close the gap between the unfettered discretion appropriate to a democratic 
representative and the sorts of contractual obligations which were beyond the pale even for 
the parliamentary authorities, but merely to make its contents visible. This preference for 
transparency over prohibition has, we shall see, been the animating principle of the majority 
of modern reforms designed to address the problem Noel-Baker identified. It is not clear, 
however, that we it meets the criteria we have previously; that it is sufficient to exclude the 
arbitrary exercise of power which would undermine the role of democracy in ensuring that 
public power does not render unfree. 
 
9.7.1 The introduction of the Register  
 
When change came, then, it took the form of the introduction of such a register. In 1969 a 
Select Committee on Members' Interests (Declaration), the Strauss Committee, had been 
convened and rejected the idea.
129
 It did, however, suggest that the existing conventions as to 
the declaration of interests during debates in the House be put into a resolution of the House 
so as to make them mandatory. Its conclusions were never debated. Eventually, a 1974 
resolution required that “in any debate or proceeding of the House or its committees or 
transactions or communications which a Member may have with other Members or with 
Ministers or servants of the Crown, he shall disclose any relevant pecuniary interest or 
benefit of whatever nature, whether direct or indirect, that he may have had, may have or may 
be expecting to have.” 130  A register was set up and first published in 1975. A Select 
Committee on Members’ Interests was appointed - between 1976 and 1989 it received only 
three complaints.
131
 For four years, however, from 1976-80, the Committee declined to 
publish the Register as a response to the House’s unwillingness to punish a group of MPs, led 
by Enoch Powell, who refused to make the necessary disclosures.
132
 A scheme which on its 
face represented a cleaning up of Francis-Baker’s ‘grey zone’ was therefore hampered by the 
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unwillingness of the House as a whole to enter into the spirit of the endeavour. Those who 
were in a position to actively exclude the possibility of corruption and consequent 
arbitrairness - via legislative endeavour or Parliamentary self-regulation - were not minded to 
do so. 
 
9.7.2 Nolan 
 
In October 1994 the Prime Minister, John Major, announced the setting up of the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life (headed by a Law Lord of the day, Lord Nolan, and so known as 
the Nolan Committee), with a remit of examining “current concerns about standards of 
conduct of all holders of public office.”133 The background to this included allegations made 
against Conservative MPs by Mohamed Al-Fayed and the ‘cash for questions’ affair 
regarding the willingness of (different) MPs to table Parliamentary questions for payment.
134
 
Alongside this, the Select Committee of Members’ Interests had produced a series of reports 
in the early 1990s in response to cases which had demonstrated a widespread “ignorance of 
or indifference to the spirit as well as the letter of the rules relating to financial interests,
135
 
making a mockery of any attempt to regulate in this area which was predicated upon the food 
faith of those being regulated. 
 
The First Report of the Nolan Committee
136
 identified seven ‘principles of public life’ (the 
‘Nolan principles’): selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and 
leadership. The Committee noted that at that time the 1947 resolution, enacted in response to 
the Brown affair, remained the principal rule on the topic and yet contained “within itself the 
seeds of the current problem.”137 Nothing in it acted to prohibit parliamentary consultancies, 
where an MP, for pay, put him or herself under an obligation to advise a client on 
Parliamentary matters. In seeking to exclude only restrictions on Members’ freedom of action 
it had left the Members the unfortunate freedom to “place themselves in situations where they 
                                                          
133
 HC Deb 25 October 1994, vol 248, col 758. 
134
 The former were Neil Hamilton and Tim Smith; the latter Graham Reddick and David Tredinnick. For an 
overview of the circumstances leading up to Nolan and its immediate aftermath, see Oliver, note 31. 
135
 Doig, note 115, at 49. 
136
 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Standards in Public Life (Volume 1: Report) (the Nolan report), (Cm 
2850-I, 1995). 
137
 Nolan, note 136, at [2.29]. 
291 
 
are liable to be improperly influenced.” 138  The clear subtext of the report was that, in 
focusing on the attempts of bodies outside parliament to improperly influence MPs, the 
authorities had overlooked the extent to which many MPs were content to be improperly 
influenced: their freedom of action not restrained by the arrangement, but with the outside 
interest nevertheless getting what it desired. The failures of a policy which relies upon 
assumptions as to when and where corruption would take place were once again laid bare. 
The solution, as should have by now been evident, was to exclude as far as possible the 
possibility of undue influence, regardless of intuitions as to its likely extent. 
 
Two changes since 1947 were identified as particular salient to the failure of the existing 
arrangements to command confidence. Firstly, where previously outside employment had 
normally meant an MP carrying on the profession in which he or she was employed before 
election, it now mostly indicated employment arising out of his or her status as an MP: it was 
work they did because they were MPs, not despite it.
139
 Secondly, the existence of the 
Register of Members' Interests had had unintended consequences - in particular, it “tended to 
create a false impression that any interest is acceptable once it is registered.”140 Transparency 
had hidden the problem in the open rather than resolving it, in keeping with the studied 
complacency of the House itself. 
 
The Committee made 11 specific recommendations relating to Members of Parliament. 
Amongst them was the recommendation that MPs not be barred from outside employment, on 
the basis that “the House of Commons would be less effective if all MPs were full-time 
professional politicians,” but that the 1947 resolution, banning any relationship restricting the 
freedom of MPs to act as they wished, should be restated.
141
  MPs should be barred from 
working for organisations which provided paid Parliamentary services for multiple clients, 
and direct employment for Parliamentary services should be disclosed and reviewed by the 
House; a Code of Conduct should be published; a Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards 
should be appointed. A ban on all forms of advocacy was rejected for the short term 
disruption it would cause and for the shortfall it would leave in the income of many MPs, 
who had “arrangements which have been made perfectly lawfully and are often of very long 
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standing.”142 This last point demonstrates a certain confusion: the very reason for Parliament 
imposing rules of its own was that the law did not - indeed, could not and should not - 
regulate these matters, and so the fact that they were lawful was wholly irrelevant to the 
question at hand. General consultancies were regarded with significantly greater suspicion, 
for the Committee could see “no justification for consultancy agreements between Members 
and public relations or lobbying firms, which are themselves acting as advisers and advocates 
for a constantly changing range of miscellaneous and often undisclosed interests.” 143  It 
recommended that such arrangements be banned, and a prohibition introduced on 
“maintaining direct or active connections with firms… which provide paid Parliamentary 
services to multiple clients.”144 On the basis of the considerations it cited, it is not at all clear 
that the Committee successfully justified its decision to distinguish between the different 
sorts of business relationships. From the perspective of the present work, the distinction is an 
illusory one, for the potential of self-interest to distort the exercise of public power is in each 
case the same. To prohibit one and rely on disclosure to mitigate the effect of the other 
demonstrates confusion as to where the harm lies in this sort of corruption.  
 
In response to the Nolan report, the 1947 resolution was restated, in an amended form which 
made clear the ban on direct paid advocacy.
145
 Where Nolan had recommended that 
disclosure of remuneration under registered contracts for parliamentary services not be 
required, the House in fact made it so.
146
 A Code of Conduct was published by the new 
Committee on Standards and Privileges, which assumed the responsibilities of the Privileges 
Committee and the Select Committee on Members’ Interests, along with guidance to the 
Code. A new post of Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards was established. The Nolan 
report therefore precipitated an improved institutional apparatus aimed at discouraging the 
sort of external influences calculated to distort the democratic process, without yet 
‘excluding’ them entirely by ensuring that any elected representative complicit in such 
distortions necessarily violates a legal or Parliamentary rule. By the terms of the account 
provided above regarding the need to ensure the non-arbitrary exercise of power by reason of 
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the unfreedom which results where it is not so excluded, it will be seen that these changes 
were insufficient. 
 
9.8 The status quo 
 
At present, the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament
147
 contains rules on the conduct 
expected of Members of Parliament and lists among the standards which Members are 
expected to maintain 'integrity', glossed as meaning that those in public office “should not 
place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or 
organisations that might influence them in the performance of their official duties.”148 In 
keeping with the trends described above, whereby generalised prohibition is resisted, the 
Code of Conduct attempts to maintain the integrity of the legislative and other Parliamentary 
process through the dual mechanisms of prohibition (of certain practices) and transparency.  
 
The relevant rules of conduct include that no member may act as a “paid advocate” during 
proceedings,
149
 and “the acceptance by a Member of a bribe to influence his or her conduct as 
a Member, including any fee, compensation or reward in connection with the promotion of, 
or opposition to, any Bill, Motion, or other matter submitted, or intended to be submitted to 
the House, or to any Committee of the House.”150 The 1947 resolution, aimed at prohibiting 
arrangements which restrict members’ freedom of action, remains in force, having been 
updated in 1995 and again in 2002. It now further provides that “no Members of the House 
shall, in consideration of any remuneration, fee, payment, or reward or benefit in kind, direct 
or indirect, which the Member or any member of his or her family has received is receiving 
or expects to receive” either (a) “Advocate or initiate any cause or matter on behalf of any 
outside body or individual,” or (b) “urge any other Member of either House of Parliament, 
including Ministers, to do so”, by “means of any speech, Question, Motion, introduction of a 
Bill or Amendment to a Motion or a Bill or any approach, whether oral or in writing, to 
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Ministers or servants of the Crown.”151 Direct paid advocacy is therefore both contempt of 
the House as well as, probably, an offense under the Bribery Act 2010.  
 
In relation to that which a conscious decision has been taken not to prohibit, transparency is 
promoted by two “distinct but overlapping and interdependent” mechanisms for the 
disclosure of personal financial interests. The first is the longstanding requirement that in any 
“debate or proceeding of the House or its Committees,” Members “shall disclose any relevant 
pecuniary interest or benefit of whatever nature, whether direct or indirect, that he may have 
had, may have or may be expecting to have.”152 The second is the Register of Members’ 
Financial Interests. Each is justified on the basis of its contribution to the same ongoing 
project of securing honesty through transparency, albeit not in those terms: the Code of 
Conduct states that the RFI’s purpose is “to give public notification on a continuous basis of 
those financial interests held by Members which might be thought to influence their 
parliamentary conduct or actions”; that of verbal declaration “to ensure that Members of the 
House and the public are made aware, at the appropriate time when a Member is making a 
speech in the House or in Committee or participating in any other proceedings of the House, 
of any past, present or expected future financial interest, direct or indirect, which might 
reasonably be thought by others to be relevant to those proceedings.”153  Inherent within the 
system, therefore, is a deeply entrenched belief as to the sufficiency of transparency. 
 
9.8.1 Enforcement 
 
The Code of Conduct is upheld by the House of Commons - like similar documents such as 
the Ministerial Code, it is not a legal document and so not enforceable by the Courts - 
through the dual authorities of the Committee on Standards and Privileges and the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. Reports by the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Standards are considered by the Standards and Privileges Committee. The Committee reports 
its conclusions to the House, which may sanction as necessary, leaving the disciplinary 
process at the mercy of the significant polarisation along party lines which normally 
dominates proceedings in the House. In the current Parliament, notable reports include that 
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into the conduct of David Laws
154
 and Denis MacShane.
155
 Most of the Committee’s work, 
however, is concerned with conduct which benefits the Member personally rather than where 
the breach has or threatens to distort the democratic process. Outside of these cases, the 
problem is not that Members accept money from third-parties, but their failure to declare an 
interest.
156
 The main exception is the report into the conduct of Sir John Butterfill, Stephen 
Byers, Patricia Hewitt, Geoff Hoon, Richard Caborn and Adam Ingram, some of whom had 
demonstrated a willingness to make introductions to Ministers in return for payment, and 
others of whom had boasted of having done so in the past.
157
 Their misdeeds, however, came 
to light only because the company offering payment (in the form of a directorship or 
consultancy work) was in fact a front for an undercover reporter working for the Sunday 
Times and the Dispatches television programme. That Members were willing to involve 
themselves suggests at least a minimal level of corruptibility that is difficult to reconcile with 
the notion that declaring interests is a suitable protection against actual corruption. Similarly, 
the fact that the potentially ‘corrupt’ act was not part of the formal duties of the Members in 
question but something which would take place out of the public eye, without leaving any 
trace on the public record, calls into question the ability of transparency to do the work asked 
of it. Here as elsewhere, however, the rules and processes by which standards are upheld 
make little room for substantive scrutiny of the interests Members have, thereby potentially 
permitting the use of financial resources to distort the exercise of public power. 
 
9.8.2 Disclosure of interests 
 
The rule as to declaration of interests is broader than the rules relating to their registration 
applying not just to present interests, but to those which existed in the (recent) past and 
expected future interests.
158
 The rule applies also to indirect interests, such as those of a 
spouse, where relevant. An interest should be declared if “it might reasonably be thought by 
others to influence the speech, representation or communication in question.”159 The duty to 
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disclose applies to the tabling of written notices (e.g., questions, motions, amendments), and 
with greater scope in relation to the work of Select Committees, where Members will 
normally be expected to stand aside from its work if they have a direct financial interest, and 
to Private Members Bills, which under Standing Order 120 require a declaration to the effect 
that that the Member has no personal interest nor, strangely, do his or her constituents have 
any local interest in the matter with which the Bill deals. Only in very limited circumstances, 
such as the asking of a supplementary question where to do so would be impracticable, is 
disclosure not mandatory.
160
  
 
9.8.3 The Register of Members’ Interests 
 
Where there is no opportunity to verbally inform the House of the interest in question, the 
general need for Members to disclose in relation to, for example, votes in divisions, is dealt 
with on an ongoing basis by the existence of the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. A 
newly elected MP is required to provide the information required by the Register within one 
month of election; changes are to be notified to the Commissioner within 4 weeks. At present, 
the Register of Members’ Financial Interests (until 2008 the Register of Members’ Interests) 
holds information on the financial interest of MPs under 11 separate headings:  (1) 
directorships; (2) remunerated employment; (3) clients; (4) sponsorships; (5) gifts; (6) 
benefits and hospitality; (7) overseas visits; (8) overseas benefits and gifts; (9) land or 
property; (10) shareholdings; and (11) controlled transactions under Schedule 7A of the 
Political Parties, Elections and Representation Act 2011.  Pursuant to a Resolution of the 
House of Commons of 27 March 2008, a separate Part 2 of the Register contains a 12
th
 
category - the names and job titles of any family members employed and remunerated 
through Parliamentary allowances.
161
 Threshold limits apply to all but the first three 
categories, below which disclosure is not required. The fourth, tenth and twelfth categories 
requires “the registration of all benefits received from the same source which amount to more 
than £1,500 in a calendar year, in increments of more than £500.”162 The fifth, sixth and 
seventh categories require declaration “of all benefits, received from the same source in the 
course of a calendar year, which cumulatively amount to more than 1 per cent of the current 
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parliamentary salary.”163 Property must be disclosed if its value is greater than the annual 
Parliamentary salary; rental income if its value is more than ten per cent of that figure. 
Shareholdings are to be disclosed only if their value is greater than the annual Parliamentary 
salary or of 15% of the issued share capital. The specificity of the RFI is to be welcomed, 
though in providing certainty it lacks the catch-all nature of the verbal disclosure requirement. 
It also lacks any method of matching up specific actions - a vote on this bill, or that 
amendment, say - with particular interests which have been declared. To cross check this 
manually is of course impossible and so unless a particular MP or issue becomes the subject 
of journalistic interest, the fact that there is a conflict of interests is not particularly likely to 
come to public attention. Most problematic, however, is the assimilation within the RFI of a 
series of qualitatively different interests - some which all or almost all Members will have 
and are unlikely to ground a meaningful distortion of the democratic process (e.g. the 
ownership of property) and others (such as directorships or remunerated employments) of 
which we should be far more vigilant.  
 
The range of activities prohibited by the House is not significantly wider than it was 50 years 
ago. Instead, there is an expanded duty to disclose external interests and a more sophisticated 
mechanism for doing so. This assumes, of course, that inclusion on the RFI is sufficient to 
bring the fact to the attention of the relevant parties and that Members will not be sufficiently 
brazen as to act in a way which promotes their personal financial interests with no concern 
for who knows it. It is not clear that the need to disclose interests disincentivises 
inappropriate conduct to the extent that we can be certain of the non-arbitrary exercise of 
public power. Disclosure will not necessarily make clear why the intervention in question 
might be thought to have been influenced. Taken literally, an interest which has influenced an 
intervention but for reasons not obvious to a hypothetical reasonable observer would not have 
to be disclosed. The neo-republican imperative against the corruption of the political process 
goes unfulfilled. 
 
9.8.4 Rules for Ministers 
 
The Ministerial Code contains additional rules for those who hold ministerial posts: they are 
required to “scrupulously avoid” any conflict of interest - real or perceived - between their 
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own financial interest and their Ministerial duties. The general principle governing such 
conflicts is that “they should either dispose of the interest giving rise to the conflict or take 
alternative steps to prevent it.”164 Specific mention is made of the requirement that decisions 
not be taken with a view to potential future employment by an outside body.
165
 Gifts to 
ministers in their ministerial capacity become property of the Government, though those of 
small value may be retained.
166
 Hospitality accepted in their ministerial capacity are to be 
notified to the department’s Permanent secretary; the department will publish details of the 
hospitality quarterly.
167
 
 
Ministers who leave office are forbidden from lobbying government for a period of two years 
afterwards. Other appointments or employment which they wish to take up within that period 
are, under the Ministerial Code, subject to the advice of the independent Advisory Committee 
on Business Appointments (ACOBA). Its rules have the stated aim of seeking to counter 
suspicion that “the decisions and statements of a serving Minister might be influenced by the 
hope or expectation of future employment with a particular firm or organisation.”168 To that 
end, the Committee applies the following test: “to what extent, if at all, has the former 
Minister been in a position which could lay him or her open to the suggestion that the 
appointment was in some way a reward for past favours?”169 Members of the Committee are 
appointed by the Prime Minister in line with the Commissioner for Public Appointments' 
Code, except for those who are nominated by the leaders of the main political parties. The 
rules themselves are determined by the Cabinet Office with the approval of the Prime 
Minister. 
 
In the period from 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011, the Committee advised 42 former 
Ministers on 95 appointments, of which 85 were eventually taken up.
170
 A higher than usual 
figure reflected the change of government in the relevant period.
171
 21 of the appointments 
were approved unconditionally; 65 with conditions attached; and 9 with a mix of conditions 
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and a waiting period attached.
172
 It is deeply unfortunate that it is only where the appointment 
is taken up that the advice is published, and the public permitted to know of the making of the 
offer of employment, and what concerns the Committee had (or may have had) with regards 
to it: this is transparency as curate’s egg, with the exception acting to undermine, quite 
significantly, the rule. The Committee’s willingness to delay publication for spurious reasons 
is also troubling and out of keeping with the purpose of the scheme.
173
 Even when publication 
is carried out, the scheme falls short of providing the information required for transparency to 
function: to take an example, the private consultancy work of Tony Blair, through his firm 
Tony Blair Associates, has been of considerable interest since he set it up. The Committee’s 
annual report in 2008-9 merely describes the firm as providing “strategic advice on both a 
commercial and pro-bono basis, on political and economic trends and governmental reform” 
and states that it saw “no reason why he should not set up the firm forthwith.”174 Though 
most of its activities have taken place well outside of the 2 year period (it was set up in 
January 2009, Blair having left office in June 2007), the success of the firm has contributed 
heavily to the process whereby Blair has accumulated massive private wealth.
175
 It goes 
without saying that Blair would not have managed this but for the position he had previously 
held. That alone does not demonstrate a corruption of the democratic process, nor does it 
mean that Blair should have been obstructed from accepting these contracts. It does, however, 
indicate the same sort of complacency that we encountered in the context of issues of bribery 
and parliamentary privilege. Despite popular opinion on this topic, those who make the rules 
seem surprisingly unconcerned the integrity of the democratic process - as though the largely 
homogenous political class could by virtue of its shared British values and common 
educational experiences be trusted to use its power for the public rather than private good, 
even as it is shown to have frequently and egregiously abused it for personal gain. 
 
The system does not apply solely to former Ministers - it also applies, with appropriate 
variations, to civil servants, diplomats, special advisors and members of the armed forces. 
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Notable in this regard was its decision by ACOBA to clear the appointment of Sir Sherard 
Cowper-Coles, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, to take up the post of international 
business development director for BAE.
176
 The intervention of Sir Sherard had previously 
been central to the decision of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office to discontinue a 
criminal investigation into BAE.
177
 The Committee was untroubled by this fact. In 
emphasised that four years had passed since Sir Sherard had had contact with BAE in his role 
as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in clearing him to take up the post, subject to the proviso that 
he must not “become personally involved in lobbying UK government ministers or crown 
servants, including special advisers, on behalf of his new employer."
178
 Speaking 
hypothetically, if this offer of employment were some sort of reward for the former 
ambassador’s intervention in the work of the Serious Fraud Office, then the affair would 
seem to demonstrate that a two year time limit is highly unlikely to catch all potential 
misdeeds in this regard: if a Minister or other individual caught within the scheme provides a 
favour of sufficient magnitude then having to wait two years for the favour to be returned is 
not a significant disincentive. Indeed, if we are discussing those in Ministerial roles, it is 
entirely possible that at the point at which that period elapses the individual in question will 
remain an MP. 
 
Similarly, the emphasis on ex-Ministers having to refrain from lobbying the government for a 
specified period misses the point that it is significantly easier for a private party to be 
provided with an advantage by a Minister who has a direct decision making power than 
indirectly, via that person’s lobbying potential when he or she is already out of office: the 
rules should be alert to the fact that a ban on lobbying may be no disincentive at all for by 
that point the damage (in the form of a decision made in contravention of standards of good 
faith, or without due regard to the public interest) may have already been done. No system 
will ever succeed in excluding any potential quid pro quo, but a more concerted attempt must 
be made. The two year waiting period is plainly insufficient. Again, this is not merely of 
high-minded interest. Political actors, ministers in particular, enjoy legal and legislative 
powers the exercise of which goes a long way to determining the horizontal freedom of 
private individuals. When the democratic process is distorted in favour of those with money 
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to insert into it, it is these anonymous masses who suffer, and not some abstract notion of 
public morality. 
 
9.9 Assessing the system 
 
The overall system for preventing the distortion of the democratic process works, then, on the 
dual basis of banning direct quid pro quos for activity by MPs through the criminal law on 
one hand, and a series of non-legal disclosure requirements on the other, to which are added 
extra, more stringent, requirements for those holding ministerial office. Even on its own 
terms (the ends of which are not clearly articulated), there is no reason to believe that this 
combination will be successful. Working on the basis of the neo-republican non-domination 
ideal, there is reason to consider them inadequate. Taking the requirements of registration at 
face value, some anomalies are evident. Most remarkable is the threshold set for the 
disclosure of shareholdings - being pegged to MPs’ salary, it stands currently at £65,739, 
unless it is greater than 15% of the total stock in the company. MPs are therefore under no 
obligation to declare on the Register any shareholding under that value, even though they are 
frequently called upon to vote on issues which can have a dramatic effect on their value. This 
is unacceptable, and cannot be justified by the difficulty of tracking the shareholdings of 
those involved.  
 
But even beyond the question of the specific thresholds at which disclosure becomes 
mandatory, the idea of registration as a solution to the problem, or guarantee, against, 
corruption of the democratic process, seems unconvincing. Firstly, we must reject 
interpretations of the scheme which see it as having the effect of either rendering legitimate 
actions which would otherwise be held illegitimate - i.e., that a conflict of interests which is 
knowable to the public is somehow ‘good’ even if, if kept hidden, it would be considered 
‘bad’ - or of ensuring that conflicts of interest will not in fact occur. Both are wrong. 
Conflicts of interest occur, and are no less harmful simply because the information is required 
to diagnose them is made public. By requiring disclosure for the sake of transparency, it is 
being suggested either that the MP in question is able to make a contribution which sees past 
the vested interest he or she has in the matter at hand or, alternatively, that those hearing the 
contribution should be in some sense ‘on guard’ as to the possibility that the contribution 
made is not entirely free of the influence of the Member’s interest. Neither of these scenarios 
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convinces: though the information is available, it is unlikely that any but the most dogged 
observer is capable of matching up votes in Parliament with relevant declared interests. 
 
This is the danger first identified by Nolan almost 20 years ago: a system of disclosure carries 
with it the danger of promoting a worldview in which nothing is improper so long as it is 
declared. It is exacerbated by a second factor: that the Register of Financial Interests makes 
no useful distinction between those interests which are of little or no significance to the 
functioning of democracy and those which threaten to subvert it, to see one set of private 
interests improperly promoted and the equilibrium of the of interests between one private 
actor and another readjusted. 
 
Similarly, the Register functions on the basis of a presumption that any benefit received as 
part of a corrupt process is both tangible and sufficiently contemporaneous for the mandated 
transparency to prevent it. This is optimistic: the banning of direct quid pro quo does not of 
course have the effect of ruling out the possibility that a non-financial benefit will be offered, 
nor that an illicit favour will be returned in kind at some future point. Similarly, we have seen 
that the approval of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments is required if former 
Ministers wish to accept employment within two years of leaving their posts. This period is 
simply too short to act as a useful deterrent to the offer of delayed reward for services 
rendered to private actors while in office. We have therefore put together an elaborate system 
for signposting and rubberstamping of potentially corrupting influences without doing 
anything significant to reduce them. One need not be as cynical about the moral status of 
Parliamentarians as is the public at large to fear that for a sufficiently shameless MP, the 
system provides no meaningful disincentive at all. 
 
We have highlighted consistently the necessity of an institutional exclusion - based upon 
clear and enforceable rules - of the corruption of the democratic process. A system to which 
transparency is so central is necessarily relying upon other factors - the good faith of those 
regulated, perhaps, or a diligent media - is necessarily secondary to one in which the things 
that good faith or media scrutiny are supposed to prevent are prohibited. An elected 
representative is left the possibility of acting out of self-interest without contravening any 
rule whatsoever. This is impermissible in a system in which, we have said, the fact that the 
public power is exercised in such a way as to track the interests of those living under it is the 
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only thing which prevents that public power from being wholly illegitimate. Where, as here, 
lawful mechanisms exist which are capable of preventing that tracking from happening, the 
public is to that extent unfree for reason of being exposed to a public power which cannot be 
designated wholly non-arbitrary. And given that these mechanisms are driven primarily by 
property, that unfreedom is suffered by those without property (who lack the ability to distort 
the exercise of public power to their own advantage) in relation to those who possess it. This 
remains true regardless of the moral status of actors within the system. 
 
9.10 Conclusion 
 
It is central to our thesis, that democracy, rather than rights, is the domain of freedom. This 
applies firstly in relation to the use made of public power: democracy must function if the 
coercive apparatus of the state is not to be utilised in an arbitrary fashion to pursue the state’s 
own interests - if the individual is to be vertically free. It also ensures, however, that public 
power is not put to work in the interest of one private actor against another on a basis that 
does not properly incorporate the interests of the latter. Democracy feeds into questions of 
private power (and so private freedom and unfreedom) in a manner which redoubles the 
importance of ensuring that it is not distorted. And yet, despite an almost never-ending series 
of developments of both the criminal law and the internal regulation of the House of 
Commons, the ability of money to influence a process already weighted in favour of those 
who own property remains intact, usually neglected in favour of a narrative of political greed 
which strengthens the hand of those who would see the state (with, of course, the exception 
of its property-protecting functions) dismantled so as to clear the way to private profit. That 
money both grounds horizontal unfreedom and potentially distorts the democratic process 
brings into focus the danger we must apprehend: that we enter into a feedback loop where the 
already wealthy, at whose mercy the have-nots live, inject their wealth into the democratic 
process in order to tilt the balance even further in their favour, and so, for example unravel 
the system of welfare protection which the masses, once integrated into the political process 
has succeeded in achieving. Such a state of affairs - essentially the opposite of the process 
whereby the masses used their new found political power to militate for legal and political 
reforms which freed them from the domination of those who had previously kept them 
excluded - is, it is submitted, already evident, and it is against this process that neo-
republicanism should resolve itself. 
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Conclusion - Republican freedom and the legal division of labour 
 
The neo-republican project has proven influential in the last decade. It has attracted a large 
number of adherents and given rise to a significant quantity of interesting scholarship, 
showing signs of an ability to take up some of the slack of communitarianism, feminism, and 
possibly even Marxism, while also entering into a productive dialect with these traditions and 
others. It has taken much of what was good in the numerous instantiations of republicanism 
and, by jettisoning that which is outdated or peripheral, introduced a momentum that has 
served it well. What it has not done, however, is interrogate fully the logic of horizontal 
domination. The present work has taken such domination as its focus. Starting from the 
premise that not only is the freedom as non-domination ideal a compelling one, but that the 
insistence upon horizontal and vertical freedom as deserving of equal concern sets neo-
republicanism apart from the commonplace assumptions about the relationship between 
individuals and their relationships, jointly and individually, with the state, certain conclusions 
have been drawn. Rather than rehash these individually, it serves only to note that, 
cumulatively, they become a claim about the pervasiveness of unfreedom and freedom - in 
life and in law alike. Firstly, the ways in which people find themselves unfree are far more 
widespread than a crude interference analysis would suggest. Unfreedom exists wherever our 
fellow citizens or our governing authorities enjoy the ability to interfere arbitrarily with our 
interests. Secondly, the relationship between law and the absence of freedom comes to be 
seen as of considerably broader spread than the political orthodoxy would suggest. Freedom 
should not be seen as the default state of affairs, disrupted only in exceptional cases and 
requiring exceptional legal mechanisms for its vindication; instead, the law which threatens 
freedom is as likely to be that which places conditions upon the exercise of the right to strike 
or the conditions under which one can achieve a divorce and the financial settlement which 
will result from it. Indeed, such legal unfreedom is all the more pernicious for fading into the 
background and taking on the appearance of an apolitical artefact of the ‘natural’ distribution 
of legal entitlements in society.  
 
Horizontal domination is a function of the coercive options open to each individual - the 
actions he or she can take or not take expecting to receive the backing of, or avoid the 
sanctions associated with, the apparatus of the state. These options are determined by the law:  
the ordinary private law of rights and obligations which are applied against a background 
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distribution of property which is in turn an artefact of law. Such rules do not arise in a 
vacuum, but are a function of a given constitutional order; the second-order rules by which 
the first-order rules are made. The republican constitution must be designed with this end in 
mind. Our considerations of rights and democracy, like those of horizonal unfreedom in 
spousal or employment contexts, exemplify modes of analysis that can be applied far more 
broadly. 
 
The argument of this thesis speaks therefore to two key points. Firstly, to the attitude we take 
towards the state. It is a commonplace of constitutional law and theory that one’s views are 
inextricably linked to the question of what one takes to be the appropriate role of the state. 
We can take this one logical step backwards and connect this to the question of why there is a 
state at all. Liberal thought traditionally identified it with the protection of property first and 
foremost; more modern liberalism with the protection of the ’right’ which is opposed to the 
‘good’. The present work has argued that the raison d’etre of the state is to exclude the 
horizontal domination which would exist in its absence, a purpose which must be borne mind 
at every stage. What matters is that where there is an organised public power, there must be 
rules which determine how and where that power will be exercised. In relation to material 
goods, that body of rules we call the law of property. Once private property is recognised, the 
game is changed. No longer can one meet one’s human needs without either working for 
another or infringing the law and coming up against the coercive apparatus through which 
property is protected. The stage is set for those who have to dominate those who do not. 
Much of what we have suggested the republican state need do to spread horizontal freedom 
follows directly from the recognition of private property. With it, the die is cast. 
 
Secondly, this thesis works to undermine the intellectual division of labour which exists 
within legal scholarship, justified upon the basis of the supposedly separate nature of the 
legal, the political and the constitutional. The points of contrast are multiple and telling. The 
dignity of the legal and the constitutional distinguishes that side of the triangle from the 
messy nature of the political. The strictly legal is mostly insulated against politics, which 
nevertheless permeate the constitution. The constitution has little to say about how men relate 
to each other, regulating instead their dealings with the state. And yet the argument put 
forward here tramples over these distinctions. It demonstrates that the ends of these different 
facets are interlinked and all are equally implicated in the pursuit of a freedom that is both 
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human and political. To attempt to restrict the pursuit of life's great ends to one or the other of 
these boxes is to do them a great disservice. They cannot, and will not, be achieved while this 
division of labour is blindly accepted as a starting point, so well coded into the discourse that 
to even see the links which exist between them requires one to step outside one’s own box.. 
This thesis, if nothing else, exemplifies a perspective which is appreciative of their equal 
importance. 
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